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 The Kennedy administration’s civil rights record requires revision. Scholars have 
developed a negative interpretation of that record by focusing on the most dramatic crises 
and a handful of poor judicial appointees. The dominant narrative, therefore, concludes 
that the administration reacted to civil rights crises, hesitated on advancing racial equality 
to protect the president’s domestic agenda from attack by southern legislators, and 
appointed racist federal judges. Those crises and judges do not fully represent the 
administration’s performance on civil rights. All matters for racial equality from that 
period and all of President Kennedy’s judicial appointees need to be examined to develop 
a comprehensive assessment of the administration’s record.  
“A Matter of National Concern” analyzes the Kennedy administration’s civil 
rights record through a case study of Prince Edward County, Virginia. This study 
synthesizes unpublished and, in some cases, previously unexamined manuscript 
collections, government documents, newspapers, periodicals, secondary sources, and oral 
histories. The historical record of the Kennedy administration’s performance in Prince 
Edward County counters the dominant narrative of President Kennedy’s civil rights 
record. In fact, the administration took proactive measures to arrest that county’s school 
crisis, risked its legislative program against southern legislators by standing up for black 
Prince Edwardians, and appointed moderate-to-progressive judges to the U.S. Fourth 
Circuit who broke down the county’s resistance to school desegregation. “A Matter of 
 
 
National Concern” calls for Prince Edward County, and other civil rights cases, to be 
included in the Kennedy administration’s civil rights record. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: A NEW FRONTIER 
 
 
 The Kennedy administration’s civil rights record requires revision. The prevailing 
interpretation determines that the administration reacted to civil rights crises, wavered on 
racial issues to safeguard its domestic agenda against attacks from southern legislators, 
and appointed racist judges to the federal bench. Scholars have drawn these 
interpretations by focusing on the most dramatic crises of that time and a handful of poor 
judicial appointees. Those crises and judges do not fully represent the administration’s 
civil rights record, nor should they obscure hundreds, if not thousands of unchronicled 
local struggles for racial equality. The untold stories represent the new frontier of 
Kennedy scholarship. It requires that all civil rights struggles and judicial appointees be 
examined. Only then can scholars develop a comprehensive assessment of the Kennedy 
administration’s civil rights record. That record must include Prince Edward County, 
Virginia.
1
 
                                                          
1
 Brian E. Lee, “A New Frontier: Reevaluating JFK’s Civil Rights Record Through a Case Study of 
Prince Edward County, Virginia,” Federal History, No. 7 (2015): 53-66. 
 
2 
John F. Kennedy “literally shook his head with incredulity” when he learned that 
Prince Edward County abandoned public education.
1
 The county school board, a litigant 
in the landmark Brown v. Board of Education case, had been under court order to 
desegregate its public schools “with all deliberate speed.” After years of legal challenges, 
a federal appeals court ordered the school board to begin desegregating its schools by 
September 1959. In defiance of that order, the county board of supervisors refused to levy 
taxes to operate schools, marking Prince Edward County as the only locale in the nation 
without free public education. Segregationist leaders improvised a private school system 
for the fourteen hundred white children. However, the county provided no educational 
program for the seventeen hundred black children, forcing hundreds to leave home, and 
many the state, to live with family, friends, or strangers to obtain a “bootleg” education. 
Hundreds more remained in the county without formal schooling for four years.
2
 The 
Kennedy administration inherited the Prince Edward County school situation, a crisis that 
threatened to intellectually and economically cripple a generation and, if replicated, 
destabilize the American institution of public education. 
                                                          
1
 Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 480. Ted Sorensen, special 
counsel to the president, did not specify when Kennedy learned that Prince Edward County abandoned 
public education. It is unclear, therefore, if Sorensen witnessed Kennedy’s reaction before or after he 
became president. In their memoir, Ken O’Donnell and Dave Powers remembered that Kennedy “devoured 
every newspaper and newsmagazine that he could get his hands on.” Conceivably, Kennedy followed the 
media’s coverage of the Prince Edward matter. See Kenneth P. O’Donnell and David F. Powers, “Johnny, 
We Hardly Knew Ye”: Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), 
408. 
2
 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Allen v. County Board of 
Prince Edward County, 266 F.2d 507 (4
th
 Cir. 1959); “Private Schools Seen Answer to Court’s Integration 
Order: Educational Corp. Affirms Plans for Private Schools,” FH, May 8, 1959, 1; Minutes, Prince Edward 
County Board of Supervisors, June 1959, PECBOSR; Robert L. Green and Louis Hofmann, “Progress 
Report,” June 30, 1963, Box 100, RG 12. 
 
3 
 Historians have overlooked the Kennedy administration’s efforts in Prince 
Edward County. The school crisis has appeared in scholarship on civil rights and Virginia 
history. In those works, the administration’s role may receive a fleeting passage, if any 
mention at all. Likewise, the Kennedys have been the subject of countless monographs 
but biographers have only permitted the school closings a brief mention, if any coverage 
at all. The absence of violence and spectacle may explain the lack of scholarly interest. 
The civil rights stories that drive the dominant narrative provide a contrast. White 
supremacists firebombed a Greyhound bus carrying Freedom Riders outside Anniston, 
Alabama. In Prince Edward County, the school buses stood idly in a parking lot. 
President Kennedy sent troops to restore order at the University of Mississippi. No troops 
were required in Prince Edward County. Birmingham furnished iconic images and 
television footage. The school closings bequeathed posterity lifeless stills and stock 
footage of vacant buildings, nothing worthy apparently for inclusion in the iconic civil 
rights documentary Eyes on the Prize. The Prince Edward school litigation offered no 
racial vitriol from the federal bench, just hearing after hearing without a resolution. The 
slender amount of published scholarship on Prince Edward County and the even thinner 
coverage of the Kennedy administration’s involvement fail to match the magnitude of the 
episode’s significance. 
 Robert C. Smith laid the foundation for scholarship on the Prince Edward County 
school closings. Smith, a journalist for the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, interviewed the major 
players as events unfolded. Those interviews represent his book’s greatest contribution to 
 
4 
the historical record. They Closed Their Schools: Prince Edward County, Virginia, 1951-
1964 (1965) provided a solid first draft of the school struggle, but not the final word. 
Smith’s work was constrained by the unavailability of sources. In the half-century since 
its publication, manuscript collections and government records have been opened to 
scholars, revealing a wealth of evidence that was inaccessible in the 1960s. In the recent 
decades, doctoral students have built upon Smith’s work by exploring those untapped 
sources, conducting oral history interviews, and writing pioneering dissertations. Kara 
Miles Turner broadened our understanding of the school closings by examining the long 
civil rights movement in Prince Edward County from Reconstruction through the 
twentieth century. Amy Tillerson focused her dissertation on the role of black women 
activists there from the Great Depression through the school closings. In addition, they 
both contributed article-length publications that further demonstrated the need to update 
They Closed Their Schools.
3
 
 Jill Ogline Titus and Chris Bonastia produced new monographs on the school 
closings. In Brown’s Battleground: Students, Segregationists, and the Struggle for Justice 
                                                          
3
 Robert C. Smith, They Closed Their Schools: Prince Edward County, Virginia, 1951-1964 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965); Kara Miles Turner, “‘It is Not at Present a Very Successful 
School’: Prince Edward County and the Black Educational Struggle, 1865-1995” (Ph.D. diss., Duke 
University, 2001); Amy J. Tillerson, “Negotiating Intersections of Gender, Social Class, and Race: Black 
Women in Prince Edward County, Virginia, Activists, and Community Builders, 1930-1965” (Ph.D. diss., 
Morgan State University, 2006); Kara Miles Turner, “Both Victors and Victims: Prince Edward County, 
Virginia, the NAACP, and Brown,” Virginia Law Review, 90, No. 6 (October 2004): 1667-1691; Kara 
Miles Turner, “Liberating Lifescripts: Prince Edward County, Virginia, and the Roots of Brown v. Board of 
Education,” in In From the Grassroots to the Supreme Court: Brown v. Board of Education and American 
Democracy, edited by Peter F. Lau (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 88-104; Amy Tillerson-
Brown, “‘Grassroots Schools’ and Training Centers in the Prospect District of Prince Edward County, 
Virginia, 1959-1964,” in The Educational Lockout of African Americans in Prince Edward County, 
Virginia (1959-1964), Personal Accounts and Reflections, edited by Terence Hicks and Abul Pitre 
(Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2010), 1-17. 
 
5 
in Prince Edward County, Virginia (2011), a revision of her dissertation, Titus utilized 
unpublished archival documents, with an emphasis on detailed memoranda of civil rights 
workers, to reconstruct the period of the school closings. Bonastia, a sociology professor 
at Lehman College, used an even wider breadth of sources in Southern Stalemate: Five 
Years without Public Education in Prince Edward County, Virginia (2012) to determine 
why Prince Edward County closed its public schools. Brown’s Battleground and 
Southern Stalemate both updated They Closed Their Schools by incorporating new 
evidence and extending the story to the present.
4
   
 Titus and Bonastia both provided chapter-length assessments of the Kennedy 
administration’s response to the school closings. Their interpretations conform neatly 
with the dominant narrative of the administration’s civil rights record. Titus argues that 
the Department of Justice was so consumed with reacting to other civil rights crises that it 
could not adequately address Prince Edward County. In fact, Titus contends that Attorney 
General Robert F. Kennedy did not recognize the “gravity of the situation” until March 
1963. Bonastia acknowledges the administration’s concern for the locked-out children, 
but determined that it was “tempered by its reluctance to antagonize powerful Southern 
                                                          
4
 Jill Ogline Titus, Brown’s Battleground: Students, Segregationists, and the Struggle for Justice in 
Prince Edward County, Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Jill L. Ogline, “A 
Mission to a Mad County: Black Determination, White Resistance and Educational Crisis in Prince Edward 
County, Virginia” (Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 2007); Christopher Bonastia, 
Southern Stalemate: Five Years without Public Education in Prince Edward County, Virginia (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
 
6 
politicians.”
5
 This study, the first full-length study of the Kennedy administration’s 
performance in Prince Edward County, questions those assertions.  
 “A Matter of National Concern” argues that the Kennedy administration’s 
response to the school closings counters the dominant narrative. First, the administration 
took proactive measures to restore universal education to Prince Edward County. 
Kennedy’s Department of Justice worked to enter the litigation at the earliest possible 
date, at every level of the federal judiciary. The glacial pace of litigation delayed justice 
for black Prince Edwardians. As a fifth year of closed schools loomed, the administration 
spearheaded an extraordinary effort to mitigate the educational deprivation: the 
establishment of a temporary private school system available to all school-age county 
residents. Second, the administration confronted powerful southern congressmen by 
defending the locked-out children. The county’s segregationists represented the core 
constituency of the dominant political faction in Virginia. That faction, the Byrd 
Organization, had the influence in Congress to undermine President Kennedy’s 
legislative agenda – and they did just that in the name of federal interference in Prince 
Edward County. Finally, Kennedy’s judicial appointees took progressive action in the 
Prince Edward litigation. In fact, those judges broke down the last vestiges of Virginia’s 
“massive resistance” to school desegregation and delivered a mortal wound to the Byrd 
Organization. From the beginning, the Kennedy administration considered the school 
                                                          
5
 Titus, Brown’s Battleground, 133-159; Bonastia, Southern Stalemate, 17, 133-160. 
 
7 
closings, as Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall stated, “a matter of national 
concern.”
6
 
                                                          
6
 Burke Marshall to Milton A. Reid, May 5, 1961, Reel 105, RG 60. 
 
8 
CHAPTER II 
 
PROLOGUE – A DARK SPOT IN THE FREE WORLD: 
ROBERT F. KENNEDY’S VISIT TO PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 
MAY 11, 1964 
 
 
 In the six months after the assassination, Arlington National Cemetery 
experienced a staggering increase in visitors. Three thousand callers per hour thronged 
the trail to John F. Kennedy’s gravesite, a six hundred square foot plot framed by a short 
picket fence. Mourners paused to pay their respects. They sang and prayed, left flowers 
and trinkets, and gazed at the orange flame flickering in the wind atop the mound of 
evergreens. Meditations on what might have been were etched across their faces. “In the 
world of their dreams,” presumed James Reston of the New York Times, “Presidents 
would be young and heroic with beautiful wives, and the ugly world would be 
transformed by their examples.” Kennedy changed the image of the presidency, but more 
importantly he imbued a spirit of morality, energy, and idealism. He encouraged the 
American people to embrace equality, inspired a nation to reach for the heavens, and 
exhorted a dangerous world to pursue peace. Lyndon Johnson inherited the presidency  
 
 
9 
but not the Kennedy promise. That had been shattered in Dallas. Only Robert F. Kennedy  
could collect the shards and carry out his brother’s legacy, but he too was shattered.
1
 
 Robert Kennedy suffered through a long period of depression. He not only lost his 
brother but the man to whom he devoted much of his life. Kennedy had managed his 
brother’s political campaigns with single-minded focus and served as attorney general 
doggedly committed to the president’s interests. “His whole life was wrapped up in the 
President,” explained Ethel Kennedy, the attorney general’s wife. “Bobby never thought 
about himself – or his own life. So when the President died – well, it was like part of 
Bobby died, too.” Kennedy’s grief ran soul deep. “There was a void in his life, a wound 
that never healed,” remembered a friend. “Anyone who looked into his eyes knew the 
suffering he endured.” The emotional crucible had also taken a physical toll. Kennedy’s 
athletic frame became gaunt, the unruly shock of light-brown hair grayed, and lines of 
grief framed his piercing blue eyes. The restless energy that distinguished him had 
subsided, as shock forced him to live on nerve. Kennedy could not escape the sorrow, as 
each day marked an anniversary or the dedication of a landmark in the late president’s 
honor. The anguish was public, as was the speculation to “what will R.F.K. do next?”
2
 
                                                          
1
 Robert M. Poole, On Hallowed Ground: The Story of Arlington National Cemetery (New York: 
Walker & Company, 2009), 209-229; Loudon Wainwright, “A Visit to the Grave,” Life, February 14, 1964, 
15; James Reston, “What Was Killed Was Not Only the President But the Promise,” NYT, November 15, 
1964, SM24; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1978), 612-614. 
2
 James W. Hilty, Robert Kennedy: Brother Protector (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 
486; High Sidey, “Journey Out of Grief: R.F.K.’s Mission to Asia,” Life, January 31, 1964, 32-33; William 
vanden Heuvel and Milton Gwirtzman, On His Own: Robert F. Kennedy, 1964-1968 (New York: 
Doubleday, 1970), 15-16, 25; “Robert F. Kennedy,” Forbes, March 15, 1964, 12; Peter Maas, “What Will 
R.F.K. Do Next?” Saturday Evening Post, March 28, 1964, 17-21; Peter Lisagor, “Portrait of a Man 
Emerging From Shadows,” NYT, July 19, 1964, SM15. 
 
10 
 The future was uncertain for Robert Kennedy. His purpose, his identity, had 
forever changed. “Bob Kennedy was no longer Bobby Kennedy, as his family and the 
nation knew him,” wrote journalist Hugh Sidey. “He was no longer the kid brother, or the 
President’s closest adviser, or the second most powerful man in the U.S….Though Bob 
Kennedy may someday again be one of the two most powerful men in the nation, the 
harsh fact is that the power has passed.” Running parallel to the grief was his loss of 
power. For one thousand days Kennedy had unrivaled access to the White House, with 
such influence that pundits speculated that he made presidential decisions. He had no 
such sway with Lyndon Johnson. They continued a tormented relationship, one of 
“mutual contempt,” that consigned Kennedy’s influence to the traditional level of a 
cabinet officer. Kennedy’s days as attorney general were numbered, but he admitted that 
“I really don’t know what I’m going to do.” He ruled out a move to the private sector: 
“I’m not interested in making money or practicing law.” Kennedy wanted to remain in 
public life, but as biographer Jeff Shesol asked, “Was there an office large enough to 
contain his capacities, his ambitions, and his brother’s legacy?”
3
  
 Robert Kennedy accepted the responsibility of being the custodian to his brother’s 
legacy. First, he had to ensure that the Kennedy promise was fulfilled. That required 
preserving the late president’s base of political support. “It’s damn important,” asserted 
Kennedy, “that the Kennedy wing…continue to be a very important force in the 
                                                          
3
 Sidey, “Journey Out of Grief,” 32-33; vanden Heuvel and Gwirtzman, On His Own, 3; Kenneth P. 
O’Donnell and David P. Powers, “Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye”: Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy 
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[Democratic] party.” He recognized the power and significance associated with being its 
standard-bearer. “I’d like to harness all the energy and effort and incentive and 
imagination that was attracted to government by President Kennedy,” the attorney 
general told Newsweek. “I don’t want any of that to die. It’s important that the striving for 
excellence continue, that there be an end to mediocrity. The torch really has passed to a 
new generation. People are still looking for all that idealism. It permeated young people 
all over the globe. And I became sort of a symbol, not just as an individual.” That was not 
demagoguery, but the recognition of the responsibility suddenly thrust upon him. To 
many he was the heir apparent, the president of a government in exile. Second, President 
Kennedy’s memory must continue to burn bright. Kennedy led the campaign to preserve 
the administration’s records and artifacts in a presidential library. He wanted the John F. 
Kennedy Memorial Library to be “something extra, something special.” A $10 million 
fundraising drive was underway to construct a “living center of teaching, research, and 
study” for scholars around the world. Robert Kennedy represented the administration’s 
accomplishments, its unfinished work, hope for the future, the Kennedy legacy – all of 
which had particular significance on an unforgettable day in Prince Edward County, 
Virginia.
4
 
 On May 11, 1964, Robert and Ethel Kennedy visited the Prince Edward Free 
Schools. The Kennedy administration had facilitated the creation of a temporary private 
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school, available tuition free to all school-age county residents, both black and white, 
until the U.S. Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of the school closings. In 
appreciation, the Free School students had collected 9,964 pennies for the John F. 
Kennedy Memorial Library Fund. They surpassed their fundraising goal of $47, a dollar 
for every year of the late president’s life. The attorney general was scheduled to inspect 
the Free Schools, accept the penny donations, and deliver some remarks.
5
 Kennedy, 
however, could not yet deliver news from Washington of utmost concern to black Prince 
Edwardians: passage of the civil rights bill and a court order to reopen the public schools. 
Definitive action in Congress and the High Court promised to fundamentally alter the 
county and Virginia as a whole. The Kennedy administration had already initiated 
reforms that, coinciding with a demographic realignment, would transform Virginia. In 
the meantime, the Kennedys’ helicopter flight cut across Harry Byrd’s Virginia.  
 
I 
 
 Social and economic forces triggered a political upheaval in the Old Dominion. 
The 1960 census reported that, for the first time, urbanites outnumbered rural Virginians. 
The declining economic opportunity in the agricultural and mountainous regions had 
fueled a migration to the industrial centers. “Slowly but steadily,” read a 1962 economic 
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analysis, “[Virginia] is moving forward in the direction of an urbanized, diversified 
industrial economy.” The population redistribution highlighted the historical 
malapportionment that favored Virginia’s rural areas – the core constituency of the state’s 
dominant political faction. The Byrd Organization had espoused traditional southern 
values: small government conservatism, tight-fisted fiscal policy, and white supremacy, 
even as population dynamics evolved, constituency needs grew, and society advanced. 
The Organization failed to adapt to the changing political environment and, in short time, 
met its demise. In the interim, the Organization clung jealously to a bygone era and still 
took its cues from Harry Byrd, who had dominated Virginia politics for four decades.
6
 
Harry Byrd had systematically consolidated the state government under his 
domination. In the 1920s, State Senator Byrd outmaneuvered his political rivals to take 
command of a flagging faction of the state Democratic Party. He soon restored that 
political machine to preeminence and lifted his own star by successfully leading the 
opposition to the Highway Bond Referendum. Virginian voters rejected financing much- 
needed road construction through bonds in favor of Byrd’s “pay-as-you-go” fiscal 
philosophy. That campaign thrust Byrd into the governor’s mansion (1926-1930). 
Governor Byrd implemented a program of fiscal responsibility. He reduced the state 
bureaucracy, cut taxes, and after inheriting a budget deficit, left office with $4 million of 
unappropriated funds in the state treasury. Byrd also pushed through government reforms 
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that centralized executive power, most notably by reducing the number of elected state 
officials from eight to three (governor, lieutenant governor, and attorney general). This 
reorganization took power from the people and gave it to the governor (Virginia 
governors could not succeed themselves). In the long run, it increased the influence of 
Harry Byrd, who as the undisputed leader of the rebranded Byrd Organization, anointed 
gubernatorial candidates for years to come.
7
  
The Byrd Organization controlled the levers of state government. United States 
Senator Harry Byrd managed the Organization from his perch on Capitol Hill. He and his 
chief lieutenants guided state policy, mapped political strategy, and endorsed candidates 
for elective office who reflected inter-Organization polling. The candidates conformed to 
Organization orthodoxy, thus providing the electorate with little choice at the ballot box. 
The weak political opposition from Republicans and anti-Organization Democrats made 
state elections a foregone conclusion and provided little incentive for Virginians to 
exercise their franchise. Voter suppression further entrenched Organization power. The 
poll tax kept untold poor whites and African Americans from the polls. Apathy and 
suppression resulted in low voter turnout. “By contrast,” wrote political scientist V.O. 
Key, “Mississippi is a hotbed of democracy.” The Organization, therefore, maintained its 
dominance through a small, predictable electorate.
8
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The Byrd Organization further consolidated its power. The governors 
(Organization men) appointed a three-man State Compensation Board to determine the 
salaries of local officials who performed state duties (e.g. commonwealth’s attorney and 
county treasurer). Certainly, the power of the purse discouraged deviation from 
Organization principles. Second, the Virginia General Assembly, which the Organization 
controlled, appointed like-minded state circuit court judges for eight-year terms – even in 
Republican-dominated areas. The judges had patronage power of their own. They 
appointed county judges and the Electoral, Reassessors, Welfare, and School Trustee 
Electoral boards. Joel West Flood (Harry Byrd’s uncle), for example, presided over the 
Fifth Circuit from 1940 to 1964. He appointed Prince Edward County’s three-man School 
Trustee Electoral Board, who in turn named the six-man public school board. Paul Tulane 
Atkinson, a trustee from 1926 to 1963, certainly had a conflict of interest; he also served 
on the board of the local segregated private schools. Through this patronage system, 
Byrd’s influence clearly permeated down into the county courthouses, and loyalty 
returned up the ranks, making Byrd’s word “law in Virginia.”
9
  
Still, Virginia was not monolithic. Professor Robbins Gates determined that there 
were different “Virginias,” classifying the counties based on black population figures, 
because southern politics revolved around the position of African Americans. The black 
population density correlated with a region’s resistance to the calls for racial equality. 
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The “white belt” and “middle ground” counties had a low concentration of African 
Americans (10 percent or less and 10-40 percent, respectively). The mountains and 
valleys had relatively little history of slavery and less connection to old plantation 
Virginia. The growth of industry and the federal bureaucracy shifted the population 
dynamics of northern Virginia. The Washington suburban population had exploded in the 
1940s and 1950s with non-Virginia residents, many of whom had no southern ties or 
interest in resisting racial integration. Despite the tremendous population growth in those 
regions, state politics was dominated by the region most closely associated with 
Virginia’s agrarian past.
10
 
 The “black belt” counties were disproportionately represented in state 
government. Southside Virginia and the Tidewater, thirty-one contiguous counties 
stretching from the mountains to the Atlantic and from the James River to North 
Carolina, had a black population that exceeded 40 percent. The region’s white 
supremacists depended on the Byrd Organization to preserve the traditional racial 
hierarchy. The state’s voter suppression laws ensured that whites controlled the elections. 
The poll tax had effectively eliminated black political power, thus permitting whites to 
elect Organization men to local, state, and national office. In fact, malapportionment gave 
the black belt’s white supremacists even greater influence over the conduct of state 
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affairs. Rural Southside Virginia used its lop-sided representation to impose statewide 
massive resistance to school desegregation. Prince Edward County led the resistance.
11
 
 
II 
 
 Prince Edward County stands in the “heart of Virginia.” The beautiful countryside 
imbued a spirit of serenity. The gentle rolling hills of lush pasture and virgin woodlands 
stretched for 357-square miles from the Appomattox River in the north to the lesser 
defined county lines in the other cardinal directions. The muddy backroads meandered 
through dark fired-cured and light flue-cured tobacco, corn, wheat, and alfalfa fields; 
dairy, poultry, cattle, and hog farms; and apple and peach orchards. The rural landscape 
presented a reminder of traditional agrarian Virginia. The bucolic imagery, however, 
belied the poverty and racial tension that underscored the human conditions in Prince 
Edward County.
12
 
 The county population reflected a statewide trend of rural outmigration. In 1960, 
census workers counted 14,121 county residents, the lowest figure since Reconstruction 
and an 8.3 percent decrease from 1950. All five rural magisterial districts experienced a 
population decline – Lockett (-6.6 percent), Hampden (-7.7 percent), Prospect (-12.4 
percent), Buffalo (-25.7 percent), and Leigh (-28.8 percent). The Farmville District, 
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which housed the county seat, had a nominal 0.5 percent increase. The school closings 
further fueled the outmigration. The majority of professional African Americans, namely 
the teachers, left the county when the schools closed. More broadly, many black Prince 
Edwardians moved to adjacent counties and “up North” (most notably New York and 
Philadelphia) so their children could receive an education. The outmigration contributed 
to the graying of the county. The school-age population fell from 3,985 in 1945 to 3,028 
in 1961. The black Prince Edwardians that remained were politically powerless against 
an “ingrown” white population tied to an agrarian past.
13
  
 The county’s economic system preserved the racial hierarchy. The average black 
family earned less than half that of white families – $1,848 to $4,070. Only a small 
number of African Americans (6.2 percent) held white-collar jobs, as compared to 45.5 
percent of whites. One in five blacks worked on the farm, while about three-quarters held 
blue-collar jobs, such as craftsmen, operators, laborers, and domestics. “The only jobs 
Negroes can hold in this town are janitors and maids at the colleges, or as laborers on the 
railroads and in the warehouses, or as unskilled workers in a couple of factories,” the 
Reverend L. Francis Griffin, a local black leader, told the New Republic in 1955. “A high 
school graduate must leave the county to get a suitable job.” Black high school graduates, 
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however, were a rare commodity in Prince Edward County. In 1960, only about 12 
percent of black residents over the age of twenty-five had completed high school. The 
vast majority (68.1 percent) had only attended elementary school.
14
 The economic 
conditions all but ensured the perpetuity of black poverty.  
 County residents also experienced a low standard of living. Poverty did not 
discriminate in Prince Edward County. “Farmville indeed had a school problem,” noted 
one observer, “but it also had a serious housing problem.” Farmville, the county seat, had 
white sections with pillared homes, as well as modern, middle-class homes on quiet 
streets. On the other hand, blacks lived in poor sections, like “catfish row” along the 
railroad tracks. Out in the country, the poor housing could be described more as “shacks” 
than houses. Those structures were weather beaten with paint chipping off the exterior 
walls. Some homes were without indoor plumbing or electricity. The lack of air 
conditioning offered little respite from the semitropical heat. Poverty limited 
communication. Antennas picked up signals from television stations in Richmond, 
Lynchburg, and Roanoke, but that provided little stimulation and information for those 
without television sets. Listeners could tune into the AM radio stations, like WFLO of 
Farmville, but no FM service was available. The Richmond and Lynchburg newspapers 
reported state and national news, but the only local paper, The Farmville Herald, was 
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owned by the county’s leading segregationist and it presented a skewed depiction of local 
events. For the poor, Prince Edward County was an isolated world.
15
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Figure 2.1 Map of Prince Edward County, Virginia. (Source: Area Redevelopment 
Department of Virginia Electric and Power Company). 
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An array of transportation systems broke the rural isolation. Three U.S. highways 
(15, 360, and 460) connected the county to Lynchburg, Roanoke, and Danville to the 
west, Petersburg and Richmond to the east, and northern Virginia and Durham, North 
Carolina. Greyhound had a station in Farmville, which offered once-a-day bus service. 
The Norfolk and Western Railroad provided passenger service from Norfolk to 
Cincinnati. Finally, Farmville had a small airport – essentially a pasture with a small 
building – with no regularly scheduled commercial flights.
16
  
 
III 
 
 At 9:37 a.m., the Kennedys touched down at Farmville Airport. A contingent of 
local officials, led by Mayor Herbert Stokes and Commonwealth’s Attorney Billy 
Watkins, cordially received the Kennedys. Kennedy and Watkins had been classmates at 
the University of Virginia’s School of Law. Kennedy commended Watkins on his 
professional success: “Billy, you’ve done real well.” To their mutual amusement Watkins 
riposted, “Mr. Attorney General, you’ve done a lot better.” Following the official 
welcome, Kennedy shook hands and chatted with an affable gathering of local citizens. 
Despite the warm reception, Kennedy appeared tense and ill at ease, characteristic of his 
chronic shyness in the presence of strangers, though, there was reason for apprehension. 
The local segregationists considered the attorney general an anathema, a symbol of 
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federal intrusion into their affairs. Under his direction, the Department of Justice had 
challenged the constitutionality of their school program, and he had used his national 
platform to denounce the county as “a blight on Virginia,” “a disgrace to our educational 
system and to our country,” and “a dark spot in the free world.”
17
  
 Bobby Kennedy boarded a convertible to tour the “citadel of opposition to his 
views on integration.” Considering the tragedy in Dallas, the mode of transportation was 
a risk. The town, though, had a reputation for calm race relations, at least in terms of 
physical violence. The school closings had resulted in a different form of violence – 
educational, social, and economic – and further diminished race relations. However, the 
town’s racial discord reached beyond the schools into all aspects of community life. 
Whites barred blacks from the country club, movie theater, public library, and lunch 
counters and observed the tradition of segregation in other settings, such as the drive-in 
theater, public restrooms, and the hospital.
18
 Kennedy’s motorcade, in essence, journeyed 
through an open air museum to Jim Crow society. 
 The motorcade passed Southside Community Hospital on its way to town. The 
private, non-profit facility acted as the center of the Southside Health District, which 
served nine counties including 40,000 African Americans. Although the district was 
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racially balanced, only one-sixth of the beds were reserved for blacks. Dr. A.G. Rawlins, 
the county’s only black physician, could not practice at the hospital because the board, 
fearing racial amalgamation, prohibited African Americans from treating patients or 
joining the staff. “When you’ve got all those white nurses, you’ve got a problem,” 
reasoned a board member. “It’s hard enough to keep nurses at these hospitals as it is.” 
Consequently, many black patients endured the ignominy of a segregated waiting room 
only to receive care from unfamiliar doctors. Some African Americans, therefore, 
traveled sixty miles east to Richmond or thirty miles west to Lynchburg to receive 
treatment.
19
 
 The Longwood Ladies administered the remedy for Kennedy’s tension. The 
motorcade had followed the gentle roll of Oak Street to the intersection of Ely and High 
streets – the northwest corner of Longwood College, a state teachers’ college for women. 
Hundreds of shrieking Ladies swarmed onto High Street, forcing the motorcade to a halt. 
Kennedy left the car to greet the crowd, who found him charming and attractive, “much 
better looking in person than on TV.” He flattered his listeners with praise for their 
college, a handsome campus of greenery and brick buildings capped with a colonnaded 
rotunda. He encouraged the students to contribute to the betterment of their community 
and nation. Kennedy’s homily on civic engagement was his standard commentary to 
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young people, but his words had special meaning at this campus. Over the last five years, 
the Ladies only had to gaze across Ely Street into the black neighborhood to find idle 
children deprived of an education. The student body, in general, had insulated themselves 
from the community’s racial strife, focusing rather on their studies, sorority life, and 
dating. Many non-county residents believed that they had no place to meddle in local 
problems. Kennedy chatted with the crowd for only a few minutes, but long enough to 
rouse laughter and cheer. He returned to his car amid their applause, visibly moved by the 
unexpected reception.
20
 
 The scene on High Street “irritated” the college president. Dr. Frank Lankford 
explicitly told planners that he did not want the attorney general to visit the campus. 
Rather, he wanted to distance Longwood from the Free Schools. “The people in the Free 
School seem to be developing more and more problems for us almost daily,” Lankford 
privately protested. “It makes it even more troublesome when some of our students and 
faculty are entirely sympathetic with their efforts to promote intermingling of the races 
on our campus.” Lankford had done his part to preserve the community’s traditions by 
practicing discrimination on campus. Black applicants had found employment with the 
maintenance and kitchens staffs, but not admission to an academic program. Grace 
Poindexter, a senior at the Free Schools, had aimed to “break the [color] barrier,” but the 
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administration rejected her application. Lankford cited flaws with Poindexter’s academic 
record, a record that earned her class valedictorian.
21
 
 
 
The motorcade turned north at the intersection of High and Randolph, the location 
of the memorial to the “Confederate Heroes.” A century earlier, the Richmond Daily 
Enquirer determined that Prince Edward was “perhaps the most unanimous county for 
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Figure 2.2 Robert F. Kennedy at Longwood College. (Photo: Richmond Times-Dispatch). 
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immediate secession in the state.” The county mustered eight companies, which saw 
battle at Rich Mountain, Antietam, Manassas, Gettysburg, Chancellorsville, and 
Spotsylvania. In 1900, the United Daughters of the Confederacy commemorated those 
“Defenders of State Sovereignty” with a seven-foot tall bronze soldier atop a twelve-foot 
granite plinth. For the secessionists and their progeny, civil war memory invoked a 
bygone era. On the other hand, one black teenager likened Prince Edward County to 
living in a “twilight zone.”
22
  
 Farmville’s industrial zone came into focus at Third Street. The county had some 
light industry, but only a handful of businesses that employed twenty or more workers. 
The Buffalo Shook Company manufactured shipping equipment, primarily pallets and 
wooden containers designed to transport tobacco. In its background, along North Main 
Street, large brick tobacco warehouses formed Farmville’s sky line. The Dunnington 
Tobacco Company had been in operation since the antebellum period. It had since grown 
into the nation’s largest buyer of dark fired Virginia tobacco and engaged in international 
commerce. The Craddock-Terry Shoe Corporation stood opposite Main Street. The five-
story building formerly operated as a tobacco warehouse, but now it hummed with the 
“steady rhythmic beat of machinery” producing shoes, about 800,000 pairs in 1964. This 
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branch of the Lynchburg-based company employed over three hundred workers with a 
payroll over $1 million, by far the largest industry in town. Nevertheless, the Craddock-
Terry plant, established in 1934, had been the last major manufacturing plant to come to 
Farmville.
23
 
 Farmville wanted more industry. In the 1950s, business leaders established the 
Farmville Area Development Corporation (FADC) to attract new industry. The county 
had the lure of an unorganized labor force, whose limited education and poor standard of 
living depressed wages. In 1957, a top industrial development executive gave the 
community good marks for its labor supply, access to transportation, industrial sites, 
water supply, and educational facilities. He expressed optimism that new businesses 
would choose Farmville. The Town of Farmville courted new industry by adopting a 
slogan, “Gateway to Opportunity,” painting INDUSTRY INVITED on its new two-million 
gallon water tank, and posted a sign on U.S. 15, which read: 
 
FARMVILLE, VA. 
INSUDTRIAL SITE 
WE INVITE INDUSTRY 
 
 
However, slogans and signs could not obscure the flood of bad press that the community 
had earned for the school closings. “We very badly need some industries to come in here 
and furnish employment for the people,” explained Dr. A.G. Rawlins. “They won’t, 
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though, so long as we are in a foment over schools.” The county’s apologists had argued 
that no correlation existed between the school closings and the lack of new industry. 
 
Quieter voices of reason knew that the lack of public schools discouraged businesses 
from choosing Farmville. An FADC director admitted that the town lost a prospective 
business because the executive could not convince his board to relocate to a community 
that closed its public schools.
24
 The community had to face the consequences or make do 
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Figure 2.3 Main Street in Farmville. (Photo: Library of Congress). 
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with its existing industry and settle for the service and retail sectors that existed 
downtown.  
 Downtown formed the central shopping corridor and thus the primary setting for 
racial interaction. Two-to-three story, turn-of-the-century commercial buildings lined a 
four-block stretch of Main Street. The stores, restaurants and theaters drew consumers 
from the surrounding counties. The weekends, in particular, increased traffic as rural 
consumers, both black and white, came into town for their weekly shopping. On the 
surface, racial interactions tended to be cordial, but the social hierarchy was clearly 
delineated. Whites treated African Americans as second class citizens. Blacks were 
expected to address whites as “Mr.,” “Mrs.,” or “Miss,” but whites condescendingly 
referred to blacks as “boy,” “uncle,” “aunt,” or by their given name. Black children 
questioned this distinction, but many parents chose not to discuss it. “That was how 
adults dealt with things back then,” recalled Aldrena Thirkill. “They just didn’t talk about 
it.” The racial hierarchy translated into the shopping experience.
25
 
 The downtown businesses practiced racial discrimination. The department stores 
prohibited African Americans from trying on clothes. Leggett’s advertised that a 
“customer in our store is as a guest in our house, and should be treated with courtesy and 
hospitality.” That customer service did not always extend to black shoppers. A young 
black girl remembered asking a clerk to try on clothes. The clerk snapped, “You people 
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ain’t allowed to try on clothes here.” Similarly, African Americans could purchase food, 
but were prohibited from sitting at the lunch counter. “For an ice cream cone or a Coca-
Cola,” described a white moderate, “[African Americans] must sidle up to the end of a 
lunch counter to make their purchase. Without the slightest pause that may be interpreted 
as ‘rising above their place’ they must slink off to enjoy their purchase without taint to a 
white skin.” The movie houses also practiced discrimination. The State Theater refused 
service to blacks, while the Lee Theater provided seating in the balcony – the “crow’s 
nest,” as one black leader derisively characterized the arrangement. Blanton Hanbury, a 
leading local industrialist, defended the town’s discriminatory business practices: 
 
These, remember, are all private facilities. Both races can have what they want. If 
the Negroes wanted a library or a swimming pool, we’d even help them get it. But 
they’re not interested. They want poolrooms and dance halls. They’re more 
interested in drinking and carousing than in reading or swimming. That’s what 
they’ve got and they’re happy with it. We have a saying around here – be a Negro 
on Saturday night and you’ll never want to be a white man again.
26
 
 
The discriminatory business practices and paternalism demonstrated the need for a public 
accommodations law and bi-racial understanding.  
 The motorcade made a planned stop at the county courthouse. The local 
dignitaries left the procession, declining to accompany the attorney general to the Free 
Schools. They had shown courtesy by greeting their guest, even one as despised as Bobby  
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Kennedy, but continuing to the schools would have signaled an endorsement of a racially 
integrated faculty and student body. As the local officials exited, the void was quickly 
filled by approximately one hundred bystanders, both black and white, who swarmed 
around Kennedy. The attorney general left his car to shake hands and make some 
impromptu remarks. The motorcade soon resumed its southward journey out of the 
downtown business district to the sister elementary schools that straddled Main Street.
27
 
 
IV 
 
The Kennedys visited the Mary E. Branch Elementary Schools. School No. 2 
gave the Kennedys an enthusiastic welcome. The students lined the sidewalk, waving 
miniature American flags in salutation. Teachers and onlookers fortified the ranks, 
swelling the reception line to several rows deep. Flashing his distinctive smile, Bobby 
Kennedy walked down the path, affectionately patting children’s heads and shaking the 
hands of well-wishers. The students opened the program by reciting the pledge of 
allegiance, an unfamiliar verse for many of them just months earlier. According to a 
federally sponsored survey, 627 black county residents aged five to twelve had received 
no formal schooling during the previous four years. That explains the children’s 
unfamiliarity with the pledge. On this day, it “rang out loud and clear.” The band 
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followed with “The Skaters Waltz,” “America,” and the “Marine Hymn.”  The program 
concluded with the presentation of a gift for the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library. 
 
Oreatha Wiley, twelve years old, handed Kennedy a white cloth bag tied with red and 
blue ribbon, containing about 2,850 pennies. He accepted the donation with pleasure and 
humor. “I don’t know if this is the biggest gift we have received,” Kennedy quipped, “but 
it is the heaviest.” Across the street, School No. 1 held a similar program in its 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Robert F. Kennedy at Mary E. Branch Elementary School No. 2. (Photo: Richmond 
Times-Dispatch). 
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auditorium. The children recited one of the late president’s favorite passages from 
Ecclesiastes: “There is an appointed time for everything, and a time for every affair under 
the heavens.” Susan Saunders, seven years old, presented about 1,800 pennies. Bobby 
Kennedy accepted the gift “on behalf of President Kennedy’s wife and all the other 
Kennedys” and offered some words of encouragement. After the program, Kennedy 
traveled five miles south on Main Street to Worsham School.
28
 
Worsham School welcomed the Kennedys with an assembly. Kennedy gave some 
informal remarks and accepted the penny donation. He assured the children that his 
brother had been “concerned about your failure to get an education and talked about it 
frequently.” Paul Evans, one of six siblings, made the penny presentation. During the 
school closings, the three older Evans children attended school in Washington, D.C., but 
the three younger ones stayed home. “It costs too much to send them all to Washington,” 
his father told a reporter in 1962. “And, anyway, seems like the younger ones are too 
young to go away from home. Just can’t tear up your whole family.” On this day, Evans 
went to school in his hometown dressed in his church clothes to recite a few rehearsed 
lines. He started well, but once he looked up at Kennedy he forgot the rest of his speech. 
Kennedy tried to make him feel at ease. As one close aide explained, the attorney 
general’s “shyness also helped account for his remarkable gift of communication with 
children....He shared their sense of self-consciousness and vulnerability in public and 
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tried to make them feel as comfortable as possible.” Kennedy often reassured children by 
placing his hand on their head or shoulder, or by other non-verbal communication. This 
time, Kennedy laughed good-naturedly and accepted the gift.
29
 
Bobby Kennedy toured the building.
 
He enjoyed some playful banter with 
students. In Miss Phyllis Mielke’s classroom, Kennedy asked, “Who’s the smartest?” He 
pulled a little girl’s pigtails and asked another about her fingernail polish. In another 
classroom, Kennedy enjoyed the children’s rendition of “Mary Had a Little Lamb” and 
said that his eight children liked that song. The school officials led Kennedy to a student-
produced tribute to the Kennedy brothers, a bulletin board titled “Welcome, Mr. Attorney 
General Robert F. Kennedy” and “John F. Kennedy.” The staff and students had thronged 
him throughout his visit, but they now gave him a few moments of relative solitude to 
enjoy the tribute. While sipping a carton of milk through a straw, the attorney general 
paused to look at Kennedy family pictures and read student compositions. One student 
recognized the unique relationship between the late president and attorney general: 
“[JFK] knew his brother was the one person on whom he could rely.” Gwendolyn 
Harrison, aged twelve, expressed her appreciation to the late President: “If it had not been 
for President Kennedy our schools might not have opened today. He was the best friend 
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the Negro has had since President Franklin D. Roosevelt.” The muted compositional 
tribute contrasted with the raucous reception at the next stop.
30
  
Robert R. Moton High School hosted the largest assemblage. One thousand 
admirers, virtually all black, had been waiting for hours to welcome Kennedy. The crowd 
converged on the attorney general, reaching out to touch him and shake his hand. The 
police escort moved in to clear a path through the overwhelming adoration, but Kennedy 
assured Chief Otto Overton that that was unnecessary: “I appreciate your help, but I’m 
okay.” The police fell back and the crowd enveloped Kennedy. He had no pretensions 
that the adulation was for him. As the custodian of the Kennedy legacy, described an 
aide, “all the emotions people felt for his brother – the sympathy, the guilt, the hope – 
were converging on him.” He surrendered himself as an outlet for people to express their 
emotions. Kennedy found his way to the main entrance and announced to the crowd: 
“We’re just going into the assembly and we’ll be back to see you.”
31
 
 The program produced a range of emotions. The packed auditorium buzzed with 
excitement. Kennedy’s appearance lifted the students’ spirits. Many questioned whether 
Kennedy would actually come. “I assume we did not think that we were worthy enough 
to have someone of his magnitude to come and talk to us,” remembered Arlene Winkler. 
His presence affirmed that they were not alone in this long struggle. Kennedy’s visit was 
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a “big deal,” thought Vic Madison, because it “reinforced the feeling that the Kennedys 
had real concern for black people.” The program opened with the singing of “America.” 
 
My country, 'tis of Thee, 
Sweet Land of Liberty 
Of thee I sing; 
Land where my fathers died, 
Land of the pilgrims' pride, 
From every mountain side 
Let Freedom ring. 
 
The singing touched Kennedy. “For schoolchildren to sing patriotic songs elsewhere 
would be unremarkable,” he thought, but the school closings made their achievements all 
the more notable. Kennedy was also visibly moved by the sentimental remarks about his 
late brother throughout the program. He wiped his moistened eyes and trembled as he 
made last minute revisions to his prepared remarks. This show of emotion, wrote The 
Moton Eagle, the school newspaper, “generated a feeling of warmth, friendliness and 
understanding between him and the audience.”
32
 
 Bobby Kennedy took to the podium in his uncomfortable manner. He stammered 
and trembled, but the sincerity of his words and past deeds shined through. Kennedy 
characterized the county’s school program as “unnatural and unsatisfactory.” He hoped 
that the U.S. Supreme Court would order the state and local officials to take 
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responsibility for public education. The attorney general credited his brother for the Free 
Schools: President Kennedy was “particularly worried about the lack of schools for 
Negroes in this county,” and he “found the laws were not as swift as they should be, and 
that we had to do something ourselves.” He asked the students to honor his late brother 
by maximizing their potential: “If President Kennedy were now here, he would ask you 
to continue to make the extra effort to live up to the expectations of your teachers, your 
community, of President Kennedy.” The students found inspiration in his words. “I 
distinctly remember that he didn’t make promises, but issued a challenge to us,” reflected 
Roger Madison, a senior. “He noted that it was our responsibility to take advantage of the 
opportunities that lay ahead for us. All that he and others who cared could do was open 
the doors of opportunity.” Kennedy’s words encouraged the senior class to “become the 
very best we could be.”
33
  
 The student body president presented the donation for the John F. Kennedy 
Memorial Library Fund. Betty Carter had missed one year of school, then enrolled in a 
neighboring school district, but was soon dismissed when it was discovered that she did 
not meet the residency requirements. Like hundreds of other black Prince Edwardians, 
Carter moved away from her parents to attend school. She lived with her aunt in 
Washington, D.C., only returning home for holidays and summer break. “It was difficult 
being away from home during those times,” Carter remembered. The Free Schools 
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allowed the Carter family to restore their family structure, and before Betty stood a man 
that played a prominent role in making that happen. “It was a bit of a dream to be there,” 
explained Carter. Kennedy accepted the gift of pennies and presented Carter and other 
distinguished students with a memento, a replica pin of the PT-109 boat that Lieutenant 
John F. Kennedy commanded in World War II.
34
 
 Bobby Kennedy concluded his Free School tour by cementing an eternal bond 
with the black Prince Edwardians. The outdoor assemblage had weathered the sweltering 
noonday sun to hear Kennedy speak. The attorney general stressed the importance of 
“continuing this education” and remaining united: “If we are separated, if we are halved 
and mistrust replaces what we have had in the past, then we are going to have nothing but 
trouble.”
 
The black community had come to expect that powerful men – be it the 
governor, general assembly, congressional delegation, or the county board of supervisors 
– would use their influence to perpetuate black second-class citizenship. The Kennedy 
brothers, on the other hand, had worked to correct that injustice. The attorney general’s 
visit, determined one black resident, was “perhaps the biggest thing that happened in 
support of the Black community.”
35
 This day affirmed that the once lonely battle had 
been joined by the federal government. 
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V 
 
The Kennedys helicoptered four miles for a speaking engagement at Hampden-
Sydney College (HSC). The private men’s college, one of the oldest in the nation 
(established in 1775), was quietly secluded in the piney woods. The college was “a small, 
self-contained world doing a great job of preparing us for graduate school and 
responsible positions in business,” described one student. “Social consciousness was not 
a big part of the process.” Like Longwood College, HSC officialdom failed to provide 
progressive leadership on the public school closings. The board of trustees had debated 
whether to “publicly take a high moral stand” but ultimately determined to refrain from 
injecting the college into a local matter. As a private institution, HSC was free from the 
scrutiny of the state board of education, unlike Longwood College. However, lacking 
public funds, HSC had to preserve positive relations with alumni, several of whom were 
among the county’s leading segregationists. Further, the paying customers, the student 
body, were southern-bred whites. It certainly was not a pro-Kennedy campus.
36
 
 Kennedy faced a “fairly hostile” reception at Johns Memorial Auditorium. The 
student body held political views, described as conservative to reactionary, that were in 
conflict with Kennedy’s positions. The students fervently supported conservative 
firebrand Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) for president. A homemade banner hung above the 
entrance that read: GOLDWATER TO WHIP MASS. SOCIALISM! – a clever double entendre 
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that jabbed big government liberalism and Kennedy’s New England upbringing. 
Kennedy, a much talked about candidate for vice president on the Democratic ticket, 
quipped, “They told me when I was coming in that this school was all for Goldwater.” 
The packed, intimate hall filled with applause. The response not only demonstrated their 
enthusiasm for Goldwater, but also their disdain for Kennedy. Some held him in 
contempt for living off his family name, being a political opportunist, and having been 
raised in the North. Students in the balcony protested this “Yankee intrusion” by 
unfurling a confederate flag, much to the satisfaction of the audience. Kennedy responded 
by disarming the audience with some well-rehearsed self-deprecating humor chronicling 
his ascent to the cabinet: “I started in the Department [of Justice] as a young lawyer in 
1950. The salary was only $4,000 a year, but I worked hard. I was ambitious. I studied. I 
applied myself. And then my brother was elected President of the United States!” 
Kennedy won some laughter and earned the audience’s respect for walking into the 
Tiger’s den.
37
 
 Kennedy dispensed with his formal remarks to take questions. The audience, 
expecting a formal speech, was caught off guard. After a moment of hesitation, Geoff 
Hubbard (’65) stirred the crowd by asking if Kennedy would accept the vice presidential 
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nomination. A grassroots movement for Kennedy had been growing in strength, as did 
his popularity among rank-in-file Democrats, who in a recent poll chose Kennedy over 
Adlai Stevenson and Hubert Humphrey 47-18-10. He offered a qualified “yes,” adding 
ambiguously that only if he wanted it. The Vietnam War was another topic of interest. 
College-age men were concerned about being drafted and killed in Southeast Asia. 
Kennedy admitted that the war “was going badly,” but that he did not support troop 
escalation. The conversation continued, but nobody raised the greatest domestic issue of 
the day. After a lull in questions, Kennedy broached the topic of civil rights.
38
 
 The attorney general opened a debate on the civil rights bill. Kennedy asked who 
supported the bill and the audience responded with mild applause, but when he asked 
who opposed it applause filled the hall. The attorney general responded that “those who 
oppose it apparently don’t understand it or regard it emotionally.” He invited the students 
to “ask me questions…let’s discuss it.” Someone questioned the most controversial 
section of the bill, Title II, which would prohibit discrimination in places of public 
accommodations, like restaurants, theaters, and hotels. The student was concerned that 
businesses’ rights would be infringed. He argued that white proprietors would be forced 
into “involuntary servitude” by serving black customers against their will. Kennedy made 
the moral argument for equality in public places by marrying the young men’s concern 
over Vietnam with the bill: African American “wives come to Washington and bury their 
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husbands in Arlington [National Cemetery] and then go back to Alabama with their 
children. Where can they stop at restaurants and hotels?” Kennedy explained that his 
brother introduced the legislation to advance racial equality because it was the right thing 
to do, and the attorney general looked no farther than the local school crisis to assert that 
point. “I don’t understand your opposition…Go over to Prince Edward County, as I have 
just done, and see the children put their hands over their hearts and swear allegiance to 
the American flag and sing ‘America the Beautiful.’” Kennedy may not have 
immediately persuaded the audience, but he earned their respect. He left campus to 
applause.
39
 
 
***** 
 
 A county official told a news reporter that “no minds were changed” by 
Kennedy’s visit.
40
 Nobody could have expected a Yankee attorney general to topple Jim 
Crow in four hours or less. Hearts and minds do not change overnight and traditions die 
hard. Still, southern traditions could not trump minority rights indefinitely. The Kennedy 
administration believed that the federal government had a responsibility to correct the 
racial inequality in Prince Edward County. Passing the civil rights bill and affirmative 
court decisions would, in time, guide the county into a new day. The breaking down of 
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racial barriers in schools and public accommodations served to demonstrate that the 
southern way of life was built on false precepts. The Kennedy administration accelerated 
the pace of that evolution. It is part of the Kennedy legacy. 
 
44 
CHAPTER III 
 
PART I 
 
 
Black Prince Edwardians challenged the racial doctrine of “separate but equal.” In 
1951, the students at the all-black Robert R. Moton High School had launched a strike to 
protest the inadequate facilities. The strike leaders asked the NAACP for legal assistance. 
Shortly thereafter, the NAACP filed a lawsuit in federal court to eradicate racially 
segregated schools in the county. After the court upheld segregation, the NAACP 
appealed the case. The litigation was combined with similar cases in Delaware, Kansas, 
South Carolina, and Washington, D.C., and argued before the U.S. Supreme Court as 
Brown v. Board of Education. On May 17, 1954, the High Court ruled that racially 
segregated schools were unconstitutional. The following year, the Court ruled that its 
order must be implemented “with all deliberate speed.” Brown threatened southern 
traditions, while at the same time, the ambiguous implementation order invited 
obstruction and delay.
1
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 White segregationists in Prince Edward County feared the social consequences of 
school desegregation. Racial mixing would expose white children to the shortcomings, 
either real or perceived, that disproportionately plagued African Americans, namely foul 
language, criminal activity, and poor hygiene. Still others predicted that integration 
would lead to racial violence. “It’s the poor white farmers who feel most violently,” 
explained Robert Taylor, a local segregationist leader. “Ever since the War Between the 
States those poor whites have had only one satisfaction, and that is cuffing the Negro 
around. If we get mixed schools, their children will start the fighting.” The concern over 
elevating the best black man above the lowest white man paled in comparison to the 
terror of interracial sex. “Mixing of children in school is the beginning of the end for both 
races,” cautioned Robert Crawford, a local businessman. “It is inevitable that children 
who play together from the age of five will not stop at 18. There will be intermarriage. 
And that means mongrelization of the black race and degeneracy for the whites.” 
Segregation had to be preserved to maintain white supremacy.
1
 
The county’s geography made preserving school segregation a challenge. The 
county did not have neighborhood schools, like Richmond for example. In the state 
capital, housing segregation created homogeneous communities with schools centered in 
areas with a predominant racial demographic. By contrast, Farmville had black and white 
sections, but generally housing was intermingled throughout the county. Only creative 
districting could preserve segregated schools that could satisfy the federal courts. Also, 
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white Richmonders had the advantage of burgeoning suburban counties as a refuge from 
school integration. The adjacent counties provided white Prince Edwardians no such 
haven. “We’re a small rural county with little money,” explained Robert Taylor. “Many 
families have lived here for 300 years and have no place to go.”
2
 The white community 
had to make their stand at home to preserve its way of life. 
The county’s segregationist leaders built a coalition to resist integration. They 
were instrumental in the establishment of the Defenders of State Sovereignty and 
Individual Liberties, a statewide organization whose primary objective was to block the 
implementation of the Brown decision. In fact, Robert Crawford, a Farmville resident, led 
the Defenders, thereby placing Prince Edward County at the center of resistance. In 1955, 
the Defenders proposed “A Plan for Virginia,” which urged the General Assembly to 
close any public school that integrated and provide public tuition grants for students to 
attend segregated private schools. The Defenders’ growing membership, exceeding ten 
thousand, gave it, Crawford, and Prince Edward County segregationists a louder voice in 
state politics. The Byrd Organization and county segregationists had a symbiotic 
relationship. The Organization depended on Southside Virginia to turn out the vote and 
the county expected the state leaders to preserve the racial hierarchy.
3
 
                                                          
2
 Robert A. Pratt, The Color of Their Skin: Education and Race in Richmond, Virginia, 1954-89 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1992); Raymond Wolters, The Burden of Brown: Thirty 
Years of School Desegregation (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984), 83-84. 
3
 Robert C. Smith, They Closed Their Schools: Prince Edward County, Virginia, 1951-1964 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 87-112; Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual 
Liberties, “A Plan for Virginia,” Box 1, JSGP; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Harry Byrd and the Changing Face 
of Virginia Politics, 1945-1966 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1968). 
 
47 
 The Byrd Organization placed the state between the federal courts and Prince 
Edward County. In 1956, the General Assembly passed “massive resistance” laws, 
which, in part, authorized the governor to close any public school that integrated. In 
September 1958, Governor Lindsay Almond closed public schools in Charlottesville, 
Norfolk, and Warren County for abiding by federal court orders to desegregate. A legal 
challenge in state and federal courts invalidated the massive resistance laws. The state 
responded by adopting a plan to mitigate desegregation – a plan that created the Byrd-
Almond schism, as Organization leaders shunned the governor for abandoning all-out 
resistance. “Freedom of choice” all but invited white parents to remove their children 
from integrated public schools and enroll them in segregated private schools. The state 
provided public tuition grants to students attending non-sectarian private schools and 
authorized localities, upon popular support determined by a referendum, to sell public 
school property, ostensibly to corporations providing private education.
4
 Prince Edward 
County was positioned to perpetuate segregation even after its legal options to resist 
integrating the public schools had been exhausted.  
 Prince Edward County took the most defiant stand against school desegregation. 
On May 5, 1959, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the school board had 
to begin desegregating its white high school by September and consider applications for 
the elementary schools “without regard to race…at the earliest practical date.” In 
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defiance, the Prince Edward School Foundation announced that it would begin operating 
private schools for white children. The segregationists had been conspiring to abandon 
public education, purchase the public school buildings, and operate its segregated school 
system with public tuition grants. In the meantime, Foundation leaders converted private 
buildings and churches into temporary schoolrooms and accepted donations until the 
tuition grant program was legally defensible. The county board of supervisors followed 
by forcing a constitutional question: can a federal court force a local legislative body to 
levy taxes to operate public schools? In June 1959, the board undermined the 
desegregation order by cutting off operational funds to the public schools, thus becoming 
the only locality in the nation without public education and leaving the black community 
without formal schooling.
5
 
Chapter IV: “Save Us From Ourselves” analyzes the black community’s response 
to the school closings and demonstrates that strong federal intervention was needed to 
correct that injustice.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
SAVE US FROM OURSELVES 
 
 
 Who the President of the United States is matters. President Eisenhower had 
earned a place among the first citizens of the world. As Supreme Allied Commander in 
World War II, General Eisenhower masterminded the D-Day invasion, directed the 
liberation of Western Europe, and received Germany’s surrender. The Democrats and 
Republicans both courted him to be their standard-bearer. Eisenhower handedly won the 
presidency in 1952 and re-election in 1956 as a Republican. Had the Constitution 
permitted, he could have won a third term in 1960. Certainly, President Eisenhower had 
the political capital to provide moral leadership on school desegregation, but he never 
endorsed the Brown decision. Eisenhower’s failure to decisively lead on school 
desegregation was felt by black Prince Edwardians.
1
 
 The Reverend L. Francis Griffin petitioned President Eisenhower to intervene in 
the Prince Edward County school crisis. On August 20, 1959, Griffin sent the White 
House a two-page letter describing the school closings. “These benighted and confused 
people,” Griffin explained, “are attempting to operate private schools to circumvent the 
law encouched in our constitution. We do not believe that should be permitted.” He 
beseeched the president to “use the full extent of your good office in the alleviation of our 
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conditions.” President Eisenhower declined to intervene. The administration narrowly 
interpreted the Brown decision by rejecting the contention that the Constitution required 
public education. “The Supreme Court decision,” explained the White House, “did not, as 
some suppose, require the States to have public schools. It merely held that if a state or 
locality did operate public schools, it could not deny admission to such schools solely on 
the ground of race or color.” The president, therefore, was “powerless to take any action” 
because the states were responsible for public education. The letter closed with a stolid 
assurance that Eisenhower was “fully sympathetic with the reasons that prompted your 
letter.” In an unsent draft, the White House promised that Eisenhower was “doing 
everything he can to bring about a moral climate whereby conformance to rulings of the 
courts of our land will take place in normal order.” No such pledge to use the moral 
authority of the presidency made the final draft.
1
 
 Undeterred, Reverend Griffin kept pressure on the Eisenhower administration. In 
September 1959, the Washington Afro-American published a lengthy report on the school 
closings. The article included an appeal by Griffin for citizens to “write and encourage 
others to write directly to the President, Vice-President and Attorney General of the 
United States, requesting that they use the full extent of their good offices in the 
alleviation of our conditions in Prince Edward County.” Ruth Hawes, a white resident of 
Richmond, for one, asked Eisenhower: “Is not the United States government responsible 
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for looking into this unfair treatment of her citizens?” A twelve-year-old white child from 
New Rochelle, New York, cried when she learned that the county closed its schools. 
“Why,” Ellen Kesend asked, “can’t they be treated as human beings?” The White House 
replied that the president “deplores” the board of supervisors’ action and “fervently 
hopes” that the schools reopen.
2
 The president’s second-hand hopes did not end the 
school crisis.  
Black Prince Edwardians needed federal intervention to reopen the public 
schools. They lacked adequate resources to respond to the school closers or provide a 
formal education to all their children. The black community welcomed assistance, but the 
segregationists worked diligently to undermine outsiders’ efforts and silenced white 
moderates through intimidation. The government provided no relief. In fact, the state and 
county officials conspired to place private segregated education on a permanent footing. 
At the federal level, the judiciary failed to issue a definitive ruling, Congress balked at 
empowering the attorney general with more authority over school desegregation suits, 
and the executive branch refused to fully explore its existing powers. The locked-out 
children needed more vigorous executive leadership than the Eisenhower administration 
provided. The 1960 presidential election, therefore, proved vital for the future of 
education in Prince Edward County. 
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I 
 
 The Reverend L. Francis Griffin led black Prince Edwardians into a new phase of 
the school matter. He had spearheaded the local black freedom struggle since the late 
1940s, but recent developments placed an even greater burden on him. The school 
closings left, as one observer determined, a “tragic vacuum in secondary leadership.” The 
black teachers had been looked upon as community leaders, but many of them had left 
the area to find work. Additionally, the black clergy consisted of many untrained, part-
time pastors, several of whom lived outside the county. Reverend Griffin worked to 
maintain solidarity within a black community that was spread across a rural landscape 
with an outmoded communications system and meager resources to help themselves.
3
 
Outside assistance was desperately needed and welcomed. Griffin formed an organization 
to coordinate that aid. The collaboration placed students in schools outside the county, 
registered voters, and provided temporary activity centers for the out-of-school children. 
 “The Fighting Preacher” offered a new generation of leadership. Leslie Francis 
Griffin was born on September 15, 1917, in Norfolk, Virginia, but spent his formative 
years in Farmville. He received his formal education in separate but unequal schools and 
endured the second-class citizenship determined by his caste. The black youths of 
Griffin’s time challenged Jim Crow on occasion but not to the point of confrontation. 
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“The most we’d get,” remembered Griffin, “was abuse for being smart, uppity niggers.” 
After serving with the 758
th
 Tank Battalion during World War II and studying at Shaw 
University, Griffin returned home to aid his ailing father’s pastorate at First Baptist 
Church. The Reverend Charles Henry Dunstan Griffin, a fundamentalist Baptist minister, 
opposed segregation but did not crusade against it. Upon his death in October 1949, the 
younger Griffin took command of the church. “It was a comfortable berth,” wrote 
journalist James Rorty. “At least it might have been if the son had been content like his 
father to be a ‘good nigra,’ preach the old time religion, and leave politics alone.” 
Instead, Griffin mobilized the black community against Jim Crow. He organized and led 
a local NAACP chapter, headed the black PTA’s campaign for better schools, advised the 
1951 Moton student strikers, and now commanded the response to the school closings 
from his headquarters at First Baptist Church. Under his leadership, the church became 
the center of action.
4
  
 The black ministers scrambled to organize a unified response to the school 
closings. Understandably, some black parents called for a halt to the school integration 
campaign to protect their children’s education. Fred Reid, a worker in a railway freight 
depot, supported equal educational facilities but opposed integration for the moment. 
“We have pushed too fast,” Reid told U.S. News & World Report. Reverend Griffin 
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admitted that some blacks had weakened their stance on integration. “There are those 
who say time is not yet ripe and they would rather go slow. But I think the majority of 
Negroes are still firm for integration – maybe 70 or 80 per cent of them.” The black 
clergy urged black Prince Edwardians to remain steadfast. The Reverend C.H Hill, the 
president of the Ministerial Alliance of Farmville and Vicinity, believed that “we have a 
great obligation to all of the children of Prince Edward County to make certain that they 
receive a public education.” On June 8, the Alliance passed a resolution calling for the 
board of supervisors to rescind its action and for citizens to stand up for public 
education.
5
 
The Ministerial Alliance called an emergency meeting to discuss the school 
closings. On June 17, 1959, Reverend Griffin presided over a conference of two hundred 
people at New Hope Baptist Church in rural Abilene. He discouraged talk of backing 
down on integration. “If the Negro in Prince Edward gives up now,” argued Griffin, “he 
will retrogress 100 years.” Instead, he proposed boycotting white businesses to 
demonstrate black opposition to the school closings: “If we don’t shop in Farmville one 
weekend, we’d show them who we are.” State NAACP leaders urged a more cautious 
approach. Oliver Hill blamed the school closings on the white county leaders but gave 
black Prince Edwardians tough love for not effectively exercising the franchise. “You are 
a party right along with the Board in closing the schools,” explained Hill, “because if you 
had done what you should, there would be so many of you on the county voting books, 
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they would have not dared close the schools.” He assured the conferees that the NAACP 
would continue litigating the case but urged county residents to “stop depending on the 
courts and get out to the polls and vote intelligently.”
6
 The NAACP doused Griffin’s call 
to action. Griffin needed more flexibility to meet the individual needs of black Prince 
Edwardians while still maintaining the legal support of the NAACP. 
 In mid-July, Reverend Griffin formed the Prince Edward County Christian 
Association (PECCA) to “meet an unprecedented crisis.” The organization’s leadership 
stressed that PECCA had not been established to replace the NAACP. Instead, PECCA 
formed to coordinate the efforts of existing agencies and to add “a much needed religious 
emphasis.” “We believe that all problems can be solved within the framework of the 
Christian Doctrine,” explained President Griffin, “without hatred, malice or ill will being 
shown against any people, we shall dedicate ourselves to the practice of constructive 
goodwill.” PECCA’s primary objectives were to restore public education and increase 
black political participation. To meet the immediate crisis PECCA sought to place upper 
classmen in accredited schools and set up play groups for the remaining children. The 
organization had meager resources to meet those objectives; it had office space, but no 
furniture, typewriter, or mimeograph, and limited funds. PECCA desperately needed 
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outside assistance. Recognizing that “no man is an island unto himself,” the organization 
welcomed offers for help, but not from all.
7
 
 Kittrell College helped PECCA place locked-out students. PECCA was most 
concerned with upperclassmen completing their high school education. “We thought it 
best for children of this age to be in school to avoid their becoming discouraged and 
dropping out or slipping into the role of juvenile delinquents,” explained Reverend 
Griffin. The Reverend A.I. Dunlap, the pastor of Beulah African Methodist Episcopal 
Church on Main Street in Farmville and a PECCA board member, served on the faculty 
of Kittrell College. The black junior college was founded by the AME Church near 
Henderson, North Carolina, about one hundred miles from Farmville. He convinced 
Bishop Frank Madison Reid to accept black Prince Edwardians into Kittrell’s high school 
program at half the cost – $210 per student. PECCA pledged to sponsor the students. In 
mid-September, a 20-car motorcade took the first wave of students to North Carolina. By 
the end of the semester, over fifty students received their bootleg education at Kittrell 
College.
8
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 The school closings placed a heavy burden on black families. About two hundred 
high school-age students and an untold number of elementary school students continued 
their education outside the county – many of them outside the state. “This situation has 
broken up many families,” lamented Dr. A.G. Rawlins. The Ward family, for one, sent 
their two eldest children, Ronald and Phyllistine, to Kittrell, and Betty Jean lived with her 
grandparents in neighboring Nottoway County. Their father, Phillip Ward, was among 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Prince Edward County Christian Association. Seated: Reverend A.I. Dunlap, vice 
president; Reverend L. Francis Griffin, president; and Edwilda Allen, secretary. Standing: Dr. A.G 
Rawlins, treasurer; unidentified man; Alberta Simms, assistant secretary; W.A. Carter, assistant 
chairman of the executive committee; A.M. Spencer, chair of the financial committee; and 
Reverend J. Samuel Williams, assistant chairman of the program committee (Photo: Richmond 
Afro-American). 
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those that considered the family disruption worth the sacrifice to achieve integration. 
“Segregated schools are definitely out,” he told the Afro-American. “It’s just a matter of 
time. It can end only one way. They will find that they cannot keep those private schools 
going.” Many agreed that the segregationists would be unable to raise money year-after-
year to operate the private schools. One mother of five actually welcomed the school 
closings. “I’m glad they have used their trump card because that’s their last card.” As 
they waited out the private school’s presumptive demise, an immediate crisis inflicted 
hundreds of black children who had no access to formal education. An interagency group 
explored educational programs for out-of-school students.
9
 In the meantime, PECCA 
joined with the NAACP to expand black political power. 
The NAACP organized a voter registration drive in Prince Edward County. “We 
believe by a show of political strength in this county, some of the people here will have a 
change of heart, especially on the school issue,” explained Howard Wilkinson, the 
political action director of the state NAACP. The organizers created a network with a 
coordinator and team leaders in each magisterial district. They hoped to register “99 
percent” of eligible black voters by December, a very ambitious goal considering two 
factors: only about 500 of a possible 3,400 black Prince Edwardians were registered and 
the slow registration process. The registrar’s office was only open on Mondays and it 
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took about twenty minutes to qualify an applicant. The application asked questions 
designed to confuse and disqualify less educated African Americans, like “Are you a 
pauper?” and “Have you ever been convicted of a petty larceny?” The long lines and time 
consuming process deterred those who could ill afford to surrender a day’s pay to 
register. Still, the drive qualified twenty-five applicants a week.
10
 At that rate, however, it 
would take the NAACP over two years to reach its goal of registering 99 percent of 
potential black voters. 
 The voter registration campaign had no effect on the county board of supervisors’ 
elections. The black leaders ran a write-in candidate in every magisterial district, but they 
lost all six races handedly. Kennell Jackson received 34 votes, the most among black 
candidates, but John Steck’s 806 votes easily won him re-election to represent the 
Farmville District. James Carter, a barber and litigant in the school case, received only 4 
votes in the Lockett District – the lowest total among black candidates. Still, Carter 
became the first African American to hold elective office in the county since 
Reconstruction. The Lockett District had three vacancies for justice of the peace, but only 
two white candidates were on the ballot. Carter received nine write-in votes for that 
office – votes that were likely intended for the board of supervisor race – which was good 
enough to win. “It’s what you call sliding in the back door when the front door is bolted 
and latched,” remarked Reverend Griffin. “It’s just the kind of unexpected gain that 
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brings a grin into our wretched lives. One need for voter education has been highlighted – 
but ever so gently.” Alarmed by this electoral activity, the segregationists organized a 
registration campaign to neutralize the black gains. At the end of the year, white 
registered voters outnumbered blacks 4-to-1.
11
 
 The white leaders offered segregated private education for the county’s black 
children. On December 16, 1959, an executive board, reflecting much of the membership 
of the Prince Edward School Foundation’s board, announced the establishment of 
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Figure 4.2 James Carter. (Photo: Jet). 
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Southside Schools, Inc., but not without an effort to drive a wedge between the black 
leadership and the rank-and-file. “The formation of this corporation was delayed because 
it was our opinion that responsible Negro citizens of the county should provide the 
leadership,” read a statement. “There has been no action along this line….This board 
believes that no further time should be lost in setting up and operating schools throughout 
the county of Prince Edward.” The board hoped to open the schools by February 1960, 
but first it had to determine enrollment. Roy Hargrove, the corporation’s president, sent 
application forms to all black parents and set a deadline of January 15, 1960. The board 
professed “deep concern,” but they had an ulterior motive.
12
 The segregationists needed 
to lure blacks into accepting the schools to make tuition grants legally defensible for the 
Foundation patrons.   
 Civil rights leaders discouraged black parents from applying to Southside 
Schools. Reverend Griffin saw through the ruse: “The white men want us to set a 
precedent on the state’s tuition grants – which they haven’t dared to use – so they can 
take advantage of them.” Further, he questioned the board’s ability to hire a professional 
faculty, find suitable buildings, or run an adequate program. “How can these schools 
meet our needs when the segregated schools were not offering a satisfactory program?” 
asked Griffin. On December 23, the NAACP addressed Southside Schools at PECCA’s 
Christmas party. “We don’t think Negroes ought to enroll,” declared Executive Secretary 
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Roy Wilkins to the assemblage of five hundred African Americans. Further, Wilkins 
discouraged them from accepting tuition grants. Oliver Hill explained that segregated 
private schools ran counter to their interests: “Some benighted individuals are trying to 
entice you away from your rights by promising you a private school.” He urged them to 
maintain the current course: “All you are losing is one or two years of Jim Crow 
education, but at the same time in your leisure you can gather more in basic education 
than you would in five years of Jim Crow schools.” Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., made a 
similar appeal at the “Pilgrimage of Prayer for Public Schools” in Richmond on January 
1, 1960. “I hope those citizens,” King said of black Prince Edwardians, “won’t sell their 
birthright of freedom for a mess of segregated pottage.” Southside Schools received only 
one application.
13
  
 Southside Schools exposed the widening racial divide in Prince Edward County. 
The program had failed long before the application deadline. The school closings had 
evaporated whatever trust remained between the races. Of course, the black community 
viewed any offer with suspicion, especially one derived without its consultation and 
swaddled in paternalism. George Morton, a tobacco farmer and guardian of his grandson, 
for one, spoke contemptuously of white paternalism and Southside Schools: “Why should 
I follow men that don’t acknowledge Almighty God and the Supreme Court?” Unmindful 
of introspection, the segregationists turned to conspiracy theories. Roy Hargrove accused 
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the black leaders of intimidating the rank-and-file against submitting their applications. 
Reverend Griffin dismissed that allegation. “These gentlemen express the belief that 
threats of reprisals have hindered colored parents from entering their children,” Griffin 
reported at a PECCA meeting, which elicited laughter. “They will never concede that the 
colored race has changed,” Griffin continued. “No longer do we let others decide what 
we need, or choose our leaders, or direct our thinking, because we can do it ourselves.”
14
 
In fact, PECCA had facilitated discussions on providing activity centers for the out-of-
school children.  
 The NAACP developed a program for Prince Edward County. An interagency 
group, consisting of the Southern Regional Council, American Friends Service 
Committee, and NAACP had been studying a temporary educational program. On 
December 19, 1959, the group consulted with representatives from other organizations 
and concerned citizens – about two dozen participants in all. A follow-up meeting with 
twenty-one organizations was scheduled for mid-January. The state NAACP, sensing its 
leadership position in the county threatened, held an emergency meeting. “The NAACP,” 
Lester Banks, the state executive secretary, explained to Roy Wilkins, “needed to retain 
the initiative in effecting whatever remedial techniques that might be subsequently agreed 
upon.” At the January 16, 1960, interagency meeting, the NAACP proposed a five-
month, $16,500 program to cover the balance owed to Kittrell College and establish ten 
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activity centers for the out-of-school children. The conferees pledged to finance 
“Operation 1700” through contributions to PECCA.
15
 
 The activity centers had a schizophrenic existence. The out-of-school children 
needed an education. So, PECCA established centers in churches, community centers, a 
former business, and a private home; and employed professional educators at five of the 
ten facilities – some of whom had taught in the closed public schools. The centers 
provided instruction in reading, math, and play-life situations three and a half hours per 
day, five days a week. However, the centers were not to be mistaken for private schools. 
Such confusion would harm the school litigation. The NAACP’s legal argument 
demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the school closings benefited from no formal 
schooling being available in the county to black Prince Edwardians. Reverend Griffin, the 
centers’ coordinator, therefore, had to restrain the program. He repeatedly emphasized 
that the centers were not private schools: “We have inadequate facilities, lack necessary 
equipment, such as libraries and laboratories, lack qualified teachers and do not follow a 
set curriculum.” Semantics became vital. The teachers were referred to as “supervisors” 
and PECCA operated “centers” not schools. Griffin emphasized that the centers served as 
“morale boosters” and were no substitute for public education.
16
 PECCA had to find a 
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balance between keeping the children minimally stimulated and not harming the legal 
case. Certainly, the activity centers could never fulfill the educational needs of black 
Prince Edwardians. PECCA’s hands were tied in responding to the educational void and 
retaliating against the school closers. 
 Black Prince Edwardians sat out the sit-in movement. On February 1, 1960, four 
black college students sparked the movement when they refused to leave a segregated 
lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina. Within two months, protests for racial 
equality had spread to forty-four southern cities, including Richmond. Virginia Union 
University students led sit-ins, pickets, and boycotts of downtown Richmond. The 
NAACP provided legal counsel, participated in marches, and rallied church 
congregations. Oliver Hill encouraged the demonstrators. “We are not going to 
accomplish our human rights by litigation, but by a determination to make the sacrifices 
necessary,” Hill declared. “We intend to assert those rights.”
17
 The NAACP leaders 
sounded a much more militant tone than they had at the New Hope Baptist Church rally 
months earlier. Still, no campaign was implemented in Prince Edward County. Black 
adults were too dependent on whites for employment and store credit to mount a 
significant direct action campaign in Farmville.  
 The black community had limited options in responding to the school closings. It 
lacked the economic and political power to retaliate against the school closers and their 
                                                          
17
 William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle 
for Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 99-141; Peter Wallenstein, Blue Laws and Black 
Codes: Conflicts, Courts, and Change in Twentieth-Century Virginia (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2004), 114-141. 
 
66 
sympathizers. Black residents were too dependent on whites to risk economic reprisals. 
The voter registration drive certainly added more African Americans to the rolls, but not 
nearly enough to immediately alter the composition of the board of supervisors. In fact, 
the November elections assured that the school closers would dominate county 
government for four more years. The black community voted by omission to reject 
Southside Schools, Inc. Still, in defeat the segregationists won a propaganda coup. They 
characterized black leaders as more interested in integration than education and 
promulgated a claim to whites’ genuine interest in black education, a myth that has lived 
on into the present. Even when truly genuine help arrived in the form of training centers, 
the program had to be restrained to safeguard the grander legal strategy. The most useful 
help – an organized campaign of white opposition to the school closings – never 
materialized. 
 
II 
 
 Black Prince Edwardians received little comfort from their white neighbors. In 
several Virginia communities, white moderates formed organizations to preserve public 
education, but not in Prince Edward County. The traditional educated community leaders, 
ministers and teachers, sounded a deafening silence on the school crisis. There were 
white moderates who openly questioned the school closings, and as a result, they suffered 
reprisals. The powerful school closer faction had all but discouraged any further acts of 
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white moderation. Assistance, therefore, had to come from outside organizations. The 
segregationist leaders, however, employed their political power and media monopoly to 
attack those organizations. Finally, the police closely monitored the black community to 
keep it in check. The segregationist leaders, in short, employed all means available to 
discourage and undermine anybody from assisting the locked-out children. 
Organizing white moderates to safeguard public education proved difficult in 
Prince Edward County. The challenge had been met in other areas. In the spring of 1958, 
the Arlington Committee for Public Schools formed in anticipation of school closings. 
Similar organizations were established in Charlottesville, Norfolk, and Warren County 
once Governor Almond closed schools in those communities under the massive 
resistance laws. Later in the year, committee members met to establish a statewide 
organization. The Virginia Committee for Public Schools had fifteen chapters with its 
membership peaking at 25,000 white Virginians, more than that of the Defenders of State 
Sovereignty and Individual Liberties. In August 1959, Marvin Schlegel, a Longwood 
College professor, had hosted a meeting to discuss forming a local chapter, but he 
determined that “the time is not yet ripe for the organization of open opposition.”
18
 White 
moderates, generally, lacked the audacity to challenge the school closers. 
 Public pressure neutralized the white clergy. The ministers avoided discussions of 
the school closings, fearing that it would “stir the waters,” divide the congregation, harm 
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church finances, and risk their pastorates. As one scholar explained, “ministers who stand 
alone can often be silenced or shipped to another church by segregationists.” The 
Reverend James R. Kennedy, pastor of the Farmville Presbyterian Church, provides an 
instructive example. In the aftermath of the Brown decision, Kennedy made public 
statements opposing segregation, including an interview with the New York Herald 
Tribune. “As a Christian, I can’t defend segregation,” stated Kennedy. “You can’t take 
the Gospel with its great message of His love for everyone and defend enforced 
segregation.” Reverend Kennedy faced criticism and social reprisals for his candor. As a 
result, he resigned and left the county. Kennedy’s departure left a progressive void 
among the white clergy and eliminated the hope for white ministerial cooperation on 
matters of race.
19
 
 The white ministers failed to embrace the opportunity for leadership. The 
Reverend James Murphy of Farmville Methodist Church, for one, believed that the 
school closings placed no responsibility on him. None of his congregants broached the 
subject, which Murphy believed gave him a pass to ignore it. Invariably, the pews 
dictated to the pulpit. John’s Memorial Episcopalian Church followed the philosophy of 
its segregationist members over the denominational leadership. The key leaders of the 
Prince Edward School Foundation – Louis Dahl, Blanton Hanbury, Robert Taylor, Barrye 
Wall, and Bo Wall – were all members and, at one time or another, served on the vestry. 
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Dr. Charles Fishburne, the rector, considered the school closings a political matter, not a 
moral issue that needed to be raised in his church. Similarly, Reverend Otis McClung and 
Hoge Smith, pastors of Farmville Baptist Church and Farmville Presbyterian Church, 
respectively, supported segregation and found no moral questions related to the school 
closings. Reverend L. Francis Griffin criticized the white clergy. “The majority of the 
ministers and their people fail to recognize that there is any moral issue involved in this 
tragedy,” lamented Griffin. “I think it’s because the gospel hasn’t penetrated their hearts 
and they haven’t communicated the gospel to their people….Somewhere, somehow, my 
white brethren must be given courage to become prophets. And, believe me, it’s hard 
being a prophet in Farmville and Prince Edward.”
20
 The white ministers were not alone in 
the abrogation of their moral responsibility.  
White teachers failed to raise a voice against the school closings. The fate of 
James Bash, the former principal of the all-white Farmville High School, had served as a 
cautionary tale for white educators considering a challenge to the community’s power 
group. At the Jarman Hall meeting in June 1955, which announced the formation of the 
Prince Edward School Foundation, Bash voiced his dissent over the school closing plan. 
“I am a public school man,” explained Bash. “I would be unable to accept a check from a 
private corporation of this kind.” In the weeks that followed, Bash felt the sting of social 
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ostracism. He lost the confidence of his teaching staff and resigned. The white teachers 
fell in line with the private school proposal and offered no public condemnation of the 
school closings. In fact, at the June 1959 public meeting on the county budget, a teacher 
voiced her support for the supervisors’ proposal to cut off funds for public schools. “I 
don’t see what other step [the board of supervisors] can take,” stated Mrs. Leslie 
Hamilton. The teachers withheld their criticism from the private schools. “There are lots 
of things about the private schools we don’t like,” admitted one anonymous teacher. “But 
we keep quiet. This is a struggle of the black man against the white man. I have to stick 
with my own people.”
21
 Moderate voices, if they existed, had to censor themselves to 
preserve their livelihoods.  
College professors constituted the only significant source of public criticism of 
the school closings. Still, it was confined to a handful of individuals. Marvin Schlegel, 
Gordon Moss, and Henry Bittinger, all of Longwood College, were the most active. From 
October 1959 to March 1960, Schlegel wrote no less than four letters to the editor 
questioning the county’s moral conscience about the void of educational opportunities for 
black children. He also suggested a solution to the school problem: voluntary public 
school segregation with private schools acting as a safety valve for white parents. Once 
black children broached the color line, white parents would have the option to send their 
child to private schools with tuition grants. Moss and Bittinger spoke in defense of public 
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education at the supervisors’ public meeting in June 1959. They also spearheaded an 
effort to organize a bi-racial committee of local prominent leaders, an equal number of 
black and white leaders, as well as neutral parties. The two professors proposed a plan: a 
three-year moratorium on desegregating the public schools, community acceptance of the 
Brown decision, and a bi-racial committee to prepare for desegregation. Barrye Wall, a 
segregationist leader and owner of the Farmville Herald, rejected the Schlegel plan in an 
editorial and never permitted the Moss-Bittinger plan to get off the ground. He refused to 
meet with black leaders.
22
 Moss and Bittinger later participated in an underground 
movement that was accelerated by the school board controversy. 
The school board withstood pressure to sell the school buildings. The Prince 
Edward School Foundation’s leaders had planned all along to make the public school 
buildings its permanent facilities. On January 11, 1960, the Foundation requested that 
Farmville High School (FHS) be offered for sale as surplus property. Blanton Hanbury 
reasoned that the private schools needed a permanent building and FHS was not being 
used. Further, as a public school building, FHS could only reopen with a racially 
integrated student body. “You have the basis to sell it,” explained Hanbury. “The people 
of the county don’t want integrated schools.” In 1959, the General Assembly had 
authorized local school boards to submit ballot initiatives for the sale of public school 
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property. Still, that law had yet to be tested in the courts. The Foundation attorneys, 
instead, asked that the buildings be sold under a 1919 statue that permitted the school 
board to sell property with the approval of the circuit court. A week later, the Foundation 
forces organized a massive show of support, about five hundred people, at the public 
hearing. Nevertheless, the school board refused to sell the school buildings without a 
referendum. A referendum was winnable, but it also posed a major pitfall, determined 
journalist John Brooks:  “the carefully cultivated illusion of unanimity among the white 
people of Prince Edward County.” Hanbury announced that the Foundation had “no 
further interest” in purchasing the building and planned instead to construct its own 
facility.
23
 The school sale controversy appeared to be over. 
The school board endured public scrutiny. In February, George Palmer, a power 
group insider, made a motion to sell Farmville High School as surplus property. He 
believed that since there would not be a referendum that the board should decide the 
matter. Fellow board members T. Cook Hix and Charles Baird joined him. However, 
chairman Lester Andrews, Calvin Bass, and George Shorter opposed the motion, splitting 
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the board 3-to-3. Walter Fitzpatrick, the school board’s attorney, declined to cast the tie-
breaking vote, thus blocking the sale. White citizens began questioning the devotion of 
these men to segregated education. In March, Fitzpatrick lobbied the General Assembly 
for legislation empowering local school boards to have greater control over funds related 
to the sale of surplus property, to be able in some instances to bypass the board of 
supervisors. In retaliation for his actions, Circuit Court Judge Joel West Flood asked 
Fitzpatrick to resign as the board’s tie-breaker vote and the board of supervisors refused 
to pay his attorney fees. Chairman William Vaughan reasoned that the supervisors would 
not compensate someone who went to Richmond “to fight us.” These reprimands 
demonstrated the segregationists’ readiness to eat their own. Fitzpatrick had recently 
served as the mayor of Farmville, was a Defender, and had joined with the segregationists 
at the Jarman Hall meeting. Now Fitzpatrick was persona non grata. The school board 
defended the actions of its attorney, even as it faced continuing pressure to sell the 
buildings. The board members suffered personal abuse and social ostracism. “We were 
just sitting there and being heavily criticized for not doing what had been asked,” Lester 
Andrews later explained. The school board responded in dramatic fashion.
24
 
 School board members shocked the community. On April 26, Foundation leaders 
renewed their request and upped the ante by asking that all public school property be put 
up for sale. The school board, again, denied the request and then Lester Andrews and 
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Calvin Bass led a mass resignation (all the board members except George Palmer). The 
departing board members left an epic fourteen-page report to the citizens of Prince 
Edward County. They eloquently defended universal education: 
 
In its decisions the School Board has been guided by the fundamental belief that 
education must be provided for all the school age children of the entire County. 
Anything short of this we regard as contrary to the best interests of all of us in the 
long run. We know that educated citizens are absolutely essential to the very 
existence of democracy in local affairs as well as in state and national ones. If a 
community leaves uneducated any portion of its citizens, because they cannot 
afford its cost, or for any other reason, it inevitably creates for itself enormous 
problems in welfare, delinquency, crime and unemployment. It means numbers of 
illiterate laborers who are difficult to absorb in the labor force. Today business 
and industry are demanding a higher level of training of its employees than ever 
before. 
 
Those men questioned whether private schools could adequately replace public schools. 
The board believed that the decision to sell school property and thus forever abandon 
public education should be decided by the people, not a six-man board. Further, the 
board’s attorneys warned that a sale would generate further legal questions. Walter 
Fitzpatrick resigned as the school board’s attorney and the Richmond law firm of Hunton, 
Williams, Gay, Powell and Gibson withdrew its counsel. The resignations generated the 
first significant protest to the Foundation forces. This controversy emboldened an 
underground movement to end the school crisis.
25
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A clandestine group of white moderates conspired to reopen the public schools. 
Sympathetic businessmen and others, approximately 150 in all, had quietly participated 
in informal discussions since November 1959. They were concerned about the 
educational, social, and economic harm that the school closings had on the community. 
Lester Andrews, the former school board chairman, and his business partner at the 
Farmville Manufacturing Company, Maurice Large, led this group – later known 
derisively as the “Bush League.” On June 3, 1960, Large hosted a meeting at his cabin in 
neighboring Cumberland County; the purpose of which was to organize a concerted 
campaign to persuade the board of supervisors to fund the public schools. The conferees 
adopted a hybrid version of the Schlegel and Moss-Bittinger plans: blacks would accept a 
moratorium on integrating the public schools for “X” number of years and the private 
schools would be available to whites who could afford it. A delegation of Bush Leaguers 
planned to present this proposal to black leaders. In the meantime, the participants were 
encouraged to invite friends to join this movement.
26
  
 The “private school fanatics” put the brakes on the Bush League. They had 
learned about the “meeting in the woods” and arrived in time to intimidate the conferees. 
They shined flashlights in the Bush Leaguers’ faces, recorded their names, and compiled 
meeting minutes. That information was made available for public consumption in a three-
page mimeograph, which opened:  
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It has come to the attention of those of us who have worked and sacrificed for the 
preservation of segregated schools in Prince Edward County and who have most 
been vitally concerned about the unconstitutional rulings of the Supreme Court of 
the United States bearing directly upon the welfare of the white children of our 
County, that an insedious [sic] movement instigated by certain businessmen in our 
town and County who are willing to sell their honor and the moral up-bringing of 
our white children for a few dollars which they allegedly lost by a business slump 
has been felt nationwide and those persons who are the enemies of your children 
and mone [sic] are using this economic weapon as a tool to force us into an 
integrated society. It must certainly be true that certain good men who have been 
duped into this movement have allowed greed to compromise them into an 
alliance with those socialists, integrationists, “do gooders”, and educationalists 
who would sacrifice our children in order to further themselves economically, and 
politically. 
 
The segregationists used the mimeograph to discourage business leaders from opposing 
the school closings. The participants were characterized as “integrationists” and traitors, 
and “suffered abuse and reprisals of various kinds.” The Farmville Manufacturing 
Company was boycotted and its employees were harassed. Lester Andrews and his 
family were socially ostracized. Andrews succumbed to the pressure and withdrew his 
activism. “I have had too many sleepless nights,” he explained. The other participants 
relented as well. The message had been sent to businessmen that dissent would result in 
economic repercussions. Intimidation had forced the community’s only significant 
movement of white moderation into oblivion.
27
 The resistance movement shrank to a 
handful of individuals.  
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 The segregationists targeted the last element of dissent: college professors. The 
campaign played on the white community’s general disdain for academia. Whites 
tolerated college professors as far as polite conversation, like weather and sports; 
otherwise, they were looked upon as outsiders. Propagandists derisively connected any 
further opposition to the school situation with professors. As Bo Wall explained, dissent 
was confined to “a few professors up at Longwood,” and thus should be dismissed as 
inconsequential. Still the segregationists worked to silence them. In early 1961, after 
Gordon Moss and Marvin Schlegel opened another round of public criticism of the 
school closings, the segregationists circulated a petition to have them fired. When local 
pressure failed, Congressman Watkins Abbitt petitioned the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction to remove them. “It is shocking to me,” thought Abbitt, “that a State 
Department would keep State personnel in a community whose sentiments do not 
coincide with local sentiment.”
28
 Later, a resident claiming to represent “Prince Edward 
White Parents” asked the governor to fire Bittinger, Moss, and Schlegel: “These 
poisonous left-overs from the 1861 abolition days have done more to encourage niggers 
to bring expensive suits against our state than any other cause. They should be removed 
from the [Virginia] payrolls, and told to teach their Nigger-poison North, where they 
learned it. Must we continue to pay them to injure us? Keep the abolitionists on our 
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payrolls? No.”
29
 Recognizing the uphill slog, Bittinger and Schlegel retreated from the 
headlines. Gordon Moss, however, continued to openly criticize the school closings.
30
 
Gordon Moss suffered the consequences for being outspoken. Moss’s activism 
continued to endanger his job, but that failed to dissuade him. He still addressed the issue 
at public hearings, in letters to the editor, and public addresses. In November 1962, 
Leonard Muse, the chairman of the State Board of Education, summoned Moss to his 
office to reprimand him for a rousing speech he gave against the school closings. He 
faced social ostracism at home. The townspeople called him an “integrationist” and a 
“nigger lover.” “I have been snubbed on Main Street by virtually lifetime friends,” 
mourned Moss. “I sit in the pew by myself in church every Sunday.” Moss displayed 
tremendous courage for standing up for his convictions. Still, the segregationists all but 
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eliminated his ability to lead dissenters by caricaturizing and isolating him.
31
 Black 
Prince Edwardians had to look outside the community for assistance.  
The segregationists tried to discredit and undermine outside organizations. The 
General Assembly had already opened an attack on the NAACP’s right to exist in 
Virginia. In 1956, the state legislators passed “anti-NAACP” laws to limit the NAACP’s 
ability to file lawsuits, forcing its attorneys to use time and resources to challenge those 
statutes rather than concentrating on civil rights cases. In addition, the General Assembly 
enforced a statute requiring NAACP chapters to surrender its membership rolls. As a 
result, membership declined sharply. Reverend Griffin had twice been called before a 
state legislative committee, but he refused to hand over the local membership roster. The 
county leaders capitalized by trying to drive a wedge between the NAACP and black 
Prince Edwardians. The segregationists deflected blame for the school closings to the 
NAACP and used the Farmville Herald to sell that assertion. “The NAACP leaders who 
forced the closing of the schools have done nothing to provide education,” wrote Barrye 
Wall on his editorial page. “We have been used as a pawn in a great game of national, 
possibly international, politics, and the time is for us to be Prince Edward Citizens again, 
working for the betterment of our own county, free from those who would use us for 
ulterior motives, and this done, leave us to solve the problems left behind.” The 
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segregationists tried to convince blacks that they, not the NAACP, were their true 
friends.
32
 
 Barrye Wall had the American Friends Service Committee investigated. In 
October 1960, the AFSC opened an office in Farmville under the direction of Helen 
Baker. Baker, a community organizer, worked to build bi-racial cooperation and support 
for public education. She facilitated bi-racial interactions, offered training for the activity 
centers’ leaders, organized a support group for parents with children in the placement 
program, and provided activities for the children. Wall believed that Baker was 
“upstirring the Negroes.” In January 1961, he asked Congressman Abbitt to have the 
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) open an inquiry. The investigation 
determined that the AFSC had “never been cited as subversive by this committee or any 
other Federal authority” and they had no records on Helen Baker.
33
 The Foundation 
forces had the connections at every level of government to thwart outside assistance. 
 Law enforcement officers harassed a multi-racial volunteer group. In March 1961, 
the Richmond Committee of Volunteers to Prince Edward organized a weekly baseball 
club for teenage boys. On opening day, about twenty boys took the field. “Shortly after 
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we arrived,” remembered Ed Peeples, a program organizer, “two police cars pulled up 
and parked on the bluff above the playing field. Two policemen emerged and assumed a 
posture to intimidate: resting the heels of their hands on their service revolvers as they 
swaggered back and forth, leering at our every move.” After three hours of play, the 
volunteers headed home with two patrol cars in tow all the way to the county line. On 
April 29, the volunteers began weekly children’s activities at the recreation center. The 
program drew police attention when “2 white boys [were] playing ball with colored boys 
on [the] school ground at [the] colored school.” The police ran the license plates of a 
1954 Pontiac and a 1959 Ford to identify the program organizers.
34
 The police created an 
unwelcome environment for outsiders.  
 The police maintained regular surveillance over Reverend Griffin and his 
associates. Officers paid particular attention to Griffin’s comings and goings, and worked 
diligently to identify the visitors to his home and church. An officer’s notes from 
September 21 and October 2, 1959, provide samples of the police’s efforts to track the 
movements of Reverend Griffin. 
 
On September 21, 1959 at 11:00 am I saw Rev. Griffin in a car 1958 Chevrolet 
Va. License No 81-003 with another man driving up & down Main St. About a 
hour later I saw Griffin and this man at the Methodist Church with C.A. Jones. At 
12:15 pm this date I saw about 50 negros at this same place some appear to be 
student going off. Albert Carter of Moran, Va and his wife were there too. This 
car was at clored school earler this date taking some pictures with Griffin standing 
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beside the school. This car belong to Drive Yourself Inc. 1909 Chamberlayne 
Ave. Richmond, Va. 
 
On October 2, 1959 on patrol I saw a 1959 chevrolet with Va. License number 
306-079 parked at C.A. Jones and a colored man going to his home. Tall light 
skin man. Time 11:20 AM. On October 2, 1959, I was on patrol going up North 
Street and saw this 1958 brown chevrlet parked on North Street near the Ford 
Place with Va. license no. A48-820 and this car have been reported to me as the 
car that is at Rev. Griffin Home and at meeting here in Farmville, Va. at 
difference times. Some where in this file we will see this license no and also 306-
079 as these cars are in Farmville most any time. 
 
In addition, officers used informants to collect intelligence on the substance of PECCA 
meetings and strategy. In April 1960, for example, Ernest Lee, a cab driver, told an 
officer that Wyatt Tee Walker of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference visited 
Beulah AME church to help organize a lunch counter sit-in in Farmville. He also reported 
that Griffin had just attended a meeting in Petersburg. In June, Mervin Branch, the 
manager of Reid’s Café, reported to the police of a recent informal bi-racial meeting at a 
private home.
35
 The police took an extraordinary interest in preserving the racial status 
quo.  
 The local control group actively disrupted efforts to assist the black community. 
The segregationists used their political, police, and media superiority to undermine 
outside assistance and splinter black unity. They intimidated white moderates into 
silence, harassed the school board to the point of resignation, and shattered the only 
substantial movement of dissent before it fully materialized. Calvin Bass, a former school 
board member and a Bush Leaguer, believed that a majority of county residents wanted 
                                                          
35
 Farmville Police Records in a private collection. See DHC.  
 
83 
the schools reopened but they feared reprisals. He suggested that if Barrye Wall and a 
few others vanished that the schools would be reopened without much trouble. The “five 
funerals” thesis, the belief that the death of five control group men would lead to the 
reopening of the public schools, proved to be moot as the segregationist leaders lived full 
lives.
36
 Black Prince Edwardians could not count on a local solution. 
 
III 
 
 Government action and inaction favored the county segregationists. The state and 
county governments worked in tandem to put the Prince Edward School Foundation on 
sounder financial footing. Still, both abrogated their constitutional obligation to provide 
public schools for all children. The federal government took no decisive action. Congress 
neglected to enact legislation to speed the implementation of the Brown decision; the 
federal courts failed to issue a decree with teeth; and President Eisenhower provided no 
leadership on the school closings. Government at all levels, in short, stood idly by as the 
educational erosion continued for black Prince Edwardians.  
 The county leaders lobbied the General Assembly to amend the tuition grant laws. 
Foundation parents had not applied for tuition grants for fear that the federal courts would 
invalidate its use in Prince Edward County, because the black students had no freedom of 
choice, no schools available to them in the community. The segregationist leaders asked 
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that tuition grants be made available to county residents attending public and private 
schools outside of Prince Edward County. Obviously, the segregationists wanted to 
safeguard tuition grants for their children by luring blacks into accepting scholarships for 
their bootleg educations. State Senator James Hagood and Delegate John Daniel, both 
representatives of Prince Edward County, introduced such measures in their respective 
legislative bodies. Still, the county leaders argued that the laws needed revision to protect 
the Prince Edward School Foundation. “Any private school sustained principally by 
tuition grants money is going to be held a public school,” testified county attorney Segar 
Gravatt. “I think the courts would be proper in decreeing this.” State legislators 
considered a number of measures to put the foundation schools on sound financial and 
constitutional ground.
37
 
 The General Assembly passed measures to aid the segregation academy. In March 
1960, the state amended the law to permit tuition grants for students attending public and 
private schools outside of their zoned school district. In addition, local governing bodies 
were authorized to provide scholarship funds matching the state allotment. In all, 
elementary and high school students were eligible for $250 and $275 per annum, 
respectively.
38
 The General Assembly also approved another measure to bolster 
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segregation academies. The state authorized the localities to pass ordinances permitting 
individuals to make voluntary tax-exempt contributions, up to 25 percent of their 
personal and real estate taxes, to private non-sectarian schools.
39
 In other words, a 
resident of Prince Edward County with a property tax bill of $100 could pay $75 to the 
tax collector and make a $25 contribution to the Foundation schools. The state had given 
the segregationists more leverage to make segregated schools permanent in Prince 
Edward County. 
The county board of supervisors remained steadfast against school integration. 
The 1959 election returned all the school closers to office, with the exception of 
Chairman Edward Carter, who dropped out of the Hampden District race due to a heart 
attack. Charles Pickett, a Defender, won the seat on a campaign pledge to “do everything 
I can do to prevent school integration in Prince Edward County.” William Vaughan of 
Prospect replaced Carter as chairman. “I am ready to do anything to improve the 
situation,” proclaimed Vaughan, “as long as it conforms with the basic principles of 
separation of the races in schools, and local control.” The school board had proposed an 
$803,700 budget to operate public schools, which the supervisors rejected. Instead, they 
invoked the Hagood-Daniel bill by raising the property tax rate from $1.60 to $4.00 per 
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$100 of assessed value to allot $270,000 for tuition grants. In addition, the supervisors 
passed the local ordinance permitting tax-exempt contributions to the Foundation. The 
county leaders believed that the public funding of the private schools was now on sound 
constitutional ground.
40
 
The federal courts had yet to determine the constitutionality of the school closings 
or tuition grants. On April 22, 1960, the U.S. District Court issued an order to put the 
U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ May 5, 1959, ruling into effect. Judge Albert 
Bryan, who temporarily presided over the case upon the retirement of Sterling 
Hutcheson, enjoined the school board and superintendent from discriminating based on 
race in the enrollment of students at the high school; and required them to begin making 
plans for the desegregation of the elementary schools at the “earliest practical date.” The 
court order, however, did not require the county to reopen its public schools. There were 
no public schools to desegregate. “This has no practical effect since the county has 
abandoned its public schools,” wrote the Southern School News. On June 10, 1960, the 
NAACP filed a motion to add the state superintendent of public instruction, the State 
Board of Education, and the county board of supervisors as defendants, because their 
inaction prevented the current defendants (the local superintendent and school board) 
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from carrying out the court orders.
41
 Litigation placed a heavy burden on black parents. 
An act of congress could have lessened the burden. 
 Congress failed to enact school desegregation legislation. In 1957, Congress 
passed the first civil rights act since Reconstruction. The law authorized the attorney 
general to initiate civil suits in federal court to protect voting rights, but a similar 
provision (Title III) authorizing the attorney general to initiate school desegregation suits 
failed in the Senate by a 52-38 vote. President Eisenhower showed little leadership on 
that provision; in fact, he demonstrated ignorance of his own administration’s bill. “I was 
reading part of that bill this morning,” the president told the press, “and there were 
certain phrases I didn’t completely understand.” Eisenhower refused to take on southern 
opposition to Title III, preferring instead to save the moderate aspects of the bill: the 
creation of a federal civil rights commission and the Civil Rights Division in the 
Department of Justice. Similarly, Congress strengthened voting rights protections in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1960 but failed to enact a school desegregation provision. The 
Department of Justice determined that the attorney general could not initiate school 
desegregation suits without congressional authority.
42
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 The U.S. Department of Justice took no action on the school closings. The Civil 
Rights Division narrowly interpreted its role in school desegregation. Assistant Attorney 
General Harold Tyler believed that the Division’s hands were tied by Congress’s failure 
to pass legislation. “The Attorney General,” he explained, “has no right under existing 
statutes to participate as a party in school desegregation cases.” In the Prince Edward 
litigation, the presiding judge had not requested the attorney general’s involvement. 
Eisenhower’s Department of Justice had advised the court in a handful of school 
desegregation as amicus curiae (literally “friend of the court”), but only upon the 
invitation of the presiding federal judge. Without legislation or an invitation from the 
court, Tyler explained to a petitioner, “the Department has no basis for participation in 
the Prince Edward County school litigation at this time.”
43
 The attorney general failed to 
put the power and prestige of the Department of Justice behind the locked-out children. 
The Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) 
condemened the school closings “as deplorable and indefensible.” “It’s a sad day for any 
community when it decides not to provide adequately for the education of its children,” 
admonished Secretary Arthur Flemming. “It’s not only a sad day for that community, but 
for the Nation.” Flemming expressed his concern about the potential threat that the Prince 
Edward school closings posed to public education more broadly and stated that private 
schools were no substitute. HEW would not become a party to the dismantling of public 
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education. Secretary Flemming rejected the Prince Edward School Foundation’s request 
for federal surplus property. “Any aid to the Prince Edward School Foundation,” 
explained Flemming, “would not only constitute aid to a private school to the detriment, 
so to speak, of a public school system, but would also discourage efforts to reactivate the 
public schools in the county.” Flemming refused to assist the segregation academies, but 
without legislation, HEW could do nothing to help the locked-out children except to call 
“attention to the seriousness of the situation.”
44
 
 President Eisenhower provided no leadership on the school closings. Catherine 
Scott sent a distress letter to the White House. The thirteen-year-old resident of Prospect 
had been locked out of school. In May 1960, after losing a year of education, Scott 
petitioned Eisenhower to help resolve the matter:  
 
We, the children of Prince Edward would like very much our schools opened. We 
would like to complete our education in order to employ jobs in the future. I think 
everyone should have their equal rights. I think everyone should have equal 
opportunities of any race, creed and color. God made all people to be equal. Our 
race, creed and color should not interfere with our equalities. The pledge to the 
American Flag says in part: One nation under God with liberty and justice for all. 
You can imagine how it would be in the future if many children in the United 
States were without education. I feel that education is important in this Atomic 
Age. I am writing you because I think you could give some help toward restoring 
our educational facilities.   
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The White House encouraged Catherine Scott to “express your feeling” to the local 
officials. She received the letter and thought, “Local officials? The local officials were 
the ones who closed the schools.”
45
 The White House response affirmed that the 
administration would not protect black Prince Edwardians from the collusion of state and 
local leaders.  
 Reverend Griffin considered the school closings a national issue that required a 
national solution. “You have carried your own ball well,” Griffin praised PECCA 
members at a meeting. “It is time the state and the nation, too, became concerned.” He 
had recommended that PECCA launch a nationwide campaign to awaken the American 
conscience to the injustice in Prince Edward County. They needed the support of fraternal 
organizations, women’s clubs, white liberals, and national publications. More 
importantly, “we need to launch a concerted effort to arouse the Federal Government, 
President and other agencies,” Griffin explained. “It is becoming increasing evident that 
the South cannot solve the problem alone and needs strong federal intervention to deter 
others from such undemocratic practices.”
46
 The presidential election loomed large for 
black Prince Edwardians. 
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IV 
 
 Reverend Griffin tried to inject the school closings into the presidential campaign. 
In October 1960, Griffin asked the candidates for their position on Prince Edward County 
through an open letter: “Will you use the powers of this great office to correct the evil 
that is negatively affecting the lives of approximately 1,400 white children and 1,700 
Negro children, and by tomorrow could affect the lives of untold numbers in the South?” 
The letter was more than a query on school closing policy, but a distress signal. He 
informed the candidates of black oppression in Prince Edward County. “This little 
Virginia community has defied the courts and violated every principle of democracy,” 
wrote Griffin. “Strong federal intervention is needed to save us from ourselves and 
guarantee our children a fair chance in an everchanging world.”
47
 At this juncture, only 
the federal government could force the state and local officials to relent. The next 
president would determine whether a policy of federal indifference continued or if the 
resources of the national government would be used to end the school crisis. The election 
of John F. Kennedy or Richard Nixon, therefore, had a direct bearing on the future of 
black Prince Edwardians. 
 Senator John F. Kennedy supported school desegregation. He endorsed the Brown 
decision and voted to expedite its implementation. In October 1957, a Republican Party 
leader publicly challenged Kennedy to state his position on school desegregation at an 
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event in Mississippi. “I have no hesitancy in telling him the same thing I have said in my 
own city of Boston,” Kennedy boldly told the Mississippi audience, “that I have accepted 
the Supreme Court’s decision on desegregation as the law of the land.” In fact, Kennedy 
had voted to retain Title III in the Civil Rights Act of 1957. He considered it “a moderate 
provision in a moderate bill.” Yet, the Senate voted to eliminate the provision. He 
thought that the pride over passage of the first civil rights legislation since Reconstruction 
had been “dimmed” by the omission of Title III. “I am convinced,” stated Kennedy, “that 
retention of this Title would have been more significant to the advancement of civil rights 
than all the rest of the bill.”
48
 Despite his position on Title III, Kennedy had not yet won 
over African Americans.  
 Black leaders viewed Kennedy’s moderate civil rights record with suspicion. 
Since 1956, Kennedy had courted white southern delegates to support his presidential 
run, some of whom had less than enlightened views on racial matters. Certainly, 
Kennedy’s political alliances with segregationists raised alarms. Further, Kennedy earned 
criticism for joining with southerners on two controversial questions during the debate on 
the civil rights bill: a procedural question not to bypass the Judiciary Committee (chaired 
by ultra-segregationist James Eastland of Mississippi) and the jury trial amendment. The 
amendment required trials by jury in cases of criminal contempt over voting rights 
violations. An all-white southern jury certainly would not punish segregationists’ efforts 
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to restrict black voting rights. Black leaders scorned Kennedy for those votes. He 
defended the votes as procedurally proper and necessary to prevent a southern filibuster. 
Kennedy also reminded his critics that he voted for a strong Fair Employment Practice 
Committee (FEPC), abolition of the poll tax, anti-lynching legislation, and filibuster 
reform. “No Senator,” boasted Kennedy, “can claim a more consistent record than I in 
supporting civil rights measures.” Senator Kennedy, indeed, had a solid civil rights 
record but he was no activist.
49
 
 John F. Kennedy was not a civil rights crusader. “As a Senator,” reflected Ted 
Sorensen, his longtime aide, “[Kennedy] simply did not give much thought to this 
subject. He had no background of association or activity in race relations. He was against 
discrimination as he was against colonialism or loyalty oaths – it was an academic 
judgment rather than a deep-rooted personal compulsion.” Kennedy considered African 
Americans no different than any other demographic group. “They were not set aside as a 
Special Problem or singled out as a special group,” explained Sorensen. “He simply 
sought their votes along with those of anyone else.” As a national candidate, Kennedy 
became more vocal in his support for racial equality. He expressed support for the sit-in 
movement, pledged to use the moral authority of the presidency to advance equality, and 
campaigned on the strongest civil rights plank of any major party in history. The plank 
included the elimination of the poll tax, the enforcement of existing civil rights laws, and 
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minimally first step compliance with the Brown decision by 1963. Kennedy created 
enough separation with Richard Nixon to win the black vote.
50
  
 Kennedy won the presidency by the slimmest popular margin in the twentieth 
century. Political analysts credit the black vote for Kennedy’s victory. Pollsters estimated 
that 7 of 10 African Americans voted for Kennedy, an increase over the Democrats’ share 
in the last presidential election cycle. The black vote swung Illinois’s crucial twenty-
seven electoral votes to Kennedy. In Chicago, Kennedy carried 7 of 10 black wards for a 
city-wide 300,000 vote plurality in a state that he won by only 8,858 votes. In all, African 
Americans provided the margin of victory in eleven states, totaling 169 of the requisite 
270 electoral votes. “If any group had reason to expect remembrance for past promises 
once Kennedy was in the White House,” wrote journalist Helen Fuller, “it was the 
Negroes and their allies in the cause of equal rights.” The Kennedy campaign had raised 
African Americans’ expectations. “A vast majority of Negroes in America look to the 
Kennedy era to become the most helpful, the most encouraging period for racial progress 
in U.S. history,” wrote Simeon Booker for Ebony.
51
 African Americans expected the 
Democratic platform to be carried out, but the congressional elections diminished such 
chances. 
 Kennedy failed to win a mandate to pass comprehensive civil rights reform. The 
people returned healthy Democratic majorities to both chambers (64-36 and 262-174), 
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but not a working majority for the president-elect. The Congress shifted further 
ideologically to the right. The conservative coalition of Republicans and southern 
Democrats (59 Senators and 285 House members) had the numbers to bottle up any 
controversial legislation. Senator Joseph Clark (D-PA) studied the president-elect’s 
legislative agenda and advised Kennedy that the prospects for passing a civil rights bill 
were “bad.” A bill simply did not have the votes. If a comprehensive civil rights bill 
could not pass in the Eighty-Sixth Congress, it certainly would not pass in the Eighty-
Seventh Congress. Kennedy refused to diminish the office of the presidency by proposing 
legislation that was certain to fail and endanger the rest of his domestic program.
52
 
The seniority rule gave southern congressmen the power to derail Kennedy’s 
legislative program. The administration’s “five must” bills – distressed area 
redevelopment, increase in the federal minimum wage, health insurance for the aged, 
federal aid to education, and housing and urban improvement – had to clear committees 
chaired by segregationists.
53
 Of the Senate’s sixteen standing committees, nine were 
chaired by signers of the Southern Manifesto. In the House, eight of the twenty chairmen 
signed the manifesto, and four others opposed the civil rights acts of 1957 and 1960 (see 
Table 4.1). If the administration sent a civil rights bill to Capitol Hill, it would have not 
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only been dead on arrival but committee chairmen could have exacted revenge on 
Kennedy’s legislative agenda, a program that stood to benefit African Americans.  
“Anything else that could ultimately provide tangible economic assistance to poor blacks 
and whites alike,” wrote biographer Herbert S. Parmet, “was also vulnerable if [Kennedy] 
gave the segregationists a club they could hold over his head.” Kennedy, therefore, much 
to the chagrin of civil rights leaders, postponed legislation.
54
 The president had to find 
another path to advance racial equality. 
President-elect Kennedy tasked an expert to make civil rights recommendations. 
Harris Wofford reasoned that “our jet-age ship of state has been flying on only one of its 
three engines – the Judiciary – while the Congress and the Executive have been stalling.” 
Still, Wofford agreed that Kennedy should not send a civil rights bill to Capitol Hill, 
because a vote on that measure would weaken the position of liberal and moderate 
southern legislators. Instead, he recommended “a minimum of civil rights legislation and 
maximum executive action” for 1961. Wofford advised Kennedy to enforce existing laws 
and exercise constitutional powers, both of which the Eisenhower administration failed to 
fully explore. As far as school desegregation, Wofford concluded that the attorney 
general could bring suits without congressional approval (Title III legislation). The report 
cited a number of prominent lawyers who expected the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold 
that contention. Wofford, therefore, advised Kennedy to test the limits of his executive 
power by authorizing the attorney general to file “some well-chosen suits and to 
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intervene in many others.” Wofford specifically identified Prince Edward County as an 
immediate challenge for the incoming administration.
55
 
 Civil rights leaders pressed President-elect Kennedy to act in Prince Edward 
County. The Virginia Christian Leadership Conference (VCLC), a newly formed affiliate 
of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), lobbied the president-elect to 
resolve the school crisis. In a letter to the incoming administration, President Milton Reid 
sent a distress signal: “We are trying to get those schools open. WE NEED HELP.” Reid 
asked that the president-elect send a representative to a prayer pilgrimage in Farmville. 
On January 2, 1961, over one thousand pilgrims gathered at First Baptist Church. The 
pilgrimage speakers directed their remarks to Kennedy. Although no representatives from 
the incoming administration accepted the invitation, the newspapers carried the message 
to them. “We must let Mr. Kennedy know we want more out of him than we got out of 
President Eisenhower,” declared the Reverend Ralph Abernathy of SCLC. “We trust 
under the new administration in Washington,” remarked Milton Reid, “that when the 
country decides to move ahead, it will move at least 200 miles and pass through Prince 
Edward County.” He reminded the assemblage of Kennedy’s debt to African American 
voters and the power of the black vote. “If the Negro can determine the election of one 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy to the Presidency of the nation,” argued Reid, “the same vote 
can determine the ‘Byrds’ in Washington, the ‘Almonds’ in Richmond, the ‘Vaughans,’ 
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the “Dillons,’ the ‘Picketts,’ the ‘Jenkins,’ the ‘Gates,’ and the ‘Stecks’ of Prince Edward 
County.”
56
  
***** 
 
 The Prince Edward County school crisis required a federal solution. President 
Eisenhower had failed to use federal power to defend the locked-out children. Instead, by 
omission the administration allowed state and local officials to collude with the 
Foundation to preserve segregated education. The segregationists used their unchecked 
power to all but stifle white moderates and undermine outside assistance to the black 
community. Black Prince Edwardians lacked the political and economic power to stand 
alone against the school closers. They needed federal intervention. The presidential 
transition provided an opportunity for Reverend Griffin to renew his appeal for federal 
assistance to resolve the school crisis.  
Black Prince Edwardians lacked the political power to sway elected officials. The 
board of supervisors felt no obligation to consider black citizens’ concerns. On December 
6, 1960, Reverend Griffin presented the supervisors with a petition signed by 272 people 
requesting that the public schools be reopened. Chairman William Vaughan explained 
that the supervisors could not immediately appropriate money for public schools, but that 
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it could be considered in the next budget cycle. “This board will follow such policy as is 
in accord with the will of the people of the county and as, in our opinion, will serve the 
welfare of all the people,” assured Vaughan. “Majorities can be wrong,” responded 
Griffin. “But there is an American way of education, and the right and wrong of a 
situation should be considered, not just the way the majority voted.”
57
 Without significant 
black political power the moral argument fell on deaf ears.  
Griffin also threatened to boycott white businesses. “If we fail in this appeal, and 
if you refuse our respective petitions,” Griffin told the supervisors, “we are prepared to 
use any nonviolent means to achieve our purpose.”  He considered an economic boycott 
“one of the ways” to pressure the white community to reopen the schools. Certainly, 
however, a boycott had its pitfalls. J. Nat Wilkerson, a member of the local power 
structure, warned in a letter to the editor that a boycott could work both ways: “Not only 
in their NOT BUYING but they could be faced with NOT SELLING or even NOT 
EMPLOYING.”
58
 Dependence on whites for consumer products, employment, and store 
credit limited black adults’ activism. Under these circumstances, a boycott was an empty 
threat. The fact that this campaign was not implemented further demonstrated the 
powerlessness of the black community to retaliate against the school closers. Black 
Prince Edwardians’ need for federal intervention was never greater. 
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Table 4.1 
 
Committees of the 87
th
 Congress, First Session. 
(Voting Record on the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960) 
 
Senate Committee Committee Chairman State 1957
1 
1960
2 
Aeronautical and Space Sciences Robert S. Kerr Oklahoma Aye No Vote 
Agriculture and Forestry Allen J. Ellender Louisiana Nay Nay 
Appropriations Carl Hayden Arizona Aye Aye 
Armed Services Richard B. Russell Georgia Nay Nay 
Banking and Currency A. Willis Robertson Virginia Nay Nay 
District of Columbia Alan Bible Nevada Aye Aye 
Finance Harry F. Byrd Virginia Nay Nay 
Foreign Relations J. William Fulbright Arkansas Nay Nay 
Government Operations John L. McClellan Arkansas Nay Nay 
Interior and Insular Affairs Clinton P. Anderson New Mexico Aye Aye 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Warren G. Magnuson Washington No vote Aye 
Judiciary James O. Eastland Mississippi Nay Nay 
Labor and Public Welfare Lister Hill Alabama Nay Nay 
Post Office and Civil Service Olin D. Johnston South Carolina Nay Nay 
Public Works Dennis Chavez New Mexico Aye Aye 
Rules and Administration Mike Mansfield Montana Aye Aye 
     
House Committee Committee Chairman State 1957
3 
1960
4 
Agriculture Harold D. Cooley North Carolina Nay Nay 
Appropriations Clarence Cannon Missouri Aye Aye 
Armed Services Carl Vinson Georgia Nay Nay 
Banking and Currency Brent Spence Kentucky Nay Nay 
District of Columbia John L. McMillan South Carolina Nay Nay 
Education and Labor Adam Clayton Powell New York Aye Present 
Foreign Affairs Thomas  E. Morgan Pennsylvania Aye Aye 
Government Operations William L. Dawson Illinois Aye Aye 
House Administration Omar Burleson Texas Nay Nay 
Interior and Insular Affairs Wayne P. Aspinall Colorado Aye Aye 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Oren Harris Arkansas Nay Nay 
Judiciary Emanuel Celler New York Aye Aye 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Herbert C. Bonner North Carolina Nay Nay 
Post Office and Civil Service Tom Murray Tennessee Nay Nay 
Public Works Charles A. Buckley New York Aye Aye 
Rules Howard W. Smith Virginia Nay Nay 
Science and Astronautics Overton Brooks Louisiana Nay Nay 
Un-American Activities Francis E. Walter Pennsylvania Present Aye 
Veterans’ Affairs Olin E. Teague Texas Nay Present 
Ways and Means Wilbur D. Mills Arkansas Nay Nay 
 
* Highlighted area denotes a signer of the Southern Manifesto. 
1 H.R. 6127 Civil Rights Act of 1957 passed by the Senate, August 7, 1957. 
2 H.R. 8601 Passage of Amended Bill, April 8, 1960. 
3 H.R. 6127 passed by House, June 18, 1957. 
4 H.R. 8601 Approval by the House of the Senate’s Amendments, April 21, 1960. 
 
101 
 Reverend Griffin described black Prince Edwardians’ desperate plight to the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights. In early 1961, he submitted a report that regarded Prince 
Edward County as “a story of hatred, reprisals, harassments.” Griffin characterized black 
Prince Edwardians as an “oppressed people” who were relegated to second-class 
citizenship with no lines of communication to the white power structure. The 
“unreasonable racists” took control because the “responsible and intelligent leadership” 
failed to act and face realities. The white clergy, for example, did not lead but only acted 
with “approval from the pew.” The churches, Griffin lamented, “have been reduced to 
Sunday social clubs.” Griffin reported that white moderates who did speak out suffered 
the consequences. He cited the backlash against Lester Andrews’s activism and the 
petition to terminate the employment of Gordon Moss and Marvin Schlegel. “Truly, the 
proverbial shoe is on the other foot, for, whereas at one time reprisals were against the 
Negroes of the county, it is now against whites to keep them in line.”
59
 Through 
intimidation and political domination the segregationists had isolated the black 
community.  
 Griffin made the argument for federal intervention. The federal government 
needed to protect individual rights from the states. “Human rights should be above ‘State 
rights,’” Griffin argued. “Law and human dignity are far more important than a people’s 
prejudices, mores, customs, and traditions.” Moral leadership was required to end the 
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school crisis. “The tragedy is not in the fact that these children, white and black, are out 
of school,” reasoned Griffin. “The real tragedy is that this could happen in America and 
arouse no more action that it has.” Griffin had asked President Eisenhower to provide 
leadership over the school closings, but he declined. “The silence of President 
Eisenhower in not invoking the power of his office,” Griffin told the Baltimore Afro-
American, “was the determining factor in the Negro’s decision to cast their vote for 
Kennedy.”
60
 Black Prince Edwardians desperately needed John F. Kennedy to use the 
moral authority of the presidency to end the school crisis. Kennedy proved that who is 
President of the United States matters. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
PART 2 
 
 
 President Kennedy had to take command of the deteriorating school desegregation 
problem. The southern states had actively engaged in campaigns to block and delay the 
implementation of the Brown decision. State legislatures had resisted school 
desegregation with over two hundred laws, resolutions, and constitutional amendments. 
As a result, by the time the torch was passed to Kennedy, school desegregation had been 
held to a minimum. Less than 4 percent of African American students in the former 
Confederate and border states attended schools with white children. In fact, more black 
students attended desegregated schools in the District of Colombia than all the 
Confederate states combined. Four states (Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and South 
Carolina) had yet to desegregate a single classroom.
1
 After the presidential election, 
desegregation began in New Orleans – the first such action in Louisiana – but it elicited 
the most explosive school situation since Little Rock. The Kennedy administration 
inherited the unresolved, simmering New Orleans crisis and the Prince Edward County 
school closings. Presidential leadership was required to prevent more New Orleanses and 
more Prince Edwards.
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  Louisiana defied the federal court. Federal District Court Judge Skelly Wright, 
frustrated by the school board’s foot-dragging, had taken the unprecedented step of 
drafting a desegregation plan of his own. He ordered Orleans Parish to desegregate a 
grade-a-year beginning with first graders in September 1960. In response, the state 
legislature passed a series of bills to frustrate the court. A cyclical battle ensued between 
the state legislature and federal court: the legislature passed obstructive bills; Wright 
struck them down; repeat. Due to the delay caused by the state’s tactic of “legislate and 
litigate,” the court gave the school board until November 14 to comply with its order. On 
“D-Day,” four African American girls, escorted by federal marshals, entered two 
formerly all-white elementary schools. Unsympathetic whites jeered the girls daily with 
obscenities and threats. Nearly all white parents, many of whom were facing social, 
economic, and physical intimidation, pulled their children out of the desegregated 
schools. The White Citizens’ Council further aroused segregationists’ emotions at a rally, 
which led to white teenagers terrorizing black bystanders in the business district. The 
mounted police averted a riot and more bloodshed. Still, President Eisenhower failed to 
demonstrate executive leadership.
1
  
Eisenhower’s Department of Justice had belatedly joined the New Orleans 
litigation. In the summer, Judge Wright had asked the Department of Justice to intervene 
in the case as amicus curiae to advise the court and enforce its orders. The administration 
declined for fear of inflaming the situation and politicizing the issue during the 
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presidential campaign. Justice pledged to intervene after the election. “It was a very 
important consideration to me because I was helpless,” remembered Wright. “I had no 
way of enforcing the order. I knew I wasn’t going to get any help out of the police, state 
or city, so I had to work with Washington…to get this job done because I knew that I was 
going to be alone, totally and absolutely alone.” Finally, on November 25, 1960, more 
than a week after violence erupted in New Orleans, a three-judge federal court “requested 
and authorized” the attorney general to enter the case as amicus curiae (“friend of the 
court”) to advise the court, present arguments, and ensure the due administration of 
justice. The Eisenhower administration finally entered the New Orleans litigation.
2
 
Executive indifference had emboldened the school closers. The Prince Edward 
School Foundation worked to strengthen its position by fostering the spread of 
segregation academies. In 1960, the Foundation’s administrator was invited to the two 
major cities facing court-ordered desegregation – Atlanta and New Orleans. Roy 
Pearson’s “whirlwind visit” to Atlanta included a conference with Governor Ernest 
Vandiver, a television interview, remarks before the state legislature, and the keynote 
speech at a mass rally organized by the Metropolitan Association to Continue Segregated 
Education. A short time later, Pearson visited Louisiana to address the White Citizens’ 
Council of Greater New Orleans. He explained that private schools were the only way to 
avoid integration and predicted that segregation academies would become widespread 
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throughout the South. During the presidential transition, Georgia and Louisiana prepared 
legislation to facilitate the conversion to publicly funded segregated private schools.
3
 The 
seeds of Prince Edward-style education were taking root, and its pollination threatened to 
further undermine Brown and destroy public education, thus creating a critical challenge 
for the new administration. 
Part 2 examines the Kennedy administration’s performance in Prince Edward 
County. The Kennedy years witnessed a tremendous shift in federal policy with regard to 
the school closings. Eisenhower’s indifference had bought segregationists time to 
entrench the segregated private school system. The Kennedy administration, therefore, 
entered the battle from behind. Still, the administration took an active interest in arresting 
the educational erosion in Southside Virginia. Chapter VI: “We Will Move” argues that 
the administration took proactive measures to restore universal education to Prince 
Edward County. Within its first one hundred days, the attorney general petitioned the 
court to enter the litigation. Chapter VII: “Armed Truce” demonstrates that the president 
risked his domestic agenda by intervening in the Prince Edward litigation. The Byrd 
Organization held key congressional leadership positions with the power to retaliate 
against the president’s program – and it did. The administration’s risk came without 
reward; the federal judge denied the attorney general’s motion to enter the case, thus 
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severely limiting the federal government’s ability to facilitate the reopening of the public 
schools. Chapters VIII: “Who’s Responsible?” and IX: “We All Have a Responsibility” 
track the administration’s work to find an opening to enter the litigation but also to take 
extralegal means to end the educational erosion for black Prince Edwardians. Chapter X: 
“To See What Can Be Done” chronicles the administration’s work in the summer of 1963 
to facilitate the creation of a temporary school system available to all school-age county 
residents.
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CHAPTER VI 
WE WILL MOVE 
 
 
The Freedom Rides have overshadowed the Kennedy administration’s early effort 
to restore public education to Prince Edward County. The activists planned a two-week 
journey by Greyhound bus from Washington to New Orleans to test compliance with 
laws prohibiting racial discrimination in interstate travel. On the second day of the 
campaign, May 5, 1961, the Freedom Riders stopped over in Farmville without incident. 
However, as the campaign headed south, the activists encountered a firestorm of hatred: a 
bus bombing, Klan violence, and police brutality. The Kennedy administration had been 
caught off guard, forcing it to respond to events. Kennedy civil rights scholarship 
habitually opens chronologically with the Freedom Riders, thus perpetuating the 
misconception that the administration only reacted to civil rights matters. That fallacious 
starting point obscures the administration’s proactive steps on school desegregation that 
predate the Freedom Rides.
1
 
John F. Kennedy changed the tone in Washington. President Eisenhower had 
balked at endorsing Brown for the final 2,441 days of his administration. Kennedy, 
contrarily, issued the first presidential endorsement of Brown on his twentieth day in 
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office. He told reporters that “there is no doubt in my view: students should be permitted 
to attend school in accordance with court decisions.” A journalist pressed Kennedy for 
his stance on the New Orleans school crisis. “It is my position,” replied Kennedy, “that 
all students should be given the opportunity to attend public schools regardless of their 
race, and that is in accordance with the Constitution.” Kennedy pledged to exert “the 
moral authority or position of influence of the presidency in New Orleans and other 
places” when it was “most useful and most effective.” The Baltimore Afro-American, for 
one, praised Kennedy for his “history-making” remarks and for placing the “power and 
prestige” of the presidency behind school desegregation.
1
 
Black Prince Edwardians welcomed the new tone in Washington. Seventeen 
months earlier, Reverend Griffin had petitioned President Eisenhower to remedy the 
Prince Edward school crisis, but the White House rebuffed his entreaty, claiming that the 
executive was “powerless” to take action. Griffin found Kennedy’s remarks “far more 
forthright.” He told the press that the president’s intimation to act in New Orleans 
“brought new hope to all persons of color in Prince Edward.” The president’s words 
inspired them to petition the White House to use its influence to reopen the schools. 
Kennedy may have changed the tone in Washington, but the executive branch still 
remained constrained by its ambiguous authority over school desegregation. 
Eisenhower’s Department of Justice had narrowly defined its role, thus precluding any 
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action in Prince Edward County.
2
 President Kennedy empowered his attorney general to 
test a broader interpretation of executive authority. 
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Figure 6.1 John F. Kennedy, February 8, 1961. (Photo: John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Library). 
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The Kennedy administration took resolute action in Prince Edward County. 
President Kennedy appointed assertive and innovative men to lead the Department of 
Justice’s work on civil rights. Those tacticians pioneered a path to federal intervention in 
the Prince Edward County crisis by actively building case law in parallel school 
litigation. Once sufficiently fortified, Justice officials pressed for voluntary compliance to 
reopen the public schools, but the county took no action. The attorney general responded 
with unprecedented legal action – a move that punctuated one hundred days of furious 
pursuit to stem the tide of racially motivated school closures in the South. The Kennedy 
administration had demonstrated active and crucial leadership in the promotion of 
educational equality before the first Freedom Rider boarded a Greyhound bus. 
 
I 
 
President Kennedy centered the administration’s civil rights program at the 
Department of Justice and, therefore, under the direction of Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy. He appointed his brother to the cabinet despite the pundits’ cries of nepotism 
and inexperience. Bobby Kennedy, only thirty-five years old, graduated in the middle of 
his class at a second tier law school, the University of Virginia (’51), and he had yet to 
argue a case in court. He had been an investigator and prosecutor in the Criminal 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, then counsel to the Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, and later chief counsel to the Senate Labor Rackets 
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Committee. Bobby had gained a reputation as an overzealous prosecutor for his 
combative questioning of witnesses during nationally televised hearings. He mocked 
witnesses for invoking their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and 
famously tangled with Teamsters president Jimmy Hoffa. His political campaign work 
raised further alarm. Critics tagged him as “ruthless” for his harddriving management of 
Jack’s campaigns. Thus, the nomination for attorney general smacked of political 
patronage to an office that was supposed to be above politics. Alexander Bickel of Yale 
Law School succinctly expressed what many critics believed: “On the record, Robert F. 
Kennedy is not fit for office.”
3
 
 President Kennedy defended his nominee for attorney general. “They tried to 
make a Federal case out of the fact that Bobby had no courtroom experience,” reasoned 
Kennedy. “The basic requirement of the job is not that at all. It is the ability to administer 
a great department.” The president could receive counsel from legal experts, but he 
needed someone to manage the “largest law office in the world,” a great bureaucracy 
with thirteen divisions, over thirty thousand employees, and a $400 million budget. 
Kennedy considered his brother’s experience managing political campaigns a testament 
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to his administrative skill: “In planning, getting the right people to work and seeing that 
the job is done, he is the best man in the United States.” Still, Kennedy was not simply 
looking for a manager of a large bureaucracy, but a cabinet official who commanded his 
complete trust.
4
  
 The Kennedy brothers formed a remarkable political unit. Bobby had devoted 
himself to his brother, even if that meant staining his own reputation. Bobby’s 
management of Jack’s first senatorial campaign, for example, did not endear him to 
Boston pols, but that did not faze the younger brother. “I don’t care if anybody around 
here likes me,” explained Bobby, “as long as they like Jack.” Bobby served as Jack’s 
tough-talking alter ego, the enforcer, while the candidate remained above the fray – what 
an observer in 1960 called a “sweet-and-sour brother act”: the candidate “uses his charm 
and waves the carrot and then Bobby wades in with the big stick.” The brothers, as 
journalists Robert E. Thompson and Hortense Myers wrote, had complementary 
personalities:  
 
Where John Kennedy can view almost any problem of state or humanity with 
dispassion and aloofness, Robert Kennedy invariably becomes emotionally 
involved in the job at hand and the people embroiled in it. Where John Kennedy’s 
mind is a vast, intrictate network that must probe and study and ponder before 
acting, Robert Kennedy’s is a more simple, direct-current connection that moves 
automatically, decisively and instinctively. Where John Kennedy is a wholly self-
possessed individual who abhors displays of emotion, Robert Kennedy is an 
intense human who can both rage and weep. 
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Their personalities may have differed, but their political views were aligned and they 
shared the same interest – advancing Jack’s political career. Bobby’s incontrovertible 
devotion to Jack ensured the communication of uncolored advice, and Jack valued 
Bobby’s counsel above all others. Bobby “knew the President so well,” explained White 
House aides, “that he often realized, better than the President himself, what was the right 
and best thing for him to do.” They became so in sync that they “communicated instantly, 
almost telepathically,” observed another aide. Through gestures, a look, or a few words, 
the brothers reached full accordance, and Jack knew that Bobby would carry out his 
directives.
5
 
 Civil rights figured prominently in Kennedy’s decision to appoint his brother to 
the cabinet. He wanted an attorney general who would advance civil rights, “somebody 
that is going to be strong; who will join me in taking whatever risks,” to provide honest 
assessments and advice. “I’m going to have to have someone as Attorney General to 
carry these things out on whom I can rely completely,” Kennedy privately explained. “I 
can do that with Bobby.” Bobby warned the president-elect that in order to do the job 
effectively, the attorney general would become unpopular in many quarters. If the 
attorney general shared the same last name as the president, then that unpopularity would 
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“rub off” on him. Kennedy dismissed the caution and commanded his brother to take the 
post. President Kennedy centered civil rights management at the Department and Justice, 
and thus, General Kennedy functioned as the “commander in chief for civil rights.”
6
 
 Bobby Kennedy’s views on race relations had not filled the public record. “I 
won’t say I stayed awake nights worrying about civil rights before I became Attorney 
General,” he admitted. Kennedy had not known many African Americans, nor fully 
understood their desperate plight, but he supported racial equality in the abstract. In 1951, 
as president of the Student Legal Forum, Kennedy invited Ralph Bunche, an African 
American Nobel Peace Prize recipient, to deliver a lecture at the University of Virginia. 
Kennedy advised the president of the university, Colgate Darden, that a racially 
segregated audience would be “legally indefensible, morally wrong, and fraught with 
consequences calculated to do great harm to the University.” With the support of three 
law professors, including Dean F.D.G. Ribble, Kennedy successfully petitioned Darden 
to desegregate the event (Kennedy, Darden, and Ribble later worked together on another 
civil rights matter – see Chapter X). At the recent Democratic National Convention, 
Kennedy supported the strong civil rights plank drafted by liberal stalwart Chester 
Bowles. At a platform committee meeting Kennedy did not ask for the plank to be 
softened, but declared: “And now, on the civil rights plank our position is we go all out 
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for the Bowles plank.”
7
 Beyond these underpublicized events, Kennedy had not built a 
record that could predict his future actions on civil rights. 
Shortly after taking office, Robert Kennedy expressed his convictions in an 
interview with Look magazine. “It is my fundamental belief that all people are created 
equal,” rationalized Kennedy. “Logically, it follows that integration should take place 
today everywhere – in schools, playgrounds and so on.” However, he tempered that 
statement by adding: “But those of us who believe this must realize that, rightly or 
wrongly, other people have grown up with totally different backgrounds and mores, 
which can’t change overnight.” In that vein, Kennedy recognized the Supreme Court’s 
wisdom in implementing school desegregation “with all deliberate speed.” Still, the 
attorney general warned that “this doesn’t mean that we are going to stand for mob 
defiance of court orders.” Instead, Kennedy pledged more vigorous leadership on civil 
rights.
8
 
 Bobby Kennedy attributed the federal government’s recent lethargy in civil rights 
to a lack of leadership. “I have an impression that the people in the Department of Justice 
wanted to do more,” explained Kennedy, “but were held back by a general hands-off 
policy of the past Administration.” Holdovers from the Eisenhower administration 
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affirmed that assessment. “President Eisenhower wasn’t very interested in civil rights, 
and neither was his attorney general,” explained Harold Greene. “As long as [William] 
Rogers was in charge of the Justice Department, civil rights was not going to become a 
major priority.” Indolence was also prevalent at the Division level. St. John Barrett 
characterized Wilson White’s leadership of the Civil Rights Division as “completely 
passive, even negative.” Morale within the Division was low. John Doar described the 
Division as being in a state of “inertia,” where the lawyers “never left their desks in 
Washington” and “did not know what was going on in the field.” Late in the Eisenhower 
administration, White’s successor, Harold Tyler, breathed life into the Division. Still, 
progress did not match the times. As John Doar explained, under White the engine was 
stopped, but Tyler only “put it into first gear.” Robert Kennedy shaped an environment at 
the Department of Justice that allowed more imaginative thinking.
9
 
 Robert Kennedy recommended Burke Marshall to head the Civil Rights Division. 
Marshall, thirty-eight-years-old, had graduated from Yale Law School (’51) and 
specialized in antitrust law at the prestigious Washington firm of Covington & Burling. 
The Kennedys did not know Marshall personally, but he had come highly recommended 
for his brilliant legal mind. “I picked him on his reputation,” explained the attorney 
general. “I asked a dozen people, and they all said Burke was the best lawyer in 
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Washington.” Still, he had no civil rights experience. Initially, Marshall’s nomination 
surprised many Division bureaucrats. He did not cut the figure of a dynamic leader; 
rather, he stood small in stature, a “sort of a mousey little fellow” with a soft, creaky 
voice, black-rimmed glasses, neatly parted hair, and a humorless, self-effacing demeanor. 
With his strong civil rights background, many considered Harris Wofford the frontrunner 
for the job, but Kennedy did not want an activist at this post. “I wanted a tough lawyer 
who could look at things objectively and give advice – and handle things properly,” 
explained the attorney general. “And that’s why I settled on Burke Marshall.”
10
 
 Burke Marshall’s nomination for assistant attorney general was subject to Senate 
confirmation, and that was no foregone conclusion. James Eastland, an ultra-
segregationist from Mississippi, chaired the Senate Judiciary Committee. Robert 
Kennedy introduced Marshall to the chairman as the man that was “going to put the 
Negroes in your white schools in Mississippi.” They talked briefly, but Marshall was not 
into chit chat, nor was he intimidated.  Eastland assured Kennedy that he would not hold 
up the nomination, but that he would not vote for Marshall. In fact, Eastland declared that 
he would “vote against Jesus Christ if he was nominated for that position.” Despite 
Eastland’s pledge, the confirmation hearings and vote were delayed for several weeks. In 
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the meantime, Marshall joined the Department of Justice as special assistant to the 
attorney general and immediately set to work establishing the administration’s school 
desegregation policy.
11
 
 
 
 JFK-RFK-Marshall marked an improvement over Eisenhower-Rogers-
White/Tyler. President Kennedy endorsed Brown; Bobby Kennedy pledged more 
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Figure 6.2 Burke Marshall. (Photo: John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Library). 
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vigorous leadership at Justice; and Burke Marshall declared his belief that the 
Department had a “duty and responsibility” to protect court orders and the due 
administration of justice. The Kennedy brothers had an unbreakable trust in one another. 
Marshall was the unknown factor, but he quickly earned the attorney general’s 
confidence. “There was no one of whose judgment [Kennedy] relied on more during the 
rest of his life [than Burke Marshall],” recounted White House aide and Kennedy 
biographer Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Marshall quickly forged that confidence by his 
handling of the school desegregation crisis in Louisiana.
12
 
 
II 
 
The Department of Justice’s path to federal intervention in Prince Edward County 
went through Louisiana. Without congressional approval or an invitation from the 
presiding judge, Burke Marshall had to build an argument for federal action. The ongoing 
New Orleans school case presented him with an opportunity to test the limits of the 
attorney general’s power under uniquely favorable conditions. The federal judges who 
held jurisdiction over New Orleans had progressive records. Skelly Wright, a self-
proclaimed activist judge, had set a specific date for desegregation in New Orleans, 
invited Eisenhower’s attorney general to participate as a friend of the court, and met 
every challenge by state officials to block his orders. Judges Elbert Tuttle, John Minor 
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Wisdom, John R. Brown, and Richard Taylor Rives made the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals – which held appellate jurisdiction over Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Texas – “an agent for change.” Those four judges, Burke Marshall later 
concluded, “have had as much of an imprint on American society and American law as 
any four judges below the Supreme Court have ever done on any court….If it hadn’t been 
for judges like that of the Fifth Circuit, I think Brown would have failed in the end.” 
Marshall capitalized on these sympathetic jurists to broaden the attorney general’s 
authority.
13
 
 The Department of Justice took firm action in New Orleans. Robert Kennedy and 
Burke Marshall encouraged state and local representatives to comply with court orders. 
Still, Shelby Jackson, the state superintendent of public education, withheld $350,000 
appropriated for teachers’ salaries at the desegregated elementary schools. Marshall 
threatened litigation, but Jackson remained obstinate. Robert Kennedy knew the federal 
government “couldn’t back down”; he therefore authorized Marshall to do “whatever is 
necessary.” On February 16, 1961, Marshall expanded the previous administration’s 
contempt suit by filing charges against Shelby Jackson for his “open and flagrant” 
interference with court orders. Judge Wright welcomed the executive action. “The 
Kennedy move,” observed the Southern School News, “was seen as a means of showing 
that the federal government means business with regard to its position that state officials 
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shall do nothing which could restrict operation of public schools.” A week and a half 
later, the attorney general used this leverage to negotiate an agreement with Louisiana 
officials to pay the teachers.
14
 The New Orleans case signaled the death knell of federal 
indifference. 
The Kennedy administration demonstrated leadership in New Orleans. Before the 
presidential transition, the Eisenhower administration had reluctantly entered the case as 
a “friend of the court” upon Judge Wright’s invitation. “The difference between the stand 
the Justice Department is now presenting and that it presented before [the presidential 
inauguration] is that it now apparently has the full support of the White House,” reported 
the Washington Post. “The great problem in the past was that the leadership in the 
sensitive area of civil rights did not come from the White House,” explained Robert 
Kennedy. “Nor was there follow-up from the Justice Department. This has drastically 
changed. Our move in the New Orleans school desegregation case is proof of the new 
approach.” President Kennedy unshackled the Department of Justice to move. The 
Kennedy brothers had an understanding that civil rights was the attorney general’s “area 
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of  responsibility.” Bobby Kennedy did not have to confer with the president over New 
Orleans, because, as he later reflected, “it seemed so logical what we had to do, what we 
should do. There wasn’t a question of sitting down and deciding that. I think it was just 
taken for granted that the United States had to do what needed to be done.” The Civil 
Rights Division’s response was quick and firm. Burke Marshall, contrary to his 
predecessor, did not use the lack of legislation as “an excuse for inaction.”
15
 
Nevertheless, the state challenged the Department of Justice’s move in federal court. 
The Fifth Circuit judges clarified the attorney general’s authority in school 
desegregation cases. On March 3, 1961, Richard Taylor Rives, Skelly Wright, and 
Herbert Christenberry issued a full-throated affirmation of the Department of Justice’s 
action in Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board. The court rejected the argument that the 
lack of legislation handcuffed the attorney general: “The absence of specific statutory 
authority is of itself no obstacle, for it is well settled that there is no such prerequisite to 
the appearance of the United States before its own courts.” In fact, the court wrote in 
unmistakable language that the attorney general was welcome in the case. “We deem it 
important to state unequivocally,” the opinion read, “the right of the United States to 
appear in these proceedings because it involves a principle vital to the effective 
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administration of justice.”
16
 The opinion provided valuable legal doctrine for federal 
involvement in existing school cases.  
In the meantime, Louisiana had continued its defiance. In February, the state 
legislature had convened yet another extraordinary session to circumvent the federal 
courts. Governor Jimmie Davis signed measures into law to block school desegregation, 
including Act No. 2. The law authorized local school boards to hold referenda to suspend 
operation or close public schools. If the school board closed its schools, it was permitted 
to sell or lease school property and abolish taxes to support public schools. The 
governor’s office wanted to test their school closing law in St. Helena Parish, a poor, 
rural community servicing 1,821 black students and 1,021 white students, and under a 
federal court order to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.” The results were a foregone 
conclusion, because although African Americans outnumbered whites, white registered 
voters outnumbered blacks 1,420 to 14. If successful in St. Helena Parish, Governor 
Davis planned to call the legislature into another extraordinary session to provide tuition 
grants to private school students. On March 2, the St. Helena Parish school board became 
the first to invoke Act No. 2. The parish scheduled a referendum for April 22 to 
determine whether to desegregate its public schools or convert to a publicly funded 
private school system.
17
 Prince Edward County-style education was pollinating in the 
Deep South. 
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The State of Louisiana presented the Kennedy administration with new problems, 
but also more opportunities to expand federal authority. Like St. Helena, East Baton 
Rouge Parish and several technical schools had been ordered to desegregate “with all 
deliberate speed,” but the legislature had obstructed Judge Wright’s edicts. Burke 
Marshall had kept in regular contact with Judge Wright, which explains the 
choreographed events of March 17. The Department of Justice filed motions to intervene 
in each of these cases as amicus curiae “to prevent interference with the carrying out of 
the court’s order.” Judge Wright immediately authorized the attorney general to intervene 
in the cases. The Department of Justice then filed pleadings to convene a special three-
judge court (a necessary move to interpret state law), declare state laws that obstructed 
the court’s orders unconstitutional, and add several state and local officials as defendants 
to enjoin them from enforcing the laws in question and interfering with the court orders. 
As a result, the attorney general’s power as amicus curiae had expanded. Bobby Kennedy 
deemed this action necessary to “enable the United States to act promptly to head off 
critical situations before they occur and to protect the integrity of the judicial process.” 
This move established the precedent that the attorney general could initiate federal 
intervention in existing school cases rather than wait for an invitation from the presiding 
judge.
18
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 The Civil Rights Division’s assertive action in Louisiana tore down artificial 
obstacles to federal intervention in school cases. The New Orleans, St. Helena Parish, 
East Baton Rouge Parish, and technical school cases demonstrated the administration’s 
commitment to enforcing court orders, and those cases expanded the attorney general’s 
authority. “This administration intends to see that court orders are obeyed,” warned 
Bobby Kennedy. “We plan to step into such suits when they are filed. This was not done 
in the past. It shall be clearly understood that the order of the Federal courts carries 
behind it the full power of the Federal Government.”
19
 The Department of Justice 
intended to use that power in Prince Edward County. 
 
III 
 
 In its opening weeks, the new administration studied the Prince Edward County 
school crisis. The Civil Rights Division drafted a twelve-page staff report, dated February 
20, 1961, that chronicled the ten-year school battle by focusing on the facts of the case, 
the educational opportunities for African Americans, and the actions taken to organize 
the private schools. Five days later, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights convened a 
two-day conference in Williamsburg, Virginia, to study problems that communities faced 
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by desegregating its public schools. The conferees included government officials, 
superintendents of school, education experts, and public school supporters. Also among 
the participants were agents from the Prince Edward County school board, the Prince 
Edward School Foundation, and the Kennedy administration. The staff report and 
conference testimony pointed to collusion between the state and county to establish and 
fund private schools to circumvent court orders, actions that required federal 
intervention.
20
 
The civil rights conference presented a forum for direct dialogue between 
representatives of Prince Edward County and the Kennedy administration. From the start, 
it was apparent that a gulf existed between the administration and the county school 
board. President Kennedy sent a message of support to open the conference, which 
included a strong statement on the importance of public schools: “Our public school 
system must be preserved and improved. Our very survival as a free nation depends on it. 
This is no time for schools to close for any reason, and certainly no time for schools to 
close in the name of racial discrimination.” Contrarily, the school board representatives 
expressed their dissent. The chairman and legal counsel, Edward Smith and Collins 
Denny, Jr., asserted that public schools were not obligatory and that private schools were 
a viable alternative. Smith praised the white community for establishing a private school 
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system but scorned the black leadership, principally the NAACP, for failing to establish 
private schools for their children.
21
 
 Frank Reeves represented the White House at the conference. Reeves’s 
participation clearly indicated the administration’s position on Prince Edward County. He 
had worked on that litigation as a NAACP attorney before joining the White House staff 
as special assistant to the president. Conversant on the case, Reeves opened a debate with 
the Prince Edward delegation: “Do you concede that the Negro residents…may have 
preference for public against private education; and, if they do, what has the school 
board, in its public responsibility, done to afford them a public education?” Collins 
Denny claimed that the school board “has done everything” that it was “permitted by law 
to do,” and would operate public schools had funding been made available by the board 
of supervisors. “As attorney for the school board, Mr. Denny,” Reeves retorted, “have 
you given consideration to the possibility of the school board, having the public school 
responsibility, joining in the litigation which is presently pending seeking to have or force 
the board of supervisors to provide funds for the operation of the public schools?” Hiding 
behind the veneer of professional ethics, Denny declined to comment about active 
litigation.
22
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 Collins Denny spoke more candidly when addressing the commission as a private 
citizen. He advised the commission that Brown had not altered the South’s opinion on 
race. Denny’s views on school desegregation were a matter of public record. He had 
 
Figure 6.3 Frank D. Reeves. (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library). 
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actively campaigned to block the implementation of Brown. As a prominent Defender, he 
had contributed to the organization’s “Plan for Virginia,” which sought to provide public 
tuition grants to fund segregated private education. “Had I not been led into this fight 
because of my strong aversion to the Supreme Court’s usurpation of legislative power,” 
he once explained, “I, in all probability, would have gotten into it because of my racial 
views.” Clearly, Denny had no intention of advising the school board to resume operating 
the public schools. Smith privately admitted that the school board “acted only on the 
advice of its attorney,” and Denny told the commission, “We are not going to educate 
[the children]…in desegregated schools.” In fact, in their statements and associations the 
school board representatives bolstered segregated private education, fueling suspicion of 
collusion between county officials and the Prince Edward School Foundation to 
circumvent federal court orders.
23
  
The Foundation’s president denied any misconduct. Blanton Hanbury told the 
commissioners that the “Foundation was not formed as a means to circumvent any court 
decision or, as we have been otherwise accused of, to break down public schools.” 
Curiously, in May 1959, Hanbury had announced plans to operate private schools two 
days after the federal circuit court handed down its desegregation order. Then the county 
closed the public schools and, soon thereafter, the state provided academy students with 
tuition grants. Commissioner Theodore Hesburgh challenged Hanbury’s claim that the 
                                                          
23
 USCCR, Problems of Schools in Transition, 132-133; James H. Hershman, Jr., and the Dictionary of 
Virginia Biography, “Collins Denny (1899-1964),” Encyclopedia Virginia, Virginia Foundation for the 
Humanities, accessed April 29, 2014; Reed Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation: The First Decade (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1966), 188; Harry Boyte to Jean Fairfax, “Prince Edward County Interviews,” April 
3, 1962, #38438, AFSC. 
 
131 
Foundation was a private institution: “So, equivalently, the money that is given…in 
tuition through the state actually pays for the operation of these private schools; therefore, 
in a sense they are private in quotation marks.” Hesburgh was convinced that the publicly 
funded foundation schools were private in name only. Hanbury provided no viable 
evidence to refute the claim that the county, state, and private schools were colluding to 
circumvent court orders.
24
 
 The Kennedy administration put its support for the locked-out children on the 
record. Frank Reeves’s presence alone was symbolic of the administration’s position, but 
he did not attend the conference to be a wallflower. Reeves concisely articulated the 
administration’s abhorrence for the county’s school program. “Prince Edward County,” 
Reeves declared, “is an outstanding example of the impossibility of providing education 
for all of our children on a private school basis.” Public education, on the other hand, 
afforded “all people the equal opportunity for education which is basic and fundamental 
and essential to a surviving democracy.” The Prince Edward delegation had exhibited its 
recalcitrance and affirmed the locked-out children’s desperate situation. After the 
conference, Frank Reeves telephoned Burke Marshall, likely to convey his appraisal of 
the situation.
25
 
 Burke Marshall determined that federal action was necessary. On February 28, 
Marshall recommended that the attorney general intervene in the Prince Edward litigation 
“as soon as possible,” adding that “if the Department [of Justice] is going into any other 
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school suits, it would be more appropriate to go into this one.” Still, Marshall advised the 
attorney general to wait until he laid the groundwork to federal intervention through the 
Louisiana cases.
26
 The district court judge that presided over the Prince Edward case, 
Oren Lewis, was much too cautious to permit intervention without statutory authority or 
precedent. Marshall gambled on the Fifth Circuit judges to provide such a precedent, 
which they did. Over the next three weeks, the courts expanded the attorney general’s 
amicus power in the New Orleans, St. Helena Parish, East Baton Rouge Parish, and 
technical school cases. Through Louisiana, Burke Marshall laid the groundwork to break 
the ring of collusion in Prince Edward County. 
 
IV 
 
Civil rights organizations expected the federal government to resolve the Prince 
Edward school crisis. However, there was no consensus on the proper course of action. 
The NAACP believed that the solution would be found by working through institutions: 
the federal legislative process and the federal courts. In the meantime, the training centers 
continued to serve as morale boosters to both the children and adults. The NAACP had 
not altered its strategy despite more militant organizations, like the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC), that found success through direct action. “SCLC’s 
strategy of nonviolent direct action by the masses,” wrote sociologist Aldon D. Morris, 
                                                          
26
 Burke Marshall to Robert F. Kennedy, February 28, 1961, Box 1, BMP. 
 
133 
“was threatening to the NAACP’s legal approach because of its mass appeal and wider 
effectiveness.” The NAACP’s strategy was seen as too conservative, too slow, and too 
ineffective. Several national groups proposed a more aggressive program.
27
 They planned 
a direct action campaign to pressure the federal government to immediately reopen the 
public schools. The campaign threatened the NAACP’s leadership in Prince Edward 
County and opened a rift between civil rights groups.  
The Prince Edward County Christian Association (PECCA) continued to operate 
the training centers. The program did not meet the educational needs of all the children.  
Sixteen centers serviced approximately six hundred children, though the quality of 
instruction and facilities varied from center to center. Only a handful of professional 
black educators remained in the community to teach at the centers, otherwise, the 
children were led by untrained, although well-meaning, housewives. Some centers 
instructed in the core subject areas, while others supervised non-academic activities. A 
few centers were housed in well-constructed buildings, but many others were poor, 
dilapidated structures. In one center, two dozen students packed into a ten-by-ten building 
that had no plumbing and a small wood-burning stove. The Farmville Herald reported 
that the building was “so overcrowded it appears to be a health hazard and a fire trap.” 
PECCA could not adequately fund the program. Several organizations that had offered 
financial support failed to make good on their pledges. Months earlier, the Virginia State 
Conference of the NAACP, even with its own financial struggles, donated $2,000 to 
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PECCA – enough to retire its debts and keep the centers running for another month. Even 
if the training centers were properly funded, staffed, and equipped, PECCA could not 
operate an effective educational program without further complicating the NAACP’s case 
in court. At best, the centers could only be a half-measure and, therefore, they served as 
monuments to the ineffectiveness of the NAACP’s conservative strategy. Hundreds of 
children were experiencing an inadequate education, while still more received no 
education at all, as the case moved glacially through the courts with no apparent end in 
sight. Leaving the community presented the only opportunity to receive a proper 
education, and that was not a viable option for all. “We’re certain that [the children] are 
being affected by the lack of organized education,” worried Reverend Griffin. “Their 
ability to read is not what it ought to be. A good many are losing interest in school and 
we anticipate a problem in getting them to return once the schools are reopened.”
28
 The 
NAACP had directed the civil rights program in Prince Edward County for years, but it 
was not omnipotent. Another organization could supplant the NAACP by presenting a 
new strategy that appealed to black Prince Edwardians. 
 The Virginia Christian Leadership Conference (VCLC) challenged the NAACP’s 
leadership in Prince Edward County. Milton Reid, the president of VCLC, had been 
planning a campaign with several organizations, principally SCLC and the Congress on 
Racial Equality (CORE), to “focus national and international attention” on the school 
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closings. Reid proposed busing five hundred black Prince Edwardians, adults and 
children, to Washington to demand action from the federal government. The campaign 
sought legislation to prevent school closings and provide immediate relief to the locked-
out children, an expedited, affirmative ruling from the courts, and an executive order to 
reopen the schools. The proposal called for pilgrims to sit-in at the Capitol until President 
Kennedy granted the protest leaders an audience. A meeting with the president would 
shine light on the school crisis, but it would also undercut the NAACP’s leadership in 
Prince Edward County and elevate Milton Reid, who many considered a showboating 
upstart.
29
 
 The Washington Pilgrimage opened a rift between Francis Griffin and Milton 
Reid. From the early planning stages, Griffin had not been present at the meetings, nor 
did he endorse the campaign. In late January, Griffin left town on business, but he had 
given Reid permission to speak at First Baptist Church to discuss a gift for the training 
centers. Griffin, however, had asked Reid not to mention the campaign until they could 
discuss the matter further. In defiance of their agreement, Reid presented the proposal to 
PECCA, who responded with “loud acclamation” and a vote of approval. Reid had left 
Griffin in a tough position: oppose his flock and risk his leadership position, or accept 
their will and risk a rupture with the NAACP, who vehemently opposed the campaign 
and paid his salary as special consultant. Griffin negotiated a tightrope. He convinced 
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PECCA to withdraw its support for the Washington Pilgrimage, explaining to Reid that 
the campaign was not of “primary importance,” but he qualified the statement by adding 
“at this time.” Griffin did not close the door on direct action. In fact, Griffin later 
participated in a VCLC meeting concerning the pilgrimage. Reluctantly, Griffin felt that 
he had “to go along with this.”
30
 
 The Virginia State Conference of the NAACP conceded no ground to VCLC. In a 
terse letter to Milton Reid, the executive secretary intimated that Prince Edward County 
was the NAACP’s turf and that cooperative efforts had to meet its criteria. Lester Banks 
reminded Reid that the Washington Pilgrimage had never received the NAACP’s support, 
and that his deceptive actions “have served to crystallize and strengthen” that conviction. 
He urged Reid to divert resources to the training centers. “If money is or can be made 
available,” Banks closed, “why not put it into the ‘centers.’” Reid responded, “Where 
your interest is in maintaining the centers, our primary concern is for the immediate 
restoration of public schools in Prince Edward,” and he refused to stand down or call off 
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the pilgrimage. Banks had come to recognize that the NAACP’s Prince Edward strategy 
was failing – and that assessment was shared by people outside of VCLC. Objective 
observers found the NAACP to be “too conservative in both its legal and non-legal 
approach” to Prince Edward County. Banks recommended to Roy Wilkins and key 
NAACP attorneys that “Nation-wide exposure [of the school closings] must be made 
without delay.” Citing the Washington Pilgrimage, Banks warned that “if the NAACP 
does not take the lead other organizations can and surely will.”
31
 
 Milton Reid continued preparations for the Washington Pilgrimage. VCLC 
solicited money from national organizations, churches, schools, and civic groups to 
defray the campaign’s cost, estimated at $4,000. Hundreds of dollars had already been 
spent. Promotional letters had been distributed throughout the state. Transportation 
services and a facility for a mass meeting in Washington were reserved. In addition, 
liaisons were lobbying congressmen to draft legislation to open the schools and 
volunteers circulated petitions addressed to President Kennedy, which read:  
 
We, the undersigned, citizens of the state of Virginia, representing a cross-section 
of the clergy, parents, children, educators, lay and professional life, do hereby 
prayerfully petition that you as Chief Executive of our great nation, do forthwith 
exert the great moral influence of your office and the powers of executive 
authority to initiate remedial action through the Judicial and Legislative branches 
of our government that the public education facilities of Prince Edward County, 
Virginia be restored. We ask that your action be of such nature that it would be 
effective in any other school districts, similarly situated, in the face of a Federal 
Court order to desegregate under the Supreme Court Decision of 1954. 
                                                          
31
 W. Lester Banks to Milton A. Reid, February 24, 1961, Milton A. Reid to W. Lester Banks, 
February 27, 1961, W. Lester Banks to Oliver W. Hill, Samuel W. Tucker, Robert L. Carter, and Roy 
Wilkins, “Prince Edward County School Case and Training Centers,” March 6, 1961, all in Group III, Box 
A107, NAACPR. 
 
138 
On March 6, Walter Fauntroy, a representative of SCLC, presented the campaign to the 
White House. One of Frank Reeves’s duties as special assistant to the president, as he 
described it, “was providing an ear…for Negro organizations and others who wanted to 
feel at least that their problems and complaints were receiving consideration.” Reeves 
heard Fauntroy out, but he also explained the proposal’s deficiencies. He told Fauntroy 
that it was “impractical for [the president] to see groups under pressure.” Furthermore, 
the president lacked the authority to issue an executive order to open the schools. Without 
such authority, and considering the matter was pending in court, a conference with the 
president offered “no value.” Additionally, he explained that without legislation the 
attorney general had “no legal basis…to initiate action.” Reeves, however, assured 
Fauntroy that the Department of Justice was “studying [the] possibility of intervention in 
[the] pending litigation or any other possible action.”
32
 
 The Louisiana cases may have contributed to the unraveling of the Washington 
Pilgrimage. On March 21, four days after the Department of Justice intervened in the 
Louisiana school cases, St. John Barrett, an attorney in the Civil Rights Division, 
telephoned NAACP attorney Oliver Hill. The substance of that conversation has been lost 
to history, but one can speculate that it influenced the advice that Hill presented to 
Francis Griffin. Hill counseled Griffin that the Washington Pilgrimage was “ill-advisable 
at this time,” especially for participation by the plaintiffs in the school case. In addition, 
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the NAACP legal staff was more confident than ever that justice would be rendered in the 
courts. Perhaps Barrett had indicated to Hill that the attorney general’s actions in 
Louisiana strengthened his hand to enter the Prince Edward litigation and that such action 
was under serious consideration. Regardless, Griffin explained to Wyatt Tee Walker, a 
friend and executive director of SCLC, that Prince Edward’s black community was 
withdrawing its participation from the sit-in campaign. After securing commitments and 
spending hundreds of dollars, Milton Reid found this change of plans “a most 
embarrassing situation.” He considered continuing the campaign without Griffin’s 
blessing, but as one observer explained, “no one can go into Prince Edward and work 
unilaterally. Griffin cannot be bypassed.” Without the support of black Prince 
Edwardians the Washington Pilgrimage collapsed.
33
 
 The NAACP’s leadership in Prince Edward County had been tested. Francis 
Griffin had staved off a challenge from VCLC but not without personal cost. “I am 
already under pressure from leaders of SCLC and many fellow clergymen,” explained 
Griffin, “and it is going to cost me in many ways in the future.” Griffin warned Lester 
Banks that the NAACP “must step up” its program to blunt more challenges to the 
NAACP’s leadership in the county. He implored Banks “to do all you can to get the state 
and national offices to see the importance of our keeping the ball in our possession and 
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that we cannot afford any fumbles at this time.” Despite the warning, the NAACP did not 
throw downfield but continued to run between the tackles. The State Conference could 
not provide additional assistance, because it could not meet its own financial obligations. 
Banks appealed to church leaders for donations to the training centers, but the letter was 
void of new ideas. The NAACP continued to slowly march the ball down the field with 
its conservative legal and non-legal approach.
34
 Federal intervention could push the line 
to pay dirt while keeping Prince Edward in the NAACP’s possession.  
 
V 
 
 Federal action in Prince Edward County became inevitable. The Civil Rights 
Division had already uncovered a violation of federal law and county officials gave no 
indication of backing down. As a result, the Division made preparations to intervene. The 
Appeals and Research Section requested that the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Richmond 
send copies of the entire case docket to Washington, as well as clarification on specific 
state and local laws.
35
 Still, Bobby Kennedy provided the state with the chance to mediate 
a solution. The state’s inability to resolve the crisis made federal intervention 
inescapable. 
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 The Department of Justice opened talks with Virginia’s attorney general. Albertis 
Harrison was not a political ally of the Kennedys. During the presidential campaign, 
Harrison had turned down dozens of invitations to speak on behalf of the national 
Democratic ticket. “I am fearful of Kennedy as a leader,” he privately fretted. “I find it 
awfully hard to ‘embrace’ a man as my candidate who, in the course of his acceptance 
speech, said that he embraced the platform of the National Democratic Party with 
conviction and enthusiasm.” Nevertheless, late in the campaign, Harrison reluctantly and 
unenthusiastically endorsed the Kennedy-Johnson ticket for the purpose of holding the 
state Democratic Party together.
36
 
On March 23, Robert Kennedy and Burke Marshall hosted Albertis Harrison for 
an unpublicized conference in Washington to discuss Prince Edward County. Kennedy 
threatened to intervene in the case if he determined that the defendants were frustrating or 
obstructing court orders. Harrison denied any such violation and found “no occasion” for 
federal intervention. Furthermore, Kennedy sought assurances that the schools would be 
reopened, but Harrison offered no such pledge, explaining that the state had no authority 
to compel a locality to operate public schools. “Such a pledge,” Harrison determined, 
“was apparently the only assurance which would have deterred [Kennedy] from an 
otherwise fixed intention to intervene in the suit.” The Kennedy-Harrison meeting 
adjourned without a resolution, but it did open a channel of communication. Harrison 
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promised to share the substance of their conversation with county representatives.
37
 The 
threat of federal intervention had a potentially pacifying effect.  
 On the following day, the newspapers reported a story that provided further 
evidence of the county’s recalcitrance. At the Virginia Congress of Parents and Teachers, 
the Farmville District P-TA challenged a proposed pro-public school legislative plank, 
which read: “We urge that educational opportunity be provided for every child in a public 
school which will enable him to develop to the maximum of his capacity.” Delegates 
contested the language because it failed to recognize private schools, a clear nod to 
Prince Edward County.
38
 However, the amended recommendation took no accounting of 
the locked-out black children. Prince Edward County showed no signs of surrender and, 
in fact, as demonstrated by this meeting, the private school forces had tremendous 
influence over the state. At this point, the county had no reason to concede, at least not 
without an enforceable court order. 
 On April 11, the federal court proceedings resumed without a shift in the state or 
county position. Judge Oren Lewis permitted the NAACP to challenge the allocation of 
public funds to private schools, tax credits for contributions to the Prince Edward School 
Foundation, and the release of public school property to private corporations, and set a 
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May 8 hearing date for the attorneys to present further arguments. Judge Lewis, however, 
did not invite the attorney general to enter the case as a “friend of the court,” as Judge 
Wright had done in New Orleans. Burke Marshall was “giving every consideration to the 
question whether any Federal action is proper and desirable,” but without new legislation 
or an invitation from the court, the attorney general’s authority to intervene in the Prince 
Edward litigation remained tenuous. When the Civil Rights Division acted without court 
orders, reflected Assistant Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, “it was often on thin 
ice, which is one of the reasons Burke [Marshall] so often tried to negotiate and 
compromise.”
39
 
 Burke Marshall continued talks with Albertis Harrison. On April 19, Marshall 
spoke to Harrison by telephone for the third straight day. Harrison had advised the Prince 
Edward attorneys of their talks, but “it did not appear that any action on their part was 
indicated.” After the negotiations yielded no significant progress, Marshall sent Harrison 
the latest opinion in the St. Helena Parish school case. Speaking for the three-judge court, 
Judge John Minor Wisdom determined that: 
 
national policy and state policy require us to scrutinize carefully any statute 
leading to the closing of public schools. When there is now such a manifest 
correlation between education and national survival, it is a sad and ill-timed hour 
to shut the doors to public schools. And, now, when one of the principal functions 
of the state is to maintain an educational system, it seems strange indeed and anti-
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civilized to shift the major burden to private persons, many of whom cannot 
afford or can ill-afford to pay for private schooling. 
 
 
In addition, the court invited the U.S. attorney general and state attorneys general from 
across the country to file amicus briefs to determine the constitutionality of school 
closings.  With the U.S. Supreme Court providing little guidance to the lower courts, the 
circuit courts often issued the definitive interpretation of the law, and the Fifth Circuit 
played a leading role. Judge Wisdom clearly indicated where the court’s sympathies lay. 
An affirmative ruling by the circuit court could set the necessary precedent to find school 
closings unconstitutional. In his final overture to Albertis Harrison, Burke Marshall 
attached a note, which read: “If this action of the court in Louisiana, and the obligations 
under which it places the Federal Government appears to you likely to change the 
situation in Prince Edward County, I would appreciate it if you would call me at your 
earliest convenience.”
40
 The time for negotiating had run out. 
Prince Edward-style education needed to be stopped. On April 22, St. Helena 
Parish voted by an overwhelming majority of 1,147 to 56 on a referendum to abandon 
public education (the federal courts had ordered the vote to be non-binding). Also, 
representatives from several Louisiana parishes, including East Baton Rouge, visited Roy 
Pearson at Prince Edward Academy to obtain first-hand information on establishing 
private schools. Pearson received favorable impressions from his visitors and predicted 
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that several parishes would organize private schools. The interest in the Academy was not 
limited to Louisianans. “We are averaging about two delegations a week coming here to 
investigate our operations,” Pearson boasted. In addition, Pearson had recently authored a 
booklet, Setting Up Private Schools, which was part Prince Edward School Foundation 
history, part procedural framework. He concluded that “any other community with 
sufficient citizens who wish to preserve and exercise their individual rights also can 
establish satisfactory private schools.” The Foundation’s president, Blanton Hanbury, 
told the Saturday Evening Post that segregation academies were “the coming thing in the 
South.” The administration “didn’t want [Prince Edward] to become a model,” explained 
Nicholas Katzenbach.
41
 Therefore, the attorney general had to blunt the segregated 
private school movement to save public schools, and that meant damming the river at its 
source.  
 Robert Kennedy addressed the “deplorable situation” in Prince Edward County, 
and school desegregation generally, in an interview with WDSU-TV of New Orleans. 
The attorney general made the moral argument against school closings. When “you 
deprive children who are going to be the future leaders of this country of an education…it 
seems to me that this is a tremendous blight on our country,” reasoned Kennedy. “The 
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mere fact that young children, who really are not involved in it directly themselves, that 
their parents are keeping them away from going to school because of the fear that they 
might be in a classroom with two or three Negro children seems to me…inexplicable.” 
The attorney general urged the South to take responsibility by complying with court 
orders: “It seems that some progress, some attention to this problem has to be given by 
the citizens of the South so that they can make progress themselves; because if they’re 
not going to take any action, then of course the federal government comes more and more 
into it” – and preparations were underway. The Civil Rights Division was making final 
revisions on a brief for federal intervention.
42
 
 On April 26, the Department of Justice acted in Prince Edward County with, as 
the New York Times reported, the “toughest move on the school desegregation problem to 
date.” Upon the recommendation of Burke Marshall and “strongly backed” by President 
Kennedy, the attorney general filed a motion in the U.S. District Court of the Eastern 
District of Virginia to intervene in the case, not as a friend of the court, but as a party 
plaintiff – an unprecedented act. The attorney general considered the case so important 
that an advisory role would not suffice; the Department of Justice had to become an 
active litigant. Kennedy wanted to join with the locked-out children in common cause. 
However, the attorney general’s motion was void of the moral assertions advanced in his 
interview with WDSU-TV. He believed that, without legislation, the Department of 
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Justice was not authorized to bring suits on behalf of individuals, but it was empowered 
to protect court orders. The defendants had violated this court’s April 1960 edict, which 
ordered the school board to make preparations for desegregation. In a written statement,  
Kennedy justified his decision: “Court orders are being circumvented and nullified. 
Therefore, we have brought this action to protect the integrity of the judicial process of 
the United States.”
43
 
 The Department of Justice petitioned the court to expand the NAACP’s 
complaint. The attorney general asked to add the Commonwealth of Virginia, the 
comptroller of Virginia, and the Prince Edward School Foundation as defendants, 
because, as he argued, the state and county were working with the Foundation to 
circumvent the court’s orders by operating a private school with public funds. The 
NAACP did not have the power to break this ring of collusion, as private parties could 
not sue the state without its consent. Next, the attorney general asked the court to enjoin 
the defendants from obstructing court orders, failing to maintain public schools, making 
tuition grant payments to Foundation students, and allowing taxpayer credits for 
contributions to the Foundation. Finally, the attorney general asked the court to enjoin 
state officials from issuing funds to any school in the commonwealth until public 
education resumed in Prince Edward County. He argued that schools being operating 
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across the state but not in Prince Edward violated the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. With his motion, Robert Kennedy put the power, prestige, and 
resources of the federal government behind the locked-out children.
44
  
 
 The NAACP celebrated the attorney general’s action. Roy Wilkins publicly 
expressed the national NAACP’s pleasure over the announcement. At the state level, 
Lester Banks conveyed his “delight” and optimism that the action would precipitate the 
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resumption of public education by September. Reverend Griffin reported that black 
Prince Edwardians were “happy” about the announcement: “We believe that this is the 
right and democratic procedure for the federal government. We are also happy that there 
are men in the federal government of such caliber.”
45
 The NAACP had banked on 
Washington to reopen the public schools, as did young people. 
 Coincidentally, two days later, five locked-out students were in Washington en 
route to a conference on race relations. A Washington Post reporter asked them about the 
federal government’s role in resolving the school crisis. Thirteen year old Everett 
Berryman presumed that Washington “should be able to do something about our 
schools.” Michael Smith, also thirteen, looked over at the White House and predicted that 
“President Kennedy is going to get our schools opened up. I saw him on television and I 
can tell from the way he talks, he’ll open them up.” Afterwards, they spent the weekend 
with the Fairfax County Junior Council on Human Relations and the Methodist Youth 
Fellowship of Chevy Chase, Maryland. The host groups “became especially concerned” 
for the schoolless children. They drafted an open letter to the attorney general urging 
“that all possible legal and moral action be taken to restore public schools in Prince 
Edward County for all students.”
46
 The youth looked to the federal government for justice 
and, now with the Kennedy brothers in power, the locked-out children had an advocate in 
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Washington. Robert Kennedy used his platform to connect the school closings’ legal and 
moral issues in a powerful state paper. 
 Robert Kennedy’s first major speech as attorney general focused on civil rights. 
The University of Georgia’s Law Day exercises on May 6, 1961, provided the ideal  
setting to proclaim his bulldog-like commitment to enforcing court orders. Days before 
President Kennedy’s inauguration, the campus had erupted into violence over the 
admission of two black students. Another crisis loomed seventy miles away. Atlanta 
faced federal court orders to desegregate its public schools by September. Recently, the 
state had signaled its intention to defy the court. Georgia lawmakers had passed a 
measure authorizing school boards to close its schools and another that provided tuition 
grants for students to attend segregated private schools.
47
 The administration could not 
allow the desegregation of Atlanta’s public schools, a potential model for other southern 
school districts, to be marred by violence like New Orleans or defiance like Prince 
Edward County. The Law Day speech gave Kennedy the platform to declare the 
administration’s determination to enforce school desegregation.  
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Reports of a civil rights “bombshell” in Bobby Kennedy’s prepared remarks 
spawned hostility. On the eve of the event, vandals painted KENNEDY GO HOME and 
YANKEE GO HOME on the sidewalk. Before the attorney general arrived, the university 
removed the graffiti and the police arrested a group of protestors – five ministers carrying 
 
Figure 6.5 Robert F. Kennedy, May 6, 1961. (Photo: Library of 
Congress). 
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placards that read: THE BIBLE TEACHES SEPARATION. Many dignitaries were noticeably 
absent. The Peach State’s top political officials, many of whom had welcomed Roy 
Pearson the previous year, had encountered scheduling conflicts of epidemic proportions; 
clearly a naked effort to distance themselves from Kennedy and his position on civil 
rights, particularly his action in Prince Edward County. The state’s political leaders, most 
notably Governor Ernest Vandiver,  Senator Herman Talmadge, and state Attorney 
General Eugene Cook, had attacked the intervention motion as a federal takeover of 
public schools. Still, Kennedy did not retreat from his position.
48
  
Kennedy presented the administration’s “blueprint” for civil rights by centering 
his remarks on Prince Edward County. He expected that communities would abide by the 
rule of law, but that was not the situation in Southside Virginia. Kennedy defended his 
legal action there by tying the county’s violation of the law to the moral bankruptcy of 
the school closings: “I cannot believe that anyone can support a principle which prevents 
more than a thousand of our children in one county from attending public school – 
especially when this step was taken to circumvent the orders of the court.” Kennedy 
warned those considering similar defiance that the administration would enforce court 
orders. “In this case – in all cases – I say to you today that if the orders of the court are 
circumvented, the Department of Justice will act. We will not stand by or be aloof. We 
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will move.” The message had been sent to Atlanta, New Orleans, and all other localities 
under court orders to desegregate.
49
  
 The attorney general affirmed his support for Brown. “I happen to believe that the 
1954 decision was right,” stated Kennedy. “But, my belief does not matter – it is the law. 
Some of you may believe the decision was wrong. That does not matter. It is the law. 
And we both have to respect the law.” Kennedy believed that the rule of law had to be 
followed whether one supported a particular court decision or not.
50
 However, his support 
did matter. As the nation’s top law enforcement official, Kennedy’s endorsement 
indicated that the edict would be vigorously enforced – quite a contrast to the previous 
administration. President Eisenhower’s cool response to the Brown decision had 
emboldened massive resisters. Robert Kennedy proclaimed that the federal government’s 
indifference to school desegregation had come to an end. Still, the influence of Attorney 
General Kennedy could not equate to that of President Eisenhower, or perhaps so. 
 Robert Kennedy’s law day speech carried the weight of the presidency. He was 
not only the attorney general, but also the president’s brother and most trusted advisor. 
The Bay of Pigs debacle in mid-April taught President Kennedy that he could not “rely 
on experts,” and therefore, the president delegated more foreign policy matters to his 
brother. The attorney general’s expanding portfolio made him, as Time magazine judged, 
the “Assistant President” and the “New Frontier’s No. 2 man.” From that position, Bobby 
Kennedy spoke with a shade of the president’s authority and the moral force of that 
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office. And this important declaration of the administration’s convictions on civil rights 
had been cleared by the president, which makes every line – the pledge to “vigorously” 
enforce civil rights statutes and federal court orders, the support of the Brown decision, 
and condemning the moral bankruptcy of closing public schools – all the more 
powerful.
51
  
 
* * * * * 
 
The Kennedy administration took proactive measures to restore public education 
to Prince Edward County.  Within its first one hundred days, the administration studied 
the situation, pressed for voluntary compliance, built the case for federal intervention, 
and took unprecedented legal action. This fury of activity resulted from the marriage of 
new executive leadership with innovative thinking. The Kennedys and Burke Marshall 
tested the limits of executive power to protect the rights of the locked-out children – 
actions unfathomable to the previous administration. In doing so, the Kennedy 
administration declared its intention to enforce the Brown decision and arrest the school 
closing movement. Executive action, if found acceptable to federal judges, would suffice 
until Kennedy had a working congress to pass civil rights legislation. All of this action 
had been put in motion before the Freedom Riders departed from Washington.  
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 The Kennedy brothers exerted executive leadership in Prince Edward County. 
President Kennedy fostered an atmosphere sympathetic to the locked-out children by 
providing the moral leadership that had been lacking in the previous administration. The 
new president endorsed the Brown decision and condemned school closings that defied it. 
As a show of the administration’s position, Kennedy sent a former NAACP attorney to 
confront the school closers at a conference on school desegregation. More important, 
President Kennedy freed the Department of Justice to test the limits of its executive 
authority. Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the president’s brother and most trusted 
advisor, acted and spoke on Prince Edward County with the moral authority of the 
presidency. Kennedy informed Albertis Harrison that the failure to reopen the schools 
would result in federal action. With that warning unheeded, Kennedy signed off on the 
most aggressive legal maneuver on school desegregation to date. The attorney general 
boldly stood by that action in his appearance at the University of Georgia. In the past, 
politicians had condemned segregation from afar, but never had such a high-ranking 
federal official done so in the Deep South.
52
 A new generation of leadership had arrived. 
Burke Marshall discovered a path to federal intervention in Prince Edward 
County. He promptly assessed the situation and recommended federal intervention; in 
fact, Marshall made the recommendation on February 28, 1961 – less than one month on 
the job and even before the Senate held his confirmation hearing. He conditioned that 
recommendation on winning an affirmative ruling of the attorney general’s authority in 
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the New Orleans school case. With that victory secured, Marshall strengthened his hand 
even further by expanding the attorney general’s amicus power in the St. Helena Parish, 
East Baton Rouge Parish, and technical school cases. The Department of Justice played 
that hand in Prince Edward County once negotiations with Albertis Harrison failed to 
bear fruit. The Burke Marshall-led Civil Rights Division recognized the urgency of the 
matter and refused to surrender to the artificial barriers (the absence of federal legislation 
and an invitation from the presiding judge) that constrained its predecessor. Burke 
Marshall exercised creativity and innovation to ensure the full enforcement of the laws.  
 Federal intervention had implications beyond Southside Virginia. The Prince 
Edward action set the precedent that school closings would not be tolerated by the 
Kennedy administration. Louisiana officials took note. The state attorney general 
expressed “great interest, because the eventual decision on the matter…could well end 
the legal fight for both a private school system and grants in aid programs.” East Baton 
Rouge’s district attorney, and recent guest of Roy Pearson, conceded that the proceedings 
“may have a great bearing on the way we chart our own course in this parish.”
53
 The 
attorney general’s action in Prince Edward County all but stopped the school closing 
movement.  
 Civil rights leaders welcomed the executive action. It lessened the urgency to pass 
federal school desegregation laws. In the aftermath of the Washington Pilgrimage 
cancellation, Walter Fauntroy had continued working with congressmen on a bill to 
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reopen the schools. He found the legislative approach fraught with difficulties. Fauntroy, 
therefore, cheered federal intervention as “far more effective and speedy than the 
cumbersome process of getting a bill through both Houses.” The federal action also 
soothed the cries for direct action, thus providing cover for the NAACP. Roy Wilkins 
privately told Bobby Kennedy that “the action of the Department of Justice will be good 
for us all.”
54
 The action certainly distracted from the NAACP’s conservative and 
unimaginative approach to Prince Edward County, but it did not provide a lot of “good” 
for the administration, which had to weather the political consequences.
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CHAPTER VII 
 
ARMED TRUCE 
 
 
 The Kennedy administration’s action in Prince Edward County counters the 
prevailing interpretation of the president’s relationship with southern congressmen. 
Kennedy scholarship purports a timid executive who moved cautiously on civil rights to 
safeguard his domestic agenda from southern conservatives. By virtue of seniority, 
southerners chaired congressional committees with the power to disrupt the president’s 
entire domestic program. In fact, three of those committees were chaired by Harry Byrd, 
A. Willis Robertson, and Howard Smith – all members of the Byrd Organization. Thus, 
by authorizing federal intervention in Prince Edward County, President Kennedy exposed 
his legislative program to retaliation from the Byrd Organization. In fact, the 
Organization men attacked the president’s education bill in the name of federal overreach 
in Prince Edward County. President Kennedy, therefore, came to the defense of the 
locked-out children despite the certain political repercussions. 
 The Kennedy-Byrd relationship was already strained. They belonged to the same 
political party, but their political views were at odds. In fact, Byrd did not endorse the 
Kennedy-Johnson ticket, and in the early months of the new administration, Kennedy and 
Byrd had already tangled over legislation. Still, they maintained a mutual regard, but 
were operating, as one journalist suggested, “under the terms of an informal armed 
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truce.” The Prince Edward intervention only exacerbated the cold war between the 
Kennedys and the Byrd Organization. Senator Byrd condemned the attorney general’s 
action as “intemperate” and “ruthless” and urged him not to “destroy the few remaining 
State’s rights – one being the right to educate our own children with our own money in 
our own State.”
1
 Nevertheless, President Kennedy continued to court Harry Byrd. 
A working relationship with Harry Byrd served the president’s political interests. 
President Kennedy accepted Harry Byrd’s invitation to attend his spring luncheon. On 
May 7, 1961, the president’s helicopter landed at the senator’s Berryville estate, leading 
to, as Harry Byrd Jr. described, a “most interesting and dramatic day.” Kennedy’s 
surprise appearance delighted the host and his one hundred fifty guests – political friends, 
newsmen, and neighbors. The president spoke casually to each guest, signed autographs, 
and sampled the fare. In The Bystander: John F. Kennedy and the Struggle for Black 
Equality (2006), a damning assessment of Kennedy’s civil rights record, Nick Bryant 
determined that the president’s appearance “smacked of political pandering.” Bryant 
implies that Kennedy attended the luncheon to reconcile with Byrd and that he 
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subsequently restrained the attorney general from seeking a legal solution in Prince 
Edward County.
2
 The historical record does not support that supposition.  
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Figure 7.1 “Getting in Bobby’s Hair.” (Image: Richmond Times-
Dispatch). 
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The Kennedy administration executed its Prince Edward strategy despite the 
political consequences. Kennedy did not signal a retreat at the Byrd luncheon or call off 
federal involvement in the case. Instead, the Department of Justice vigorously prosecuted 
the case. In doing so, the administration left its domestic agenda exposed to attack from 
the Virginia congressional delegation. President Kennedy could have expended federal 
patronage as a peace offering, but instead, he rewarded the Organization’s foes with 
federal positions. The attorney general’s action also renewed the press coverage of the 
shameful school closings, thus exposing the Organization to ridicule and ensuring that the 
Prince Edward crisis was an issue in the gubernatorial race. President Kennedy’s 
assertive action in Prince Edward County demonstrated that he would not be cow-tailed 
by Harry Byrd.  
 
I 
 
The Kennedy administration vigorously prosecuted the case despite the political 
fallout. The editorial pages across the commonwealth denounced the move as 
“dictatorial,” “vindictive,” “an invasion,” “arrogant,” “reckless,” “punitive,” “a 
constitutional upheaval,” and “shocking.”
3
 The Byrd Organization raised the specter, and 
played on base fears, that the attorney general’s action marked the first step to federal 
control over schools and the slow march to the elimination of states’ rights and individual 
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liberties. Virginia citizens grew concerned over the uncertainty that the intervention 
motion created for the future of the state’s public school system. The Department of 
Justice tried to allay unwarranted fears, but it was not dissuaded from presenting a strong 
case on the unconstitutionality of the school closings.  
The Byrd Organization related the attorney general’s action in Prince Edward 
County to federal incursions into states’ rights a century earlier. Virginia’s congressional 
delegation led the chorus of condemnation. Watkins Abbitt attacked the move as “an 
attempt by totalitarian executive action and judicial usurpation of power to make hollow 
shells of our state and local governments and assume dictatorial control over a purely 
local function.” Burr Harrison warned that it would lead to “absolute despotism.” Bill 
Tuck found it “the most wicked and vicious abuse of federal authority since the tragic era 
of Reconstruction.” Citizens called for resistance. William M. Perry of Providence Forge 
(New Kent County) felt that the attorney general had opened “old wounds.” He urged 
Virginians to draw inspiration from their Confederate heroes to “attack the problem with 
renewed vigor and make sure those who died in Virginia 100 years ago did not die in 
vain.” Similarly, J.V. Lewis of Prospect stated that the “Kennedy crowd” was “sowing 
the seed…[of] insurrections” and predicted that “people will be so riled one of these 
days, that they will say we will not take anymore.” Four days after the attorney general 
filed his motion, a crowd of two hundred fifty dissenters gathered in Farmville. The 
Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties held a rally and unanimously 
moved to censure the Department of Justice’s action as “coercion and intimidation of a 
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type found only in totalitarianism.”
4
 Segregationists attacked federal intervention by 
ramping up false fears and playing on emotions. 
The intervention motion caused anxiety for Virginians. The attorney general 
threatened to close all public schools in the state as long as Prince Edward County 
remained closed. Kennedy exposed himself to the charge that he, not the massive 
resisters, was the school closer. Harry Byrd exploited that role reversal. “I am amazed 
that the Attorney General of the United States seeks to close every public school in 
Virginia to 847,000 white and Negro students unless Prince Edward surrenders on its 
position in regard to integration,” admonished the senator in a statement. “The attempt to 
punish an entire State because the action of one county displeases the U.S. Attorney 
General is fantastic and completely unrealistic.” Ironically, Governor Almond, the man 
who in 1958 closed schools under the massive resistance laws, tried to allay fears. He 
assured the public that the federal government was “not seeking to close down all schools 
in Virginia,” that he and the State Board of Education were “calm” over the situation, and 
that “there is no reason to be excited about it.” The Byrd Organization, apparently, had no 
interest in taking heat off the attorney general. State Senator Harry Byrd Jr. derided 
Almond and Kennedy. “I maintain that calmness is no virtue when it means complacency 
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in the face of threats to one of our most basic liberties.” He pledged to “resist to the 
utmost this new invasion from Washington.”
5
 
 The Department of Justice went into damage control. “No school in Virginia need 
to be closed,” read a press release. “All that is necessary is for the State of Virginia and 
Prince Edward County to reopen the County’s public school system.” U.S. Solicitor 
General Archibald Cox assured the public that the Department’s aim was to “bring about 
the operation of a public school system.” Another government source divulged that 
Kennedy threatened to close schools only for “leverage purposes,” to prohibit the transfer 
of responsibility from local to state officials, as had been done. Bobby Kennedy further 
clarified his position at the University of Georgia’s Law Day ceremony: “It is now being 
said that the Department of Justice is attempting to close all public schools in Virginia 
because of the Prince Edward situation. This is not true.” Nor was the suit a threat to 
local control of schools. “The Federal Government would not be running the schools in 
Prince Edward County any more than it is running the University of Georgia or the 
schools in my State of Massachusetts.” Kennedy clarified but did not soften his position.
6
 
Burke Marshall tasked an experienced lawyer to present the United States’ 
arguments in federal court. St. John Barrett, thirty-seven years old, had joined the 
                                                          
5
 “Statement by Senator Harry F. Byrd (D. Va.), in re intervention by the Attorney General of the 
United States in the Prince Edward County school case before the Federal District Court, Richmond, 
Virginia,” April 28, 1961, Box 413, HFBP; Allan Jones, “Prince Edward Held Main U.S. Target,” RTD, 
April 29, 1961, 1; William P. Cheshire, “Almond Discounts U.S. Threat to Va. Schools,” RNL April 28, 
1961, 1; “Harry Byrd, Jr. Sees Switch by Governor,” RTD, May 5, 1961, 2. 
6
 U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, April 27, 1961, Reel 105, RG 60; Associated Press, “Cox 
Explains U.S. Stand in School Case,” WP, May 14, 1961, B3; Jean White, “Almond Sets Meeting on 
School Suit,” WP, April 28, 1961, 1; Thomas A. Hopkins, ed., Rights for Americans: The Speeches of 
Robert F. Kennedy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1964), 17-26. 
 
165 
Department of Justice in 1954 as a trial attorney in the Criminal Division and later 
headed its Civil Rights Section. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 created the Civil Rights 
Division and Barrett was named the second assistant to the Assistant Attorney General 
for Civil Rights. Barrett had worked on high profile school desegregation cases. He had 
been sent to Little Rock and New Orleans to untangle state interference with court orders; 
collaborated with the U.S. attorney in Louisiana on the motions to intervene in the St. 
Helena Parish, East Baton Rouge Parish, and technical school cases; likely authored the 
February 20, 1961, staff report on Prince Edward County; attended the U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights’ conference in Williamsburg; and prepared the Department’s intervention 
motion. Justice lawyers held Barrett in high esteem, considering him a very capable 
lawyer, technician, and litigator, and a tireless leader who “worked his tail off seven days 
a week.”
7
 
 St. John Barrett received final instructions from Burke Marshall. Marshall 
considered it a “matter of extreme importance” that Barrett inform the court that the 
administration did not seek to close schools elsewhere. “I am of the view,” rationalized 
Marshall, “that you should not suggest that the schools could or should be closed as a 
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matter of equitable relief anywhere else even as a temporary matter.” The federal 
government’s complaint alleged that the defendants circumvented and nullified the court 
orders by closing the schools. “The thrust of the relief that is asked for is that the schools 
must be reopened and must be operated again in order to terminate this circumvention 
and nullification of the orders of the court,” explained Marshall. “The particular relief 
asked against each party is that that party do what is necessary to bring about this 
result.”
8
 The directive was clear: make the best possible case to reopen the schools.  
 On May 8-9, 1961, St. John Barrett presented the federal government’s case in 
U.S. District Court. Tall and slight of build, “Slim” Barrett, as his colleagues 
affectionately called him, spoke softly and deliberately. He argued that the Department of 
Justice had a “clear duty” to act when “it appears the integrity of the judicial process is 
threatened.” The state and county had “nullified and circumvented” federal court orders 
by closing the public schools and supplanted them with a publicly funded segregation 
academy. The federal government, therefore, had to intervene to protect the due 
administration of justice. Barrett cited the Little Rock and New Orleans cases as 
precedents to intervene in Prince Edward County. He argued that closing public schools 
to avoid desegregation was as obstructive as Governor Orval Faubus using the National 
Guard to prevent desegregation at Little Rock Central High School or the Louisiana State 
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Legislature passing laws in defiance of court orders.
9
 Nevertheless, Barrett did not find 
this court nearly as sympathetic to his arguments as the one in Louisiana.  
 
 Judge Oren Lewis appeared unmoved by St. John Barrett’s presentation. Lewis, 
appointed to the federal bench by President Eisenhower in 1960, disagreed with Barrett 
over the similarity between Prince Edward County, Little Rock, and New Orleans. He 
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         Figure 7.2 St. John Barrett. (Photo: Associated Press). 
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reminded Barrett that county officials “certainly aren’t using force to prevent 
enforcement of an order.” Barrett told the court that “orders can be frustrated and 
nullified by more subtle methods than troops and legislatures gone wild.” Barrett and 
Lewis also sparred over a more fundamental issue: the constitutionality of the school 
closings. Judge Lewis wanted the Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals to answer 
that question, but Barrett considered the school closings a federal matter. Denying 
children a public education violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. “The one fact that renders the school closing illegal,” argued Barrett, “is 
that other schools are open.” Still, he emphasized that the Department of Justice did not 
ask that other schools be closed, only that Prince Edward County’s public schools be 
reopened. “I don’t see how I can order the reopening of schools,” replied Lewis, “without 
also saying how big, what kind of schools, how many teachers and so forth.” Throughout 
the hearing, Judge Lewis indicated his reluctance to permit federal intervention. His 
caution served as a boon to county attorneys. “I am rather encouraged,” reported 
Commonwealth’s Attorney Frank Nat Watkins, “and believe that this is the first time any 
‘little sunshine’ has come in this case so far as I am concerned.”
10
 
 The court denied the attorney general’s motions. On June 14, Judge Lewis issued 
a twenty-four-page memorandum opinion outlining his reasoning that granting 
intervention would “unduly delay and prejudice” the rights of the litigants. He cited some 
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procedural issues. First, the attorney general failed to submit a “timely” application. 
Kennedy filed his motion “more than a year” after the court’s April 22, 1960, ruling – on 
April 26, 1961. Ultimately, the court penalized the locked-out children for the previous 
administration’s indifference. Second, Lewis found federal intervention in this case 
“contrary to the intent of congress.” He believed that the attorney general had no 
authority to intervene without federal legislation. This opinion stood in contrast to the 
three-judge court’s decision in Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board just three months 
earlier that welcomed federal intervention in school desegregation cases, a decision the 
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed on June 19, 1961. Finally, the federal motion would 
“materially delay” the adjudication of the plaintiffs’ rights. Adding the Commonwealth of 
Virginia as a defendant required convening a three-judge court, and the potential appeals 
ran the risk of postponing a final decision.
11
 
 The court also refuted the federal government’s arguments for intervention. First, 
Judge Lewis dismissed the contention that the Little Rock and New Orleans cases were 
comparable to Prince Edward County. Unlike the other cases, the problems in Prince 
Edward County were “being solved in a lawful and proper manner through the courts.” 
Next, the court had not determined that the defendants had violated or circumvented any 
orders. Federal intervention would only be granted after the plaintiffs proved that 
allegation. Finally, the intervention motion made relief “unnecessarily punitive.” Despite 
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St. John Barrett’s assurance that the attorney general had no interest in closing schools, 
Lewis still found the threat real. “This Court can only conclude,” Lewis explained, “if the 
Government be permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff, it would urge this Court to 
enter an order that would jeopardize the education of several hundred thousand Virginia 
children.” The court denied both federal intervention and the motion to add defendants. 
The decision, reported the Washington Post, represented the “sharpest setback that the 
civil rights efforts of the Kennedy administration have received in a courtroom.”
12
 
Consequently, it reduced the chances of arresting the educational erosion in Prince 
Edward County. 
 The negative court decision compounded the impact of the county’s renewed 
defiance. On June 9, the board of supervisors had convened a public hearing on the 
proposed school budgets. The school board had presented a plan to operate public schools 
for all the county’s school-age children and another for about eighteen hundred children 
(a rough estimate of the school-age black population). Seven segregationists urged the 
board of supervisors to reject both budgets and keep the public schools shutdown. Louis 
Dahl recommended that “until such time as schools can be run as the majority of white 
people in the county want them run – stick to your policy.” On the other hand, two 
Longwood College professors (Gordon Moss and Henry Bittenger) and three African 
American citizens (Reverend L. Francis Griffin, Reverend Robert Ellis, and Dorothy 
Croner) petitioned the board to reopen the schools. Nevertheless, the board of supervisors 
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voted to keep the public schools closed for a third year. The supervisors passed the 
savings along to county residents through a cut in the personal property, real estate, and 
merchant tax rates. Still, the county had sufficient funds to provide $285,000 in tuition 
grants and $30,000 in transportation grants to private school students.
13
 The county 
ensured that education for white students continued uninterrupted but did nothing to fill 
the educational vacuum for black children. 
The Department of Justice maintained its interest in Prince Edward County. A 
spokesman told the press that Justice lawyers had given “considerable study” to the U.S. 
District Court’s ruling and were contemplating new action. On July 24, Judge Lewis 
convened a four-day hearing on the NAACP’s allegation that the state and county 
circumvented federal court orders. St. John Barrett sat conspicuously with the plaintiffs, 
fueling speculation that federal action was imminent. Barrett told the press that he was 
present “strictly as an observer.” However, he was no ordinary court watcher. Judge 
Lewis had stated that the court would consider granting federal intervention if he 
determined that the defendants had circumvented court orders. The Department of Justice 
signaled through Barrett’s presence its eagerness to intervene in the case at the earliest 
possible moment.
14
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 The testimony indicated that the court orders had been circumvented. The 
NAACP tried to prove that the board of supervisors intended to defy the federal courts. 
Robert Carter pressed William Vaughan, chairman of the board of supervisors, to divulge 
whether the board had discussed closing the schools to block desegregation. Segar 
Gravatt shielded the supervisors from this questioning by invoking legislative privilege. 
Judge Lewis sustained Gravatt’s objection but added that he would “be surprised if 
[Brown] wasn’t discussed.” T.J. McIlwaine, the superintendent of schools, testified that 
the school board would operate public schools once the board of supervisors provided 
funds. Otherwise, the school board had done nothing to comply with the court orders, 
because it was “advised by counsel that there was nothing for us to do since the schools 
were already closed.” Next, the NAACP alleged that the Prince Edward School 
Foundation was not a private but a public facility, and therefore, it should be barred from 
receiving public funds to defy the court and perpetuate segregation. Foundation officials 
stressed that the schools were “strictly private,” that they took no direction from any 
government agency. Still, the officials admitted that public money, through tuition grants, 
funded over 90 percent of the school’s $348,072 budget. Nevertheless, the county 
attorneys vociferously defended the constitutionality of the tuition grant program. They 
argued that the white children should not be penalized because the black children did not 
take advantage of the freedom of choice program.
15
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 Judge Oren Lewis determined that Prince Edward County circumvented court 
orders. On August 25, 1961, Lewis handed down his ruling. “By closing the public 
schools, the Board of Supervisors have effectively deprived the citizens of Prince Edward 
County without a freedom of choice between private and public education,” read the 
opinion. “County funds have been appropriated (in the guise of tuition grants and tax 
credits) to aid segregated schooling in Prince Edward County. That, to say the least, is 
circumventing a constitutionally protected right.” Therefore, the court severed the 
Foundation from its lifeblood by enjoining county officials from disbursing local grants, 
from allowing tax credits for donations to the foundation schools, and from the 
disbursement of state tuition grants to any resident of Prince Edward County “so long as 
the public schools of Prince Edward County remained closed.” Next, Judge Lewis found 
that the school board failed to comply with the court’s April 22, 1960, order to make 
preparations to admit students to the public schools without regard to race. The court 
directed the school board to prepare such plans “so that they may be readily available 
when and if the public schools…are reopened.” Judge Lewis, however, did not issue an 
order to reopen the schools. Rather, he remanded the case to the Virginia State Supreme 
Court of Appeals to determine whether the state constitution required a locality to operate 
public schools.
16
 Judge Lewis, ultimately, agreed with the Department of Justice that 
court orders had been circumvented, but by remanding the case to the state courts, he 
kept the case out of the attorney general’s orbit.  
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The U.S. District Court in Louisiana acted much more forthright in Hall v. St. 
Helena Parish School Board. A three-judge court had invited the attorney general to file 
an amicus brief to provide his view on the relationship between the equal protection 
clause and school closing and tuition grant statutes. The U.S. Department of Justice 
stressed that education was “of fundamental importance” and that the state had the 
responsibility to provide public schools. In its sixty-seven-page brief, Justice asserted that 
“Louisiana’s experiment with ignorance must be examined.” The federal government 
argued that Louisiana’s school closing law, Act No. 2, violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment and obstructed court orders. Justice alleged that the Louisiana legislators 
acted with “subterfuge” by passing laws written in innocuous language but clearly defiant 
in intent. “We submit that this Court need not stand idly by, permit the public schools of 
St. Helena Parish to be closed, await the organization of the subterfuge schools, and then, 
when the evasive scheme has fully been consummated, call a halt. Rather, the Court may 
and should intervene now to enjoin the initial and indispensable prerequisite to the entire 
scheme: the claimed abandonment of the public school system.”
17
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 The court’s opinion reflected the Department of Justice’s argument. On August 
30, 1961, the court found Act No. 2 unconstitutional. The judges affirmed that the state 
was responsible for providing education and that it could not circumvent the Fourteenth 
Amendment by surrendering school operations to localities. The court determined that “a 
state cannot close the public schools in one area while, at the same time, it maintains 
schools elsewhere with public funds.” In fact, the court cautioned against school closings 
with language borrowed from the Department of Justice: “This is not the moment in 
history for a state to experiment with ignorance.” Nor did the court consider a dual 
private school system funded by public tuition grants a viable alternative. “There can be 
no question about the actual inequality in educational opportunities that will follow 
closure of the public schools in St. Helena Parish, or any other community that invokes 
the Act,” read the opinion. “Grants-in-aid, no matter how generous, are not an adequate 
substitute for public schools.” The St. Helena Parish case demonstrates what could have 
been in Prince Edward County. The Fifth Circuit formed a three-judge panel, invited the 
attorney general to advise the court, and issued a decisive ruling. The opinion offered no 
equivocation on its conviction that states were responsible for public education. The 
defendants appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which affirmed the district court’s ruling 
on February 19, 1962. In the meantime, the public schools in St. Helena Parish remained 
in operation.
18
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The attorney general showed no letup in Prince Edward County. The Department 
of Justice was eager to advise the court and enforce its orders, but Judge Lewis denied its 
request to participate, and by remanding the case to the state court, put the case well 
beyond Bobby Kennedy’s reach. Judge Oren Lewis, in coordination with the Department 
of Justice, could have ended the Prince Edward County school crisis. Instead, the court’s 
caution put the case back on the slow road to resolution, thus buying the segregationists 
more time and compounding the damage to the school-less children. The administration 
had taken a great political gamble and lost. Certainly, a positive resolution to the school 
crisis would have mitigated the negative political repercussions from the intervention 
motion. However, the schools remained closed and the intervention motion put a key 
element of the president’s agenda on the chopping block. 
 
II 
 
 The federal intervention in Prince Edward County exposed the president’s 
domestic agenda to attack. The attorney general’s action struck at the core constituency 
of the Byrd Organization. Certainly, the Organization did not take the situation lightly. 
Organization men chaired key congressional committees with the power to weaken or 
defeat the president’s legislative program. These men already held that program in 
contempt and viewed the Kennedy brothers with suspicion. The federal intervention only 
exacerbated the strains between the Kennedys and Organization leaders stemming from 
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the 1960 presidential campaign. The Kennedys’ action in Prince Edward County gave 
their opponents a club with which to hammer the administration’s education bill.  
 
 
The Virginia senators had the power to bottle up much of the president’s program. 
A. Willis Robertson and Jack Kennedy had a cordial relationship, but it cooled in 1960 as 
Robertson distanced himself from Kennedy and the party’s civil rights plank (although he 
did support the Kennedy-Johnson ticket). Robertson chaired the Senate Banking and 
Currency Committee. The president’s Distressed Area Redevelopment and Housing and 
Urban Improvement bills had to clear Robertson’s committee. Like Robertson, Harry 
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Byrd had personal regard for Jack Kennedy, but not his legislative agenda. As chairman 
of the Senate Finance Committee, Harry Byrd had tremendous influence over Kennedy’s 
proposals on medical care for the aged, tax policy, and Social Security. Kennedy worked 
to safeguard his domestic program by currying the senator’s favor. Certainly, Kennedy 
and Byrd never approached full accord. Luckily for Kennedy, Byrd earned a reputation 
for running the committee with fairness. Although he did, at times, stall hearings, Byrd 
allowed bills he opposed to be reported out of committee.
19
 The chairman of the House 
Rules Committee was not nearly as scrupulous. 
Howard Smith wielded unparalleled power as chairman of the House Rules 
Committee. The committee determined what bills went to the House floor and the manner 
in which the members could debate them (i.e. time limit and the number of amendments 
that could be offered). In short, nearly all matters of Congress had to go through the 
committee, and thus Howard Smith, who determined the committee’s schedule, agenda, 
and timing of votes. A master parliamentarian, Smith delayed, amended, and employed 
any conceivable tactic to defeat or weaken a bill that he opposed – and that meant liberal 
legislation. As the leader of the conservative coalition of Republicans and southern 
Democrats, Smith used the Rules Committee as a bulwark against challenges to small 
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government conservatism, white supremacy, “right-to-work” laws, and states’ rights. The 
Democratic Party platform, therefore, faced a difficult slog.
20
 
 A Kennedy-Byrd Organization rift had opened during the August 1960 special 
session of Congress. The Democrats introduced Senator Kennedy’s five “must” bills, but 
the conservative coalition sent them all down to defeat – an embarrassment to the 
Democratic standard-bearer. Howard Smith played a significant role in bottling up the  
“socialistic” program in the Rules Committee. In a radio interview, the Kennedy-Johnson 
campaign manager, Robert Kennedy, blamed the session’s failure on Howard Smith: 
“The fact that one individual can hold all this up, I think, it’s just a – I think it’s just a 
deplorable situation.” Smith took offense to the indictment. Kennedy sent a letter to 
Smith to express his “regret” for having “personally offended” the congressman, but he 
offered no apology. “I think the Members of Congress should at least have a right to vote 
one way or another,” explained Kennedy. “This is legislation which might well affect the 
destiny of our country and should be considered by our Representatives. These are my 
convictions and I have no apologies to make for them.”
21
 Still, Smith used the incident to 
play the victim as part of a scheme to diminish Senator Kennedy’s vote share in the Old 
Dominion.  
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 The Kennedy-Johnson campaign failed to win the support of Smith and Byrd. 
Smith refused to back the liberal party platform and took personal offense for its calls to 
restructure the Rules Committee. Party leaders proposed diluting the chairman’s 
influence by packing the committee with members favorable to the national party’s 
agenda. “To ask me to publicly endorse a candidate who promises, if elected, to cut my 
throat is a little more than I can swallow,” explained Smith. He even discouraged third 
party candidates from running for fear that they would split the conservative vote and 
hand Virginia to Kennedy. Harry Byrd maintained his “golden silence” – a refusal to 
publicly support the Democratic ticket, which was tantamount to an endorsement for 
Nixon-Lodge. “It would be a tragedy if Kennedy is elected,” State Senator Garland Gray 
warned Harry Byrd, “It is important to you and your friends that Virginia not go for 
Kennedy.” Organization leaders determined that a Kennedy victory would alter the 
political balance in Virginia. Collins Denny warned that Governor Almond, an early 
Kennedy supporter, would become the “real political power” in the state and that an anti-
Organization candidate would win the governor’s race in 1961. Denny urged 
Organization leaders not to endorse the Democratic ticket.
22
 
 Harry Byrd sabotaged the Kennedy-Johnson ticket. At the outset of the general 
election season, Kennedy’s prospects for winning the Old Dominion’s electoral votes 
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appeared remote. A Kennedy pollster found Nixon leading in Virginia by fifteen 
percentage points, but that margin shrunk in the closing weeks of the campaign. Byrd 
worked behind-the-scenes to offset those gains. He employed a political hatchet man to 
communicate the candidate’s opposition to “right-to-work” laws to Virginia businessmen. 
The Byrd team then played to racial fears. On Meet the Press, Senator Kennedy had 
suggested appointing African Americans to the federal judiciary. Speaker of the House of 
Delegates Blackburn Moore, Byrd’s neighbor and confidant, penned an open letter urging 
that Kennedy “publicly pledge himself that no Negro judge will be appointed in any 
Southern State.” Moore predicted that black federal judges “could bring chaos” to the 
South. The Moore letter caught the campaign off guard and arrested its momentum. 
Finally, on October 27, 1960, Byrd introduced President Eisenhower at an event in 
Staunton. The senator’s praiseworthy remarks about Eisenhower signaled his support for 
the Republican ticket. Nixon carried Virginia by a 52.4 to 47.0 margin. Kennedy 
supporters blamed Harry Byrd for the loss.
23
  
Democratic leaders called for Byrd and Smith to relinquish power. Senator Joseph 
Clark (D-PA) proposed penalizing Harry Byrd for his disloyalty to the party. He 
suggested that Senate Democrats who had refused to endorse the Kennedy-Johnson ticket 
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be expelled from the party’s caucus and those who opposed the platform be stripped of 
their committee chairmanships. Nevertheless, Byrd’s colleagues voted to renew his 
chairmanship for the Eighty-Seventh Congress. The bigger problem rested in the twelve-
man House Rules Committee. Howard Smith and William Colmer (D-MS), both 
outspoken opponents of the party platform, were set to ally with four Republican 
committee members to bottle up any liberal legislation. Under these circumstances, 
President Kennedy predicted that “nothing controversial would come to the floor of the 
Congress. Our whole program would be emasculated.” Speaker of the House Sam 
Rayburn (D-TX), an administration ally, recognized the political hazard of purging Smith 
from the chairmanship, preferring, rather, to enlarge the committee by three members 
(two Democrats and one Republican). Unlike the Clark proposal, the president joined this 
fight. “It’s no secret that – I would strongly believe that Members of the House should 
have an opportunity to vote themselves on the programs which we will present,” 
Kennedy told the press. “Shouldn’t the Members of the House themselves and not merely 
the members of the Rules Committee have a chance to vote on those measures?” The 
White House handed out political favors and Speaker Rayburn mustered all his prestige 
to win 217 to 212.
24
 The narrowness of that victory foretold trouble for the 
administration’s program. 
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 President Kennedy proposed controversial legislation to address the nation’s 
education crisis. School buildings were decaying; the baby boom overcrowded schools; 
and teachers’ wages failed to keep up with inflation. On February 20, 1961, President 
Kennedy sent a special message on education to Congress. He proposed a multi-billion 
dollar program that included federal support to build classrooms, supplement teacher 
salaries, and subsidize poorer school districts. The proposition of federal aid to education 
historically faced opposition on several fronts: Americans failed to form a consensus on 
whether parochial schools should receive federal funds; southerners opposed federal aid 
that was tied to integration; and many opposed surrendering local control to the federal 
government. Federal intervention in Prince Edward County married the latter two 
concerns with the general political opposition to the president’s liberal agenda. Senator 
Robertson declared that the attorney general’s action “makes me doubly glad that I have 
always opposed Federal aid to public schools on the ground that Federal aid would 
inevitably be accompanied by Federal control.” Robertson set to work organizing 
opposition to the education bill with renewed vigor.
25
  
 Harry Byrd used federal action in Prince Edward County to lead a new assault on 
the president’s education bill. On May 3, 1961, Harry Byrd took to the Senate floor to 
denounce the bill with federal intervention in Prince Edward as exhibit A:  
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This action is so intemperate it defies belief by parents of our children. But it is 
true, and it comes at a time when we are being urged to enact Federal subsidies 
for public school education in the name of “Federal aid to education.” If 
nonelected Federal officials will go to the extreme they are applying in Virginia 
now, who can imagine the ruthlessness of Federal bureaucrats with the power of 
the Federal purse to force their domination over the schools in our States and 
localities? 
 
Byrd warned that federal dollars meant more federal control over public schools. He 
cautioned that any surrender of control over public education to the central government 
was “certain to be permanent,” despite provisions that declared otherwise. “Those relying 
on these provisions as safeguards against Federal school control will be booby-trapped,” 
cautioned Byrd. He again pointed to federal intervention in Prince Edward County to 
make his point. The omission of a provision permitting the attorney general to initiate 
action in school desegregation cases from federal civil rights legislation did not prevent 
Bobby Kennedy from intervening in the Prince Edward litigation. Following that logic, 
the federal government would go beyond the letter of the education bill to wrest even 
more control of public education from the states and localities. Prince Edward County 
served as “a fair warning” to the perils of federal involvement in public education.
26
  
 Two conservative colleagues joined the choreographed floor “debate.” Senators 
Russell Long (D-LA) and Strom Thurmond (D-SC) warned that the education bill would 
lead to integration. Russell Long predicted that his colleagues would fold under pressure 
and prohibit federal dollars to segregated schools, thus forcing integration through 
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financial coercion. Strom Thurmond, the Dixiecrat candidate for president in 1948, 
expected President Kennedy to use almost any incident as a “pretense for forcing 
integration.” Like Harry Byrd, Thurmond hitched the federal intervention in Prince 
Edward County to the education bill. He censured the attorney general for threatening to 
close all the public schools in Virginia to force integration in Prince Edward County. He 
called on all “right thinking” Americans of all regions of the nation to condemn “one of 
the most unreasonable steps that any Cabinet officer has ever taken in the history of the 
country.” Despite the conservative opposition, the Senate passed the education bill 49 to 
34.
27
 
 Kennedy’s education bill, however, died in Howard Smith’s Rules Committee. 
The Education and Labor Committee reported out the bill by a virtual party line vote 
(only one Democratic committee member opposed the bill). The legislation appeared to 
be gaining the support of southern legislators. Howard Smith worked to hold the 
conservative coalition together. He used the federal intervention in Prince Edward 
County as a key argument to rally southern opposition to the bill. He also circulated a 
race baiting letter to over one hundred newspapers, which read: “This is not a bill to aid 
education. It is a bill to aid the NAACP to complete the subjugation of the Southern 
states and control the direction and conditions under which our youth is to be educated.”  
Smith’s ability to hold together the conservative coalition and the religious issue led to 
the bill’s defeat. James Delaney (D-NY), a representative of a heavily Catholic district, 
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succumbed to constituency pressure and joined the conservative coalition in opposition. 
By an 8 to 7 vote the Rules Committee tabled the bill and a parliamentary device to free 
the bill from committee failed by an overwhelming 170-242 vote. Ted Sorensen 
considered it the administration’s biggest legislative failure of 1961.
28
 
 
III 
 
President Kennedy did not use federal patronage to soothe hard feelings over 
federal action in Prince Edward County. Since the president did not call off the 
Department of Justice’s legal move, offering Harry Byrd some political plums would 
have been politically expedient. Patronage may have softened the conservative coalition’s 
retaliation against the president’s domestic program. Instead, in the days surrounding 
federal action in Prince Edward County, Kennedy named two prominent anti-
Organization men to federal posts. Additionally, Kennedy rewarded three principal 
NAACP attorneys associated with the Prince Edward litigation to federal positions. With 
these appointments, Kennedy doubled-down on his defense of the locked-out children. 
President Kennedy used federal patronage, not to placate Harry Byrd, but to reward the 
Organization’s opponents.  
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The Byrd Organization’s most outspoken critic joined the Kennedy 
administration. Francis Pickens Miller had vehemently derided the Organization for its 
unresponsiveness to the needs of Virginians and for facilitating the state’s anti-
democratic political climate. In 1949, Miller challenged the Organization’s gubernatorial 
candidate for the Democratic nomination. He campaigned on, among other things, 
dismantling the infrastructure that supported the state’s “self-perpetuating oligarchy.” 
Nevertheless, John Battle won with a plurality in a four-man race, but Miller put up a 
good second place showing with 35.3 percent of the vote. Miller vowed to “continue to 
organize the forces of the Democratic Party until we have taken control of the party.” In 
1952, Miller set his sights on a bigger prize: toppling Harry Byrd in the senatorial race; 
however, Byrd won handedly and held off this last major attack by the state party’s 
liberal wing. Recognizing the political reality, Miller worked to hold together the 
coalition of liberals, labor, and African Americans in support of the national party. In 
1960, he was a leader of the Straight Democratic Ticket Committee, an organization 
committed to supporting the Kennedy-Johnson ticket – a sharp contrast to Harry Byrd’s 
“golden silence.” In May 1961, the most despised anti-Organization man was appointed 
special assistant in the Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the U.S. 
Department of State.
29
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President Kennedy also nominated an anti-Organization man to the U.S. District 
Court of the Western District of Virginia. Thomas Michie had demonstrated political 
courage by defying massive resistance. In 1958, Mayor Michie stared down school 
closers by exhorting the citizens of Charlottesville to accept desegregation in order to 
preserve public education. Bob Crawford, president of the Defenders of State 
Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, urged Senator A. Willis Robertson to block the 
nomination: “I consider him one of the most liberal of liberals....I strongly feel that the 
appointment of Michie to a Federal judgeship would be extremely unfortunate.” 
Likewise, Fred Switzer, a Democratic Party committeeman, advised Harry Byrd to 
invoke senatorial courtesy. He characterized Michie as “a radical left winger of the worst 
sort,” “soft on the integration question,” “bitterly anti-Organization,” and “the worst 
enemy you have in Virginia other than [Francis] Pickens Miller.” Nevertheless, the 
Senate confirmed Thomas Michie’s appointment to the federal bench.
30
  
A war of words between Harry Byrd and the NAACP did not prevent Oliver Hill 
from joining the administration. On May 12, in adjoining Buckingham County, Harry 
Byrd distorted reality by blaming the NAACP, and the NAACP “alone,” for the Prince 
Edward County school closings and 1,700 black children being kept out of school. He 
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derided the NAACP, specifically attorney Oliver Hill, for advising the black community 
(with unsubstantiated allegations of intimidation) to reject the offer of white leaders to set 
up a separate private school for blacks. Hill responded to Byrd at a mass rally in 
Farmville the following week.  He put the onus for the school closings on the county 
leaders and characterized their action as “a crime against humanity.” The attorney 
defended his advice on rejecting segregated private schools: “How could any sensible 
person expect anyone with an ounce of common sense to voluntarily accept an 
arrangement designed solely for the purpose of perpetuating ‘inherently unequal’ school 
facilities simply because the public officials of this county, in the exercise of 
overabundance of obstinacy and self-aggrandizement, had closed the public schools?” 
Despite a vigorous rebuttal that characterized Byrd’s core constituency as “tyrants,” 
Oliver Hill joined the Federal Housing Administration as assistant to the commissioner.
31
  
President Kennedy appointed two additional NAACP attorneys with Prince 
Edward connections to federal positions. Spottswood Robinson had filed the Davis case 
in U.S. District Court a decade earlier. In April 1961, Kennedy nominated Robinson to 
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Subsequently, the Robinson nomination, along 
with that of Erwin Griswold of Harvard Law School, altered the composition of the 
commission to “a clear majority openly in favor of the liberal civil rights position,” wrote 
commission historian Foster Rhea Dulles. Months later, President Kennedy gave 
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Thurgood Marshall a recess appointment to the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 
“Mr. Civil Rights” had argued the Brown case before the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
“Everybody connected with the NAACP attack on our school system appears to have 
profited and moved on to better pastures,” commented Barrye Wall in the Farmville 
Herald.
32
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Figure 7.4 Oliver Hill, Roy Wilkins, and L. Francis Griffin, May 20, 1961. (Photo: Richmond Times-
Dispatch). 
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The timing of these appointments is notable. Miller, Michie, and Hill were all 
appointed in May 1961. In fact, the administration announced the Michie nomination on 
the ninth, two days after Kennedy helicoptered to Byrd’s estate. Had the president 
attended the spring luncheon to conciliate Byrd, as Nick Bryant asserted in The 
Bystander, the Michie announcement would have been poorly timed. Further, in the days 
following Byrd’s luncheon, Kennedy had sufficient time to mollify Harry Byrd by 
withdrawing Spottswood Robinson’s nomination and punishing Oliver Hill for his war of 
words with the senator. Nevertheless, Congress soon confirmed Robinson, and Hill 
joined the Federal Housing Administration. Certainly then, Kennedy’s visit to Byrd’s 
luncheon was more benign than Nick Bryant alleged.  
 
IV 
 
The federal intervention made the Prince Edward County school closings an issue 
in the Virginia gubernatorial race. Samuel Tucker, a NAACP attorney, had considered 
Kennedy’s April motion “timely,” because it forced public debate on the school crisis. 
“After a history of defiance, evasion, and vacillation in state leadership I don’t think 
Virginia citizens are going to let either candidate remain silent on the issue.” In fact, all 
the Democratic candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, and attorney general – both 
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Organization and anti-Organization men – denounced the federal action, but there was a 
difference.
33
 The Organization candidates campaigned on the status quo, while the antis 
openly opposed the school closings and presented a plan to reopen them. Nevertheless, 
the Byrd Organization won the Democratic primaries. Ultimately though, the campaign 
contributed to the demise of the Organization. The Kennedys had forced a public 
discussion on Prince Edward County, an enduring reminder of the failed massive 
resistance scheme. 
 Harry Byrd gave Albertis Harrison the “nod” to run for governor. Harrison was an 
ideal candidate to reunite the Organization in the aftermath of the Byrd-Almond schism. 
He had risen to the upper echelons of state government by adhering to Organization 
orthodoxy. As a state senator (1948-1957), Harrison supported massive resistance even 
though he privately questioned the law’s constitutionality and recognized that 
desegregation was “inevitable.” As state attorney general (1958-1961), Harrison 
defended the massive resistance program. After its fall, he proved instrumental in 
convincing state leaders to accept “freedom of choice” to keep desegregation to a 
minimum. Although Governor Almond suffered politically for abandoning massive 
resistance, Harrison emerged virtually unscathed, subsequently building a wide base of 
support. As far as massive resistance, Harrison considered the matter a dead political 
issue and had been delighted that the school controversies were “out of the press.” The 
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urbane Southside Virginian privately pledged to refrain from the rhetorical flourishes and 
race-baiting that defined Almond’s previous campaign. “I will stick to my position as 
being opposed to integration, but I will soft-peddle it,” explained Harrison. “I am not 
going to say anything to arouse racial feeling.” The governor’s office was Harrison’s to 
lose.
34
 
A.E.S. “Gi” Stephens ensured that Harrison did not have an unobstructed path to 
the governor’s mansion. Lieutenant Governor Stephens, once a staunch Organization 
man, ran as the anti-Organization candidate. The Southside Virginian had fallen out of 
favor with Organization leaders for joining with Governor Almond in the retreat from 
massive resistance. In fact, in the previous fall, State Senator Garland Gray had advised 
Harry Byrd to select the Organization’s gubernatorial nominee at the earliest possible 
date to block Stephens from running. He warned that a Stephens victory would have “a 
disastrous effect” on the Organization. Byrd’s hesitation provided an opening for 
Stephens’s insurgent run. After failing to win Byrd’s endorsement, Stephens preempted 
the official “nod” by announcing his candidacy. On paper, the gubernatorial candidates 
had similar resumes: both had Organization backgrounds and later supported “freedom of 
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choice.” The candidates’ positions on Prince Edward County, however, demonstrated a 
contrast. The federal intervention brought that contrast into plain view.
 35
 
 The federal action in Prince Edward County put the anti-Organization ticket on 
the defensive. James Latimer, a journalist with the Richmond Times-Dispatch, predicted 
that federal intervention “won’t hurt and should help” the Organization ticket, while “it 
won’t help and may hurt the Stephens ticket.” Gi Stephens and his running mate, State 
Senator Armistead Boothe of Alexandria, both opposed the attorney general’s motion. 
Stephens found it “lamentable.” Stephens believed that state and local officials, not the 
federal government, had to resolve the issue. Boothe agreed. He called the attorney 
general’s action “extreme, lamentable, and contrary to the welfare of more than 800,000 
public school children.” Still, the anti-Organization ticket could not escape guilt by 
association, as they both had campaigned for the Kennedy in 1960. The anti-Organization 
ticket, although in opposition to federal intervention, were more closely associated with 
the Kennedys and, therefore, suffered the political ramifications.
36
 The Byrd candidate, 
however, had Prince Edward County problems of his own. 
Albertis Harrison’s negotiations with Justice officials haunted his campaign. In 
his statement announcing the intervention motion, Bobby Kennedy explained that court 
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action was taken only after talks with public officials failed to achieve a voluntary 
solution. He omitted the names of the officials he conferred with, fueling suspicion of 
who spoke on behalf of Prince Edward County. Governor Almond, the county attorneys, 
school superintendent, and school board all denied holding any discussions with the 
Department of Justice. Finally, on May 2, two days after resigning as state attorney 
general to run for governor, Harrison identified himself as the one that conferred with 
Justice officials. He divulged that county attorneys were kept abreast of discussions, but 
not state leaders. Gi Stephens pounced by questioning Harrison’s professional conduct. 
“Certainly Mr. Harrison must realize,” stated Stephens, “that as chief legal adviser of the 
commonwealth of Virginia it was his duty to keep the chief executive, and others holding 
responsible state offices, informed at all times of major developments affecting vital 
public matters.” Harrison denied any need to contact the governor considering that during 
their discussions the attorney general had not threatened to close all schools in Virginia. 
In fact, Harrison spun the criticism by alleging that Stephens was trying to divert 
attention from the attorney general’s statewide school closing threat – a naked effort to 
derisively connect his opponent with the Kennedys.
37
 
Each ticket tried to define the other in terms of the school closer-integrationist 
dichotomy. Stephens and Boothe supported “freedom of choice” and opposed the school 
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closings. Therefore, the Harrison campaign tied them to the Kennedys and the NAACP, 
branded them as “integrationists,” and warned of their commitment to “maximum 
integration.” The Harrison ticket clearly outlined their differences in a campaign ad that 
ran in the Farmville Herald: “We are opposed to the integration of the races in our public 
schools. Thus we are not the ticket which has been endorsed by the NAACP.” On the 
campaign trail, Harrison recounted his work as state attorney general to preserve Jim 
Crow. “Our policy has been to resist every case of integration in schools, swimming 
pools, or drugstores – and I was there to oppose it,” boasted Harrison. “The policy of 
Virginia is to take all legal, constitutional means to avoid the evils resulting from the 
Supreme Court’s school decision.” On the other hand, the Stephens campaign labelled its 
opponents as the massive resistance ticket. Stephens warned that a Harrison 
administration would “wait on the sidelines for another chance to padlock our 
classrooms.”
38
 In reality, Harrison and Stephens’s records were not as divergent as they 
portrayed them to be.  
 The race for lieutenant governor provided the voters a clear choice. State Senator 
Mills Godwin of Nansemond (Southside Virginia) had the purest massive resistance 
record of any candidate running for statewide office. In fact, Godwin was a “principal 
architect” of that policy, who, at the time, pledged never to retreat “from our stand of no 
compromise on our principle of total segregation in Virginia.” When massive resistance 
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collapsed Godwin remained steadfast. He signed the minority report in opposition to  
“freedom of choice.” Armistead Boothe reminded the electorate that Mills Godwin voted 
for every school closing bill. He, therefore, characterized the lieutenant governor’s race 
as a “fight between school-closer Godwin and school-opener Boothe.” Boothe, an 
opposition leader within the Organization, had been an outspoken opponent of massive 
resistance, a defender of public schools, and a supporter of “freedom of choice.” During 
the campaign, Boothe proposed a plan to reopen Prince Edward County’s public schools 
and safeguard “freedom of choice.”
39
  
The “Boothe plan” required the state to take responsibility for public education in 
Prince Edward County. Under the proposal, the General Assembly would provide the 
funds to operate public schools. Over the previous two years, the state had saved money 
from the school closings. The schools could be funded by those unappropriated dollars 
and an additional $125,000, an amount Boothe described as “a modest price to pay to 
erase a dark blot from Virginia’s education escutcheon.” The plan protected “freedom of 
choice” by permitting black students to attend the public schools so that whites could 
continue receiving tuition grants to attend segregation academies. Gi Stephens rightfully 
predicted that the federal courts would find the tuition grants unconstitutional if the 
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public schools remained closed.
40
 Certainly, the plan had its shortcomings; the funding 
only accounted for one school year and it set a poor precedent that allowed other 
localities to shirk its public school responsibility. Boothe, at least, opened a discussion on 
resolving the matter, but at the same time, his proposal exposed him to political attack. 
Organization leaders resolved to concentrate their fire on Armistead Boothe. “I 
feel that if we can ‘break Boothe’s back’ we will have the campaign won,” Watkins 
Abbitt advised Harry Byrd. “He is the spearhead of the ticket and the most vulnerable.” 
The Boothe plan became fodder for attack. Albertis Harrison derided his opponents for 
injecting the school closings into the campaign. “If the NAACP, the federal government, 
the Stephenses and the Boothes would leave Prince Edward alone,” declared Harrison, 
“the responsible people of the county – white and colored – would soon solve their 
problems.” While Harrison derisively associated the antis with integrationists, Mills 
Godwin slapped the Boothe plan and sounded the massive resistance dog whistle. 
Armistead Boothe “well knows that neither Prince Edward County nor the state can open 
or operate a public school for Negroes only,” attacked Godwin. “Any public school 
operated in Prince Edward County must be an integrated school.”
41
 The Organization 
ticket offered no alternative plan. Instead, they gambled on the people accepting the 
status quo in Prince Edward County. 
                                                          
40
 “Boothe Would Have Virginia Pay Cost of Schools in Prince Edward,” WP, June 11, 1961, A1; 
Allan Jones, “Stephens Charges Foes Are Panicky,” RTD, June 22, 1961, 1. 
41
 Watkins M. Abbitt to Harry F. Byrd, May 25, 1961, Box 264, HFBP; Allan Jones, “Touchy Problem 
Plaguing Candidates,” RTD, June 19, 1961, 2; Allan Jones, “State Intervention Seen Ill-Advised,” RTD, 
June 14, 1961, 1. 
 
199 
 
 
                           Figure 7.5 Harrison-Godwin-Button Advertisement 
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 The Stephens-Boothe challenge concerned Harry Byrd. The campaign offered the 
state Democratic Party its first real choice since the Byrd-Miller senatorial race. The 
primary served as a referendum on the Organization and its policies. Byrd, therefore, 
injected himself into the campaign. In response to a barrage of Stephens’s attacks against 
the Organization, Byrd released the lieutenant governor’s letter from months earlier 
requesting his endorsement. The letter’s public release signaled Byrd’s support for 
Harrison. Stephens made his sever with Organization complete in his response to Byrd’s 
move: “I am not running against Albertis Harrison but…I am opposing the head of a 
machine who would be United States Senator and Governor at all times.” Further, Harry 
Byrd mobilized the Organization to turn out the vote. Ironically, Harry Byrd, who relied 
on voter apathy to maintain the Organization’s dominance, feared that low turnout would 
sink his ticket. “The Negroes will come out and do not need any urging,” Byrd privately 
warned, “What we have to do is get out our conservative votes in order to win.” He 
looked to his base. “It is imperative that the 4
th
 District get out the biggest possible vote,” 
Harry Byrd wrote Barrye Wall. The Farmville Herald dutifully complied with an 
endorsement of the Organization ticket and a vigorous attack on Stephens. “One of 
Stephens’ main projects will be to work against this county and other counties in 
Southside Virginia,” editorialized Barrye Wall. “OBVIOUSLY STEPHENS MUST NOT 
BE ELECTED!”
42
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The Organization ticket held off the anti’s challenge. Harrison and Godwin won 
the election by turning out the vote in Southside Virginia, a region they carried by an 
overwhelming majority. In fact, they won Prince Edward County by a 4-to-1 ratio. The 
statewide polling (Harrison, 56.7 percent and Godwin, 54.3 percent) was not nearly as 
impressive and too close for comfort by Organization standards. “The significance of the 
outcome lay not so much in the fact that the Byrd men had won yet again,” wrote Frank 
Atkinson in The Dynamic Dominion, “but in the closeness of the contests.” The once 
invincible Organization appeared vulnerable and in decline.
43
 
 
***** 
 
 The Kennedy administration took executive action in Prince Edward County 
despite the political consequences. The president’s domestic agenda had to pass through 
key congressional committees chaired by members of the Virginia delegation. Harry 
Byrd, A. Willis Robertson, and Howard Smith already held the Kennedy brothers with 
suspicion and opposed the national party’s platform. Those congressional leaders did not 
need another reason to assail the president’s domestic program, but the federal 
intervention in Prince Edward County was like an attack on the Byrd Organization itself. 
The Organization called off the “armed truce” and retaliated against the president’s 
education bill. Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration did not surrender to Harry Byrd 
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or relent on Prince Edward County. In fact, the attorney general’s action hastened the 
decline of the Byrd Organization.  
 The Kennedy administration refused to back down on Prince Edward County. The 
president’s use of federal patronage reinforced Kennedy’s conviction to stand with the 
locked-out children over Harry Byrd. In the wake of the intervention motion, President 
Kennedy appointed three NAACP attorneys who worked on the Prince Edward litigation 
and two prominent anti-Organization men to federal positions. Second, the Department of 
Justice actively pursued a resolution to the school crisis even after the federal court 
denied its intervention motion. The Department of Justice sought a negotiated settlement. 
In mid-August 1961, Burke Marshall and St. John Barrett invited the county’s legal 
counsel (Segar Gravatt, Collins Denny, Jr., and State Attorney General Frederick Gray) 
to a private meeting in Richmond, presumably to discuss a plan to end the impasse. Prior 
to the conference, Segar Gravatt pledged to Harry Byrd that he would “make no 
compromise” on their position. True to his word, the county attorneys reported that they 
“reached no conclusions whatsoever” in their meeting with Marshall and Barrett.
44
 
Clearly, Harry Byrd refused to permit the crisis to end.  
 The executive action in Prince Edward County contributed to the downfall of the 
Byrd Organization. The attorney general earned criticism for threatening to close all 
Virginia’s public schools if Prince Edward County’s remained closed. The administration 
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had no desire to close any school but only to inspire Virginia communities to turn against 
Prince Edward County, and thus, the Byrd Organization. The threat of federal court 
action against all Virginia’s public schools remained real as long as the county 
maintained its recalcitrance. Virginian parents detested the proposition that their children 
be penalized for Prince Edward County. As time passed, the county attorneys recognized 
that they were losing popular support across the commonwealth.
45
 Second, the Kennedy 
administration drove a wedge into an Organization still reeling from the Byrd-Almond 
rift. Gubernatorial candidate Albertis Harrison was supposed to heal those fissures. The 
federal intervention reopened those wounds by making the school closings a campaign 
issue. The Organization ticket defended the school closings – an enduring indictment on 
the excesses of massive resistance – while the antis proposed to reopen the schools and 
preserve “freedom of choice.” The clear distinction over that issue gave the electorate a 
clear choice. The close election results demonstrated that the Byrd Organization was 
losing its grip on Virginia politics.  
 The Department of Justice tried, but failed, to force the state and local officials to 
take responsibility for public education in Prince Edward County. The federal courts had 
permitted federal intervention in the Louisiana school desegregation cases. In its 1961 
report, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights concluded that “the most effective executive 
action in public school desegregation has been the participation of the Attorney General 
of the United States in some desegregation suits….Only in Prince Edward has the Federal 
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court denied the Attorney General the right to intervene to protect the interests of the 
United States.”
46
 Judge Oren Lewis’s indecision took the state and county off the hook, at 
least for the moment. The court’s decision set in motion an inordinate delay that bought 
the segregationists more time and prolonged the injustice being inflicted on the black 
children. Some entity had to take responsibility for educating all the children in Prince 
Edward County.
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CHAPTER VIII 
WHO’S RESPONSIBLE? 
 
 
 The Prince Edward County school closings raised the question of who’s 
responsible for education. “The responsibility for the education of the youth must soon be 
determined,” wrote Barrye Wall on the Farmville Herald editorial page in 1955. “Will it 
become the responsibility of the Federal Government? Is it the responsibility of the State 
Government? Or, is it the responsibility of the local government? Or is it the 
responsibility of the parent.” Wall had maintained that the obligation rested with the 
state, which should then yield control to localities. However, that position became 
untenable once school closings came under assault in federal court. Hall v. St. Helena 
Parish School Board determined that the state was responsible for public education and 
that it could not deflect that obligation to localities so that they could permit school 
closings. The Prince Edward County segregationists’ opinion on the matter, therefore, 
shifted with legal strategy. They took the position that public education was the 
responsibility of the state, but that education was primarily the responsibility of the 
parent.
1
  
The county segregationists took responsibility for educating the white children. In 
September 1961, the Prince Edward School Foundation dedicated a permanent high 
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school complex on a thirteen-acre site in Farmville. The campus-style plant consisted of 
six brick buildings connected by covered crosswalks. Prince Edward Academy had 
twenty-seven classrooms, a shop, home economics department, and library. The complex 
was valued at $400,000, but donated materials and volunteer labor cut the construction 
cost to $230,000. “All of this had been done through the efforts and sacrifice of our 
people,” boasted board member Robert Taylor. Prince Edward Academy stood as a 
source of accomplishment for the white community. “For hundreds of people who had 
contributed to the building of this plant a sense of ownership and pride was felt,” said 
Barrye Wall. The school symbolized the segregationists’ commitment to educating their 
children in the manner they desired. “It was…a protest that outsiders could not come in 
and tell us how to live, where to send our children to school, take away the ‘freedom’ that 
we had in choosing,” remembered a foundation student.
1
 The new school made 
segregated private education a fixture in Prince Edward County.  
 The segregationists criticized the black community for not taking responsibility to 
educate their children. John H. Varner of Farmville predicted that the black children, in 
time, would fault their parents: “I believe [the child] will blame his parents as he will 
realize that the basic responsibility of educating a child is that of the parents. He will 
know that an education could have been his had his parents availed themselves of the 
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opportunity.” J. Guy Lancaster, also of Farmville, believed that black parents had to take 
action: “All the Negro parents have to do is organize and really try to do something about 
it….Do the colored people of the county intend to wait year after year and do nothing 
practicable toward educating their own children?”
2
 The segregationists invariably 
reminded the media that the black parents rejected their offer to establish black private 
schools (Southside Schools, Inc.); of course, they omitted any reference to their ulterior 
motives, thus perpetuating the myth of white benevolence. The segregationist leaders had 
convinced the white community that it had a clean conscience, thus clearing the path to 
blame the victims.  
 The black community had welcomed an educational program for its children. In 
July 1961, the Virginia Teachers’ Association (VTA) operated a four-week summer crash 
program to prepare the locked-out children for the potential resumption of public 
education. These classes, the first formal education program for black children since the 
schools closed, were taught by volunteer teachers in private buildings. The 
segregationists tried to exploit the situation. In a letter dripping with feigned sympathy, 
the school board had offered the VTA use of the public school buildings free of charge. 
Chairman Edward Smith claimed that the board was “deeply distressed that a substantial 
segment of the children of the County have now for two years been without schools,” 
adding that “the School Board believes that it should do all it can to help.” The offer was 
                                                          
2
 Letter to the Editor, John H. Varner, “Parents Responsible For Child’s Education,” FH, June 30, 
1961, 1C; Letter to the Editor, J. Guy Lancaster, “Education Of Child Parents Responsibility,” FH, April 
29, 1960, 1C. 
 
208 
not genuine. County attorney Segar Gravatt described the ruse to Harry Byrd: “If we can 
ever get the Negro children into the schools of Prince Edward I do not believe that they 
will ever permit the NAACP to get them out again. If we can discredit the NAACP 
leadership in the County, as a practical matter, our battle will be won.” Reverend Griffin 
saw through the deceit and declined the school board’s offer.
3
 The white leaders’ interest 
in black education did not extend beyond perpetuating segregated private education, and 
the black parents lacked the resources to sustain an educational program. The school 
crisis required a solution from government. 
 Education in Prince Edward County became a political hot potato. The 1961-62 
school year witnessed little progress, even as the crisis compounded. The county’s 
parents bore the hardship of providing education for their children; the white parents had 
to pay private school fees without the benefit of tuition grants and black parents had to 
send their children away from home to attend school. Meanwhile, no branch of 
government at any level took responsibility for education in Prince Edward County. The 
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governor, general assembly, and state courts had opportunities to take action, but they all 
punted. The county, even with the financial woes of the Academy, remained steadfast by 
not allocating funds for public schools. The county refused to retreat until ordered by a 
federal court to reopen the public schools. Judge Oren Lewis proved reluctant to force 
state and local officials to take responsibility. Without a federal court order, the 
Department of Justice had no statutory authority to act. Justice eagerly awaited an 
affirmative ruling. The Kennedy administration was the only government entity willing to 
take decisive action to remove the responsibility from the parents.  
 
I 
 
 The situation in Prince Edward County placed an unusual burden on parents. The 
federal injunction on tuition grants put a crushing weight on Academy parents. With the 
annual budget fixed, white parents had to pay taxes for tuition grants that they could not 
use and still find money to pay for their children’s fees at the private academy. Months 
earlier, Barrye Wall arrogantly responded to the Saturday Evening Post’s hypothetical 
question about a possible injunction: “No problem. We’ll go without grants. The parents 
here will raise the money one way or another. They want these private schools so badly.” 
Now, Wall admitted that the injunction “brings problems for the parents of Prince 
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Edward County.”
4
 The black parents, again, faced an even more daunting problem. They 
also paid taxes to support tuition grants, but they had no freedom of choice, no local 
school available for their children. Black parents had to bear the financial and emotional 
costs of sending their children away from home to receive an education. 
 Academy leaders worked to ease their patrons’ concerns. On his editorial page, 
Barrye Wall reassured the community that “the Prince Edward School Foundation will 
provide means for educating those enrolled in its schools without undue hardship on the 
individual parents.” Blanton Hanbury announced the foundation’s intention to provide 
schools for all white children regardless of their parent’s ability to pay fees. “Parents who 
can will be expected to pay tuition,” explained Hanbury, “but we will have a scholarship 
program to provide for those who can’t pay.” The foundation made a statewide appeal to 
raise $300,000 for its scholarship fund. Hanbury mailed an “urgent” appeal to those 
interested in the “defense of State sovereignty and the liberties of individuals” for 
donations. State Senator William Stone of Martinsville answered the call with a $100 
check and a note for publication in the Farmville Herald: “I believe that there are at least 
3,000 persons in this country who will give $100.00 annually, if necessary, to aid you.”
5
 
Senator Stone overstated the philanthropic interest of his countrymen.  
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 The Committee in Support of Prince Edward was formed to meet the financial 
needs of white families. Congressmen Watkins Abbitt and Bill Tuck, the “most massive 
of resisters among the state’s major political figures,” spearheaded a statewide campaign 
to raise $200,000. The committee centered its campaign on the white children’s 
victimization by a popular southern straw man: the federal government. The 
organization’s literature blamed the federal court for destroying public education and 
their determination “to sacrifice future generations of Southern white children in 
fulfillment of a fraudulent sociological notion that there is no biological difference 
between the Negro and white race.” The fund drive sputtered despite the emotional 
appeal. The philanthropic capacity of the surrounding Southside communities, for one, 
had its limits. After having raised $10,000 for the Academy over the previous two years, 
Delegate John Daniel determined that neighboring Charlotte County had “about scraped 
the bottom of the barrel.”
6
 The foundation could not expect its neighbors to finance its 
school program in perpetuity.  
 The foundation faced a great financial challenge as its support eroded. For years, 
James Kilpatrick had used the Richmond News Leader’s editorial page to cheerlead for 
the county’s segregated education scheme. He altered his position. “We are charged with 
defending what appears absolutely indefensible to the rest of the country,” Kilpatrick 
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wrote to Senator A. Willis Robertson. “For the past two years, I have done my best to 
argue the law and keep my eyes closed to the merits.” Now he publicly and privately 
urged the county to reopen its schools as the only way to preserve freedom of choice. 
Robertson agreed and also questioned the foundation’s fundraising capacity. He believed 
that this was the last year that it could raise $300,000. Barrye Wall remained unmoved. In 
fact, he found opportunity in the injunction. “This will show the world we can get along 
without public aid whatever,” declared Wall. Further, if the foundation “can be 
reasonably financed the federal court can not say we are a public school.”
7
 Despite the 
financial realities and eroding support, the segregationist leaders were determined to 
maintain their segregated private schools and keep the public schools closed. 
 The black parents, again, had to find schools for their children. The Prince 
Edward County Christian Association (PECCA) worked with other organizations to 
identify host families. In August 1961, Hans Furth of Catholic University and Burma 
Whitted formed the Prince Edward Educational Committee. They placed twenty-nine 
locked-out children in Washington, D.C., schools and raised money to pay for out-of-
district tuition and boarding. For a second year, the American Friends Service Committee 
located host families for black Prince Edwardians. The Placement Program assigned 
thirty-seven children to homes and schools in eight states. Approximately three hundred 
black children in all went to school outside of the county, the great majority of whom 
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lived with family or friends outside the community without the benefit of scholarships. 
Over twelve hundred more did not attend school at all.
8
 The last best option for them 
remained the activity centers. 
 The future of the activity centers was in doubt. By the end of 1961, the program 
had an outstanding balance of $1,684.90, almost all of which was owed to the centers’ 
supervisors and assistants. Reverend Griffin petitioned the NAACP to pay the bill. “The 
Prince Edward County Christian Association has been diligent in its efforts to satisfy its 
financial obligation in regard to the activity centers,” reported Griffin, “but all of its 
efforts have been insufficient to date.” The NAACP paid the balance and pledged to 
sponsor an additional two months of operating costs. The training centers finally resumed 
operation on February 5, 1962. “We are opening the training centers to help maintain the 
morale of the children,” announced program director Dorothy Croner. “The centers are 
not in any respect offered as a substitute for schools.” PECCA ran five centers (one in 
Farmville, Meherrin, Prospect, Hampden-Sydney, and Sulphur Springs), down from 
fifteen the previous year. The enrollment, over two hundred, had fallen by more than half 
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since its last session. PECCA attributed the enrollment drop to an increase in the out-of-
county placements and the inability of many parents to transport their children to the 
centers.
9
 
 An overwhelming number of parents, both black and white, could not afford to 
educate their children without outside assistance. White families depended on the 
generosity of others to subsidize their children’s education, but at least schools were 
available close to home.  The injunction on tuition grants tested the foundation’s ability 
to raise sufficient funds to educate all the white children for one year, let alone in 
perpetuity. Black parents, on the other hand, had to find the means to pay for their 
children’s school fees and boarding. It was already apparent that the black community 
could not afford to send all its children away from home to receive an education, even 
with outside assistance. Certainly, black parents had no long-term interest in a system 
that forced a choice between familial intimacy and an education. The state had the power 
to resolve the matter.  
 
II 
 
 The state government had a clear obligation to ensure the operation of public 
schools in Prince Edward County. The Virginia State Constitution required the General 
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Assembly to “establish and maintain an efficient system of public free schools throughout 
the State.”
10
 Nevertheless, no branch of state government had taken responsibility to 
reopen the schools. In 1962, all three branches had new opportunities to take action. A 
new governor took office, the legislature convened a regular session, and litigants argued 
the Prince Edward school case in state court. Still, the state government failed to act. 
Each branch tossed the political football, like a hot potato, amongst themselves without 
any intention of resolving the crisis. Ultimately, the state punted the school responsibility 
back to the county.  
 Governor Almond declined to exert leadership on the school closings. He 
recognized the issue’s political toxicity. “For me to have taken the lead,” Almond 
privately shrunk, “would be like waving a red flag in the face of a mad bull.” Colgate 
Darden, a member of the State Board of Education, recommended to Almond that the 
state seize the county’s public school buildings and provide an educational program. 
“Something should be attempted,” advised Darden, “to resolve the impasse which 
presently exists and which is very costly to everybody concerned, especially the Negro 
school children.” Nevertheless, the governor claimed that he had no power to issue an 
executive order to open the schools. Armistead Boothe, fresh off his electoral defeat, 
renewed his school funding proposal. The tuition grant injunction created the impetus for 
him to lobby Almond to release the county’s share of the state school appropriations for 
the 1960-62 school years to the board of supervisors for the operation of public schools. 
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The Boothe plan would restore universal education and preserve segregation, as blacks 
would attend the public schools and whites the private schools. “Control of the schools 
would be taken away from the Court and put back in the hands of the County,” argued 
Boothe. “No further Court action would be necessary to test the constitutionality of the 
Virginia tuition grants.” Almond claimed not to have the statutory authority to open the 
schools. Neither would Almond provide moral leadership. He refused to comment on a 
matter before the courts.
11
 The hopes for executive leadership hinged on his successor. 
 The school closings were an issue in the general election campaign. Unlike 
Lindsay Almond, the Republican gubernatorial candidate believed that the governor had 
the authority to intervene in Prince Edward County. Clyde Pearson blamed the school 
closings on the state government for failing to live “up to its Virginia constitutional 
responsibility to maintain a free public school system throughout the state.” He pledged 
that his first act as governor would be to open the schools – first by asking the county 
board of supervisors to voluntarily appropriate funds and, if that failed, to request money 
from the General Assembly. There was no reason to wait for a court ruling because it 
would “cause a delay of another semester” and that “it would be better to remove even 
the necessity of a court ruling for Virginia to obey her Constitution.” Pearson called on 
his Democratic opponent to match his pledge, but none was forthcoming. Harrison had 
no need to engage his opponent. Winning the Democratic primary made the general 
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election a formality. Harrison defeated Pearson handedly by a two-to-one majority. The 
Harrison victory promised the continuation of executive inaction. “The Prince Edward 
situation must await a decision” by the state court, determined Governor-elect Harrison. 
“It would be most inadvisable to move in any direction until that occurs.”
12
 
 The NAACP, reluctantly, filed suit in the Virginia State Supreme Court of 
Appeals. The U.S. District Court had refused to order the schools reopened until the state 
court determined whether the state constitution permitted localities to abandon public 
education. Judge Lewis had chastised the NAACP for not finding redress in state court: 
“Why you don’t file a suit [in state court] and get this basic, narrow question disposed 
of,” said a frustrated Lewis, “I will never understand.” NAACP attorneys had avoided 
state litigation because, as Oliver Hill explained, the “judges were Byrd Organization 
people. We never got to first base in state courts.” Nevertheless, on January 8, 1962, the 
NAACP asked the court to order the county to reopen its schools. “The county cannot be 
relieved of its responsibility since schools require both the General Assembly and 
supplemental county funds,” argued Samuel Tucker. Contrarily, the state and county 
attorneys found no provisions in the state constitution that required the county to fund 
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public schools. The court’s decision in Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward 
County was not expected until March.
13
 
 The General Assembly declined to pre-empt the court with legislation to reopen 
the schools. The state legislators were concluding a harmonious session that resulted in 
overwhelming support for Governor Harrison’s legislative program: increased teachers’ 
pay, industrial development, and a revision to daylight savings time. At least one 
representative found the session unsatisfactory. “We have busied ourselves with a 
multitude of trifles,” criticized Delegate John Webb of Fairfax County. “We spent untold 
hours debating routine, run-of-the-mill legislation, but never once have we begun to 
consider what to do about” the school closings. He proposed attaching an amendment to 
the state appropriations bill requiring the State Board of Education to operate schools in 
Prince Edward County. “The time to act is now,” declared Webb. “Virginia cannot afford 
a generation of illiterates anywhere in this Commonwealth no matter what their race may 
be.” The proposal went down to defeat soundly by a voice vote. The chairman of the 
House Appropriations committee, Howard Adams, considered the school closings an 
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issue for the court, not the state budget.
14
 The General Assembly tossed the political hot 
potato back to the courts.  
The state court provided constitutional cover for the school closings. On March 5, 
1962, the Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals unanimously determined that the state 
constitution did not require Prince Edward County to operate public schools. The court 
did, however, note that the state constitution required the General Assembly “to establish 
and maintain free public schools throughout the state.” Nevertheless, the court did not 
order the state legislature to fulfill its constitutional responsibility to ensure public 
education in Prince Edward County. “To grant the writ in this proceeding would amount 
to an invasion by the judicial department of those functions of the legislative 
department,” read the opinion. “It would mean that this court may substitute its discretion 
for that vested by law in the local legislative body.” Separation of powers prevented the 
court from compelling the state to take action.
15
 The court made state action optional. 
The court put the onus on the executive and legislative branches. “Now that the 
state Supreme Court has tossed the problem back to the political branches,” opined the 
Washington Post, “Gov. Albertis S. Harrison and the General Assembly have a towering 
obligation to clear this blot from the Virginia record.” Nevertheless, Harrison refused to 
take responsibility. He believed that reopening the schools was “a decision for the people 
of Prince Edward to make,” adding disingenuously that “the people of Prince Edward are 
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as deeply sensitive to their responsibility, both to Negro and white children, as any people 
anywhere in this State.” Harrison did offer state assistance if requested by the county, but 
he remained reluctant to lead on an issue that he considered political “dynamite.”
16
 The 
three branches of state government passed the explosive situation back to the county.  
 
III 
 
 The county board of supervisors had an opportunity to lift the responsibility of 
education off the parents. In March, the school board had prepared two budgets for the 
1962-63 school year: one to provide public education for all the county’s children and 
another for those not attending the private schools (segregationist speak for an all-black 
public school). The supervisors adopting either budget offered potential relief to black 
and white parents. If the black community accepted, at the minimum, a segregated public 
school, then education would be available for all their children, and close to home. For 
white parents, reopened public schools could lead to the federal court lifting the 
injunction on tuition grants. By the spring of 1962, the school closings and injunction 
pushed many Prince Edward parents to their breaking point. Still, the board of 
supervisors decided against appropriating funds to operate the public schools. 
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 Reverend L. Francis Griffin reached his lowest moment. He anguished over every 
child’s loss of education. “It hasn’t been an easy thing for me personally,” reflected 
Griffin years later. “Sometimes I didn’t sleep comfortably. I could have made the 
decision to subject myself to whatever happened. But I debated the moral right of 
whether I could involve others.” The introspection took an emotional and physical toll on 
Griffin. The stress elicited frequent illnesses, culminating in early 1962 with a thirty-
seven-day hospital stay to remove half of his ulcerated stomach. Griffin could have 
improved his health by accepting offers of employment elsewhere, but his conscience did 
not permit him to abandon the locked-out children. He was concerned that nobody would 
carry on the fight in his absence. Reverend Griffin willed himself to lead the black 
community through the nadir of its despair. The Virginia State Supreme Court had 
delivered an additional blow. Griffin offered encouragement to black Prince Edwardians 
by declaring that the ruling “doesn’t end our fight. We shall go on.”
17
 
The state court’s decision opened the NAACP’s Prince Edward strategy to 
scrutiny. An observer noted “diminishing patience” in the black community. Charlie 
Hicks of Rice, who the NAACP considered a “good supporter of our cause,” interpreted 
the court’s decision as a signal that “there is no law to help these children.” He indicated 
to the NAACP that its strategy had failed, that a school had to be built for black children. 
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Lester Banks, the executive secretary of the Virginia State Conference of the NAACP, 
tried to reassure Hicks that the court’s decision “should not be looked upon as the Negro 
citizens’ last straw, but rather it should serve to solidify their efforts and determination to 
continue the fight to reopen public schools in the county on a desegregated basis.” In 
addition, Banks discouraged any talk of black private schools: “Don’t let yourself 
become a party of a movement that will rob the Negro children of their constitutional 
rights.”  Banks toed the party line, but he knew that he was defending a failed policy. He 
recognized the pressure increasing to accept segregated private schools and the financial 
insolvency of the activity centers. “The composite picture,” Banks advised Roy Wilkins, 
“point up the need for immediate action.” He warned that another civil rights 
organization could woo black Prince Edwardians away from the NAACP. Martin Luther 
King Jr.’s appearance in Farmville made that apparent.
18
 
The Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. visited Farmville to boost morale. Wyatt 
Tee Walker, the executive director of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, had 
been “particularly distressed that Prince Edward has in a sense been left to fade away.” 
He, therefore, added First Baptist Church to SCLC’s “People to People” tour itinerary. 
On March 28, 1962, King delivered a message of support to the two hundred fifty 
congregants. He commended black Prince Edwardians for their perseverance: “We all 
realize that if we are to be free, we cannot sell our birthright of freedom for a mess of 
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segregated pottage.” King urged the black community not to relent: “Do not despair; do 
not give up, but just stand firm for what you believe in, and people all over the United 
States will say there are the people of Prince Edward County who have injected new 
meaning into the veins of civilization.” He lifted up the black children. “Dr. King’s visit 
gave light to a darkness that had settled around the students,” remembered Naja Griffin. 
“Our spirits were low. His visit let us know that the world did indeed know about our 
situation and that we were not forgotten! Our hope was renewed by his visit; our spirits 
uplifted.”
19
 King boosted morale that day, but the day-to-day burden of leadership fell to 
Reverend Griffin. 
 Reverend Griffin adhered to NAACP orthodoxy. He discouraged direct-action 
campaigns. Black Prince Edwardians tended to be patient, but some young militants had 
called for sit-ins to draw attention to the school closings. Clearly, Griffin sympathized 
with them. “Next time don’t tell me about it,” he told the youngsters. He quietly 
considered organizing demonstrations in the event that the board of supervisors failed to 
appropriate funds for public schools. In the meantime, Griffin focused on raising money 
for the activity centers. “The whites have taken care of their kids, but we have been 
forgotten,” Griffin told Jet magazine. He urged its readers to send school supplies and 
money to keep the centers running. The centers bought the NAACP time to win in the 
federal courts. Griffin did not believe that the schools would reopen without a strong 
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court order or until the county accepted token integration. The private schools ensured 
that the public schools, if reopened, would be “99 44/100%” black. “This is a sad 
prospect,” Griffin privately lamented, “and I am ashamed to live among such bigots.”
20
 
The success of the NAACP’s strategy depended on the failure of the Prince Edward 
School Foundation. 
 The Prince Edward School Foundation suffered a serious financial crisis. Roy 
Pearson reported that contributions had “slowed to a trickle.” In March, foundation 
leaders calculated that they needed an additional $50,000 from outside the community to 
meet the organization’s financial obligations for the year. The treasurer anticipated 
having to borrow money. Attorney Collins Denny privately shared his sober assessment 
of the school’s long-term financial viability: “The time is fast approaching when 
contributions from outside Prince Edward will largely disappear.” The burden of the 
financial crunch fell on Academy parents. The foundation had increased its tuition on 262 
families in the hope of generating an additional $31,825. Barrye Wall expected “a 
minimum of local reaction to this request which may be unfavorable.” One county 
resident, however, observed a “growing unrest and dissatisfaction” among the lower and 
middle-class Academy families.
21
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 A study found that white solidarity was cracking. Harry Boyte of the American 
Friends Service Committee had spent weeks interviewing scores of white residents. He 
determined that they were “willing to accept desegregation if this were necessary to 
reopen the public schools.” Academy parents struggled to pay their children’s tuition and 
grew agitated upon receiving threatening delinquency letters from the foundation. For 
some, the educational deprivation of African Americans troubled their conscience. Still 
others were embarrassed about the negative perception of their community. The racial 
strife and the lack of public schools were stunting industrial growth and economic 
development. Boyte reported a “sharp and clearly defined opposition to the rigidity 
indicated in the public posture of the county board of supervisors’ delay in acting this 
spring in preparation for reopening the public schools next fall.” He believed that if the 
issue was put to a ballot that the residents would “without any question” vote to reopen 
the public schools.
22
 Boyte’s evaluation was overly optimistic, as dialogue among white 
moderates remained in its infancy. 
 In early June, the topic of reopening the public schools was raised for the first 
time at a white church. Lester Andrews had suffered social and economic repercussions 
for refusing, as a school board member, to release surplus property to the foundation and 
for his involvement in the Bush League. He now opened a discussion at Farmville Baptist 
Church because he sensed a shift in public sentiment. Considering that other white 
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citizens willingly participated in a public discussion on the matter, the community had 
come a long way since the “meeting in the woods” two years earlier. The discussion was 
reportedly candid, constructive, calm, and “free from bitterness or segregationist 
fulminations.” The participants agreed that public education had to be restored in some 
manner.
23
 The meeting could only be characterized as the beginning of a dialogue. 
Despite this breakthrough, the eleventh-hour meeting, unsurprisingly, did not generate a 
groundswell effort to topple the foundation forces. 
 The white moderates had yet to organize a sufficient force to alter public policy. 
The county board of supervisors presented a budget void of operational funds for the 
public schools. At the budget’s public hearing on June 15, only three white citizens urged 
the county to reopen the public schools. “Public education is the foundation of our 
democracy,” declared Elizabeth Burger, “and Prince Edward County has the tremendous 
responsibility in upholding our democracy by providing funds for education.” Richard 
Dupuy, agreed, urging the supervisors to increase the budget to provide schools for black 
children. Gordon Moss appealed to the supervisors to demonstrate leadership: “You 
gentlemen have an opportunity for greatness this day.” He urged the board to change its 
course by allocating funds to operate all the public schools. Instead, the supervisors 
maintained the status quo. They cut the property tax rate from $3.50 to $1.00 per $100 of 
assessed value and slashed the merchant capital tax in half, but allocated no operational 
funds for the public schools. Instead, despite the federal injunction that already held 
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$600,000 in escrow, the supervisors allocated an additional $360,000 in tuition grants. 
The county would not take responsibility for public education until it received a federal 
court order and the injunction on tuition grants was lifted.
24
 
 
IV 
 
The federal government had to provide the solution in Prince Edward County. 
The U.S. District Court needed to settle the constitutional issue of the school closings, an 
issue it had balked on and deferred to the state courts in 1961. The attorney general had 
been denied participation in the federal case and he had no jurisdiction in the state 
litigation. Still, the administration maintained an active interest in the matter. The 
executive branch encouraged local leaders to reopen the schools, studied a possible 
federal school program, provided support to a summer crash program, kept abreast of 
developments through intelligence reports, closely monitored the federal court 
proceedings, and conferred with organizations sympathetic to reopening the public 
schools. The Kennedy administration was eager to enforce an affirmative court order and 
would not be satisfied until the schools were open and desegregated.
25
 
Bobby Kennedy encouraged the county to take responsibility for public 
education. On May 1, 1962, Kennedy discussed the school crisis while in Roanoke, a city 
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about one hundred miles west of Farmville. He condemned the school closings as “a 
blight on Virginia and on the country in general,” found it incomprehensible that 1,700 
black children had “no place to go to school,” and urged state and local officials to open 
the schools. Two days later, Kennedy addressed the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights’ 
Fourth Annual Conference on Problems of Segregation and Desegregation of Public 
Schools. He commended southern communities that had peacefully desegregated its 
schools and urged Prince Edward County to do the same. “I would hope,” Kennedy 
remarked, “that the local authorities…would take the initiative and bring some action 
forward to open the schools to all children on a desegregated basis in Prince Edward 
County.”
26
 Nevertheless, the board of supervisors voted to keep the public schools 
closed.  
The Kennedy administration came under pressure to fill the educational vacuum. 
Burke Marshall had explored the possibility of federal schools in the county, but 
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determined that “there is simply no statutory basis for it.” The U.S. Commissioner of 
Education, Sterling McMurrin, had also studied the matter. In 1961, McMurrin concluded 
that the federal government could not offer educational programs without a request from 
the state or locality. At no point did a responsible state or local official ask for federal 
assistance. The commissioner’s assessment remained unaltered in 1962. “We in the 
Office of Education fully share your concern over the tragic situation that has developed 
in Prince Edward County, Virginia,” McMurrin told a petitioner. “If there were anything 
we could do to assist in that situation, and if it were within our power to do so, I can 
assure you that we would….I see no immediate prospect of our being able to do anything 
useful.”
27
 Despite the statutory limitations, the administration was prepared to provide 
help within the confines of its narrow authority.  
The U.S. Office of Education trained volunteer teachers for a summer crash 
program. In May, the Student Christian Federation had requested assistance from the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare for “determining the most effective 
approach” to teaching children who lacked formal schooling. “We are in complete 
sympathy with your objectives and we wish to be of any possible assistance to your 
group,” responded Secretary Abraham Ribicoff. He offered the resources of the Office of 
Education. The agency invited the volunteer teachers to Washington to avail them to 
those resources and the agency’s expertise. In late June, the agency provided an 
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unpublicized two-day session on teaching remedial reading and simple arithmetic and 
selecting appropriate teaching materials.
28
 The Office of Education could be more helpful 
once a resolution to the crisis was at hand. 
Burke Marshall kept tabs on developments through intelligence reports. He had 
encouraged the American Friends Service Committee to solicit white parents to file a 
lawsuit to reopen the public schools. On May 3, Harry Boyte met with Marshall to 
provide his analysis on the mood of the white community – an overly optimistic 
assessment. Marshall received more reliable information from Benjamin Muse of the 
Southern Regional Council. Muse interviewed state and local leaders throughout the 
South to gauge sentiment and progress on race relations. He interviewed key individuals 
directly connected to the county school crisis and volunteered his confidential reports to 
Burke Marshall. Through those reports, the Civil Rights Division became privy to the 
private attitudes of Governor Harrison, Barrye Wall, newspapermen, and white 
moderates.
29
 Those reports provided valuable insight into the local situation as the Civil 
Rights Division developed its legal strategy. 
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 The Department of Justice continued to monitor the litigation. Howard Glickstein, 
a young lawyer in the Appeals and Research Section, observed the May 18, 1962, U.S. 
District Court hearing and presented a summary to Burke Marshall. Weeks later, the Civil 
Rights Division requested a copy of the entire case file, which now filled two cabinet file 
drawers. The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Richmond was directed to vigilantly patrol that 
filing cabinet for any addendums. St. John Barrett maintained contact with NAACP 
attorneys to keep abreast of their strategy and developments in the case. He persistently 
searched for an opening to permit federal intervention. Barrett found inspiration in a 
newspaper article. Journalists had reported that the board of supervisors allocated funds 
for tuition grants despite the federal injunction. Therefore, two years of tuition grants 
were held in escrow. Barrett drafted a complaint asking the federal court to divert those 
funds to the school board for the operation of public schools. Judge Lewis had been 
reluctant to order the county to levy taxes for the public schools. Barrett believed that his 
proposal would alleviate Judge Lewis’s anxiety.
30
 Nevertheless, the Department of 
Justice opted to wait for the next move in federal court.  
 The U.S. District Court settled the issue of responsibility. On July 25, 1962, Judge 
Oren Lewis determined that the state and local governments had a shared responsibility 
to operate public schools. The state constitution required that public schools be 
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maintained throughout the commonwealth. The state, therefore, could not shirk its 
obligation and permit discrimination by delegating authority to its subdivisions. 
Conversely, localities could not shirk its obligation by deferring to the state. In fact, the 
court considered local officials indirect agents of the state. State and local officials, wrote 
Judge Lewis, “cannot abdicate their responsibilities either by ignoring them or by merely 
failing to discharge them, whatever the motive may be.” The court held that Prince 
Edward County’s public schools “may not be closed to avoid the effect of the law of the 
land as interpreted by the Supreme Court, while the Commonwealth of Virginia permits 
other public schools to remain open at the expense of taxpayers.” Judge Lewis directed 
the county school board to develop a plan to operate desegregated public schools and 
submit it to the court by September 7, 1962.
31
 The court glaringly omitted any reference 
to how the schools should be funded. 
 The court order would have been more effective had it been directed to the agency 
that controlled the county’s purse strings. William Vaughan, the chairman of the board of 
supervisors, privately expressed his disappointment over the ruling. An affirmative court 
order to reopen the schools would have provided the supervisors with the political cover 
to end the crisis and shield them from the criticism of the county’s power structure. Segar 
Gravatt advised the local leaders that funding the public schools would put them in a 
better position to lift the injunction on tuition grants. The supervisors and county leaders, 
recounted Gravatt, “did not receive this information with sympathy.” The county’s 
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recalcitrance had potential ramifications across the state. The failure to operate public 
schools in one county meant a possible legal challenge to block state funds to all of 
Virginia’s public schools. Public opinion was turning against the county. “To the 
majority of Virginians who have given the dilemma thoughtful attention,” wrote the 
Roanoke Times, “it must seem foolish to allow diehard prejudices of a single community 
to imperil the entire structure of the new way of education.” Even the conservative 
Richmond papers insisted that the schools must reopen. “This newspaper has supported 
Prince Edward all the way,” editorialized the Richmond News Leader. “But there comes a 
time when wars must end.” The Richmond Times-Dispatch believed that public schools 
should be available to all children. “The longer these boys and girls are left without 
public schools, the greater will be the burden on the conscience of every Virginian, and 
the more unfavorable will be the ‘image’ of the Old Dominion in the eyes of the nation 
and the world.” Nevertheless, the board of supervisors refused to act in the absence of a 
court order.
32
 
 Two days later, the Virginia Council on Human Relations hosted a multi-agency 
meeting on Prince Edward County. The purpose of the meeting was to connect people at 
the federal, state, and local levels and discuss their roles in reopening the schools. The 
conference included a handful of sympathetic county residents and representatives from 
the Southern Regional Council, Potomac Institute, Virginia General Assembly, U.S. 
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Commission on Civil Rights, and U.S. Department of Justice (Harold Greene of the 
Appeals and Research Section). The conferees found only a “faint possibility” that 
schools would be opened in the fall. The pessimism was based on Judge Lewis’s 
“lamentably inconclusive” decision, the lack of school funds, the feasibility of finding 
teachers, and expectations that the county would continue its defiance. On the other hand, 
they believed that the state would comply with the order, and that only state leaders could 
cajole the county segregationists to relent. The Virginian conferees, therefore, had to 
convince Governor Harrison and other state leaders to demonstrate leadership on this 
issue.
33
 
 Governor Harrison provided no leadership. Privately, he said that the state could 
not take the lead on the matter, but that it would act if the county requested assistance. 
The county’s 1962-63 fiscal year budget, which allocated no funds to operate public 
schools, could not be amended without special state legislation. The public schools 
needed money and only the state could unlock such funds. The General Assembly could 
have permitted the county to reallocate budgeted money to the public schools, 
specifically the tuition grant money held under federal court injunction. Of course, that 
required voluntary action by the county board of supervisors, who were not named in the 
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federal court order. The General Assembly also had the option to provide the county 
school board with state funds. Harrison believed that that option would set a poor 
precedent. “The people throughout the rest of Virginia would not long tolerate a situation 
in which property owners in Prince Edward would be relieved of the obligation to pay 
taxes to support schools and this burden transferred to other areas of the state.” The point 
became moot. The county attorneys, reportedly, had advised the local leaders not to 
request or accept any state assistance. Governor Harrison never called the General 
Assembly into a special session to address Prince Edward County.
34
 
The county leaders continued to deflect responsibility for public education. The 
school board pledged to comply with the federal court’s order, but its chairman, Edward 
Smith, asserted that “our hands are tied.” The school board did not have operational 
funds. Even it money was available, Smith considered it impossible to hire teachers for 
the start of school in September. Still, the school board submitted a desegregation plan 
void of comprehensive desegregation. The board assumed that all the white students 
would continue attending the private schools, while about 1,250 black children would 
enroll in the public schools. To safeguard against any desegregation, the board included a 
provision for the state Pupil Placement Board to assign students. Satisfied that the school 
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board complied with the court order, Smith declared: “The matter is out of our hands 
now. It’s for Washington and Richmond to solve.”
35
  
 The federal court tied Washington’s hands. Judge Lewis rejected the school 
board’s desegregation plan, but he took no affirmative action to require compliance with 
his order. In fact, in October 1962, Lewis stayed his order until it could be reviewed by 
the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court’s hesitancy frustrated the NAACP. 
Judge Lewis “hasn’t required anybody to do anything that is designed to correct that 
inequality,” lamented Samuel Tucker. “He recognized the inequality, but doesn’t do 
anything to correct it.” The court’s indecision spurred more state litigation. In August 
1962, the county filed suit in the Richmond State Circuit Court against the black litigants 
and the State Board of Education to deflect the responsibility of education to the state.
36
 
The dual litigation track promised further delay. Judge Lewis’s vacillation prevented the 
Kennedy administration from using the power and prestige of the federal government to 
reopen the public schools. 
 
***** 
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 The failure of government officials to take responsibility for educating black 
Prince Edwardians prolonged the crisis. No branch of government at any level – federal, 
state, or local – had taken decisive action. In fact, the situation in September 1962 closely 
resembled September 1961. In both instances, Judge Lewis had issued opinions that 
raised hopes for progress that were soon diminished by weak court orders. The county 
attorneys further complicated the federal proceedings by filing suits in state court. These 
tactics ensured further delay and diminished hopes of progress. “It seems as if we are on 
some sort of treadmill,” grumbled NAACP attorney Robert Carter.
37
 The slow pace of 
litigation coupled with irresponsive politicians left the responsibility for educating the 
county’s children, both black and white, on the parents. 
 The white parents had to pay fees for Prince Edward Academy, again, without the 
benefit of tuition grants. The foundation leaders forecast that over seven hundred students 
would require partial to full assistance to cover those expenses. Verle Gordon, a local 
businessman, chaired the scholarship committee dedicated to raising $130,000. The 
previous year’s scholarship drive, although a struggle, reached that figure. Foundation 
leaders expressed optimism that the goal was attainable, citing the slashed county taxes 
(valued at about $200,000) as a prime source of philanthropic opportunity. “With a 
substantial difference in taxes this year,” explained Blanton Hanbury, “it is reasonable to 
expect the people of the county to contribute liberally to this scholarship fund.” Barrye 
Wall urged his readers to open their wallets: “Those who have children in Prince Edward 
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Foundation schools must carry their fair share of the cost. Those who do not have 
children in the schools must see it as a duty to assist by contributing to the Foundation 
scholarship fund….It is as simple as that.”
38
 The segregationist leaders urged the white 
community not to forsake the foundation, even as the foundation cast off the most 
vulnerable white families.  
The Prince Edward School Foundation’s financial woes forced it to abandon a 
longstanding principle that no white child be turned away.  In late August, the media 
reported that about a dozen white children were denied admission because their parents 
failed to pay the previous school year’s tuition. The foundation’s treasurer, Louis Dahl, 
tried mitigating the damage. He told the Farmville Herald that the foundation had no 
plans to bar “any child because its parents are unable to pay tuition.” Nevertheless, the 
Lynchburg News pursued the story to discover that half a dozen children had indeed been 
denied admission. K.H. Latham, a delinquent patron, told his story for a front-page 
expose. Although the foundation awarded his family a $480 scholarship for the 1961-62 
school year, Latham could not afford to pay the $240 balance. As a result, explained the 
agitated Army veteran, “They barred my kids from school!” Subsequently, the foundation 
worked out a financial agreement and the Latham children returned to school. Still, the 
ordeal and the county’s education system disturbed Latham. “I want free public schools 
for all,” declared Latham. “I want my children to get an education.” He was the first 
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Academy parent to publicly dissent. The state NAACP and the Virginia Council on 
Human Relations capitalized by mailing copies of the article to all the white households 
in the county.
39
 
The black parents bore a heavier burden. They still had to send their children out 
of the county to receive a formal education. The Virginia Teachers’ Association and 
American Friends Service Committee sponsored over two hundred placements in the 
District of Columbia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Clinton and Etta Lee reluctantly sent their two older 
children to a host family in Washington, D.C. “It is unfair to have to break up a family in 
order to have your children get an education,” agonized Etta Lee. For thousands of 
others, the educational tragedy continued and reached still more children. “There are 10-
year old boys and girls here who have never been inside a school room, who can’t read or 
write,” Reverend Griffin told the New York Times. The Scott family had four children, 
but only Lagrant had ever been to school. Mrs. Scott taught her children the basics at 
home. “I don’t want them to be completely ignorant,” she explained. The school closings 
had hurt her children, but she believed that integrated public schools “would be worth 
it.”
40
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 The county parents, both black and white, reached the zenith of their 
vulnerability. In published letters to the Farmville Herald, Gordon Moss urged the 
community to reassess its school program. “There is no gun being held at the head of any 
one, or any official body, at this time in regard to reaching a solution. With no 
embarrassment to any one, we can admit we have attempted the impossible, and simply 
resume public education.” He questioned the feasibility of perpetually raising money to 
keep the Academy in operation. “Do the citizens of Prince Edward County want to be 
pauperized?” Moss asked. “It is inconceivable to me that the proud citizens of Prince 
Edward desire to be dependent upon private charity for the education of their children.” 
Barrye Wall, contrarily, remained steadfast. He considered education to be the “duty of 
the parents” and public education a “privilege.”
41
 The state sanctioned that philosophy 
through legislation, court rulings, and executive aloofness. Congress and the federal 
courts permitted its continuation through inaction and indecisiveness. The Kennedy 
administration was the only branch at any level of government interested in taking 
decisive action to end the school crisis, but it was handcuffed by statutory limitations. 
Only the Kennedy administration’s direct involvement could assure that education was a 
right and not an expensive privilege.
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CHAPTER IX 
WE ALL HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY 
 
President Kennedy employed extraordinary executive authority to ensure that 
James Meredith matriculated at the University of Mississippi. Meredith had attempted to 
break the color barrier at Ole Miss, but the registrar rejected his application. The NAACP 
filed suit in federal court, where the judges determined that Meredith was “turned down 
solely because he was a Negro” and ordered the university to admit him. State and 
college officials obstructed the court order and were found to be in contempt. Governor 
Ross Barnett became the face of defiance. He personally blocked Meredith’s initial 
attempts to register, negotiated in bad faith with federal officials, and played to the 
emotions of white supremacists, who descended on Oxford by the thousands. As a 
precaution, the president had Meredith protected by the U.S. Marshals Service. On 
September 30, 1962, Kennedy went further by issuing an executive order authorizing the 
Secretary of Defense to use the U.S. armed forces, including federalizing the Mississippi 
National Guard, if necessary, to carry out the court orders.
1
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That evening, President Kennedy addressed the nation on the situation in Oxford. 
He dispassionately summarized the court proceedings, omitting any reference to the 
inherent racial discrimination involved in the matter or an appeal for racial conciliation. 
Rather, Kennedy urged his countrymen to observe the law and the orders of the court, 
even those held in disdain: “Americans are free, in short, to disagree with the law but not 
to disobey it.” Kennedy reminded the people that the president had a responsibility to 
ensure that the court orders were implemented, thus couching his unpopular decision to 
federalize the National Guard in his duty to office. At that moment, Kennedy contentedly 
reported that activating federal forces had not been required. However, as he spoke, 
students and outside militants attacked the marshals, resulting in the death of two 
bystanders, hundreds of injuries, and over two hundred arrests. In response, President 
Kennedy sent in the armed forces to restore order. The following day, James Meredith 
became the first African American to register for classes at the University of Mississippi.
1
  
 The federal response alarmed segregationists. A Gallup poll showed that 65 
percent of southern whites believed that the Kennedy administration was pushing 
integration “too fast.” Weeks later in a nationally televised interview that aired on all 
three networks, the president defended his actions in Mississippi:  
 
I don't really know what other role they would expect the President of the United 
States to play. The court made up of Southern judges determined it was according 
to the Constitution that Mr. Meredith go to the University of Mississippi. The 
Governor of Mississippi opposed it, and there was rioting against Mr. Meredith, 
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which endangered his life. We sent in marshals, and after all, 150 or 160 marshals 
were wounded in one way or another out of four or five hundred, and at least 
three-fourths of the marshals were from the South themselves. Then we sent in 
troops when it appeared that the marshals were going to be overrun. I don't think 
that anybody who looks at the situation can think we could possibly do anything 
else. We couldn't possibly do anything else.  
 
Nevertheless, Kennedy recognized that the integration of Ole Miss “caused a lot of 
bitterness against me and against the National Government in Mississippi and other 
parts.” In Prince Edward County, Mayor Billy Watkins forecast the “death knell” of state 
sovereignty and Barrye Wall lamented that states’ right to freely educate its citizens “has 
been trampled into the dust through brute federal force.” White citizens were concerned 
that federal troops might be sent into their community to force open the public schools. In 
an editorial titled “Mississippi and Prince Edward,” Wall tried to alleviate those 
concerns: “The unprecedented action in Mississippi has no direct effect upon Prince 
Edward….We can conceive of nothing which will require federal troops in Prince 
Edward County.”
2
 
 The president’s response to Ole Miss raised African Americans’ expectations for 
federal action in Prince Edward County. Sandra Stokes, who had missed two years of 
school before resuming her education in Washington, D.C., then Suffolk, Virginia, 
believed that if the federal government could help James Meredith, then the president 
could do something in Prince Edward County. Barbara Ann Botts, who had received her 
                                                          
2
 George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971, Volume Three (New York: Random 
House, 1972), 1786; “Television and Radio Interview: ‘After Two Years – a Conversation With the 
President,’” December 17, 1962, in PPP-1962, 889-904; William F. Watkins, Jr., to Albertis S. Harrison, 
Box 9, ASHP; Editorial, “Rule By Force,” FH, October 2, 1962, 4A; Editorial, “Mississippi and Prince 
Edward,” FH, October 6, 1962, 1C. 
 
244 
bootleg education in Massachusetts and New Jersey, argued that the president could open 
the schools with federal troops, if necessary.
3
 The difference, however, was that the 
federal government enforced a court order in Oxford. No such order to reopen Prince 
Edward County’s public school had been decreed. The Department of Justice actively 
looked for an opening to enter the litigation and advise the court to issue such an order. 
 
 
John F. Kennedy emerged from his autumn of trial battletested and popular. The 
president not only advanced racial progress in Mississippi but walked the world back 
from nuclear holocaust with his clearheaded leadership during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
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President Kennedy’s Job Approval Rating 
 
 
Source: George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971, Volume Three (New York: Random House, 1972). 
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Kennedy’s performance arrested the steady decline of his approval numbers. He began 
the new year with a 76 percent approval rating nationwide and, after having lost ground 
for his action in Mississippi, his numbers in the South recovered to a remarkable 68 
percent. The midterm elections also demonstrated the president’s popularity. The 
Democrats maintained supermajorities in both chambers, suffering a net loss of just four 
House members but making a net gain of four in the Senate. The president’s popularity 
was only outdone by his growth in office. “By early 1963,” concluded historian David G. 
Coleman, Kennedy “appeared more sure-footed, more confident, more thoughtful, and 
more at ease with the presidency.”
4
 Kennedy harnessed his prestige to lead the nation 
closer to full equality. He sponsored federal civil rights legislation, framed racial equality 
as a moral issue, and made educating Prince Edward County’s locked-out children a 
federal responsibility.  
 
I 
 
 The Kennedy administration needed a court decree to reopen Prince Edward 
County’s public schools. The U.S. district court had found the school closings 
unconstitutional, but Judge Oren Lewis stayed his order to reopen the schools until the 
federal circuit court reviewed the case. “Judge Lewis,” lamented Burke Marshall, “keeps 
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on entering decrees which are nothing but declarations without teeth.” The forthcoming 
appeal to the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals removed the case from the treadmill 
that was Judge Lewis’s courtroom and put it before a potentially more sympathetic panel 
of jurists. It also provided an opening for the attorney general to participate in the case, an 
opportunity that Judge Lewis had denied in 1961. Marshall believed that the Department 
of Justice could “usefully advise” the circuit court to enter an effective order. Without the 
United States’ involvement, “it is quite possible that the Prince Edward litigation will 
continue to go on inconclusively for several more years.”
5
 An affirmative ruling, 
especially one the U.S. Supreme Court allowed to stand by declining to grant certiorari, 
could force the school doors open by September, and the administration had proven that 
it would enforce a court order with troops, if necessary. The stars appeared aligned, but 
such hopeful prospects failed to transpire. 
 The Civil Rights Division had been looking for an opening to enter the Prince 
Edward litigation. St. John Barrett, second assistant to Burke Marshall, inquired about the 
NAACP’s legal strategy, specifically if it planned to appeal to the U.S. Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Barrett envisioned filing an amicus brief and presenting the court with 
a precise plan that set a deadline to reopen and fund the public schools. He communicated 
his intentions to NAACP attorney Samuel Tucker, who was pleased and offered his 
complete cooperation. Barrett was anxious to resolve the matter and advised a Division 
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attorney that they “should be prepared to file a brief at the same time Mr. Tucker does.” 
After filing an appeal in early November, Robert Carter sent the NAACP’s brief to the 
Civil Rights Division. Burke Marshall assured Carter that his office was reviewing the 
documents and “considering whether we should not file a brief.” Marshall expected that 
no matter what the court’s decision that a litigant would appeal the case. Therefore, he 
carefully prepared an argument that would ultimately prevail in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Marshall cleared his strategy with U.S. Solicitor General Archibald Cox, who advised 
him to present the case “upon such narrow grounds as are adequate to win the 
case…without pressing the Court too hard to embrace some sweeping position 
that…would be difficult to defend in the Supreme Court.” Specifically, the Solicitor 
General’s Office urged Marshall to confine his arguments to supporting the holding of 
the U.S. district court.
6
  
On December 20, 1962, the Department of Justice petitioned the U.S. Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals to enter the Prince Edward case as a friend of the court. “This is 
a case of great importance to public education in the United States,” the brief opened. “It 
is of great importance also to the future course of desegregation of the public schools in 
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this country and to the implementation of the constitutional principles announced by the 
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education.” The brief argued that the lower court’s 
decrees and orders should be made effective immediately and that the federal courts had 
jurisdiction to require the county to levy taxes and operate public schools. Furthermore, 
the United States had an interest to protect the constitutional rights of its citizens, and this 
case tested “whether the federal courts have power to protect these rights before they are 
forever lost.” The county officials had failed to meet their obligation, imposing an “undue 
and unreasonable burden” on parents. “It is time – in fact, it is high time,” reasoned the 
United States, “to call a halt to this abdication of responsibility on the part of the county 
authorities.” The court authorized the Department of Justice to file its brief and present 
oral arguments.
7
  
 On January 9, 1963, the federal circuit court held hearings on the constitutionality 
of the school closings. The NAACP supported Judge Lewis’s finding that the school 
closings were unconstitutional and asked that the court order the schools reopened by 
February. “This case should be decided forthwith,” asserted Robert Carter. “There’s an 
urgency about this.” In addition, the NAACP asked for an injunction on state funding to 
all Virginia public schools while Prince Edward County’s schools remained closed. “The 
state is under an obligation to maintain the system [of public schools],” explained Carter, 
“and is doing so everywhere else but Prince Edward.” The Department of Justice 
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intervened in the case, in part to temper the NAACP’s call for an injunction on state 
funds for schools across the commonwealth. The attorney general had generated undue 
anxiety with a similar motion in 1961. This time the Department of Justice had assured 
the court that “it is not here to advocate the spread of an educational vacuum.” Rather, the 
administration simply sought to restore public education to Prince Edward County.
8
 
 Burke Marshall presented the case for the Department of Justice. He explained 
that the United States had an interest in this matter to enforce compliance with the Brown 
decision and protect the constitutional rights of the black children. Marshall reminded the 
court that the children were innocent victims. “It should be remembered that the decision 
to deprive hundreds of children in Prince Edward County of any education was not made 
by the children even though it is their constitutional rights which are primarily involved 
in this litigation,” reasoned Marshall. “They have also already suffered what is probably 
irreparable damage in more than a legal sense because it will affect their opportunities for 
the rest of their lives. For many of them the deprivation has probably been made 
permanent by this time – not, as I say, by their own choice, but by the choice of others 
who are reflecting a history of racial intolerance.” He asserted that the constitutional 
rights of the children superseded the rights of local citizens to organize a school system in 
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the manner they wished and made clear that the United States had an obligation to 
prevent other communities from following the Prince Edward model.
9
 
 Marshall made two fundamental arguments. First, the school closings violated the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a contention overwhelmingly 
supported by precedent. In every instance that a school closed or was threatened with 
closure the federal courts ruled against the school closers – except Prince Edward 
County. The defendants had maintained that the county differed from the other 
circumstances, because the schools closed for all, both blacks and whites, and the state 
gave localities the option to operate schools. Marshall reminded the court that the state 
was responsible for public schools and argued that the state violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment by operating schools throughout the state, but not in Prince Edward County. 
Second, federal courts had the authority to order the county to reopen and fund the public 
schools. Marshall, again, wrapped his argument in the Fourteenth Amendment: “The 
Constitution forbids the State to permit the Prince Edward schools to be closed. The 
County officials are the relevant state officers under the Fourteenth Amendment for this 
purpose. They accordingly have a positive, not a discretionary, federal duty to levy taxes 
sufficient to maintain open schools. Put another way, their failure to levy taxes to open 
the schools is an abuse of discretion as a matter of federal law because it deprives the 
children of the County of their constitutional rights.” Marshall concluded that the court 
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not only had the authority to open the schools, but it had the power of contempt to ensure 
that the county complied.
10
 
 The defendants took no responsibility for operating public schools in Prince 
Edward County. The attorneys argued that the county had no constitutional obligation to 
provide schools. Collins Denny told the court that the federal constitution “never 
has…required that public schools be operated.” Nor, the defendants argued, did the 
Constitution prohibit a locality from educating its children as it desired – be it public 
schools or private schools funded by tuition grants. The state attorneys, likewise, found 
that Virginia had no obligation to reopen the schools “because they have no duty, no 
power and no funds to do so. Virginia has no schools, no buses, no teachers.” The 
defendants had prepared for the federal case by raising similar questions in state court. 
Months earlier, the county attorneys had initiated a suit in the State Circuit Court of 
Richmond to determine whether the state must operate public schools when local officials 
refused to appropriate funds. Collins Denny argued that the county school board had “the 
sole right, authority and duty to operate schools,” but the board of supervisors could 
“block this duty” by refusing to allocate funds, an “intentional” design in the state 
constitution. Neither the governor, nor the general assembly, nor the state board of 
education could usurp the local school board’s authority. The school board, therefore, 
violated neither state laws nor violated the Fourteenth Amendment because public 
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schools were closed to both blacks and whites. The county banked on the state court’s 
ruling to complicate matters in the federal circuit court.
11
  
The State Circuit Court of Richmond countersigned the state and county’s 
arguments. On March 27, 1963, Judge John Wingo Knowles determined that the state 
board of education had no authority to operate schools in Prince Edward County, that the 
local school board had fulfilled its responsibility as outlined in the state constitution, and 
that there was no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and no reason to block tuition 
grants. The court’s opinion was in direct conflict with Judge Lewis’s rulings in U.S. 
district court and, as Collins Denny planned, complicated the virtually identical issues 
pending in the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Farmville Herald celebrated 
Judge Knowles’s opinion with a front-page editorial, claiming that the ruling “definitely 
makes the localities responsible for education in Virginia, and it rules out federal 
interference or authority under the Constitution.” Lawyers at the Department of Justice, 
on the other hand, believed that the state ruling had no bearing on the federal case. St. 
John Barrett advised Burke Marshall that Judge Knowles’s ruling did not require further 
action in the federal circuit court. In fact, he argued that the state ruling should be 
dismissed as “irrelevant,” adding that “to suggest that the state court decision is of any 
importance, one way or another would invite further delay inasmuch as this is a decision 
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only of a lower state court and is now on appeal to the State Supreme Court.” Ultimately, 
Collins Denny’s strategy to delay the federal proceedings by running parallel litigation in 
the state courts worked and, to boot, it created an opening to lift the injunction on tuition 
grants.
12
 
Governor Harrison had come under pressure from Prince Edward Academy 
parents to distribute the state tuition grants. Leo Wells, the manager of the Longwood 
Golf Club, for one, had paid his daughters’ full tuition for the previous two years. Wells 
considered the state court’s ruling reason enough for Virginia to immediately compensate 
parents for their tuition expenses. “We feel that we have been discriminated [against] 
enough in this county,” Wells explained to Harrison, “and these grants should be paid [to] 
us as soon as possible.” Harrison believed that a favorable ruling in the state supreme 
court would convince the federal circuit court to lift the injunction on tuition grants. At 
the governor’s request, the state attorney general petitioned the Virginia State Supreme 
Court of Appeals to expedite a hearing on the constitutionality of tuition grants. 
However, Chief Justice John W. Eggleston questioned why the state court must “run a 
race with the [U.S.] Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to get this issue decided.” In early 
June, the state supreme court declined to expedite the case. Both courts had similar 
constitutional issues to interpret and both waited for the other to make their decision. 
Federal Judge Clement Haynsworth privately admitted that he found himself “bogged 
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down in unresolved questions of state law, the ultimate resolution of which I found 
myself wholly unable to predict with confidence.” His indecision prompted further delay, 
which left the school situation in a cloud of uncertainty deep into the summer.
13
 
 The federal courts’ delay emboldened the county. In June, the county board of 
supervisors passed a budget that allocated $375,000 for tuition grants. In addition to the 
money blocked by a federal injunction, the county held $100,000s in escrow for tuition 
grants. If the federal court lifted the injunction, then the county could immediately 
provide relief to Academy parents. However, the county afforded no relief for the locked-
out children. For the fifth consecutive year, the supervisors unanimously approved a 
budget void of operational funds for public schools. The school board had prepared two 
budgets: one that provided funds to operate public schools for all children and another to 
fund only the public education of black children. At the budget hearing, all six speakers, 
four white and two black, urged the board to allocate the funds for public schools. No 
speaker defended the status quo. In an editorial, Barrye Wall spun the public hearing by 
dismissing the value of citizens petitioning their government. “We could have filled the 
courtroom [the site of the public hearing] with our people and so could they,” explained 
Wall. “The board knows how they feel.” The budget bought the massive resisters more 
time. If the federal court ordered the public schools reopened, then a new states’ rights 
issue would arise: the county would not have sufficient funds to operate public schools 
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and by state law it could not amend the budget after June to raise more revenue for that 
fiscal year. The county could not comply with the federal court order without violating 
the state law, and that scenario opened the door to further delay to the resumption of 
public education.
14
 
 
II 
 
 President Kennedy’s thinking on civil rights legislation had shifted. In the first 
two years of his presidency, Kennedy advanced racial progress through executive action 
rather than proposing new legislation. A civil rights bill simply did not have the votes in 
Congress. He considered it unwise to diminish the office of the presidency by pushing 
legislation that was destined to fail. The midterm elections sustained the Democratic 
supermajorities but not a working majority for the president. Kennedy determined that 
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the new Congress was “slightly against us more” than the previous congress. In addition, 
there was little public demand for a bill. According to a Gallup poll, only 4 percent of 
Americans ranked racial matters as the country’s most important problem. The people 
considered international problems, Fidel Castro and Cuba, and unemployment more 
pressing concerns. Nevertheless, President Kennedy directed the White House staff to 
study a legislative message on civil rights. The process moved the administration to take 
extraordinary action in Prince Edward County.
15
 
 The president’s advisors had reservations about a civil rights bill, particularly a 
provision on school desegregation. The administration had drafted language that 
authorized the attorney general to file suits. With hundreds of school districts still 
segregated, Lee White, assistant special counsel to the president, advised that the attorney 
general “would be under heavy pressure to enter every school district to seek 
desegregation.” The Civil Rights Division did not have such resources. “And while it is 
emphasized that the Attorney General would only be authorized, not directed, to bring 
suits,” underscored Burke Marshall, “how would he explain a decision not to enforce the 
law in a particular county?” Marshall was also concerned about passing a bill that the 
administration could not enforce, like one demanding immediate desegregation. “We 
have a great problem in maintaining respect for the law,” explained Marshall. “This law 
would not be obeyed.” In fact, localities could defy the law by closing schools on “a large 
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scale.” He believed that it was more realistic to pass a bill that provided technical and 
financial assistance to school districts undergoing desegregation.
16
 Kennedy proceeded 
with a civil rights message that requested moderate expansion of executive authority over 
school desegregation.  
President Kennedy sent his “Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights” to 
Capitol Hill on February 28. Kennedy outlined his recommendations for voting rights, the 
commission on civil rights, employment, public accommodations, the non-discriminatory 
use of federal funds, and education. The president, again, affirmed his support for the 
Brown decision, which “represented both good law and good judgment – it was both 
morally and legally right.” He renewed his conviction that “closed schools are not the 
answer” and highlighted the Prince Edward County school crisis. The Department of 
Justice had “intervened to seek the opening of public schools in the case of Prince 
Edward County, Virginia, the only county in the nation where there are no public 
schools, and where a bitter effort to thwart court decrees requiring desegregation has 
caused nearly 1,500 out of 1,800 school age Negro children to go without an education 
for more than three years.” President Kennedy pledged that “the Executive Branch will 
continue its efforts to fulfill the Constitutional objective of an equal, non-segregated, 
educational opportunity for all children” and recommended that Congress pass legislation 
to permit federal technical and financial assistance to school districts that were 
desegregating “in compliance with the Constitution.” The message, however, failed to 
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excite the public or move the Congress to act. In addition, the president did not expend 
his stores of political capital on a campaign to pass his recommendations – and 
presidential leadership was needed to pass a civil rights bill.
17
  
 The White House conferences on civil rights prompted a study of possible federal 
action in Prince Edward County. The president’s proposal to provide technical and 
financial assistance to desegregating school systems meant nothing to the county unless a 
federal court ordered the schools reopened. Besides, there was no guarantee that the 
federal circuit court would rule favorably and that Congress would pass the president’s 
recommendations. Kennedy recognized that if the schools were to reopen in September, 
an extraordinary effort would be required to compensate for the four lost years, and the 
federal government had to assume this responsibility. President Kennedy directed the 
Department of Justice to investigate all manners in which the federal government could 
assist the county’s locked-out children. Burke Marshall spearheaded this task. He asked 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to present proposals that 
provided educational opportunities for all children in Prince Edward County. HEW then 
directed the U.S. Office of Education to conduct an investigation.
18
  
 Peter Muirhead, assistant commissioner for program and legislative planning, led 
the study. He opened informal discussions with a half-dozen people who were 
knowledgeable about the situation and sympathetic to the locked-out children (see Table 
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9.2). From these conversations, Muirhead noted that the younger children had not seen 
the inside of a classroom and that the older children were insufficiently trained for the 
workforce; the county lacked the  resources to meet the challenge of educating children 
who had been locked-out for four years; former black public school teachers had moved 
away or found employment elsewhere; public school buildings might be made available 
for an educational program; and the NAACP would not oppose a federal program. On 
March 11, Muirhead presented his recommendations to Francis Keppel, the U.S. 
Commissioner of Education. With the likelihood that the federal courts would delay 
ordering the schools reopened, he proposed that “immediate steps should be taken to 
provide an organized program of instruction starting in September 1963….This would 
seem to indicate that the principal effort between now and September should be directed 
toward assessing the pupil population, obtaining financial support, recruiting staff, and 
locating and preparing facilities and teaching materials.” Muirhead’s review became the 
basis for federal action in Prince Edward County.
19
 
 The Office of Education submitted a broad range of recommendations. The 
federal government’s position was complicated due to insufficient authority to operate a 
school system. Thus, the administration could play a minor role simply by encouraging 
the NAACP and the American Friends Service Committee to place more children in 
schools outside the county. That approach, however, had proven to be ineffective at 
restoring universal education. Second, the administration could employ existing laws to 
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provide educational opportunities for some of the locked-out children. The National 
Defense Education and the Manpower Development and Training Acts could provide 
demonstration projects in educational television for all grade levels, a remedial reading 
clinic, and vocational training for older children. Third, the administration could solicit 
philanthropic foundations to provide funding for correspondence courses. Finally, a more 
ambitious program – the Muirhead proposal – called for a full school program funded by 
private donations. The schools would be staffed with master teachers on sabbatical from 
large school systems, Peace Corps volunteers, and graduate students serving as interns.  
 
Table 9.2 
 
Discussants of School Situation with Peter Muirhead, March 1963 
 
 
Discussant Connection 
Jean Fairfax 
American Friends Service Committee 
The American Friends Service Committee has been active in 
setting up classes and providing instruction in Prince Edward 
County for the past three summers. 
 
Dr. Hans Furth 
Professor of Psychology 
Catholic University of America 
Dr. Furth is active in the group of persons bringing children 
from Prince Edward County to attend Washington schools. 
 
 
Rev. L. Francis Griffin 
Prince Edward County Christian Association 
Rev. Griffin is the President of the Prince Edward County 
Christian Association, the local group which has tried to 
maintain community interest in education since the schools were 
closed. (He is an important local Negro power figure.) 
 
Kenneth Morland 
Professor of Sociology and Anthropology 
Randolph-Macon Women’s College 
 
Dr. Morland has published articles on race relations as related to 
cultural change and has conducted research concerned with the 
educational and occupational aspirations of children in a 
Southern community. 
 
Dean C. G. Gordon Moss 
Longwood College 
Dean Moss is a local person concerned with the situation in his 
community. 
 
Dr. Deborah Wolfe 
Education Chief 
House Committee on Education and Labor 
Mrs. Wolfe has worked closely with the several groups 
interested in helping with the education of Negro children in 
Prince Edward County. 
 
Source: Peter P. Muirhead to Francis Keppel, “Prince Edward County Situation,” March 11, 1963, Box 100, RG 12. 
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The Office of Education’s recommendations were not a comprehensive program but a 
number of overlapping proposals. In order to determine the community’s needs, the 
administration had to conduct a survey to obtain information on the age distribution and 
educational level of black students, the number of interested students, transportation 
needs, and the availability of staff, school facilities, and teaching materials. The Office of 
Education concluded that once these results were analyzed “a definite course of action 
can be laid out.”
20
 
 On March 18, HEW submitted the Office of Education’s report to Burke 
Marshall. Assistant Secretary James Quigley’s commentary biased the report toward 
implementing a full school program. However, he cautioned that HEW did not have the 
programs to support general education and made clear that the proposal assumed that the 
school buildings and transportation services would be available. In addition, Quigley 
warned that, especially without a compulsory attendance law, the student body and 
parents had to be “strongly motivated.” He emphasized that it was imperative to “remove 
any practical obstacle to attendance.” Quigley closed by pledging HEW’s support to 
“remedy this deplorable situation” and imploring that “a program such as has been 
outlined will require the active support of the Administration to succeed.” President 
Kennedy had already demonstrated his strong interest by charging the Department of 
Justice with leading this investigation. As long as Robert Kennedy remained attorney 
general, Justice was the center of action, and Prince Edward was a top concern. Just 
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weeks earlier he told the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot that “the case I’m most concerned about 
is Prince Edward,” adding that “it’s one of the really deplorable situations in the 
nation.”
21
 
 
 Robert Kennedy intensified his condemnation of Prince Edward County. 
Recently, he had denounced the school closings in a national context, as “a disgrace to 
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Figure 9.1 Robert F. Kennedy, March 18, 1963. (Photo: Louisville Courier-Journal). 
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our educational system and to our country.” On March 18 at the Emancipation 
Proclamation Centennial celebration in Louisville, Kentucky, Kennedy shamed the 
county by placing the school closings in an international context: “We may observe, with 
as much sadness as irony that outside of Africa, south of the Sahara where education is 
still a difficult challenge, the only places on earth known not to provide free public 
education are Communist China, North Vietnam, Sarawak, Singapore, British Honduras 
– and Prince Edward County, Virginia.” Barrye Wall took to his editorial page  to 
respond, considering it a “slap” at the county because “by association he damns [its] 
people…by the spurious method of association with people of which we never had any 
contact.” Annie Putney of Farmville refuted Wall in a letter to the editor, stating that 
Kennedy’s remarks were not a slap, “but the statement of a fact.” Burton G. Hurdle, Jr., 
of Hampden-Sydney added that the county “looks senile, foolish, and backward in the 
frowning eyes of the nation. It has no feeling of obligation or responsibility.” The 
Kennedy brothers had resolved to make educating the locked-out children a federal 
responsibility.
22
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III 
 
 In October 1962, Reverend L. Francis Griffin was elected president of the 
Virginia State Conference of the NAACP. Under his leadership, the association dedicated 
itself to strengthening and accelerating all phases of its program in observance of the 
centennial of emancipation. He resolved to make 1963 the year that “will challenge the 
ambitions, talents and energies of every freedom loving citizen in Virginia.” The state 
Association sought “speedy and lasting resolutions to the ‘unfinished tasks’ of our 
democracy.” Prince Edward County was one of those unfinished tasks, and Griffin’s 
ascension placed the school crisis at the top of the agenda. In fact, at the state convention 
that elected Griffin, the Association held a memorial dinner to honor him and the black 
citizens of Prince Edward County. The evening’s program included a lyrical tribute: 
 
Praise is due our gallant sons, 
Our gallant daughters too! 
Those brilliant, brave, inspired ones – 
That grand Prince Edward Crew! 
…Let’s bind ourselves together 
In a new abiding TRUST! 
We’ll face all kinds of weather 
With a new UNITED MUST! 
 
Reverend Griffin urged black Virginians to “redouble” their efforts for desegregation: 
“We must decide as individuals that we will do anything, even give our lives, for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
disgrace that outside of Africa…” An editor circled “national disgrace” and wrote in the margin: “Too 
strong. Let the fact[s] speak for themselves.” In the end, the final draft closely resembled the Sorensen 
memo. See Theodore C. Sorensen to John F. Kennedy, March 6, 1963, Box 5, BMP; Drafts of 
Emancipation Proclamation Centennial Celebration, Speeches 1961-1964, Box 2, RFKP. 
 
265 
freedom.” He assured the delegates that black Prince Edwardians “intend to hold out to 
the end regardless of the cost.”
23
 
The state NAACP modified its Prince Edward strategy. Reverend Griffin 
dissolved the Prince Edward County Christian Association (PECCA), because the Prince 
Edward project had become “too massive in scope” for the organization to “manage 
effectively.” Also, PECCA had too often been misidentified as an affiliate of SCLC. 
Management of the school crisis returned unmistakably under the umbrella of the 
NAACP. PECCA’s dissolution, however, meant the termination of the training centers, 
thus closing a door to an educational program for the black children that remained in the 
community – and more parents chose not to send their children away to school. The 
Virginia Teachers’ Association had more out-of-county placement slots than interested 
students. Griffin tried to “stimulate interest in this project but with little success.” He 
offered an assessment for the declining interest: some did not want to accept help, others 
preferred staying close to their birthplace; a segment was apathetic, “lethargic and 
complacent”; and still others had become “despondent” and “lost all faith in democratic 
processes.”
24
 The NAACP had to find a winning strategy that would not permit 
surrender.  
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 The NAACP resolved that the federal government had to take responsibility for 
educating the locked-out children. Over the winter, Griffin had coordinated with the 
national Association, the American Friends Service Committee, and the Virginia 
Teachers’ Association to develop a plan to pressure the Kennedy administration to 
provide a remedial education program in the county. They settled on a three-point plan: 
survey the school-age population, assist in the development of a federal remedial 
education program, and present a petition to President Kennedy. On April 10, the 
NAACP unveiled its proposal at a well-publicized press conference. The NAACP urged 
the federal government to “commit its full resources” to Prince Edward County. “Nothing 
less than the most comprehensive remedial and preparatory program that can be devised 
will do,” a statement read. “Only government – federal government in this case – can or 
should bear the burden of providing this aid.”
25
  
A week later, the NAACP sponsored a census to assess the educational status and 
needs of the black children. Seven dozen students from Hampton Institute and Virginia 
Union University canvassed the county. They counted 1,633 school-age black children, 
of which 492 attended school outside of the county, and 129 of them went to school 
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outside the state. That left over 1,000 children not attending school at all. The NAACP 
reported that parents strongly favored a remedial education program and an 
“overwhelming majority” would call their kids back to the county to attend reopened 
public schools. In addition, some census workers voluntarily surveyed racial 
discrimination in places of public accommodations. Several sought service at lunch 
counters (Owen-Sanford Drug Company, Southside Sundry, and J.J. Newberry’s) and 
admittance to the State Theater, but all were turned away. The demonstrations 
foreshadowed a tense summer.
26
 
The NAACP circulated a petition that urged President Kennedy to act in Prince 
Edward County. The document summarized the tragedy that had been inflicted on the 
black children:  
 
The abandonment of public schools has been a disaster from which some of our 
children will probably never fully recover. There are 8, 9, and 10 year old 
children who have never had any formal education and can neither read nor write. 
There are adolescent boys and girls, now discouraged and overaged, who could 
easily become like the school drop-outs: without skills and training for our 
nation’s needs. There is the large in-between group who lost precious years of 
education before they even established strong study habits.  
 
 
The signatories trusted that the president had the “concern and power” to avail the 
children of a “massive program of Federal assistance” that would ease their transition 
back to public schools. They made a dramatic plea for the implementation of a remedial 
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education program which “will match in purpose, scope and quality the best social and 
technical assistance project which our Government has ever done anywhere in the 
world.” Six hundred ninety-five black Prince Edwardians affixed their signature to the 
petition, which Roy Wilkins transmitted to the White House in mid-May.
27
 
 The NAACP may have provided the impetus to push the administration’s Prince 
Edward program along. Reverend Griffin had first-hand knowledge that a federal 
program was being studied. In March, the U.S. Office of Education had interviewed 
Griffin about the schools crisis and tipped him off about a possible program. Griffin had 
also obtained a copy of a college professor’s application for a cooperative research grant 
to study Prince Edward County, which was under review by the Office of Education. 
Additionally, the NAACP had learned that a White House memorandum on Prince 
Edward had been circulating through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 
With this intelligence, the NAACP called on the administration to implement a remedial 
education program – a program vaguely worded and, admittedly, one that had not fully 
matured in the minds of NAACP planners.
28
 That was irrelevant. The NAACP had seized 
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the initiative, commanded the headlines, and forced the administration to disclose its 
plans for Prince Edward County. 
 The NAACP’s April 10 press conference had caught the Kennedy administration 
off guard. A disconcerted Francis Keppel hurriedly drafted a press release that outlined 
the Office of Education’s concern, recent study, and preliminary plans, and he 
volunteered to speak to the press. Nevertheless, the administration decided to have the 
spokesman for the Department of Justice handle public relations. Ed Guthman issued a 
statement that was widely published on April 12. He explained that weeks earlier 
President Kennedy directed the Office of Education, working in partnership with the 
Department of Justice, to make “an intensive study to determine what kind of remedial 
training program would be possible and appropriate for the children of Prince Edward 
County.” As a preliminary step, a research team was contracted to conduct a survey to 
determine the educational needs of the county. The study would “serve as a basis for a 
final determination of what kind of educational programs, including remedial reading 
programs, can be instituted.” Guthman emphasized the administration’s concern for the 
lost years of school and closed by stating, “If the federal government can help, we want 
to help.”
29
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 Governor Albertis Harrison opposed federal assistance to Prince Edward County. 
“It has always been my hope that we could avoid any move by the Federal Government 
to set up any type of schools in the county,” grumbled Harrison, “but…there may be no 
means available to us that would discourage the Federal Government’s apparent intention 
of setting up the so-called remedial program.” The governor told reporters that he 
preferred a program carried out by the state and locality. Commentators impugned 
Harrison for his disingenuous statement. The Lynchburg News called on the governor to 
do “more than ‘prefer’ that a remedial program be instituted by the State and locality 
rather than the Federal government. Let him take the lead in these matters.” Likewise, 
during a speaking engagement at Longwood College, State Senator Armistead Boothe 
urged the state to take responsibility by funding the public schools and, thereby, beat 
“Jack and Bobby Kennedy to the draw.” The state’s failure to take responsibility had 
created a vacuum of leadership.
30
 
Robert Kennedy soon declared the school closings a federal responsibility. On 
April 25, in an address at the University of South Carolina, the attorney general 
denounced the county’s legal defense for shirking its responsibility. “In Prince Edward 
County, Virginia, public officials met the legal requirement of equality in public 
education by closing all public schools in that county,” decried Kennedy. “Equality was 
achieved in the mathematical sense that zero equals zero – that is, the lack of public 
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education for Negro children satisfies requirements of equality if there is no public 
education for white children.” Also, Kennedy laid out the moral consequences of the 
county’s policy: “The shocking result is that about 1,300 Negro children in Prince 
Edward County have not attended school for four years. There are children there who are 
eleven years old who cannot read or write. These are the lost children in an age of 
transition. They have been caught in a social revolution which, though not of their 
making, has made itself felt most directly on them.” Finally, Kennedy stated that “we all 
have a responsibility to find a solution,” adding that the administration “is working 
actively to find what it can do to erase the mockery of ‘zero equals zero.’”
31
  
 The administration funded a study of Prince Edward County. Months earlier, Dr. 
Robert Green, an instructor of educational psychology at Michigan State University, had 
visited the county to informally interview black leaders and residents. He determined that 
a study was “possible and mandatory” and, therefore, submitted an application for a 
cooperative research grant. In April, the U.S. Office of Education awarded Green 
$75,372 for a year-long study of the school closings’ effects on the children and 
community. The first phase of the project began in late May. Thirty college students from 
Michigan State University, Virginia Union University, and North Carolina College 
canvased the county to administer a nine-page questionnaire to parents and guardians of 
all school-age black children. The census workers recorded the number of children, their 
age, educational level, recent school attendance, interest in attending school, and 
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transportation availability. Green “hoped to gather valuable information to allow 
educators to plan a meaningful curriculum in case the schools are reopened someday.” 
The Office of Education expected a report on Phase I by the end of June. Originally, the 
administration planned for the data to guide the development of educational programs, 
but it moved on a project before receiving Green’s report.
32
 
 On June 3, the Institute of Educational Research announced that they were 
awarded a grant to conduct a teaching experiment in Prince Edward County. The 
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), under the aegis of the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, agreed to fund a five-year $2.5 million program to test Dr. 
Myron Woolman’s reading technique, the “progressive choice method,” on five hundred 
children who read below a sixth grade-level. Woolman boasted that his project would 
complement future federal programs and the eventual reopened public schools. An 
NAACP spokesperson declared that this program “is what we have been asking for,” 
which just demonstrated the confusion over the project’s purpose. Woolman 
acknowledged that under his program children would learn, but that his purposes were 
“purely for scientific research,” not to provide remedial education. The Woolman project 
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toed a line between research and an educational program, the latter of which the 
administration had no authority to provide.
33
  
 The Kennedy administration had not effectively communicated its Prince Edward 
strategy. The NIMH grant was larger than originally recommended. The internal Quigley 
memo had proposed a four-month $50,000 remedial reading project. NIMH awarded Dr. 
Woolman fifty times more money and extended the term of the project fifty-six more 
months. The price tag and commitment were high, which gave the false impression of it 
being a cure-all program. However, the project was only designed to reach five hundred 
children. Reverend Griffin, for one, welcomed the project but had hoped for a broader 
federal commitment. The administration had not explained how the remedial reading 
project fit into its broader strategy, that the NIMH grant represented only a fraction of its 
Prince Edward program. Within days, Ed Guthman announced that the Office of 
Education was preparing a vocational training program, but he provided no additional 
details. The administration’s disclosing of its program in “bits and pieces” created 
confusion.
34
 The time certainly had come for briefing interested parties on the federal 
government’s plans. 
For months, Jean Fairfax of the AFSC had been working in vain to schedule a 
meeting between federal agencies and private organizations to coordinate planning on 
Prince Edward County. Fairfax likened her efforts to “taking a brisk walk through 
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molasses.” In May, Fairfax again wrote Francis Keppel, but she did not receive a 
response. Keppel worried that a federal school program in Prince Edward County would 
jeopardize the administration’s education bill. He regrettably “took the position that it 
would be wiser, on the whole, to have the ball outside the Office of Education,” which 
accounts for him dodging Jean Fairfax. A short time later, Fairfax met with Burke 
Marshall to express her frustration over Keppel’s silence. Marshall immediately called 
Keppel. “I have Miss Fairfax in the office,” said Marshall. “I have the letter that she has 
sent to you, and I hope you will be able to convene this group.” Keppel acceded. The 
Office of Education invited representatives from several federal agencies and private 
organizations to discuss Prince Edward County.
35
 
 On June 6, Francis Keppel hosted the “informal discussion” at the Office of 
Education. The meeting buzzed with excitement over the recent news reports of the 
NIMH grant. Harold Hildreth of the National Institute of Health cautioned the conferees 
that the report was premature, because the deal had not been formalized, yet he appeared 
confident that the project would move forward. Burke Marshall was less optimistic about 
the federal circuit court ordering the public schools reopened. He announced that the 
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administration was organizing a school system in Prince Edward County that would open 
in September. They planned to lease the public school buildings, recruit teachers, and 
develop the curriculum. The federal government, however, had no authority to pay for the 
schools. “Mr. Keppel’s statutes are stretched to some degree,” explained Marshall, “but 
we can’t stretch them into a school system.” The school had to be funded through private 
sources. Marshall emphasized that the administration did “not want another year to go by 
without schools in Prince Edward County.”
36
 
 That same day, President Kennedy discussed the federal government’s role in 
education during his commencement address at San Diego State College. He cited two 
factors that impeded equal educational opportunities for all: economics and racial 
discrimination. “If our Nation is to meet the goal of giving every American child a fair 
chance,” Kennedy stressed, “we must move swiftly in both areas.” The president 
regarded this issue as a national problem, because “these uneducated boys and girls know 
no State boundaries…and they are your citizens as well as citizens of this country.” 
Kennedy acknowledged that the state and localities “quite rightly” were responsible for 
education, but the federal government also had a responsibility. “I believe that education 
comes at the top of the responsibilities of any government, at whatever level.”
37
 The 
president did not directly invoke Prince Edward County, but his words were no more 
applicable than there. The commencement address aligned with the meeting at the Office 
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of Education, thus crystalizing the administration’s commitment to arresting the 
educational erosion in Prince Edward County. 
 
 
 
 
Table 9.3 
 
Informal Discussion on Educational Matters in Prince Edward County, Virginia, 
June 6, 1963 
 
American Friends Service Committee 
Jean Fairfax 
U.S. Department of Health Education 
and Welfare 
 Samuel Botsford 
International Rescue Committee Harvey Bush 
Bill vanden Heuvel Lisle Carter 
 James Quigley 
National Institute of Health Charles Rogers 
Harold Hildreth  
 U.S. Department of Justice 
NAACP Burke Marshall 
W. Lester Banks  
L. Francis Griffin U.S. Office of Education 
John Morsell Lucille Anderson 
 Margaret Hughes 
Potomac Institute Francis Keppel 
Harold Fleming David Seeley 
 Donald Smith 
President’s Committee on Juvenile 
Delinquency 
 
Virginia Council on Human Relations 
Sanford Kravitz Heslip Lee 
 Edward Peeples 
Southern Regional Council  
Benjamin Muse (none) 
 Gordon Moss 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights  
Virginia Council on Human Relations  
  
  
  
Source: Magaret Hughes, “Notes on Informal Discussion Requested by Miss Fairfax of the American Friends 
Service Committee on Educational Matters in Prince Edward County, Virginia,” June 6, 1963, Box 100, RG 12. 
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IV 
 
 The Birmingham (Alabama) campaign in the spring of 1963 hastened the call for 
racial equality. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, and local black leaders organized a movement to challenge racial 
discrimination in the nation’s most thoroughly segregated large city. African Americans 
boycotted downtown businesses, sat-in at lunch counters, and marched in mass to protest 
employment discrimination and racial segregation in places of public accommodation. 
The police answered with repressive measures that were widely covered by the national 
and international press. Newspapers ran front-page stories with images of law 
enforcement officers using police dogs, high-pressure fire hoses, and billy clubs on 
African Americans. The police could not control the protestors, the jails were filled, the 
business district was paralyzed, and the city’s reputation was scarred. In response, 
business leaders made concessions to the protest organizers. They agreed to desegregate 
public facilities, hire African Americans for non-menial jobs, and form a bi-racial human 
relations committee. White extremists expressed their disdain for the settlement by 
bombing the motel where King had been staying, as well as his brother’s residence. In 
retaliation, thousands of African Americans rioted until federal troops restored order. 
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Birmingham had awakened the nation to the racial injustice that African Americans 
endured.
38
 
 Birmingham inspired a social revolution that evolved faster than local black 
leaders could manage. The campaign proved that direct action could yield concessions 
and served as a model to break down Jim Crow in other communities. In the following 
months, there were nearly one thousand civil rights demonstrations across thirty-eight 
states and the nation’s capital, resulting in twenty thousand arrests. The “Negro 
revolution” was not monolithic or under centralized command. Rather, it created a crisis 
of leadership to meet the increasing demands of the black masses. In Virginia, Reverend 
Griffin faced mounting pressure from those seeking more militant action. “The hardened 
attitude and techniques in Birmingham,” he told the Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
“certainly has served to arouse a great many lethargic and complacent Negroes to action 
in Virginia and elsewhere.” After Birmingham, the NAACP’s conservative, legalistic 
approach appeared antedated and too slow. Griffin grew concerned about African 
Americans turning to irresponsible leaders and unorganized groups that advocated 
violence.
39
 
 Virginia demonstrators encountered police brutality rivaling, if not exceeding, the 
Birmingham campaign. In Danville, about ninety miles southwest of Farmville, African 
Americans who had become frustrated with the local NAACP formed the Danville 
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Christian Progress Association (DCPA). In late May, the DCPA launched a campaign to 
challenge racial discrimination. The Danville Corporation Court issued an injunction that 
essentially outlawed the demonstrations and indicted its leaders for “conspiring to incite 
the colored population of the State to acts of violence and war against the white 
population,” a statute that had been enacted in response to John Brown’s antebellum raid 
of Harpers Ferry in 1859. On June 10, tensions escalated. Early in the day, the police had 
turned back 150 protestors with high-powered fire hoses, and arrested 38. Mayor Julian 
Stinson, with patience “just about at end,” appealed for order and threatened to “fill every 
available stockade” with demonstrators. In defiance, a second wave of protestors 
marched without incident, but the police arrested the juvenile participants’ parents for 
violating an injunction barring demonstrations. In response, a third wave marched on the 
city jail but was dispersed by fire hoses from two directions, “bowling them over like 
tenpins.” Dozens of police officers and deputized sanitation workers moved in to beat the 
demonstrators with nightsticks, injuring forty-seven in what became known as “Bloody 
Monday.”
40
 
The previous day in Hawaii, President Kennedy had urged the United States 
Conference of Mayors to exercise progressive leadership on race relations. He anticipated 
more demonstrations, expressed sympathy for the protestors, and encouraged the 
conferees to recognize the inevitability of racial equality. Kennedy called upon local 
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officials to meet their responsibilities: “The question is whether you and I will do 
nothing, thereby inviting pressure and increasing tension, and inviting possible violence, 
or whether you will anticipate these problems and move to fulfill the rights of your Negro 
citizens in a peaceful and constructive manner.” Further demonstrations and the potential 
for racial discord, the president counseled, could be averted by local remedies. Kennedy 
recommended that mayors meet this challenge by forming bi-racial human relations 
committees; scrubbing racial segregation from local ordinances; implementing 
nondiscriminatory hiring practices in municipal government; ensuring equal access to 
housing, employment, and public accommodations; and decreasing unemployment of the 
unskilled workforce by reducing school dropouts. The president believed that responsible 
leadership could facilitate “a peaceful revolution which will not only avoid disaster, but, 
much more importantly, fulfill our highest obligations.”
41
 
 The Kennedy administration had been preparing to meet its obligation by drafting 
federal civil rights legislation. Months earlier, Robert Kennedy found “no public demand 
for it. There was no demand by the newspapers or radio or television….Nobody paid any 
attention.” Birmingham “aroused people generally in the country and aroused the press.” 
After Birmingham, a majority of Americans considered racial problems the nation’s most 
important issue – up from 4 percent in early April. “Recognizing that the American 
conscience was at last beginning to stir,” reflected Ted Sorensen, President Kennedy 
“began laying his plans for awakening that conscience to the need for further action.” The 
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administration outlined a civil rights bill and began building the groundwork for popular 
support. On May 22, Kennedy announced that legislation was under consideration: “I 
would hope that we would be able to develop some formulas so that those who feel 
themselves, or who are, as a matter of fact, denied equal rights, would have a remedy. As 
it is today, in many cases they do not have a remedy and therefore take to the streets and 
we have the kinds of incidents that we have in Birmingham. We hope to see if we can 
develop a legal remedy.” The president delivered a series of speeches to lead the country 
toward acceptance of racial equality, beginning at San Diego State College and the 
conference of mayors and culminating in a nationally televised address on June 11, 
1963.
42
 
 The “Kennedy Manifesto” was set against the backdrop of political theater in 
Alabama. Governor George Wallace fulfilled his campaign promise to “stand in the 
schoolhouse door” to prevent desegregation. A federal judge had ordered the University 
of Alabama to admit two African American students, Vivian Malone and James Hood. 
On June 11, Wallace choreographed a confrontation with the federal government by 
personally blocking the entrance to Foster Auditorium. The stage had been set. Wallace 
was flanked by a supporting cast of state troopers and miked up for his speaking role, 
amid the flashbulbs of a large media contingent. When the governor refused to step aside, 
President Kennedy federalized the Alabama National Guard to ensure the fulfillment of 
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the court order. Having satisfied his objective to raise his political star, the governor 
ended the charade and pledged to “return to Montgomery to continue this constitutional 
fight.” Malone and Hood successfully registered for classes without further incident. 
 
President Kennedy capitalized on the peaceful conclusion to address the nation on civil 
rights.
43
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Figure 9.2 John F. Kennedy, June 11, 1963. (Photo: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library). 
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 That evening, President Kennedy delivered the greatest presidential appeal for 
racial equality to date. The president deemed civil rights a “moral issue” that must be met 
to fulfill the promise of the nation that could “not be fully free until all of its citizens are 
free.” African Americans should not have to demonstrate or be backed by military force 
to exercise their constitutional rights, nor could repressive police action stem the tide of 
this social revolution. “The events in Birmingham and elsewhere,” Kennedy advised,  
“have so increased the cries for equality that no city or State or legislative body can 
prudently choose to ignore them.” He implored government officials, at all levels, to meet 
their obligation by facilitating a peaceful and constructive resolution. More important, 
Kennedy appealed to all citizens to reexamine their conscience. In the absence of a 
completed text Kennedy improvised a heartfelt conclusion. He described the racial 
discrimination African Americans faced in employment, education, and public places and 
juxtaposed it against his vision for America where every citizen has the “equality of 
treatment which we would want for ourselves” and every child had an “equal right to 
develop their talent and their ability and their motivation, to make something of 
themselves.” Kennedy asked for the support of all Americans to make his vision a 
reality.
44
  
 A week later, President Kennedy sent a new civil rights message to Capitol Hill. 
He asked congress to pass a bill to ban discrimination in places of public accommodation, 
to accelerate the pace of school desegregation, and to ensure fair and full employment. 
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Kennedy fully committed his administration to passing the civil rights bill. “Just as he 
had believed in earlier months that the best interests of the nation required him to avoid a 
losing, bruising legislative battle, so now he believed that the national interests required 
him to try,” explained Ted Sorensen. “Not content with a bill and a speech, he 
immediately resumed the hard, practical job of creating the political, legislative and 
educational climate that would transform the bill into law and the speech into a new era 
of racial justice.” The White House opened a series of well-publicized conferences to 
build broad support for the bill. Over the following weeks, the president met with 
congressmen, civil rights leaders, businessmen, labor leaders, lawyers, clergy, women, 
educators, mayors, governors, Republicans, Democrats, integrationists, and 
segregationists, more than sixteen hundred people in what one historian described as “a 
highly ambitious and unusual exercise of Presidential leadership.”
45
  
 
* * * * * 
 
 After the midterm elections, President Kennedy assumed a more prominent role 
over civil rights. Previously, the president had fostered an atmosphere for racial progress, 
but he remained detached from the debate. He had delegated civil rights issues to the 
Department of Justice, thus emphasizing the legal aspects over the moral concerns. That 
emphasis shifted between the integration of the University of Mississippi and the 
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University of Alabama. Kennedy had dispassionately made the legal argument, but not 
the moral case, for James Meredith to enroll at Ole Miss. By contrast, on June 11, 1963, 
Kennedy clearly articulated that civil rights required the attention of all Americans, not 
just as a matter of law but as a matter of conscience. He married law and conscience by 
sponsoring the most comprehensive civil rights legislation to date. Earlier, Kennedy had 
been reluctant to use the bully pulpit to push for a bill that was sure to fail. However, 
Birmingham stirred the national conscience at the moment that Kennedy’s confidence 
and prestige were peaking, and the social revolution sparked by Birmingham required 
national leadership. At great political risk, President Kennedy placed the moral authority 
of his office behind the greatest moral issue of the day. 
Kennedy’s civil rights bill harmed his prospects for winning re-election. 
Nationwide, the bill enjoyed popular support among whites, but it was very unpopular 
with white Southerners, a supermajority of who believed that the administration was 
pushing integration “too fast.” In the South, Kennedy’s approval rating plummeted to 33 
percent, and he trailed Barry Goldwater and George Romney by significant margins in 
hypothetical presidential election matchups among southern voters. These were ominous 
figures for a politician facing re-election, especially for a Democrat. No Democrat had 
ever won the presidency without southern support. With his razor-thin popular margin in 
1960, Kennedy could ill afford to write off the South. Kennedy knew that the civil rights 
bill might cost him a second term, but he proceeded nonetheless. “What the hell,” he told 
his brother. “If we’re going to lose, let’s lose on principle.” “There comes a time,” 
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Kennedy held, “when a man has to take a stand and history will record that he has to 
meet these tough situations and ultimately make a decision.” Kennedy hitched his 
political future to the civil rights bill and thus the ideal of racial equality.
46
 
 
 The Kennedy administration had earned near-unanimous praise from rank-and-
file African Americans. Eighty-nine percent of blacks believed that Kennedy was doing 
an “excellent” or “pretty good” job. Roy Wilkins witnessed that popularity at a meeting 
in North Carolina. “I attacked John Kennedy for ten minutes and everyone sat on their 
                                                          
46
 William Brink and Louis Harris, The Negro Revolution in America (New York: Simon and Shuster, 
1963), 142; Gallup, Gallup Poll, 1829-1830; Peter Maas, “What Will R.F.K. Do Next?” Saturday Evening 
Post, March 28, 1964, 20. 
Table 9.4 
 
Public Opinion of the Kennedy Administration’s Speed on Integration 
 
 
 
Source: George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971, Volume Three (New York: Random 
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hands,” recalled Wilkins. “Then I said a few favorable words about the things he had 
done, and they clapped and clapped.” African Americans recognized that, among recent 
presidents, Kennedy had done more to advance their rights. They favored Kennedy’s re-
election almost to a man; many feared that his defeat would set them back. Barry 
Goldwater, George Romney, and Nelson Rockefeller barely registered among black 
voters in hypothetical matchups against Kennedy. African Americans looked to Kennedy 
to fight for them, more than the courts and Congress, and overwhelmingly more than 
state and local authorities. Likewise, in Prince Edward County African Americans were 
“in love with the Kennedys.”
47
 
 Black Prince Edwardians believed that a resolution to the school crisis would 
come from the federal government. According to a poll taken in June, African American 
parents had little confidence in a state or local solution. In fact, more people believed that 
the schools would be reopened by divine intervention than the state of Virginia. The 
governor, general assembly, and state board of education all denied any responsibility to 
operate schools in Prince Edward County, a contention supported in the state circuit 
court. A small proportion of respondents considered a local solution more likely – be it 
by whites working unilaterally or through black-white cooperation. However, the board 
of supervisors failed again to allocate funding for public schools and bi-racial 
communication was virtually non-existent. The Birmingham campaign inspired African 
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Americans to fight for their rights, but that required abandoning the NAACP or the 
Association amending its position on direct action. The NAACP preferred remedies from 
institutions, like the courts, and had recently pressured the federal government to take 
more responsibility for the school-less children. In fact, the president headed the only 
branch of government at any level with the determination to open the schools. Like 
African Americans more broadly, black Prince Edwardians looked to the Kennedy 
administration to protect their rights – and by an overwhelming margin (see Table 9.5).
48
  
 President Kennedy made educating Prince Edward’s locked-out children a federal 
responsibility. The Department of Justice had jumped at the first opportunity to intervene 
in the litigation. However, when a court order and voluntary action to reopen the schools 
appeared remote, President Kennedy directed his administration to explore means of 
arresting the educational erosion and to compensate for the four lost years of education – 
a directive that pre-dated the Birmingham campaign and the NAACP’s April 10 press 
conference. The administration adopted a plan to assess the situation, provide a remedial 
education program, and facilitate the implementation of a temporary school system. The 
federal government had no authority to provide a school system, but they had the 
influence and resources to act as a conduit to a program. President Kennedy inspired this 
strategy and charged the Department of Justice with ensuring its implementation. 
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Table 9.5 
 
Responses of Negro Parents in Prince Edward County, Virginia, in June 1963, to the Question: 
“How do you think the schools can be opened again?” 
 
Source: Robert L. Green, et al., The Educational Status of Children in a District Without Public Schools (Lansing, Michigan: 
College of Education, Michigan State University, 1964), 120. 
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CHAPTER X 
 
TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE 
 
 
 The Kennedy administration had expanded its commitment to Prince Edward 
County. In the first half of 1963, the Department of Justice presented arguments before 
the federal circuit court, the Office of Education funded a study to determine the effects 
of the school closings, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare secured a 
sizeable grant for a remedial reading program. The administration had confronted the 
situation from several angles, but none guaranteed the restoration of universal education. 
The county leaders had given no indication that they would voluntarily open the schools 
and no court order to compel such an action appeared on the horizon. Burke Marshall 
advised the president and attorney general that the case would not reach the Supreme 
Court until 1964, which meant that the educational erosion would continue into a fifth 
year, an outcome that President Kennedy was unwilling to permit. Robert Kennedy, 
therefore, tasked Bill vanden Heuvel to work specifically on resolving the school crisis. 
In the late spring, the attorney general met with vanden Heuvel to convey President 
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Kennedy’s personal concern for the locked-out children, review the legal case, and ask 
him “to see what can be done” about Prince Edward County.
1
 
Bill vanden Heuvel enjoyed a meteoric rise from humble beginnings to a position 
of influence. He was the son of working-class immigrants; his Belgian mother operated a 
boardinghouse and his Dutch father earned a modest wage at the R.T. French Company, a 
spice and mustard factory in Rochester, New York. They would have lost their home to 
foreclosure during the Great Depression if not for the New Deal. As a result, vanden 
Heuvel admired Franklin Roosevelt and aspired to a career in public service. At age 
fifteen, he won a scholarship to the exclusive Deep Springs Junior College and later 
completed his education at Cornell Law School, where he served as editor-in-chief of The 
Cornell Law Quarterly; won the debating championship; graduated at the top of his class 
(’52); and attracted the attention of prominent individuals. “I had the good fortune of 
having great men interested in me,” reflected vanden Heuvel. Roger Baldwin, founder of 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), mentored him, and “Wild Bill” Donovan, a 
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decorated soldier, intelligence officer, and diplomat, brought vanden Heuvel into his law 
firm and later hired him as his executive assistant during his ambassadorship to Thailand.  
As chair of the International Rescue Committee, Donovan had vanden Heuvel elected a 
director at age twenty-five and, among other things, the two worked together on a 
humanitarian mission for refugees of the Hungarian Revolution. In fact, vanden Heuvel 
worked on the ground in Budapest to help freedom fighters escape. He later served as 
special counsel to New York Governor Averell Harriman and became a partner in the law 
firm of Senator Jacob Javits (NY-R). He completed his ascent to “Upper Bohemia” when 
he married Jean Stein, a daughter of Jules Stein, the co-founder of the Music Corporation 
of America (MCA). Finally, vanden Heuvel was a rising star in the New York 
Democratic Party. He allied with Herbert Lehman and Eleanor Roosevelt in a reform 
movement against Tammany Hall. In early 1960, the party nominated him to challenge 
the popular Republican incumbent, John Lindsay, for his congressional seat as the 
representative of Manhattan’s “Silk Stocking” district (NY-17). Bill vanden Heuvel was 
accomplished, connected, wealthy, and a candidate for national office all before his 
thirtieth birthday.
2
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Figure 10.1 Bill vanden Heuvel. (Photo: Associated Press). 
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 Bill vanden Heuvel had already won President Kennedy’s confidence and earned 
a reputation as a champion of human rights. Vanden Heuvel had first met Kennedy in 
1956 at the wedding of Stephen Smith and Jean Kennedy, the then-senator’s sister, but 
despite their acquaintance, he enthusiastically supported Adlai Stevenson for president in 
1960. After Senator Kennedy won the Democratic nomination, he brought vanden 
Heuvel into his camp as special assistant on housing and urban affairs for the August 
special session of Congress. During the general election season, Kennedy visited vanden 
Heuvel’s campaign headquarters and they held several rallies together. Nevertheless, 
John Lindsay defeated vanden Heuvel (81,006 to 53,574). Afterwards, vanden Heuvel 
became the president of the International Rescue Committee. He took leave from that 
position to work on Prince Edward County as a special assistant to the attorney general. 
This assignment was an overwhelming one for any thirty-three-year-old, but as vanden 
Heuvel later explained, “I’d had an experience base so that the challenge of Prince 
Edward County didn’t scare me.”
3
  
 Vanden Heuvel immediately immersed himself in a study of the school crisis. He 
attended the June 6 conference hosted by the U.S. Office of Education, which opened a 
series of meetings with Francis Keppel and his staff. Burke Marshall provided vanden 
Heuvel with the legal briefs, an update on the status of the litigation, and a recent 
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sociological study, “A Perspective of the Prince Edward County School Issue,” by a 
graduate student at the University of Pennsylvania. Edward Peeples produced a 
community analysis based on traditional sources, personal observations, and interviews 
with local citizens – certainly valuable briefing material for vanden Heuvel. The 
concluding chapters demonstrated the urgency of the matter. Peeples estimated the 
damage in the hundreds of illiterate black children, and he could forecast no timetable for 
the schools to reopen. Even if the schools “unexpectedly” opened, the community lacked 
the human and financial resources to operate an effective school system without 
assistance.
4
 In the following weeks, any chance of a court order or voluntary action to 
open the schools had all but diminished. A school program for African American students 
required an extraordinary effort. 
 The Kennedy administration moved forward with its plan to organize a temporary 
private school. Bill vanden Heuvel had to build local support, win the endorsement of 
Governor Harrison, fill a board of trustees, raise significant funds, lease school buildings, 
hire a faculty, and coordinate with the Office of Education to develop a school program – 
all against the clock if he wished to ring the opening bell in September. To further 
confound matters, vanden Heuvel worked in an atmosphere of uncertainty and increasing 
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tensions. Some of the stakeholders did not speak to one another and still others would not 
fully commit to the program until the federal circuit court issued a ruling, which was 
delayed until deep in the summer. By that time the “Negro revolution” had come to 
Farmville in the form of street demonstrations and an economic boycott, thus 
exacerbating an already strained community. Despite the complications, Bill vanden 
Heuvel ultimately negotiated a settlement that laid the foundation for the Prince Edward 
Free School Association. 
 
I 
 
 Bill vanden Heuvel entered a rapidly deteriorating situation. In his first weeks on 
the job, several circumstances diminished the prospects for restoring universal education 
to Prince Edward County. First, the county leaders responded to the “Negro Revolution” 
not by opening channels of communication but by preparing for a confrontation. Second, 
Governor Harrison’s hands-off approach to racial crises and his public opposition to 
federal civil rights legislation drew the ire of the state NAACP, further cooling relations 
between state officials and established black leaders. Finally, the $2.5 million remedial 
reading program collapsed under congressional scrutiny. Its absence left a void that 
needed to be filled by another program. These setbacks necessitated a solution from 
Washington.  
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 The county leaders assumed a defensive posture to fend off civil rights 
demonstrations. The Danville situation had made Mayor Billy Watkins “considerably 
concerned” that civil unrest would engulf Farmville, yet he initiated no measures to 
achieve racial conciliation. He made no preparations for a bi-racial committee, admitting 
 
Figure 10.2 Billy Watkins. (Photo: Town of Farmville). 
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later that he “was never real interested in it,” nor did he review the municipality’s hiring 
practices or encourage businesses to provide equal access to public accommodations. In 
short, Watkins disregarded the progressive reforms outlined by President Kennedy at the 
recent conference of mayors. Watkins, rather, sought to maintain the status quo by 
mobilizing for a confrontation. The Town of Farmville already had ordinances on the 
books prohibiting loitering and parading without a permit, and Watkins had planned to 
reject parade applications submitted by African Americans. If demonstrators violated the 
ordinance, the protest leaders would be arrested and, if necessary, so would other 
participants. Unfortunately for the authorities, the detention center had a maximum 
occupancy of fifteen, meaning that one act of civil disobedience could have filled the jail. 
If needed, the Farmville Airport would be converted into a detention center for adults, 
and juveniles would be sent to the state farm in nearby Goochland County. Finally, the 
media would be required to obtain a permit from the town manager to enter “any troubled 
area.” Mayor Watkins wanted to avert another Danville, but the execution of this plan 
was certain to draw negative attention and invite further discord.
5
 
 The community’s law enforcement agencies were undermanned and ill equipped 
to ward off a mass direct action campaign. Together, the Prince Edward County sheriff’s 
department and the Town of Farmville employed less than two dozen full-time law 
enforcement officers. The county soon hired two additional deputies and deputized 
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dozens more. The Town of Farmville also authorized Police Chief Otto Overton to hire 
several special officers. The additional personnel were identified by an armband and 
assigned guard duty and traffic control, but they received no formal police training. 
Mayor Watkins obtained assurances from the state police that additional officers were 
available if necessary.  In terms of weaponry, the sheriff’s department had “three riot 
guns and an undetermined supply of ammunition, one gas gun, .37 caliber and a limited 
supply of gas. . . . [and] three motor vehicles attuned to the State Police frequency.” 
Farmville possessed “1 riot gun with 50 rounds of ammunition, one small pistol-type tear 
gas gun, one walkie-talkie radio . . .three police cars equipped with 3-way radios on the 
same frequency and one 9mm German-type machine gun with approximately 50 rounds 
of ammunition.” In addition, Chief Overton ordered flashlights and riot sticks. If 
demonstrations grew too large or disorderly, dozens of untrained civilians armed with riot 
sticks would help the police maintain order. Asked years later if the community was 
prepared for demonstrations, Chief Overton admitted, “Not at that time.” Watkins, 
therefore, sought assurances from Governor Harrison that state assistance was available 
to maintain law and order and recommended that the governor convene a conference of 
mayors to discuss racial disturbances.
6
  
Governor Harrison was not prepared to lead on civil rights. He pledged to enforce 
the laws, but he declined Watkins’s proposal to hold a meeting. He determined that 
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drawing attention to racial strife would only exacerbate the situation: “I doubt the 
wisdom of too much activity on our part when such might provoke demonstrations.” 
After the Danville violence, Harrison did draft a statement intended for a television 
address. He acknowledged African Americans’ rights of speech and assembly, vowing to 
protect them “to the fullest extent of the law.” Still, he cautioned that freedom of speech 
and assembly did not protect the cursing of police officers and mob violence, and that law 
and order would be maintained. In an effort to promote racial conciliation, Harrison 
suggested that counties and cities form bi-racial committees. This speech could have been 
a remarkable step toward alleviating racial tensions, but it was never delivered.
7
 Harrison 
neither stoked armed reactionaries nor interceded on behalf of black civil rights. The 
governor attempted to extinguish racial conflicts through executive aloofness, but his 
public indifference only emboldened white reactionaries and further alienated black 
leaders. 
 Governor Harrison’s opposition to federal civil rights legislation further cooled 
relations with black leaders. After attending a White House conference on the president’s 
bill, Harrison told the press that “local action and cooperation would be more effective 
and lasting than new federal legislation in the civil rights field.” The state NAACP took 
exception to the governor’s statement. Reverend Griffin and Lester Banks issued a 
blistering public rejoinder that criticized Harrison for failing to utilize the “good offices 
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of the Governor” to mediate racial problems, citing his silence over police brutality in 
Danville and his misplaced trust in Prince Edward County officials to open the public 
schools. Harrison’s statement appeared especially disingenuous in light of the Prince 
Edward County budget that left the public schools unfunded. Griffin and Banks warned 
that African Americans’ patience was waning: “It is becoming abundantly clear that there 
is every intention to make 1963…the year of full Emancipation; and this is to be 
accomplished non-violently if possible, but violently if necessary.” The state NAACP 
had struck a new and alarming tone. The Richmond Times-Dispatch considered the 
remarks “incredible” and called on other NAACP leaders to denounce Griffin and Banks. 
Harrison privately determined that the remarks represented “a clear indication of the 
extremes to which some of these people are willing to go.”
8
 Relations between Harrison 
and NAACP leaders entered a deep freeze, further diminishing the chances of reaching an 
agreement to reopen the schools.  
Finally, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) reversed its decision on 
the $2.5 million grant for a remedial education program in the county. In May, the Mental 
Health Advisory Council had voted twelve-to-one with one abstention by a mail vote to 
fund the Woolman project. The premature press release that followed opened the project 
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to public and congressional scrutiny. The Senate subcommittee that provided oversight of 
NIMH requested documents related to the grant. The subcommittee’s influential staff 
director, Herman Downey, considered the Woolman project “a prostitution of medical 
research.” Under pressure, the advisory council reopened the matter at its next regularly 
scheduled meeting. The members questioned the validity of the relationship between 
literacy and mental health, the cost and length of the project, and its true purpose. Some 
considered the grant a teaching program under the guise of a research project. Finally, the 
members admitted that they had succumbed to “pressure” from the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare to approve and expedite a grant that had not gone through 
standard procedures. On June 21, the advisory council voted unanimously to disapprove 
the grant, and without its consent the project could not move forward. President Kennedy 
was disappointed by the decision. He told Lee White, assistant special counsel to the 
president, that he was anxious that everything be done to save the Woolman project. 
White alerted the U.S. Office of Education to the president’s “wishes and his extreme 
interest and concern.” Nevertheless, the administration could not convince the advisory 
council to reverse its verdict once more. The unraveling of the Woolman project became, 
as one administration official admitted, “a pretty sad fiasco.”
9
 The advisory council’s 
reversal embarrassed the administration, but that was insignificant in relation to the 
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educational loss suffered by black Prince Edwardians, the damage of which was soon 
disclosed. 
Robert Green reported the findings on phase one of the Michigan State University 
study to the U.S. Office of Education. The results quantified what many had suspected. 
The survey counted 269 of the 1,725 African Americans aged 5 to 22 living away from 
home as attending school, leaving well over one thousand children uneducated. In fact, 
only 29 black Prince Edwardians had attended school for the entire duration of the school 
closings, while 1,058 did not attend school at all. The lack of formal schooling certainly 
affected the literacy rate. Four hundred of these children (23 percent) were unable to read. 
Of these illiterate children, 92 percent were age ten or younger, the children who came of 
school-age after the schools closed. The survey reported that younger children had great 
interest in attending a reopened public school, but the older children and young adults, 
most of whom had not attended school in four years, comprised nearly all the respondents 
who answered that they were unlikely to resume their education.
10
 The survey results – in 
combination with the lack of cooperation between black and white leaders, the board of 
supervisors’ recalcitrance, the courts’ delay, and the defunding of the Woolman project – 
demonstrated the necessity for the federal government to initiate an extraordinary 
undertaking to arrest the educational erosion. 
 The administration explored other options short of a full school program. They 
considered, among other things, beaming educational television from Richmond to living 
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rooms in Prince Edward County. However, if that idea had not already lost reception, 
then the limited access to televisions – only 1,274 children, as indicated in the Michigan 
State survey – certainly made it impractical. To partially fill the void left by the Woolman 
project, the Office of Education had considered using Cooperative Research Program 
funds for more extensive student achievement testing and a resultant demonstration 
remedial reading project. However, that project would only impact several dozen 
students, and Francis Keppel conceded that “it is doubtful that a full remedial reading 
program or project under this program would be feasible.” However, anything less than 
educating every child would have been a failure, but the federal government could only 
provide schools under rare circumstances. There was talk of establishing a military base 
in the county to provide schools on “U.S. soil.” The administration found it more 
practical to move forward with plans to facilitate the organization of a private school 
system. Vanden Heuvel immediately opened talks with philanthropic foundations to 
finance the $1-1.5 million program, and he visited Farmville to build local support and 
secure the lease of school buildings – all in an atmosphere of rising tension.
11
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II 
 
 Bill vanden Heuvel visited Farmville to make firsthand observations. He found a 
community with antiquated race relations, derisively inferring that the “message from 
Appomattox took a long time coming back to Prince Edward County that the Civil War 
was over.” Moreover, the black and white leadership did not talk with one another. In 
fact, Barrye Wall used his newspaper to discourage the formation of a bi-racial human 
relations committee, editorializing that elected officials “have an obligation to discharge 
their duties, not to bargain over them with citizens’ committees.” Vanden Heuvel 
determined that the chances for direct negotiations between black and white leaders were 
remote; therefore, he acted as the intermediary. Without publicity, he interviewed leaders 
from both camps separately. Those conversations took place in an increasingly tense 
atmosphere. The county received an influx of outsiders – civil rights workers, national 
media, the Michigan State research team, volunteer teachers from New York, and vanden 
Heuvel himself – that threatened to disturb white supremacy. Without bi-racial 
communication the county had developed into a powder keg.
12
 
Vanden Heuvel met at length with Barrye Wall. The newspaperman could not be 
expected to endorse the school program, but he could foster acceptance by withholding 
criticism from his editorial page. Vanden Heuvel characterized Wall as “a completely 
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candid white supremacist” and certain of his convictions. “I have nothing against the 
Negro children or against anyone,” Wall explained, but he was convinced that the races 
would live better separately and that both sides preferred it that way. Despite their 
divergent views, vanden Heuvel found Wall “scrupulously polite, easily available for talk 
and discussion.” Wall’s demeanor belied his deviousness. He asked Congressman 
Watkins Abbitt to “get some dope” on vanden Heuvel by submitting his name for 
investigation with the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), because “I 
just like to know who we are being visited by.” The HUAC investigation turned up no 
subversive activity. Wall’s action again demonstrated his determination to discredit those 
that tried to assist the black community.
13
 
Vanden Heuvel needed the support of the black community, which began with 
Reverend Griffin. Griffin worried that the school program would undercut the campaign 
for integrated public schools, but vanden Heuvel assured him that that would not be the 
case. In fact, the program would act as a “bridge” to integrated public schools. Instead of 
losing another year waiting for the Supreme Court’s decision, the children “would be able 
to move forward from a running start rather than just picking up the pieces of five lost 
years.” After four years without public schools, Griffin was in no position to oppose the 
program. Still, he and the NAACP bargained for the best possible deal. They opposed 
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vanden Heuvel’s suggestion that the students accept state tuition grants, which would 
have brought in an estimated $250,000. The NAACP argued that the tuition grants were a 
relic of massive resistance and vowed not to accept those funds. Nor did they want 
segregationist leaders to have influence over the program. “I had no reason to believe that 
the whites would do the right thing by the Negro people,” Griffin explained. Also, the 
black leaders wanted the program operated not just in the formerly black school buildings 
but also in at least one formerly white school to denote the break with segregation.  
Finally, they wanted a pledge that the Department of Justice would continue its legal 
support as the litigation moved to the U.S. Supreme Court.
14
 The NAACP wanted a legal 
solution, but it also adapted to the demands of the Negro revolution. 
The NAACP maintained its relevance by embracing direct action. The state 
Association’s membership fell as SCLC’s star rose. In order to “catch up with the 
revolution,” state NAACP leaders determined that its “conservative tactics…need to be 
supplanted.” In late June, Griffin convened a special meeting of the state NAACP in 
Petersburg, and attendees unanimously adopted a new “Program of Action.” Local 
branches were instructed to initiate selective buying campaigns and petition their 
municipal government to end discrimination. The failure of local officials to address 
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black grievances would result in demonstrations. The “freedom demonstrations” were to 
be lawful, orderly, and led by an “indoctrinated NAACP representatives,” not affiliates of 
other organizations. Shortly thereafter, at its national convention, the NAACP adopted a 
Direct Action Resolution requesting that branches initiate “picketing, sit-ins, mass action 
protests, selective-buying campaigns, and all appropriate constitutional means of 
attacking discrimination and segregation in public accommodations, housing, education, 
employment and political action.” In the meantime, Griffin and Banks had already urged 
their members “to take immediate steps to effectuate this program in their respective 
localities.”
15
 
 Mobilizing black Prince Edwardians to implement the Program of Action proved 
difficult. Blacks could not join the picket line without fear of economic reprisal, a 
consideration that limited the activism of adults. A new minister in town was struck by 
the black adults’ complacency. Reverend Goodwin Douglas found that “the grown-up 
Negroes were complacent even without schools for their children.” Black teenagers, 
frustrated with the pace of change, blamed their parents for not taking more aggressive 
action to open the schools. “They are too afraid to stand up for what is ours,” bemoaned 
sixteen-year-old Barbara Ann Botts. “They are afraid and won’t stick together.” Griffin 
found a cadre of young people, galvanized by Birmingham, willing to execute the 
Program of Action. Many locked-out teenagers were eager to participate in the broader 
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civil rights revolution and to bring about change in their community. Dozens of teenagers 
had recently returned home from boarding with families in the North to attend school. 
 
Many of them had lived in white households, attended integrated schools, and 
experienced a life far removed from Jim Crow. For some, like Bessie Reed, who recently 
 
 
 
             Figure 10.3 L. Francis Griffin. (Photo: Library of Congress). 
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graduated from high school in Massachusetts, demonstrations were “the only way to get 
what we want.”
16
 
 Griffin reconstituted the NAACP Youth Council with two experienced activists as 
its advisors. The twenty-nine-year-old Reverend J. Samuel Williams had participated in 
the 1951 Moton student strike, and later, while enrolled at Shaw University, he joined the 
sit-in campaign in Raleigh, North Carolina. He was a local man whom the black youth 
knew, trusted, and regarded as a brother figure. Reverend Goodwin Douglas, the pastor 
of Beulah African Methodist Episcopal Church, was new to the community but not 
unfamiliar with the local struggle. At Kittrell College, Douglas had classmates who were 
locked-out high school students from Prince Edward County, and in fact, he roomed with 
Charlie Taylor of Farmville. And while living in North Carolina, Douglas participated in 
textile strikes. He was an outsider to Farmville with a more militant philosophy, who at 
twenty-five provided youthful inspiration. Griffin, Williams, and Douglas held frequent 
planning sessions with a core group of teenage leaders, including Ernestine Land, Grace 
Poindexter, Catherine Scott, Carlton Terry, and Leslie Francis “Skip” Griffin, Jr., but 
Reverend Griffin directed the campaign. He satisfied the young activists’ enthusiasm 
while sustaining a disciplined program to meet the community’s specific needs.
17
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 Reverend Griffin permitted the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC) to train the teenagers in nonviolent protest. Ivanhoe Donaldson and Roland 
Sherrod, veterans of the Danville campaign, simulated potential scenarios to test the 
trainees’ ability to maintain their discipline, including dousing the teenagers with ketchup 
and mustard. The trainees were taught to “go limp” when arrested and to protect 
themselves from a beating. Also as part of the training, NAACP attorneys provided legal 
advice. Samuel Tucker and Henry Marsh advised the teenagers not to participate in the 
demonstrations, but the attorneys also outlined proper conduct for those who chose to 
protest. The training lasted for days, which was too long for an impetuous youth like 
Carlton Terry, who argued that “we’ve had enough training.” Terry pushed for 
demonstrations to commence immediately “because the summer was going to pass 
quick.”
18
 A nationally covered county election provided an opportunity to mollify the 
anxious teenagers. 
 Two men challenged incumbent John Steck for the Democratic nomination to 
represent the Farmville District on the county board of supervisors. Edwin “Sonny” 
Pairet, the proprietor of an appliance store, ran “to bring the [school] issue out in the 
open,” making him the first serious candidate to challenge the school closers. Pairet was 
“not an integrationist,” but he acknowledged the moral issue of the school closings and 
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the resultant economic consequences: the loss of potential new industry to the 
community, the fiscal instability of the private schools, and some parents’ inability to pay 
their child’s tuition. C.H. Lafoon, a real estate broker, supported the school closings and 
segregation and declared that his convictions were so strong “that I feel like I am doing 
the Lord’s work.” There was concern that Steck and Lafoon would split the 
segregationists’ vote, thus throwing the election to Pairet. Barrye Wall made “every 
appeal” for Lafoon to withdraw, but he refused. There was no other option but to “do our 
utmost to elect John Steck…with the largest possible vote.”
19
  
Many considered this contest a referendum on the school issue. On July 9, John 
Steck won the nomination with a plurality of votes (Steck – 799, Pairet – 438, and Lafoon 
– 376). The massive resisters interpreted the election as a vote of confidence for the board 
of supervisors. In fact, they combined the votes for Steck and Lafoon to argue that a 
supermajority favored the status quo. Pairet’s share of the vote, although modest, 
diminished the veneer of white unanimity on the school issue. He believed that people 
were heavily invested in the private schools and “they don’t want to change until they get 
a mandate from the courts.” Regardless of the results or political spin, Sonny Pairet 
demonstrated great personal courage by challenging the school closers (many of whom 
were his friends) and exposing himself to possible social ostracism and economic 
reprisals. People did talk behind his back and he received hate mail from outside the area, 
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but he did not lose any friends, nor did his business suffer repercussions. “They all know 
me and that I say what I want,” Pairet reasoned. He may not have won the election, but 
he opened a door for others to speak their mind. 
 The NAACP capitalized on the media’s attention to the election. The state and 
national press, along with AP and UPI reports, carried news of the campaign across the 
commonwealth and nation. “I had just about every network come in here and interview 
me,” recalled Sonny Pairet. With the media in town, the NAACP staged a demonstration 
on Election Day. That evening as the election workers tabulated the results, thirty-five 
African Americans sought service at the College Shoppe, a restaurant on Main Street, but 
were denied service. Likewise, two activists were denied admittance to the movie theater. 
In both instances, the protestors left without incident and melted into the night. The 
demonstrators did gain direct-action experience and publicized their campaign to 
potential recruits, but they received scant media coverage. The Farmville Herald and 
Richmond Times-Dispatch were less interested in the purpose of the protest than with 
speculating on the proportion of outsiders who participated, estimated at anywhere from 
30 to 100 percent.
20
 
 An allegation related to the demonstration could have embarrassed the Kennedy 
administration. Police Chief Overton had learned from a confidential source that Robert 
Green, the principal investigator on the Michigan State University research team, had 
organized the protest. Overton shared that report with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
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(FBI). J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI director, advised Robert Kennedy of these findings. This 
allegation, if found to be true, would have embarrassed the administration, because it was 
improper for the recipient of a federal grant to instigate a street demonstration. 
Furthermore, a public revelation would have sunk the research project and thus set back 
the administration’s overall effort in Prince Edward County. Burke Marshall, therefore, 
asked Bill vanden Heuvel to investigate the matter. Vanden Heuvel received assurances 
from Green that “he will not be involved in any way with demonstrations or other 
action.” The media did not report Overton’s allegation, but the research team remained in 
the news.
21
  
 The Michigan State research team had begun phase two of its study. The 
researchers selected a study sample to determine the effects of the school closings on the 
educational and social life of the black community. In an editorial titled, “A Study of the 
Obvious,” the Petersburg Progress-Index predicted that the results “could hardly be other 
than a picture of a tragedy.” That tragedy quickly became apparent to the researchers 
when they administered the achievement tests. “Before we could even get to the test,” 
explained Robert Green, “we had to show some of them how to hold a pencil. We had to 
show seven, eight, and nine year olds how to hold a pencil for the first time.” This age 
group also struggled with following directions, like turning more than one page (or in the 
wrong direction) in the test booklet. Green recorded that many of the confused children 
still gave their best effort, while others “resigned themselves to the notion of failure.” 
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Weeks later, the Washington Post reported the children’s test-taking deficiencies with a 
front page article, “Lesson One for Prince Edward’s Unschooled: How to Hold a Pencil.” 
As long as the research team worked in Farmville, they would continue to embarrass the 
county.
22
 
 After the local election, the arrival of volunteer teachers from New York fueled 
further tension. A racially integrated group of thirty professional teachers from the 
American Federation of Teachers and students from Queens College organized a 
remedial crash program in black churches across the county. The volunteer teachers 
angered the white community by violating southern mores. The New Yorkers lived with 
black families and socialized in bi-racial groups. “Most whites are disgusted with white 
girls associating with Negro men,” Barrye Wall privately explained, adding that “some of 
the whites, more emotional ones – very few, are inclined to start something, but we have 
them pretty well in hand.” The Queens College volunteers soon discovered that the white 
leadership could not restrain everybody. One evening, one “wild, wild, wild!!!” evening, 
Jack Shepherd and Bob Lerner of Look magazine treated Goodwin Douglas and a handful 
of volunteer teachers to Tastee-Freez, an ice cream shop beyond town limits. About two 
dozen troublemakers heckled the group with some “nasty cracks.” The bi-racial group 
fled and spent a good part of the night trying to outrun their pursuers. The New Yorkers 
were shaken by the incident. “The event,” wrote Phyllis Padow, “showed us in a chilling 
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though un-harmful way how unthinking and off guard we were.” The outsiders had the 
fear from that evening seared into their memory, but Goodwin Douglas had a physical 
reminder of the segregationists’ disapproval of him socializing with whites – a permanent 
scar on his leg from being struck by a hay hook. The county had previously been spared 
from racial violence, but the influx of outsiders raised tensions.
23
 
 Finally, the school program became the Kennedy administration’s worst kept 
secret. Published reports indicated that the federal government was planning a school 
program in Prince Edward County. The talks were in a sensitive stage, which accounts 
for the administration’s conflicting statements. The White House press secretary, Pierre 
Salinger, told reporters that the program was “only in the exploratory stage. Nothing 
definite has come out of it.” Salinger explained that Kennedy was interested, but that the 
White House had no involvement, that it was “strictly” a matter that the Department of 
Justice was investigating. Ed Guthman, the Justice spokesman, told reporters that “there 
have absolutely not been any negotiations with anyone and no school system is planned.” 
Guthman contradicted Bill vanden Heuvel’s statement that he had spoken with 
“interested parties to see what can be done to stop this human erosion.” Still, he denied 
reports that he had contacted philanthropic foundations to fund a school program. Barrye 
Wall editorialized that “if the Department of Justice and all the other do-gooders would 
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leave” the community could work out its own problems. However, there was no chance 
for the community to resolve its own problems in an atmosphere that discouraged bi-
racial communication. “Forecasts are heard that violence is inevitable if the impasse 
continues,” wrote syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. “The 
proposed model school may be one way to prevent violence in the only place in the 
United States that has no public schools.”
24
 
 
III 
 
 In early July, Bill vanden Heuvel presented a formal proposal on a full school 
program to the attorney general. Kennedy was “greatly taken” by the plan, but he 
expressed his doubts that it could be implemented. However, as vanden Heuvel 
explained, “If the goal was right, [Kennedy] was not intimidated by obstacles.” The 
attorney general authorized him to move forward. “Let’s go ahead and see if we can do 
it,” encouraged Kennedy. “Step-by-step build it up.” He trusted vanden Heuvel to finish 
the job: “All I want you to do is keep me posted. Talk to me every day – a minute will be 
enough – then I will know where you are and what you are up to.” Vanden Heuvel 
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immediately set to work on securing the lease of school buildings, staffing a faculty, 
winning support for the program, and raising one million dollars.
25
 
 Bill vanden Heuvel aimed to lease buildings from the board of education. He met 
with county attorneys Segar Gravatt and Collins Denny at the latter’s home in Richmond. 
The attorneys agreed that the school buildings should be made available to black 
students, and if it did not compromise their legal position, they would not oppose a 
“reasonable arrangement” to lease the buildings to a responsible group. The county had 
much to gain from an agreement; it would begin repairing its reputation and potentially 
secure the private schools. If black students accepted tuition grants, perhaps the federal 
court would lift the injunction on Prince Edward Academy. “I hope that ultimately the 
parents of Negro children in the community will apply for these grants,” Gravatt wrote to 
a friend. “That would further serve to secure the general principle of free choice of 
parents in the education of their children.” Vanden Heuvel would only accept a lease 
agreement, however, that did not promote segregated schools or undermine the reopening 
of the public schools. The initial talks looked promising, but vanden Heuvel was prepared 
to immediately take an inventory of other available buildings if negotiations broke 
down.
26
 
                                                          
25
 Vanden Heuvel, interview by Hohl, in Hohl, “Open the Doors,” 55; Vanden Heuvel, “Closing 
Doors, Opening Doors.” 
26
 John F. Daffron, “Prince Edward’s Days in Court Not Over Yet,” RT, August 18, 1963, B1; William 
J. vanden Heuvel to Robert F. Kennedy, “Progress Report on Prince Edward County School Situation,” 
July 19, 1963, Box 21, BMP; J. Segar Gravatt to Colgate Darden, August 14, 1963, Box 1, PEFSAP; 
William J. vanden Heuvel to Burke Marshall, July 9, 1963, Reel 108, RG 60. The Richmond News Leader 
reported a meeting between Bill vanden Heuvel, Collins Denny, and local leaders that took place on July 
 
319 
 The four-year educational vacuum necessitated a faculty of superior quality. 
Vanden Heuvel conceded that staffing a faculty would be a “tough job.” The school 
program needed over one hundred teachers, but many were already under contract with 
other school districts. In mid-July, vanden Heuvel met with superintendents of twenty-
seven major school systems from across the nation. Some tentatively agreed to grant one 
or two master teachers a one-year sabbatical. The National Education Association (NEA) 
offered to assist in teacher recruitment. Its early assessment determined that a number of 
highly qualified retired teachers were available. Vanden Heuvel also pursued some 
younger candidates – returning Peace Corps volunteers. Finally, Robert Green sent 
vanden Heuvel information on dozens of educators that lived in the county. Certainly, 
local teachers would provide the eventual reopened public schools with a degree of 
continuity. Vanden Heuvel wanted not just a faculty of superior talent and experience but 
one that was racially integrated, an unprecedented act in Virginia.
27
  
The Kennedy administration also envisioned a bi-racial board of trustees 
comprised of renowned Virginia educators. “By restricting the trustees to Virginia 
educators,” vanden Heuvel believed, “a maximum of community acceptance could be 
achieved and perhaps a path opened that would encourage the reopening of the public 
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schools.” He contacted college presidents from Hampton Institute, Randolph-Macon, 
Virginia State, Virginia Union, and Washington and Lee, and received tentative 
commitments on the condition that Colgate Darden was named chairman. Darden had a 
long career of service to his state. He had represented Norfolk in the House of Delegates 
(1930-1933) and U.S. House of Representatives (1933-1937, 1939-1941); and served as a 
popular wartime governor (1942-1946), chancellor of the College of William and Mary 
(1946), president of the University of Virginia (1947-1959), and on the state board of 
education since 1960. Darden had an impressive resume and broad-based popularity. He 
had been a member of the Byrd Organization, but he also had a progressive streak that 
appealed to the anti-Organization faction. As far as school desegregation, Darden had 
testified in support of “separate but equal” in Davis v. County School Board of Prince 
Edward County (1952), but he publicly broke with the Organization over massive 
resistance, warning that closing schools “would be an irreparable blow.” For anti-
Organization men, Colgate Darden was the one man who could put the issue of public 
schools plainly before the people. Vanden Heuvel found Darden to be the “only Virginian 
I have encountered with sufficient independent stature to stand up to Sen. Byrd, etc. and 
have significant influence at the same time.”
28
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 The White House pressed Colgate Darden to accept the chairmanship. President 
Kennedy dispatched his special assistant, Brooks Hays, a former congressman from 
Arkansas and past president of the Southern Baptist Convention, to meet with Colgate 
Darden. Hays and Darden had a cordial relationship. As recent as February, Hays stayed 
at Darden’s home in Norfolk while traveling to speak at the Preaching Mission. At their 
meeting, Hays told Darden: “The President feels he has to have the schools open in 
Prince Edward.”  Darden described the school closings as “indefensible” but considered 
the matter the state’s responsibility. “Only the state can do it with any chance of success 
because the effort must have public support,” reasoned Darden. He would only accept the 
post upon the request of the governor. Originally, vanden Heuvel planned for the Virginia 
Council on Human Relations to appoint the board of trustees, but now, winning Governor 
Harrison’s support became imperative.
29
 Still, vanden Heuvel had more work to do 
before he presented his plan to the governor. 
 Bill vanden Heuvel first had to obtain the support of civil rights organizations. On 
July 16, the U.S. Office of Education hosted a second meeting to coordinate federal and 
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private agency planning for Prince Edward County – a follow-up to the June 6 meeting. 
Vanden Heuvel proposed three plans. First, the county school board would receive 
private funds to operate the public schools. The school board would no longer have the 
excuse that the lack of money prevented them from operating a school system. Reverend 
Griffin opposed this option, because the school board could not be trusted to adequately 
run the schools. Vanden Heuvel argued that this option should be considered in the event 
that the federal courts ordered the schools opened and the school board had no money to 
operate them. Second, vanden Heuvel presented the model school program, where 
philanthropic foundations would finance a temporary private school system. He admitted 
that securing the buildings, hiring a faculty, and raising the funds would be a tremendous 
undertaking but hinted that preparations were underway. Any misgivings that the 
conferees had were clarified by the NAACP. Griffin predicted that black students would 
attend the school; Samuel Tucker gave assurances that the school would not complicate 
the legal case; and John Morsell gave the project the national Association’s blessing. 
Third, vanden Heuvel proposed organizing a private school funded by tuition grants. 
Accepting tuition grants was legally but not psychologically defensible. Morsell was 
adamantly opposed. Clearly, vanden Heuvel had already won the NAACP’s support for 
the model school prior to this meeting. The NAACP’s endorsement and his masterful 
performance at this meeting allowed vanden Heuvel to win the other participating 
agencies’ support for the freshly christened Prince Edward Free School Association.
30
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 Convincing foundations to fund the Free Schools proved to be much more 
difficult. Vanden Heuvel had spoken with the Adele Levy, Carnegie Corporation, 
Danforth, Edgar Stern, Field, Ford, James, Rockefeller, Rockefeller Brothers, Sloan, and 
Taconic foundations, but he had secured no firm commitments. The foundations were 
reluctant to support a project that had a potentially infinite duration. There was no 
guarantee that the federal courts would order the schools reopened, and then the 
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foundations would be committed year-after-year to funding the Free Schools. The 
Rockefeller Brothers Foundation, for one, would not support the Free Schools unless 
vanden Heuvel proved that it would resolve the situation and that the program was 
limited to one year. At a July 17 meeting with foundation representatives, vanden Heuvel 
predicted that the court would order the schools opened by September 1964. 
Nevertheless, the Rockefeller Brothers rebuffed the proposal but kept the door open to a 
future application. As vanden Heuvel left, he chastened the foundation for not adding the 
Rockefeller name to this undertaking.
31
 
 Bill vanden Heuvel pitched the Free Schools at a conference featuring a number 
of prominent foundations. On July 23, the Danforth Foundation and the Southern 
Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools held a conference in Atlanta to discuss 
black education in the South. Although vanden Heuvel made “a very effective 
presentation,” the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller foundations showed no interest in 
approving a grant. Several detractors decried letting the county “off the hook.” Vanden 
Heuvel responded with an impassioned rejoinder. He reminded the audience that Prince 
Edward County was the only locality in the nation that had no public education. The 
whole nation was on the hook to blot out this shame. And although the school closings 
affected only a relatively small number of children, it was an injustice that must be 
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remedied. Vanden Heuvel did not ask for contributions but closed by emphasizing that 
time was of the essence.
32
 
 Two days later, Bill vanden Heuvel apprised Governor Harrison of his plans. 
Harrison had come under increasing pressure to resolve the school crisis. He privately 
lamented that if he announced a new industry that would employ a million Virginians that 
it would be pushed off the front page by Prince Edward County. The governor wanted the 
situation out of the papers, but he had no solution nor the political courage to lead. 
Vanden Heuvel considered him a “very cautious man on this issue.” The Free Schools 
offered Harrison an out without much personal commitment. Vanden Heuvel needed 
Harrison to use his office to secure the lease of the school buildings, ensure state 
accreditation, and enlist a board of trustees. Harrison agreed to cooperate as long as 
county leaders accepted the prospect of a private integrated school system.
33
 Vanden 
Heuvel had worked at a frenetic pace, but he had yet to secure any tangible commitments 
that would lead to the operation of the Free Schools. The street demonstrations in 
Farmville provided a new sense of urgency. 
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IV 
 
The rumor had spread that once the demonstrators won in Danville, Farmville was 
the next target. Having observed the unrest in Danville, Police Chief Overton recognized 
the potential dangers for his community. He determined that demonstrators had to be 
handled with “kid gloves.” It was imperative that law enforcement cultivate positive 
relations with the black community, starting with Reverend Griffin, whom Overton 
considered “one of the finest, a peaceful man,” and a friend. Overton met regularly with 
Griffin, often for lunch at First Baptist Church, to discuss community problems and share 
intelligence. Despite these meetings and their cordial relationship, Griffin did not reveal 
anything about the forthcoming demonstrations. “Of course, I knew it was coming,” 
remembered Chief Overton. “You’d hear pieces and all. Reverend Griffin and I were 
pretty close then, but not enough for him to give me information.” Not suspecting 
anything imminent, Overton took a beach holiday. He would soon be recalled.
34
 
On Thursday, July 25, the freedom demonstrations began in Farmville. The 
Queens College program held class in the basement of First Baptist Church. Around 
noon, as Phyllis Padow began teaching the English lesson, the class heard a group outside 
singing “We Shall Overcome.” The class gazed through the window to see teenagers 
formed in a circle, holding hands, and swaying in harmony. “They’ve started!” blurted 
Chuckie Reid, an eleven-year-old student. Many of the younger children knew little about 
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what had just started, having no entrée into the planning meetings. Reid knew from his 
contacts on the NAACP Youth Council that demonstrations were planned to pressure the 
county to reopen the schools so that nobody had to leave the county or attend summer 
crash programs to receive an education. Sensing history unfolding, Padow escorted the 
children outside to “see the beginning of the public activities that will probably affect the 
rest of their lives.”
35
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Figure 10.4 Goodwin Douglas. (Photo: VCU Libraries). 
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At 12:35 p.m., seventy demonstrators began, as the Richmond Times-Dispatch 
reported, “the first full-scale ‘nonviolent action’ by Negroes in Prince Edward County.” 
Feeling a mix of excitement, fear, and uncertainty, protestors formed six groups to picket 
downtown businesses, the courthouse, and the Farmville Shopping Center. The 
demonstrators marched eight feet apart, providing shoppers with ample space to enter and 
exit stores. They carried homemade signs protesting segregation and the county’s closed 
schools. Reverend Douglas carried a sign that drew attention to the federal court’s six 
months of delay: WHILE THE FOURTH CIRCUIT CONTINUES TO WAIT, EDUCATION FOR 
NEGRO CHILDREN SUFFOCATES. Another sign called out the chairman of the board of 
supervisors: ASK MR. VAUGHAN WHY THE SCHOOLS ARE CLOSED — HE WILL “HEM” AND 
“HAW” AND DECLINE TO DISCLOSE. Still another asked: WE’VE GONE FOUR YEARS—
MUST WE GO FIVE? While the picketers marched, other teenagers distributed leaflets 
urging black patrons to boycott certain stores “until you can work where you spend your 
money.” With Overton on vacation, acting chief George Crowder assembled twenty 
officers along Main Street with orders not to interfere unless violence erupted. Curious 
shopkeepers stepped outside to see what was happening. “We surprised everyone,” 
delighted Betty Jean Ward. “I don’t believe anyone thought this would happen in 
Farmville.” A contingent of white teenagers heckled the picketers, but there were no 
incidents and no arrests. The demonstration ended at 1:55 p.m., when the marchers 
returned to First Baptist Church, reformed their circle, joined hands in song and prayer, 
and chanted “Old Jim Crow has got to go.” Griffin told reporters that the demonstrations 
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will continue “indefinitely” to protest “closed schools, delay in the courts, and 
segregation in its totality.”
36
 
On Friday afternoon the demonstrations intensified. Fifty teenagers in five groups 
carried placards in front of the downtown businesses, the courthouse, and the Farmville 
Shopping Center. At the same time, several teenagers staged try-ins at department stores 
to “tie up” clerks. Traditionally, African Americans could not try on clothing before 
making a purchase, which was a sore point among local blacks. In this case, recalled 
Reverend Douglas, “We would select clothing stores, where we knew that they didn’t 
want us in. We would go in there and try on clothes and not buy them.” Simultaneously, 
fifteen protestors in three groups attempted sit-ins at downtown lunch counters. They 
were refused service at Rhue’s Diner, Southside Sundry, and J.J. Newberry. After the 
demonstrators left, the manager of J.J. Newberry closed the counter and removed the 
seats. At the College Shoppe and at Chappell’s Fountain, white patrons were permitted to 
enter, but the businesses locked the doors to the black teenagers. Later that afternoon, 
demonstrators targeted the State Theater. The marquee read: YOU WILL ENJOY THIS 
MOVIE, but a sign on the ticket window stated: IN ANSWER TO ALL QUESTIONS—WE 
RESERVE THE RIGHT TO REFUSE SALES OF TICKETS TO ANY PERSON. Protestors formed a 
circle and repeatedly attempted to purchase tickets until the ticket booth closed, and thus 
closed day two of the campaign. The demonstrators had not yet won any tangible 
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victories, but their presence was having an effect. One observer noted that “the 
atmosphere in town is getting tenser.”
37
  
 
 
On Friday evening, Beulah AME Church hosted an electrifying rally. The 
NAACP Youth Council implored more teenagers to join the picket line, even if it meant 
defying their parents. The energy and emotion captured the attention of a member of the 
Michigan State University research team. Melvin Moore, a nineteen-year-old from 
Inkster, Michigan, had spent several weeks interviewing Prince Edward’s youth. “The 
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Figure 10.5 State Theater. (Photo: VCU Libraries). 
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whole impact of what they had been denied and the poverty really didn’t hit home until I 
interviewed them,” recalled Moore. “It was . . . very sad. There was a certain amount of 
anger I had.” The rally inspired Moore to cast aside his clipboard and join Saturday’s 
picket line. For the protestors more broadly, the rally raised morale, heightened 
enthusiasm, and increased their determination.
38
 
The next morning, Mayor Watkins denied Reverend Griffin’s application for a 
parade permit “because of the possibility of some trouble.” Saturday was the principal 
shopping day in Farmville, drawing patrons from the five surrounding counties. “We felt 
that because of the large crowds, we could not control it as well as we would like to,” 
justified Mayor Watkins. Sensing displeasure, Chief Overton employed shuttle 
diplomacy between Watkins and Griffin to arrive at a compromise. The police roped off a 
half-block section of Main Street for picketing in front of First Baptist Church. This 
arrangement sapped the strength of the pickets because they were too distant from the 
businesses to have an effect. Undeterred, Griffin elected to continue the demonstrations 
without a parade permit. More than one hundred picketers paraded up and down Main 
Street, marching two abreast and singing freedom songs.
39
 
Saturday witnessed the campaign’s first arrests. The Reverend Richard Hale, 
pastor of St. James African Methodist Episcopal Church in the nearby community of 
Prospect, led nine demonstrators to the College Shoppe. The picketers attempted to enter 
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the luncheonette, but the shopkeepers barred the entrance. So, the picketers stood silently 
along the storefront. Chief Overton soon arrived, alerted the protestors that they were in 
violation of a town ordinance that prohibited loitering and repeatedly asked them to 
disperse. When they refused, Overton told Hale, “All right, you’re under arrest.” Hale 
and the nine others dropped to the sidewalk and went limp. As they sang “We Shall Not 
Be Moved,” officers carried them to the courthouse. The five  juveniles were soon 
released, as were the three women who posted bond. Reverend Hale and Melvin Moore 
refused bond and were jailed. Melvin Moore’s arrest provided a potential propaganda 
coup for the county’s segregationists, because he was both an “outside agitator” and 
employed under a federal grant. Robert Green had exhorted his research team to 
concentrate on their work but admitted to the Richmond News Leader that he could not 
control what his team did “on their own time.” Local officials contemplated exploiting 
the arrest, but Moore’s accusation of police brutality, an alleged blow to the abdomen, 
may have tempered considerations to further publicize the episode (a county judge later 
found no evidence to convict the deputy).
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The demonstrations signified a new form of communication. The white leaders 
had never seriously addressed the black community’s grievances and dismissed the value 
of bi-racial committees. The campaign was an overt expression of black Prince 
Edwardians’ dissatisfaction with their station. The white leaders were not yet literate in 
this language. Following the arrests, Mayor Watkins informed Reverend Griffin that all 
future demonstrations required a parade permit and that no permits would be issued on 
the weekends. Further, Watkins expected that future demonstrations would be orderly. 
However, the three days of protests, highlighted by the arrests, marked a new day for 
Prince Edward County. The younger generation had refused to accept anything short of 
full citizenship, revealing the local white leadership’s inability to manage white 
 
 
Figure 10.6 College Shoppe. (Photo: VCU Libraries). 
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supremacy. Segregationists no longer dictated how and when the black community 
exerted its constitutional rights. The demonstrators were now on the offensive and would 
determine their next action.
41
  
On Sunday, the movement targeted four white churches. Reverend Griffin 
lamented that the local churches “have been reduced to Sunday social clubs,” and he 
resolved to force the white ministers and their congregations to confront segregation 
forthwith. Seven African Americans attended the service at Johns Memorial Episcopal 
Church. Gordon Moss saw the group at the door and invited them to worship with him at 
his pew. Eight blacks entered the Wesleyan Methodist Church, but all but five of the 
white parishioners walked out of the church, and some went to the police station seeking 
arrest warrants. The visibly shaken young minister asked the black teenagers to leave and 
they complied. A separate group arrived at the Farmville Presbyterian Church, but the 
services had already begun and that attempt was aborted. Those turned away converged 
on Main Street.
42
 
Reverend J. Samuel Williams led a fourth group to Farmville Baptist Church. The 
large brick building, which housed the largest congregation in the county, stood on Main 
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Street next to the courthouse. Six white columns and two sets of double doors formed an 
impressive front porch. At the entrance, parishioners received the bulletin, which read: 
“If you feel the need for prayer, if you are heavy laden and are tired—if you are in need 
of friendship—and want a friend that will stick closer than a brother—if you want to 
know the way of life more perfectly, walk through the doors of this house, worship with 
us and make your wants known.” Ruth Turner, an Ohioan who had taught in the previous 
summer’s crash program, acted as the group’s spokesperson. She asked the usher, “Has 
the service already started?” A middle-aged usher with balding red hair and glasses 
snapped, “You people are not coming in here.” He gestured down the street and said, 
“You have your own church.” Turner then asked, “Do you mean we are not going to be 
admitted to this church?” The usher crossed his arms and blocked the entrance. The 
church leadership had grown alarmed by the recent demonstrations and rumors that their 
church was targeted for integration. The previous evening, the board of deacons 
unanimously adopted a policy that barred blacks. Undeterred, Ruth Turner declared, 
“Then we will wait until the service is over.” The group stood silently on the front porch. 
The church leadership locked the front entrance and late parishioners were directed to a 
side door.
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The kneel-in at Farmville Baptist Church produced the most arrests of the 
campaign. The Reverend Otis McClung opened the service with the offertory, 
accompanied by the singing of the anthem. The demonstrators heard the choir from the 
porch, as did more protestors who had just arrived after being turned away from other 
churches. The group decided to sing as well. Twenty-three demonstrators belted out “We 
Shall Overcome” so loud that Reverend McClung could hear himself preach, “but that 
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Figure 10.7 Farmville Baptist Church. (Photo: Richmond Times-Dispatch). 
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was about all.” Many parishioners expressed their irritation to church leaders, and the 
steamy summer heat, intensified by the closed doors and lack of air conditioning, 
exacerbated the tension. Deacon Robert B. Burger urged Reverend Williams to leave, but 
he refused. The demonstrators continued clapping and sang “Let Us Break Bread 
Together,” “Lead Me, Guide Me,” and “This May Be the Last Time.” The volume was so 
great that the choir, which sat behind the pulpit, had trouble hearing the sermon. The 
deacons determined that the disturbance had to end. Burger again asked the 
demonstrators to leave, and again they refused. The deacons then summoned the police. 
Chief Overton asked Reverend Williams to lead his followers away, but the group 
remained steadfast. Williams was arrested for disturbing a public worship. The other 
twenty-two protestors fell limp on the porch. Chief Overton painstakingly read ever arrest 
warrant, as one-by-one each demonstrator was carried, wheeled on a stretcher, or 
transported by motor vehicle to the county courthouse, singing freedom songs along the 
way. Overton’s policy of personally executing every arrest prolonged the spectacle for 
forty-five minutes. The church service ended early, and irritated parishioners filed out the 
side entrance, staring in disbelief as they witnessed the final arrests. Whites gathered 
outside the courthouse, as did blacks one block away. Tensions peaked, but a timely 
downpour doused a potential confrontation.
44
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The tension was renewed inside the courthouse. The detainees were processed in 
a courtroom because they would have overfilled the jail. They continued to sing, so 
 
Figure 10.8 Fred Wallace. He was arrested after a physical 
confrontation with local law enforcement officers at the county 
courthouse. Wallace had trouble securing a criminal defense attorney. 
Weeks earlier, President Kennedy had established the Lawyers’ 
Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, a bi-racial association of 
lawyers that worked to find legal solutions to racial problems. The 
committee’s co-chairman, Bernard Segal, asked Dean F.D.G. Ribble of 
the University of Virginia Law School to find an attorney for Wallace. 
Ribble secured the services of George Allen of Richmond, who, after 
years of litigation, reached an agreement with the county to drop the 
felony charges and for Wallace to pay the fines on the misdemeanor 
counts (Photo: Prince Edward County). 
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loudly recalled Chief Overton that “you couldn’t hear yourself talk.” The seventeen 
juveniles were released into the custody of their parents, but the six adults refused bond 
and were locked up. A contingent of NAACP officials, including Reverend Griffin, 
Lester Banks, and attorney Henry Marsh, visited the jail. After meeting with the 
detainees, Marsh called on the Commonwealth Attorney’s office to obtain assurances for 
his clients’ safety. In the meantime, Marsh sent his law clerk back to the jail to deliver a 
message to his clients. Fred Wallace, a third-year Harvard Law student, had a personal 
attachment to the locked-out children. He had taught in the previous summer’s crash 
program and had been interviewed for a nationally televised special on the school 
closings, where he stated somberly that “a good percentage of the kids…are undoubtedly 
lost. I think they have been ruined permanently.” When he reentered the courthouse 
through a side door, an officer asked him what business he had in the building. Wallace 
perceived this comment as harassment, because he was conducting lawful business. He 
cursed the officer and a melee ensued. It took several officers to restrain Wallace. During 
the altercation, he kicked a deputy sheriff, who later testified that “my leg hurt a lot, and 
he had put a right-sized knot on my leg there. It didn’t bleed, but it took some of the skin, 
the outer layer of skin off, up on my leg.” Wallace was arrested and charged with several 
counts, including cursing an officer, resisting arrest, and assaulting an officer “with the 
intent . . . to maim, disfigure, disable, and kill.” Wallace was released on $5,000 bond.
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In the evening, the six kneel-in detainees were moved to the neighboring 
Lunenburg County Jail, presumably to clear space in the event of more arrests. “That was 
kind of a mistake there,” reflected Chief Overton, “because then the blacks got mad 
because we were taking their kinfolks to another jail.” While in jail, Ruth Turner too had 
time to reconsider her role in the kneel-in. She determined that the arrests were “unwise” 
and “not timely” because they removed twenty-three demonstrators from the picket lines. 
Reverend Williams also admitted that they made an error in judgment by singing loudly 
and inviting arrest. Numbers were the movement’s greatest deficiency. Reverend Griffin 
was upset that his instructions were broken and so many were arrested. At a rally on 
Sunday night, he appealed for more volunteers, but only a handful stepped forward, not 
nearly enough to replenish those detained or out on bond.
46
 
Reverend Griffin may have lost numbers, but he won the message war. Earlier in 
the day, the Reverend Edward Meeks Gregory, a white Episcopalian minister and 
president of the Richmond Area Council on Human Relations, had delivered a guest 
sermon at First Baptist Church. “The Gospel makes it quite clear,” preached Gregory, 
“that church, by its very nature, is aggressively integrationist in order to draw men 
together under God.” In an interview with the New York Times, Reverend Griffin used 
Gregory’s sermon to draw a contrast between First Baptist and the white churches: “I 
would surrender my pulpit before I would let anyone connected with my church prevent 
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anybody from worshipping in it.” Furthermore, the arrests “showed that the white 
ministers of this community and their congregations have failed to realize the moral 
issues connected with the integration movement.” Finally, Griffin noted that the arrests 
“intensified our determination to demonstrate.”
47
 
The weekend’s events placed a strain on local officials. On Tuesday, 
Commonwealth’s Attorney Frank Nat Watkins requested assistance from Governor 
Harrison “in the prosecution of a large number of cases growing out of the violation of 
State Laws dealing with sit-ins, kneel-ins and prayer-ins, etc.” Watkins also expressed 
concern about the possibility of violence erupting in the county. “As you know,” he 
explained to the governor, “the tempo of the harassment of the citizens of Prince Edward 
County and the State of Virginia is increasing day by day. I had hoped that we, in this 
county, would be spared of the ordeals that are now going on in the City of Danville.” 
Watkins not only asked for legal assistance but also suggested that Harrison call out the 
National Guard. “Small towns and counties are not equipped to continue this fight 
without the aid of the State,” pleaded Watkins. The governor’s office denied both 
requests. To meet the crisis, the county board of supervisors approved the appointment of 
ten additional deputy sheriffs.
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The state circuit court provided further protection. Judge Joel W. Flood, citing 
“insufficient space” in the county lockup, issued an order incorporating the jails of eight 
neighboring counties, three cities, and the state farm into the Prince Edward County jail 
system. A black spokesman saw this action as “an attempt to intimidate the young 
people.” The modified system was large enough “to house every citizen of Prince Edward 
County, Negro and white, including horses, cattle, and dogs.” Judge Flood’s order 
eliminated filling the jails as a protest tactic, not that that was a viable campaign strategy 
at the moment. Further arrests would sap the strength of the picket lines, so 
demonstration leaders obtained parade permits and protestors appropriately spaced 
themselves apart while picketing. The picketers, however, still applied pressure. Several 
teenagers performed try-ins at department stores and sought service at the lunch counters, 
but when asked to leave they did so without a disturbance. Although these actions 
appeared conservative by the previous weekend’s standard, a new phase of the 
demonstrations had begun.
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Table 10.2 
 
1963 Farmville Demonstrations List of Arrests 
 
 
Name 
 
 
Age 
 
County 
Resident 
 
Date of 
Arrest 
Joyce Allen 15 Yes August 3 
Lavera Allen 16 Yes July 28 
Bessie Bolding 15 Yes August 3 
Barbara Botts 16 Yes July 28 
James Russell Brown 14 Yes August 3 
Mattie Carey 15 Yes July 28 
Betty Carter 16 Yes August 3 
Elizabeth Crawley 16 Yes July 28 
Ivanhoe Donaldson 21 No July 28 
Goodwin Douglas 25 Yes August 3 
Wilbert Eanes 22 Yes August 3 
Mary Fowlkes 16 Yes July 27 
Clara Gibson 16 Yes July 27 
Leslie F. Griffin 15 Yes July 27 
Richard Hale 26 Yes July 27 
Frances Hayes 19 Yes July 28 
George Hughes 15 Yes July 28 
Emerson Hunt 17 No August 3 
Brenda Jackson 14 Yes July 28 
Otis Jackson 14 Yes July 28 
LaNae Johnson 18 Yes July 27 
Gwendolyn Lancaster 17 Yes July 28 
Ernestine Land 17 Yes July 28 
Melvin Moore 19 No July 27 
Angela Neverson 19 Yes July 27 
Clara Paige 15 Yes August 3 
Ethel Poindexter 17 Yes July 28 
Grace Poindexter 18 Yes July 27 
Shelia Pride 15 Yes July 27 
Charles Pryor 14 Yes August 3 
Bessie Reid 19 Yes July 28 
Nathaniel Robertson 14 Yes August 3 
Laneuville Scott 13 Yes August 3 
Phillip Stockman 15 Yes July 28 
Rudolph Stokes 16 Yes July 28 
Sandra Stokes 15 Yes July 28 
Carlton Terry 15 Yes July 27 
Patricia Turner 18 Yes July 28 
Ruth Turner 24 No July 28 
Betty Jean Ward 17 Yes July 28 
Roy Louis Webb 17 Yes August 3 
James White, Jr. 15 Yes  July 28 
Raymond Wiley 15 Yes July 28 
Shirley Wiley 15 Yes July 28 
J. Samuel Williams 29 Yes July 28 
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In the following weeks, the demonstrators focused on exerting economic pressure 
on the business community. First, the demonstrators sought to discourage white 
consumers from patronizing the business district. The presence of demonstrators and the 
fear of potential trouble did keep some people away. “We usually went to Farmville to 
shop on Saturdays,” remembered one white youngster. “We didn’t go a couple of times 
because of the demonstrations.” Second, the marches disrupted business by taking action 
that fell within the confines of the law. For instance, Main and Third streets was a major 
intersection. At the cross street, the marchers “would keep on walking without stopping,” 
recalled Reverend Douglas, “because we knew pedestrians had the right of way.” This 
action blocked traffic and slowed down trucks from making deliveries. Finally, the 
NAACP initiated a boycott of Farmville businesses. As Reverend Griffin explained, 
“Prince Edward Negroes spend proportionately more of their income than any other 
group in the county through necessity to eat and be housed.” In conjunction with African 
Americans from the five neighboring counties, “their spending power enables the 
economy of the business community to survive.” As a bloc, blacks held the economic 
power to pressure the white leadership to make concessions. “When the merchants find 
out they’re not getting trade from Negroes,” Douglas told a reporter, “then they’re going 
to have to yield some sort of way.” For adults that did not picket for fear of economic 
reprisals, the boycott permitted anonymous participation.
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Figure 10.9 Handbill. (Image: University of Richmond). 
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The NAACP worked diligently to promote the boycott. Dozens of teenagers 
canvassed black residential areas to build support. Others solicited cooperation in the 
business district by distributing flyers to black passersby. The flyers listed the businesses 
that practiced segregation and urged blacks not to spend their money in Farmville. Some 
overzealous teenagers actually went into stores and advised customers to leave, a tactic 
that infuriated shopkeepers. “I do not object to their parading and handing out handbills 
on public streets,” explained Emanuel Weinberg, the proprietor of The Hub, “but when it 
comes to walking into my store and catching customers by the arm telling them to come 
out and not deal here, as well as passing out literature of this kind is the next thing to 
blackmail.” The boycott was not complete. Several blacks crossed the picket line to shop, 
while others shopped after the marchers went home. Some considered the boycott unfair 
for merchants that hired African Americans, while others stated that “no young people 
can tell me where to shop.” Furthermore, many African Americans had credit accounts 
with white merchants. “They’re good customers and always pay off,” said one 
businessman.  “But where else can they get credit?” The NAACP considered organizing 
carpools to transport shoppers to Richmond and Lynchburg, but nothing substantive 
materialized.
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On Saturday, August 3, Mayor Watkins denied Reverend Douglas’s request for a 
parade permit. The mayor justified the decision by saying Farmville “is so congested with 
                                                          
51
 McLaughlin, “Negro Demonstrators Denied Parade Permit in Farmville,” 2; Emanuel Weinberg to 
Watkins M. Abbitt, August 1, 1963, Box 5, WMAP; White, “Prince Edward’s Fame Disturbs Rural Calm,” 
B7. 
 
347 
pedestrian traffic and auto traffic . . . we feel [demonstrations] might be detrimental to the 
peace and good order of this town.” Chief Overton again roped off a one-block section of 
Main Street for protestors, and he warned that demonstrators who crossed the barrier 
would be arrested. Forty law enforcement officers formed a perimeter around the 
business district, connected by walkie-talkies, and with two pickup trucks “ready to use if 
needed.” Reverend Douglas considered this arrangement a violation of his constitutional 
rights and decided to challenge it. He and ten teenagers snuck around the police barricade 
and began picketing on Main Street. Chief Overton explained to Douglas that he was 
parading without a permit and asked the picketers to disperse, but they continued 
marching peacefully. The police arrested the eleven demonstrators and loaded them onto 
a pickup truck. A short time later, the police arrested Wilbert Eanes, also for picketing in 
the business district. Douglas and Eanes were transported to the Mecklenburg County 
jail. Four juveniles refused bond and were sent to the Campbell County jail. NAACP 
leaders could not afford to lose any marchers, but they justified the arrests as a test of the 
constitutionality of the local parade ordinance. They may have also sanctioned the arrests 
to reenergize the movement. The weekend arrests marked another turning point for the 
Farmville demonstrations. Afterward, participation dropped to thirty to forty marchers 
per day, with the exception of the following Saturday, when seventy-five demonstrated 
within the confines of the roped-off area. There were no more arrests, and the newspapers 
quickly lost interest in the protests. Subsequent media coverage shortened and was 
relegated to the back pages. The segregationists had mastered fighting a war of attrition 
 
348 
during the school crisis, and they were prepared to wait out the picketers as well. Many 
white residents believed that the demonstrations would fizzle out once a “few hot-
blooded” teenagers left town for school.
52
  
Several locked-out children wrote impassioned, heart-wrenching pleas to 
President Kennedy to reopen the schools. Jordan Jackson and Gene Lee described the 
desperate situation. The schools had been closed for four years. They had been fortunate 
to go to school in neighboring Cumberland County the previous year, “but a large 
number of children haven’t attended school at all.” They entreated Kennedy to “do every 
thing in your power to reopen the schools.” Likewise, Arthur Smith asked Kennedy to do 
“any thing to Reopen our schools…because we are in need of An education very badly.” 
Preston Mottley repeatedly beseeched the president for help. “I would like for you to help 
us to reopen schools in Prince Edward County, Because we feel as if we need 
education….Thank you for any help you can give us, as there are so many of us in need 
of help.” He closed his letter with a simple postscript: “Please help.” Morman Farley had 
heard that help was on the way but wrote to the president that “we [haven’t] see it come 
yet.”
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V 
 
 The Kennedy administration continued working on a solution. President Kennedy 
had been briefed on recent developments in the county and “directed that his personal 
concern about the situation be communicated to those responsible for setting up a 
satisfactory program in the county.” A White House aide emphasized the president’s 
concern in a memorandum to Secretary Anthony Celebrezze. “I know that there is a 
strong desire on the Department [of Health, Education, and Welfare] to see to it that this 
problem is resolved properly and satisfactorily,” explained Lee White, “but did want to 
make clear the President’s deep personal interest.” Kennedy affirmed his commitment to 
Prince Edward County by privately and without publicity making a $10,000 contribution 
to the Free Schools.
54
 Nevertheless, the Free Schools were in danger of miscarriage. Bill 
vanden Heuvel had yet to obtain donations from philanthropic foundations, commitments 
for the board of trustees, or a lease for the school buildings. Those circumstances changed 
in a matter of weeks and all the administration’s groundwork began to bear fruit.  
 Bill vanden Heuvel made “a major breakthrough” in negotiations with state and 
local representatives. On July 30, after weeks of talks, he reached a tentative agreement 
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with Governor Harrison and county attorney Segar Gravatt to proceed with a “a non-
profit corporate association [that] will be chartered under the laws of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia for the purpose of providing an educational program for children in Prince 
Edward County.” All three initialed a six-page memorandum, because, as vanden Heuvel 
later explained, “Lawyers, you know, like to put things in writing.” Each had a 
responsibility to carry out a part of the agreement. First, they arranged a one-year lease 
for public school buildings. This agreement, however, was subject to formal approval by 
the county school board, which Gravatt pursued. Second, a six-man bi-racial board of 
trustees would oversee the operations of the Free Schools. Harrison pledged to use his 
good offices to enlist men to serve on the board. Finally, vanden Heuvel was responsible 
for “bringing about the means by which the children of Prince Edward County can be 
offered educational opportunity while the public schools of the County are unavailable to 
them.” In short, vanden Heuvel was accountable for everything else, and there was much 
to be done.
55
 
 Four days later, the Prince Edward County school board “generally” approved the 
agreement. The board tentatively made four school buildings available to the Free 
Schools – Robert R. Moton High School, Mary E. Branch Elementary Schools #1 and #2, 
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and Worsham School (a former white school building, thus satisfying an NAACP 
demand) – a laboratory, shop, transportation facilities, and other equipment. They wanted 
assurances, however, that donations to the corporation were not “subject to any 
objectionable conditions,” that buildings were maintained and insured, that the board was 
compensated for the use of property and equipment, that the Free Schools draft 
acceptable by-laws, and that the buildings were used for educational purposes only. A 
final agreement needed board approval and the blessing of the circuit court of Prince 
Edward County. Segar Gravatt secured the signatures of a nearly unanimous board. 
Gravatt reported that board member Ray Moore “stated to me that he would sign the 
[approval] but left on vacation before he could do so.”
56
 A final agreement signed by all 
board members would have carried more weight, but even this tentative lease agreement 
marked a major step forward. 
 The status of the board of trustees also remained tentative. Harrison, Gravatt, and 
vanden Heuvel had ranked potential trustees by race. The governor had agreed to pursue 
commitments from the top three possible black candidates and the top three possible 
white candidates. Thomas H. Henderson, Robert P. Daniel, and Earl H. McClenny, the 
presidents of Virginia Union University, Virginia State College, and St. Paul’s College, 
respectively, headed the list of African American educators. Colgate Darden, the 
aforementioned former governor and president emeritus of the University of Virginia; 
Fred C. Cole, president of Washington and Lee University; and F.D.G. Ribble, dean of 
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the University of Virginia Law School, led the list of white educators. Five of the 
candidates had already given vanden Heuvel an affirmative commitment on the condition 
that Darden accept the chairmanship, and Darden conditioned his acceptance on a request 
by the governor.
57
   
 Governor Harrison made a personal appeal to Colgate Darden. On August 9, 
Harrison called for Darden, who was in Richmond on business. Harrison forthrightly 
said, “I want you to go down to Farmville and get the schools open.” Darden was caught 
off guard, thinking that they were meeting to discuss a minor favor. “I’ll tell you, this 
situation is bad,” the governor continued. “I don’t go anywhere to make a speech but 
what somebody jumps up and down to know when we are going to open the schools.” 
The school crisis certainly stained Virginia’s image, but Harrison was also concerned that 
the Farmville demonstrations would descend into violence. “Something has to be done 
about it.” As a governor, Darden had tasked many people for special assignments, which 
compelled him to answer Harrison’s call. He would accept the chairmanship but only 
once certain conditions were met – the children had to stop marching and he needed 
assurances that the community supported the program.
58
  
 The following day, Colgate Darden and Segar Gravatt visited Farmville to gauge 
support for the Free Schools. They conferred with a delegation of prominent 
segregationists, which included representatives of the Prince Edward School Foundation 
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(Rat Glenn, Tony Martin, Roy Pearson, and Robert Redd), Joseph Glenn of the school 
board, Mayor Watkins, and county judge William Hay. Darden explained that the schools 
would not interfere with the litigation but serve only to provide an educational program. 
To do so he needed their “support, friendship, and help.” The delegation pledged their 
support and cooperation on the lease of the school buildings. Darden left the meeting 
satisfied that the Free Schools had the backing of the white community. On his own, 
Gravatt met with twenty-five of the county’s “most hard bitten segregationists,” and 
despite some reservations, he won their unanimous support. The board of supervisors also 
expressed reservations, but Gravatt was optimistic about gaining their endorsement.
59
 
Darden’s ability to cajole this most recalcitrant community demonstrated how invaluable 
he was to this endeavor.  
 Bill vanden Heuvel had yet to secure sufficient funds to operate the Free Schools, 
and he was growing more anxious. He wanted $250-300,000 on hand to contract 
teachers, but by early August only the Public Welfare Foundation pledged a significant 
sum – $25,000. Vanden Heuvel continued to press foundations for commitments but with 
no success. The Field Foundation, for one, had reservations. A board member, Justine 
Wise Polier, felt “very sympathetic” about the program, but was “troubled about it being 
done in a haphazard fashion.” Maxwell Hahn, the foundation’s director, agreed, stating: 
“You just don’t put together a high school or elementary faculty in a few days.” 
Foundations had now been put in a position of either turning a blind eye to the locked-out 
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children or setting a precedent by providing financial support to communities that 
abandoned public education. They opposed shifting the responsibility for funding 
education from the government to private entities. Bill vanden Heuvel had stayed in near 
daily contact with the foundation to answer their concerns.
60
  
 The foundations remained reluctant to contribute to the Free Schools prior to a 
ruling from the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Board members closely followed 
the case through their sources. Chief Judge Simon Sobeloff, who did not sit for the case, 
received memorandum on the deliberations from his colleagues on the bench. Based on 
this evidence, the circuit court planned to reverse the district court. Sobeloff volunteered 
that information to friends serving on boards of foundations and to the chief judge of the 
U.S. Fifth Circuit, Elbert Tuttle, who also shared the intelligence with foundations. Tuttle 
advised several foundations on the Prince Edward situation. Initially, he was “on the 
fence,” but Sobeloff’s assessments convinced him that the foundations should support the 
Free Schools. Finally, on August 12, seven months after the hearing, the circuit court 
handed down its ruling. In a two-to-one decision, the court found “nothing in the 
Fourteenth Amendment which requires a state, or any of its political subdivisions…to 
provide schooling for any of its citizens.” The NAACP planned to appeal the decision, 
but a final verdict from the U.S. Supreme Court remained many months away. In the 
meantime, the state and county were under no legal obligation to operate public 
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schools.
61
 On one hand, the decision was a blow to the locked-out children, but on the 
other hand, it was a blessing. Many stakeholders had been waiting on the circuit court’s 
decision to make an affirmative commitment to the Free Schools. That barrier had now 
been lifted and the next step could be taken to provide the county with universal 
education. However, the court’s delay did run valuable time off the clock. 
 The following day, the principals assembled in Richmond to finalize an 
agreement on the Free Schools. Colgate Darden wanted the black leaders to satisfy his 
two conditions. Reverend Griffin and Lester Banks pledged their cooperation on the first 
condition – that even without a compulsory attendance law the children will register and 
attend school. Next, Darden wanted the children to stop demonstrating. “I’m willing to 
undertake this,” Darden explained, “but I can’t do so unless you all can stop the 
marching. I haven’t any objection to protests on anybody’s part, but I don’t believe you 
can teach children under those circumstances.” Griffin and Banks did not yield on the 
demonstrations. They refused to ask the children to forfeit their constitutional right to 
protest. Anyhow, Griffin could not foresee a “significant number” of student protestors 
marching, and those that did would not disturb the school program. “You are on sound 
ground as to their rights,” replied Darden, “but I’m not going to open a school down there 
under conditions which I deem impossible.” Darden went upstairs to meet with Harrison, 
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Gravatt, and Denny (even at this late moment the black and white delegations did not 
engage in direct negotiations) to withdraw his support, “because I can’t get the 
commitment to quiet.” Harrison replied, “Oh, you can’t do that. We’ve got to get the 
schools open!” Darden walked to the exit but was overtaken by Bill vanden Heuvel. “I 
have talked to the [black] leaders,” explained vanden Heuvel. “They are right. They’re 
not willing to go to their people and tell them they can’t march. They just can’t do that 
and have the people trust them; but I can say this to you: if you’ll go work on the schools, 
there won’t be a parade while you are there.” With that assurance, vanden Heuvel had 
convinced Darden to accept the chairmanship.
62
 
 Colgate Darden imparted legitimacy to the Free Schools. His involvement made it 
easier for Gravatt, Harrison, and vanden Heuvel to fulfill their end of the July 30 
agreement. The county’s white leaders respected Darden and had given him their 
assurance that the school buildings would be available. Second, Darden’s commitment 
fulfilled the condition set by the other candidates to serve on the board of trustees. 
Harrison was able to fill the board with the top choices. Third, vanden Heuvel had 
struggled to raise funds, but now, with an esteemed board headed by Colgate Darden, that 
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task was less daunting. Darden’s acceptance, vanden Heuvel determined, “was the final 
piece of the jigsaw.”
63
 
 
 
 On August 14, Governor Harrison held a press conference to present the Prince 
Edward Free School Association, “a non-profit association incorporated under the laws of 
Virginia, whose purpose will be to establish, maintain and operate a system of schools for 
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Figure 10.10 Prince Edward Free School Association Announcement, August 14, 1963. Pictured: 
Governor Albertis Harrison, L. Francis Griffin, Bill vanden Heuvel, and Henry Marsh. (Photo: 
Richmond Times-Dispatch). 
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the education of the children of Prince Edward County, Virginia, without regard to race, 
creed, or color.” The schools were to be available for the 1963-1964 school year, 
“pending the determination of the issues now being litigated.” He reported that a bi-racial 
board of trustees, led by Colgate Darden, had the “sole responsibility” for hiring the 
faculty and establishing an educational program; a tentative agreement had been reached 
with the school board to lease buildings; and the school would be funded by donations 
from foundations and private citizens. Harrison credited the program’s formation on the 
“mutual cooperation” of federal, state, and local representatives, as well as black and 
white county residents, and as a symbol of that cooperation, Segar Gravatt, Reverend 
Griffin, Bill vanden Heuvel, and Henry Marsh sat at his side.
64
 The governor gave a 
misleading impression of that mutual cooperation, as this occasion was the first that these 
men all assembled in the same room. They certainly all had a mutual interest in this 
endeavor, but the cooperation was achieved through the medium of Bill vanden Heuvel.  
 
* * * * * 
 
Bill vanden Heuvel’s work forming the Prince Edward Free School Association 
was a diplomatic tour de force. This “supersalesman” won the endorsement of all the 
necessary players, some of whom were not on speaking terms with one another and had 
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been uncompromising.
65
 The black leaders wanted the state and county to fulfill its 
responsibility, but neither could they dismiss an opportunity to stop the educational 
erosion. The county leaders did not want to concede an inch on integration, but their 
recalcitrance had done harm to the community’s reputation. The governor did not want to 
lead on civil rights, but the school closings had embarrassed the state. Vanden Heuvel 
had handed the NAACP, the county, and the state a chance to save face, an offer than 
none could reasonably refuse.  
Bill vanden Heuvel received some high praise for his efforts. Charley McDowell 
of the Richmond Times-Dispatch wrote privately that the Department of Justice, “so often 
and so vaguely criticized in the South for ‘tinkering,’ has had its tinkering endorsed by 
the segregationists, the NAACP and the Governor, which is some tinkering.” Dean Moss 
believed that vanden Heuvel was the “only person in the world” who could have brought 
these men together. He was especially impressed by vanden Heuvel convincing the 
governor to sign on. “How did…[you] make Governor Harrison commit himself flatly on 
so controversial a matter?” asked Moss. “That I will always marvel at.” Vanden Heuvel 
had worked from the premise that “if something should be done, then it can be done. And 
what had to be done in terms of saving America’s own character was that those children 
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could not be denied an education.”
66
 Although he deserved much of the credit, Bill 
vanden Heuvel had the political astuteness to effectively deflect praise.  
The press conference announcing the Free Schools had the potential for broader 
impact. Vanden Heuvel wanted Harrison to make the announcement, but the NAACP did 
not want him to receive undue credit. It preferred that vanden Heuvel lead the press 
conference. “If I make the announcement,” vanden Heuvel countered, “you’re going to 
have a hard time getting [white] support later on to keep the schools open.” The 
announcement had greater long-term benefits coming from the governor than a federal 
official, but it also provided immediate gains to the NAACP. “Never before have we 
witnessed the Governor of the state sitting down with NAACP leaders at a press 
conference,” celebrated Heslip Lee, executive director of the Virginia Council on Human 
Relations, “and never have we witnessed a picture of these state leaders on the front 
pages of our newspapers and on our television.” Just years earlier, state lawmakers had 
passed anti-NAACP laws to curb its influence in Virginia. Now, Reverend Griffin and 
Henry Marsh joined the governor at the table, thus elevating the NAACP.
67
 Bill vanden 
Heuvel had simultaneously arrested the educational erosion and facilitated a thaw in race 
relations.
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CHAPTER XI 
 
PART 3 
 
 
It could be argued that no segment of the population mourned the loss of 
President Kennedy more than black Prince Edwardians. Kennedy once said that 
“education comes at the top of the responsibilities of any government, at whatever level.” 
But for years, Virginia and Prince Edward County failed to meet their responsibility, nor 
had the Congress acted, nor had the federal courts issued a definitive ruling. Only the 
Kennedy administration took decisive action to restore universal education to Prince 
Edward County. It negotiated a lease of the public school buildings and buses; recruited 
an integrated faculty; offered recommendations on a school program; and persuaded 
philanthropic foundations and corporations to donate over $1 million in cash and 
equipment for the Free Schools. Still, the Prince Edward Free School Association did 
more than provide education. It attacked poverty by providing medical and dental care, a 
free lunch program, and warm clothes; and facilitated bi-racial communication that led to 
a pro-public school organization. The long-term impact of the Free Schools is 
immeasurable.
1
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Similarly, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had a lasting impact on Prince Edward 
County. President Kennedy did not live to sign his civil rights bill into law. Lyndon 
Johnson invoked Kennedy’s memory to guide public opinion and lobby Congress for 
passage of the bill. “No memorial or eulogy could more eloquently honor President 
Kennedy’s memory,” Johnson told the nation. After months of congressional debate, 
Lyndon Johnson signed the bill into law on July 2, 1964. The law, among other 
provisions, barred discrimination in places of public accommodations. African 
Americans immediately tested Farmville’s compliance and these new patrons were met 
with courtesy in restaurants and the theater.
1
 The law did not change men’s hearts, but 
time gradually reduced the scourge of Jim Crow. 
 The Kennedy legacy was also felt in the federal courts. The Department of Justice 
participated in the Prince Edward litigation through the U.S. Supreme Court hearing. 
However, the litigation continued through the 1960s, beyond the tenure of many Kennedy 
holdovers at Justice. Kennedy’s judicial appointees extended the influence of the 
administration through the life of the Prince Edward litigation. Chapter XII: “Men of 
Unquestioned Ability” chronicles the work of Kennedy’s judicial appointees on the 
Prince Edward litigation. 
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CHAPTER XII 
MEN OF UNQUESTIONED ABILITY 
 
President Kennedy left a lasting impact on the federal judiciary. During his 1,036 
days in office, he made 129 lifetime appointments to the federal bench, more than any of 
his predecessors had nominated in two full terms, save only Harry Truman and Dwight 
Eisenhower. Kennedy’s judges – two Supreme Court justices, 21 circuit court judges, 104 
district court judges, and 2 special court judges – averaged a quarter century of service 
beyond Dallas. To put that in perspective, the typical Kennedy judge sat on the bench 
deep into Ronald Reagan’s second term. In a feat of longevity, four of them held senior 
status during Barack Obama’s second term. President Kennedy’s unprecedented judicial 
power extended the influence of the New Frontier for generations.
1
   
 Much of Kennedy’s appointment power stemmed from the Omnibus Judgeship 
Act of 1961. The Judicial Conference of the United States, an association of federal 
judges, had repeatedly recommended that Congress add about fifty judges to alleviate a 
heavy backlog of cases. The Democratically controlled Congress, however, refused to 
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hand over a bonanza of patronage power to a Republican president, despite Eisenhower’s 
assurance to nominate an equal number of Democrats and Republicans. Democrats 
delayed action, gambling on a Democrat winning the White House in 1960. Weeks after 
the inauguration, President Kennedy asked for congressional support to add dozens of 
federal judgeships. This time Congress consented. On May 19, 1961, Kennedy signed the 
bill that created seventy-three new district and circuit court judgeships – “the greatest 
expansion of the Federal judiciary,” reported the New York Times. Kennedy pledged to 
“choose men and women of unquestioned ability,” candidates with “respected 
professional skill, incorruptible character, firm judicial temperament, the rare inner 
quality to know where to temper justice with mercy, and the intellectual capacity to 
protect and illuminate the Constitution and our historic values in the context of a society 
experiencing profound and rapid change.”
1
 Many critics have charged that Kennedy’s 
appointees failed to match his vision. 
 Victor Navasky’s interpretation of Kennedy’s judicial appointments set the 
foundation for future scholarship. In Kennedy Justice (1971), Navasky decried the 
Kennedy brothers for appointing obstructionists to the federal bench, with particular 
emphasis on district court judges Robert Elliott of Georgia, Gordon West of Louisiana, 
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and Harold Cox of Mississippi. These men will never be accused of advancing racial 
progress. Elliott stated that he did not “want those pinks, radicals, and black voters to 
outvote those who are trying to preserve our segregation laws and traditions”; West 
declared that Brown was “one of the truly regrettable decisions of all time”; and Cox 
called two hundred black voter applicants “a bunch of niggers” and “chimpanzees.” 
Navasky explained that these men postponed justice, dealt a severe blow to the civil 
rights movement, and undermined the Department of Justice’s strategy to litigate rather 
than legislate. “For it was a blatant contradiction,” reasoned Navasky, “for the Kennedys 
to forego civil rights legislation and executive action in favor of litigation and at the same 
time to appoint as lifetime litigation-overseers men dedicated to frustrating that 
litigation.”
2
 Navasky’s critical interpretation has endured. 
 Kennedy Justice needs to be updated. Navasky focused his analysis on a small 
sample of judges – and the most obnoxious and racist at that. President Kennedy 
conceded that “some of the judges may not have ruled as I would have ruled in their 
cases,” but he also cautioned against classifying all southern judges based on the conduct 
of a few.
3
 An evaluation of Kennedy’s appointment record requires the inclusion of 
Elliott, West, and Cox, but with the understanding that they only represent a small 
fraction of his nominees. Every one of his judicial selections needs to be analyzed – and 
that analysis needs to expand geographically. Traditional studies center on judges in the 
Fifth Circuit, which at the time consisted of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
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Mississippi, and Texas – the Deep South region that was home to Elliott, West, and Cox. 
Expanding the analysis will not make the segregationists’ courtroom antics any less 
egregious, but it will paint a more comprehensive portrait of Kennedy’s appointment 
record.  
 
 President Kennedy appointed three judges to the Fourth Circuit that directly 
altered the course of events in Prince Edward County. The Omnibus Judgeship Act 
created two vacancies on the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held appellate 
 
 
Figure 12.1 Omnibus Judgeship Act, May 19, 1961. (Photo: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library). 
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jurisdiction over the district courts in Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and West Virginia.
4
 Kennedy filled the vacancies with Albert Bryan and 
Spencer Bell, who provided the necessary votes to stop and reverse the flow of tuition 
grants in Prince Edward County. Also, Kennedy appointed John Butzner to the federal 
district court. Butzner sat on a panel, along with Albert Bryan, that limited and eventually 
invalidated tuition grant disbursements across Virginia. Bryan, Butzner, and Bell have 
never been mistaken for Elliott, West, and Cox, nor have their careers been substantially 
evaluated. A study of Kennedy’s Fourth Circuit judges’ handling of the Prince Edward 
County litigation counters the prevailing assessment of the administration’s appointment 
record. 
 
I 
 
 The U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had tremendous influence over the 
interpretation of Brown. Next to the Fifth Circuit, the Fourth heard the most school 
desegregation cases. The U.S. Supreme Court had left the district courts with unclear 
implementation guidelines. The circuit court judges clarified the ambiguities for the 
district courts. In Briggs v. Elliott (1955), John J. Parker, chief judge of the Fourth 
Circuit, authored what one scholar characterized as the “most authoritative gloss” of 
Brown. He concluded that the Constitution “does not require integration. It merely 
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forbids discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of 
voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce 
segregation.” The “Briggs dictum” emboldened local school districts to resist 
desegregation and provided district court judges with narrower guidelines to interpret the 
Brown decision. The court had been historically conservative, but Parker’s successor, 
Simon Sobeloff, led the circuit on a more progressive path.
5
 President Kennedy further 
altered the dynamics of the court by appointing Albert Bryan and Spencer Bell to the 
bench. The realigned court increased the prospects for an affirmative ruling to reopen 
Prince Edward County’s public schools. 
 Simon Sobeloff, a liberal Republican from Maryland, was not a popular figure in 
the South. As U.S. solicitor general, Sobeloff had presented arguments in the Brown II 
hearings, which segregationists considered a disqualification for a seat on the federal 
bench. Nevertheless, President Eisenhower nominated Sobeloff to the circuit court in 
1955. Ray Moore of Hampden-Sydney urged Senator A. Willis Robertson (D-VA) to 
block the nomination, because Sobeloff had “interceded for the government of behalf of 
the NAACP.” Moore speculated with derision that the nomination was “an effort to pack 
the Court with men of the same caliber as the ones now serving on the Supreme Court.” 
Robertson took to the Senate floor to oppose Sobeloff’s nomination, stating that it was 
“an affront to [North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia] and that his selection 
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represents an effort to woo certain political pressure groups in other parts of the Nation 
by an action which is offensive to a majority of the people in the region he will serve.” 
The southern-led Judiciary Committee held up the nomination for over a year, but once 
reported out of committee, and after segregationists’ last ditch effort to obstruct the 
process, the Senate voted for confirmation. Sobeloff earned even more ire from 
segregationists after the death of Judge Parker elevated him to chief judge.
6
 
 
 Initially, Chief Judge Sobeloff led the Fourth Circuit with caution. The court 
consisted of two other active judges and two men that had taken senior status, a semi-
retirement that permitted elder jurists to receive full compensation with a reduced 
caseload. Armistead Dobie had actually retired, but Morris Soper, a champion of racial 
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Table 12.1 
Judges of the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1951-1969 
Judge State Born-Died Active Senior Status Appointed by 
John J. Parker North Carolina 1885-1958 1925-1958 - Coolidge 
Morris A. Soper Maryland 1873-1963 1931-1955 1955-1963 Hoover 
Armistead Dobie  Virginia 1881-1962 1939-1956 1956-1962 Roosevelt 
Simon E. Sobeloff Maryland 1894-1973 1956-1970 1970-1973 Eisenhower 
Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. South Carolina 1912-1989 1957-1981 1981-1989 Eisenhower 
Herbert S. Boreman West Virginia 1897-1982 1959-1971 1971-1982 Eisenhower 
Albert V. Bryan Virginia 1899-1984 1961-1972 1972-1984 Kennedy 
J. Spencer Bell  North Carolina 1906-1967 1961-1967 - Kennedy 
Harrison Winter Maryland 1921-1990 1966-1990 1990 Johnson 
James Braxton Claven, Jr. North Carolina 1918-1977 1966-1977 - Johnson 
John D. Butzner, Jr. Virginia 1917-2006 1967-1982 1982-2006 Johnson 
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equality, maintained a steady caseload until his death in 1963. President Eisenhower 
filled the vacancies left by Dobie and Parker with two conservatives. Senator Strom 
Thurmond (D-SC) had lobbied the administration to appoint Robert Figg, who 
represented the Clarendon County (South Carolina) school board in Briggs, but Attorney 
General Herbert Brownwell recommended Clement Haynsworth, a moderate South 
Carolinian Democrat who had not been active “in the effort to continue segregated 
schools.” Next, Eisenhower promoted district court Judge Herbert Boreman of West 
Virginia, who was characterized by a colleague as “one of the most conservative judges 
in a conservative circuit.” Sobeloff, Soper, and Haynsworth formed the panel that heard 
the bulk of the court’s school desegregation cases from 1958 to 1961. The court upheld 
tokenism and gradualism, ruling that pupil placement laws were constitutional on their 
face and that grade-a-year desegregation plans were acceptable.
7
 The pace of school 
desegregation quickened after President Kennedy diluted the influence of the 
conservatives with his appointees. 
The White House delegated recruiting and screening judicial candidates to the 
Department of Justice. The deputy attorney general, Byron White, and later Nicholas 
Katzenbach, played the leading role in judicial selections. The deputy’s assistants, Joseph 
Dolan and Bill Geoghegan, researched the candidates’ backgrounds, including their 
views on segregation. The Department of Justice, explained Geoghegan, sought to ensure 
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that the nominee was “willing and able to abide by precedents” and not function as an 
activist against Brown. Political forces, however, complicated the nomination process. 
With a Democrat in the White House, Senate Democrats could invoke “senatorial 
courtesy” to block any candidate from their state that they deemed “personally 
obnoxious.” Also, the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by ultra-segregationist James 
Eastland (D-MS), could test the president’s determination to appoint his nominee by 
delaying confirmation hearings for months. “We do not expect to find and to be able to 
obtain confirmation for a militant civil rights advocate in the South,” admitted 
Katzenbach. “What southern senator could afford not to oppose confirmation?” These 
political realities narrowed the field to the best candidate that could be confirmed.
8
  
 The Department of Justice relied on “spotters,” trusted and connected individuals, 
to recommend and evaluate candidates from their state. President Kennedy’s war buddy, 
Virginia campaign manager, and son of former governor John Battle administered the 
federal patronage in the Old Dominion. Bill Battle sought candidates who “would serve 
with the greatest distinction” and, in an effort to build “a reasonable backing” for the 
president, an emphasis was placed on rewarding Kennedy supporters. Battle solicited 
advice from state officials, but he bypassed senators Robertson and Byrd. Robertson 
harbored some resentment that the administration did not consult him but instead relied 
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on Battle, who he referred to condescendingly as “the so-called Virginia dispenser of 
patronage.” Byrd, although willing to oppose undesirable candidates, preferred a limited 
role over judicial selections rather than being indebted to the president for nominating his 
candidate. When Byrd deferred to the president, wrote a legal scholar, “the quality of 
appointments [in Virginia] was exceptionally high.”
9
 Indeed, Kennedy appointed 
exceptional Virginians to the federal bench. 
 President Kennedy nominated Albert Bryan to the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in August 1961. Bryan had a distinguished resume. He graduated from the 
University of Virginia School of Law (’21) and served as city attorney of Alexandria 
(1924-1928) and commonwealth’s attorney (1928-1947) before President Truman 
appointed him to the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia in 1947. 
Bryan’s nomination to the circuit court received near-unanimous praise. Several local bar 
associations endorsed Bryan, including the cities of Richmond and Alexandria, Arlington 
County, and the American Bar Association awarded him its highest rating, “exceptionally 
well qualified.” “No Virginia jurist in modern times,” concluded the Richmond Times-
Dispatch, “has enjoyed the admiration and respect of the bar to a greater degree than 
Judge Bryan.” The Richmond paper acclaimed his nomination as “nothing less than a ten-
strike,” and the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot considered him “wisely chosen.” Bryan, once a 
member of the Byrd Organization, was the choice of state leaders like Congressman 
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Howard Smith, Senator Robertson, and former governor John Battle. In fact, Battle 
visited the attorney general’s office to personally lobby for Bryan. Certainly such high 
praise from the Byrd Organization threw into question Bryan’s conviction in adhering to 
Brown.
10
  
 The evolution of Judge Bryan’s school desegregation rulings reflected new 
interpretations of the law. He strictly followed precedent. In Davis v. School Board of 
Prince Edward County (1952), Bryan upheld racial segregation in public schools, as 
“separate but equal” remained the law. The U.S. Supreme Court famously overturned 
decades of precedent in Brown, and thus Bryan’s ruling. “The removal of the rule and 
custom of segregation was an abrupt change,” wrote Judge Bryan. “It was a social epoch, 
beginning of a new era.” But without precise guidelines from the High Court, Bryan 
followed the precedent set by the “Briggs dictum,” thus mimicking Parker’s 
interpretation that Brown did “not compel the mixing of different races in the public 
schools….The order of that Court is simply that no child shall be denied admission to a 
school on the basis of race or color.” However, when Bryan found a violation of that 
principle, he directed remedies. In 1956, he ordered the Arlington County school board to 
begin desegregation, but legal challenges delayed its execution for years. Finally, on 
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February 2, 1959, after the federal and state courts invalidated Virginia’s massive 
resistance laws, Arlington (along with Norfolk) became the first Virginia school districts 
to desegregate. Days later, Bryan ordered the school board of Alexandria to admit several 
black students to all-white schools. The token desegregation of northern Virginia schools 
continued under his direction. In September 1960, Bryan rejected the Fairfax County 
school board’s plan to admit only five of the thirty-one black applicants to white schools. 
He ordered that number increased to nineteen. “I thought I had not done too badly in the 
school cases from this area,” reflected Bryan. “Without any disorder whatsoever and 
without a single school closing, as occurred and continued for months elsewhere in 
Virginia, Negro children entered schools under the orders of the court as early as at any 
place in the State.” Still, there was room for criticism. He had scrutinized school boards’ 
student placement procedures, but he did not order that every black applicant be admitted 
to a white school. Bryan could be charged with slowing down desegregation, but his 
rulings were consistent with the circuit court. Simon Sobeloff defended Bryan’s school 
desegregation record in a seven-page memorandum that reached Robert Kennedy. 
Sobeloff assured that Bryan had a “sincere purpose to follow the law” and a record that 
moved school desegregation forward. The administration went ahead with Bryan’s 
nomination and he was easily confirmed.
11
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Albert Bryan’s promotion created a vacancy on the U.S. District Court of the 
Eastern District of Virginia. President Kennedy owed Lindsay Almond a debt for his 
support in the 1960 campaign, but his candidacy proved problematic. The optics was bad. 
Almond, as state attorney general, had defended school segregation in federal court and 
later, as governor, he closed schools under the massive resistance laws. On the other 
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Figure 12.2 Albert Bryan and John Butzner. (Photo: Richmond Times-Dispatch). 
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hand, Almond led the state away from massive resistance once the courts invalidated 
those laws. The Northern Virginia Bar Association, an organization of black lawyers, 
overlooked Almond’s segregationist past to endorse his candidacy. However, Harry Byrd 
remained unforgiving. For months, Bill Battle lobbied Byrd to withdraw his objections, 
but the senator would not relent. The administration was forced to remove Almond from 
consideration. Instead, President Kennedy nominated John Butzner, a state circuit court 
judge from Fredericksburg, to the U.S. District Court in May 1962. Like Albert Bryan, 
Butzner received the enthusiastic support of Congressman Smith, which raised concern 
about his sincerity to uphold Brown. Any suspicions were laid to rest within the first six 
months of him receiving his commission. Butzner ordered the town of West Point, 
Chesterfield County, Powhatan County, and Fredericksburg to desegregate their public 
schools.
12
 
 President Kennedy appointed a North Carolinian to the other vacancy on the U.S. 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Senators Sam Ervin and Everett Jordan both publicly 
endorsed state superior court judge Will Pless, but Jordan also recommended someone he 
considered “one of the outstanding lawyers in the state.” Spencer Bell graduated from the 
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University of North Carolina School of Law (’30), had a successful private practice, was 
a past president of the state bar association, and chaired the association’s committee on 
the reorganization of the state courts – the “Bell Committee.” However, Bell had no 
judicial experience but instead had held public office as a three-term state senator. In 
1960, Bell forged important political connections. He was a Kennedy delegate at the 
Democratic National Convention and also supported the gubernatorial campaign of Terry 
Sanford, a political ally of Kennedy. With the pending passage of the judgeship bill, 
Governor Sanford urged Robert Kennedy to nominate Bell, because doing otherwise 
would “damage seriously the Kennedy forces in North Carolina. Bell was openly for 
Kennedy before the [1960 Democratic National Convention] and stood strong and voted 
there. He is one of my closest friends. He is an excellent lawyer – and on the merits 
alone, better qualified than Judge Pless. The Senators will give you no trouble, but we 
have put this on the line in public, and if Bell is not appointed it will be a mortal blow.” 
In September 1961, President Kennedy appointed Bell and thus recalibrated the court’s 
political ideology. Bell was a liberal voice in the wilderness of southern conservatism. 
“We can and we must,” he believed, “bring our own southland back into the mainstream 
of economic and political life of this great democracy.” Almost immediately, Sobeloff 
and Bell formed a friendship “so natural and congenial,” the chief judge later wrote, “that 
I felt as if it has always existed.” Bell joined Sobeloff to bolster the liberal wing of the 
circuit court.
13
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 Simon Sobeloff was eager to move the circuit beyond the “Briggs dictum.” He 
considered it “one of the worst things that Judge Parker ever launched.” His court, 
however, was split on Briggs. Soper and Bell shared Sobeloff’s disdain, but Haynsworth, 
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Figure 12.3 J. Spencer Bell. (Courtesy of the State Archives of 
North Carolina). 
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Boreman, and Bryan supported Parker’s interpretation. “It has been the only effective 
amelioration of the widespread alarm which the school cases created,” defended Clement 
Haynsworth. “Without it, I am convinced we would not have progressed as far as we 
have. If we renounce it now, I think we will only succeed in hardening resistance and 
diminishing the potential for cooperative effort on the part of school boards.” Herbert 
Boreman approved the tempo of school desegregation in the Fourth Circuit. “There has 
been a general trend, slow-moving, perhaps,” gauged Boreman, “toward integration 
where sought and it is my view that this course should be continued.” Haynsworth and 
Boreman, the conservative wing of the court, were reluctant to move beyond tokenism 
and gradualism. Invariably, Chief Judge Sobeloff assigned two liberal judges to sit on 
three-judge panels in school desegregation cases to dilute the influence of the 
conservative judges. In June 1962, Haynsworth accused Sobeloff of packing the panels. 
He noted that over the previous year he had not sat for a single school case, while 
Sobeloff had sat for them all. Haynsworth suggested “that no member of our Court 
should sit on school cases appreciably more frequently than any other member.”
14
 
Sobeloff’s manipulation of the docket, however, permitted the court to make progress. 
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 The circuit court soon renounced tokenism and gradualism. In 1962, the court 
found that several school boards administered pupil placement in a discriminatory 
manner and directed the district courts to issue orders for the school boards to develop 
new assignment plans. The following year, the U.S. Supreme Court established new 
expectations for school desegregation. In Watson v. City of Memphis (1963), the High 
Court denounced the slow rate of progress in unmistakable language: 
 
Given the extended time which has elapsed, it is far from clear that the mandate of 
the second Brown decision requiring that desegregation proceed with “all 
deliberate speed” would today be fully satisfied by types of plans or programs for 
desegregation of public educational facilities which eight years ago might have 
been deemed sufficient. Brown never contemplated that the concept of “deliberate 
speed” would countenance indefinite delay in elimination of racial barriers in 
schools. 
 
Weeks later, the Supreme Court found that the school transfer requirements in Knoxville, 
Tennessee, “cannot be deemed to be reasonably designed to meet legitimate local 
problems, and therefore do not meet the requirements of Brown.” The Fourth Circuit 
Court liberally interpreted the High Court’s mandate and joined with the Third, Fifth, and 
Sixth circuits to invalidate the “grade-a-year” desegregation plan. On June 29, 1963, the 
Fourth Circuit Court held that the Lynchburg school board’s stair-step program, “for 
initial implementation eight years after the first Brown decision, cannot now be 
sustained” and directed the district court to “bring the plan into full conformity with the 
 
381 
law.”
15
 The realigned Fourth Circuit Court appeared primed to accelerate the pace of 
school desegregation. 
Black Prince Edwardians did not immediately benefit from the circuit court’s 
realignment. Judge Sobeloff granted the appellants a hearing and recommended that the 
court sit en banc, a case heard before all the active judges, not just a select three-judge 
panel. Nonetheless, Albert Bryan asked Sobeloff to relieve him from the case due to his 
prior connection as a district court judge. Not only had Bryan written the Davis (1952) 
opinion, but in 1960 he ordered the county to desegregate its public schools – an 
inconsequential ruling in light of the school closings (see Chapter IV). He recognized that 
new questions were involved in the case but thought it was not inappropriate for him to 
participate. “However,” as Bryan explained, “this would be difficult for a layman to 
understand. Even though there may be no legal or ethical ground to disqualify me from 
now sitting, the contrary could appear on the surface, and I think unfortunate appearances 
should be avoided, for frequently they are as hurtful as actual improprieties.” Sobeloff’s 
prior connection to the case – presenting the federal government’s arguments in Brown II 
– could also raise alarms. Therefore, the court announced that if there were any 
objections both Sobeloff and Bryan would recuse themselves. The defendants issued an 
objection, and Collins Denny privately reveled that “by a strange set of circumstances we 
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were able to get rid of Soper and Sobeloff.” On January 9, 1963, the plaintiffs presented 
arguments not to a sympathetic five-judge court but to an unfavorable three-judge court 
led by Clement Haynsworth (see Chapter IX).
16
 
 Judge Haynsworth deliberated over the case for months, “much of it wasted” 
time. He monitored the case’s developments in state court, but the Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals refused to expedite a hearing (see Chapter IX). Haynsworth determined 
that the case could not be disposed of with “unresolved questions” of state law and 
drafted an opinion reflecting his reticence. Judge Boreman concurred that the court 
should withhold judgment until the state supreme court interpreted the state constitution. 
“We should not undertake to guess and shortly thereafter perhaps find that Court in 
disagreement with us.” On August 12, 1963, the court remanded the case to the Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals. In the majority opinion, Haynsworth and Boreman justified 
their caution: “If we should hazard a forecast and it should be wrong, any judgment based 
upon it will appear both gratuitously premature and empty when the state questions are 
authoritatively resolved in state courts.” Further, the court vacated the findings of the 
U.S. District Court, which ordered the public schools reopened, restrained the distribution 
of state tuition grants, and forbid tax credits for contributions to the Prince Edward 
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School Foundation.
17
 Haynsworth and Boreman delivered a terrible blow to the locked-
out children. 
 Judge Spencer Bell penned a blistering dissent. Once he had learned that Boreman 
joined Haynsworth, he felt “considerable pressure” to quickly write a dissenting opinion 
so the case could be filed. With a new school session only weeks away, Bell acted 
“promptly so that the parties may take any possible steps in time to get the schools 
opened or permanently closed before September.” In his nine-page dissent, Bell declared 
that the majority’s ruling presented “a truly shocking example of the law’s delay” and an 
“abnegation of our plain duty.” Bell argued that Virginia’s public school system “is 
maintained, supported and administered on a statewide basis…therefore, the closure of 
the schools constitutes discrimination.” The majority, on the other hand, ruled that the 
plaintiffs must prove that the county had a duty to operate public schools before the 
federal courts could provide relief. Also, Judge Bell determined that Prince Edward 
County “closed the schools solely to frustrate the orders of the Federal courts that the 
schools be desegregated.” He considered either point – the violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or the circumvention of court orders – sufficient to immediately implement 
the district court’s earlier ruling to reopen the public schools.
18
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 The NAACP filed a motion to stay the order vacating the injunction on tuition 
grants. Robert Carter and Samuel Tucker asked that the injunction remain in effect 
“pending the filing and disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari by the United 
States Supreme Court.” The county opposed a stay. Collins Denny argued that lifting the 
injunction would “not cause harm” to the black children, because they received a free 
education at the Free Schools. However, blocking tuition grants caused “irreparable 
harm” to Academy children who had to pay school fees. Haynsworth and Boreman 
denied the motion. Adopting Denny’s language, they determined that “a stay is 
unnecessary to further proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States, and that 
the plaintiffs will suffer no irreparable harm if the stay is not granted.” Judge Bell, again, 
dissented by forecasting that “the effect of this order will be to further entrench and 
perpetuate the irreparable harm inherent in the operation of an illegal tuition grant system 
while the public schools of Prince Edward County remain closed.”
19
 Spencer Bell could 
not provide relief for the locked-out children as a judge voting in the minority. He did, 
however, craft his dissents to influence the High Court.  
 The NAACP petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to stay the order. Robert Carter 
and Samuel Tucker argued that the resumption of tuition grants would “entrench and 
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perpetuate opposition to what is the only conceivable solution to the problem – the 
maintenance of a public school system free of racial discrimination.” The Department of 
Justice filed a memorandum with the court in support of the NAACP’s application. The 
United States predicted that the petitioners would ultimately prevail on the merits and 
asked the court to renew the injunction on tuition grants. The public funds were part of an 
“evasive scheme” to countermand the Brown decision with private schools that were “de 
facto state institutions.” The memorandum concluded by countering Denny’s assertion 
that the white children suffered from the injunction. The county had the option to open 
the public schools for all, or white parents could send their children to the Free Schools. 
The Department of Justice argued that the injunction had to stand because it was the 
“sole” pressure remaining to open the public schools. Associate Justice William Brennan 
was convinced. On September 30, Brennan stayed the circuit court’s order and the 
injunction on tuition grants remained in effect.
20
 
 A similar Virginia school case had a decidedly different outcome. African 
Americans sued in federal district court for the admission of black students to the all-
white schools in Powhatan County, a rural community adjacent to Prince Edward County. 
The county board of supervisors had threatened to close the public schools if forced to 
desegregate. On January 2, 1963, Judge John Butzner ordered the school board to 
immediately admit three black applicants to the white school and end its racially 
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discriminatory student assignment procedure by the next school year. In addition, 
Butzner enjoined officials from closing any public school in the county. The ruling 
alarmed Virginians. Harry Byrd worried that the federal judiciary was encroaching on a 
local legislative function by mandating that Powhatan County appropriate funds for 
public schools. “Judge Butzner went much further – further than any court has ever 
gone,” vexed Senator Byrd. “If the power to spend or not to spend is to be placed in the 
hands of federal judges appointed for life, then we are taking a reckless plunge down the 
road to dictatorship.” Clearly, Butzner recognized that Powhatan was flirting with Prince 
Edward-like defiance and he met it squarely. Further litigation was inevitable but 
interrupting the children’s education was not. Butzner refused to permit Powhatan to 
descend into another Prince Edward. “The schools must remain open while you carry on 
your further litigation,” he lectured the county attorneys. Butzner left his injunction on 
school closings intact but stayed his order on the immediate transfer of black students 
until the federal circuit court reviewed the case.
21
 
 On June 29, 1963, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld and expanded 
upon Judge Butzner’s ruling. Judge Sobeloff, writing for the court sitting en banc 
(Sobeloff, Haynsworth, Boreman, Bryan, and Bell), found that the Powhatan County 
school board practiced “an undeviating adherence to the system of segregation, sustained 
by acts of omission and commission.” The circuit court affirmed Judge Butzner’s order 
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restraining the school board from closing any school and administering a racially 
discriminatory student placement program. The stay was lifted on the transfer of three 
black students to the white school without further delay. In fact, the circuit court 
determined that all the black applicants (sixty-five in all) should be admitted to the white 
public school at the opening of the next school year. Finally, the court found that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to counsel fees, a determination traditionally made by the district 
court. “Here we must take into account,” read the opinion, “the long continued pattern of 
evasion and obstruction which included not only the defendants’ unyielding refusal to 
take any initiative, thus casting a heavy burden on the children and their parents, but their 
interposing a variety of administrative obstacles to thwart the valid wishes of the 
plaintiffs for a desegregated education.” Judges Haynsworth and Boreman concurred 
with Sobeloff, Bryan, and Bell on the opinion, dissenting only on awarding counsel 
fees.
22
 
 The circuit court’s ruling in Griffin is puzzling once juxtaposed against its 
Powhatan opinion. “We are unable to explain,” wrote the Department of Justice in its 
memorandum to the Supreme Court, “why the majority of the three-judge panel which 
decided this case chose to disregard a very recent ruling by the court en banc concurred 
in as to this point by all members of the court.” In fact, Judge Haynsworth considered the 
cases’ issues identical. He addressed the similarity in a memorandum to his colleagues 
before the Powhatan hearing. “One obvious question which will arise upon appeal is the 
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propriety of that portion of the order which requires continued operation of the schools,” 
wrote Haynsworth. “The issue here seems to be precisely the same as the issue in Prince 
Edward.” At that time, he considered conflicting rulings in the Powhatan and Prince 
Edward cases to be “purposeless.” Yet, Haynsworth and Boreman sided with their 
colleagues to keep Powhatan’s schools open but provided Prince Edward with 
constitutional cover to keep its schools closed.
23
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Figure 12.4 “Powhatan County Under Federal Dictatorship.” (Photo: Edward H. Peeples, Jr., VCU 
Libraries).  
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President Kennedy altered the composition of the Fourth Circuit Court in a way 
favorable to resolving the school closings. Unique circumstances negated that effect in 
the Prince Edward case. The Powhatan case, however, demonstrates that the circuit court 
sitting en banc would have ruled in favor of Prince Edward’s locked-out children. 
Further, such a court would not have tolerated the county’s delaying tactics. Spencer 
Bell’s patience for Virginia’s segregationist attorneys, some of whom represented both 
Powhatan and Prince Edward counties, was waning. In discussing the Powhatan ruling 
with his colleagues, Bell stated that he “could only wish that [the county attorneys] read 
our judgments as broadly when they set out to comply as when they assert grounds for 
rehearing, appealing, or other obstructionary tactics.” Bell wanted the schools 
desegregated and to remain open without interruption. Then county attorneys could 
present their “nitpicking arguments until Hell freezes over.”
24
 However, Bell was 
virtually powerless on the minority side of the Prince Edward litigation. Had Simon 
Sobeloff and Albert Bryan not recused themselves, they certainly would have joined 
Spencer Bell to form a majority to order the reopening of Prince Edward’s public 
schools. It is further possible that the U.S. Supreme Court would have affirmed the circuit 
court’s ruling without a hearing, thus providing the administration with a court order that 
it could enforce to reopen the public schools in 1963. Instead, more hearings in state and 
federal court were required.  
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II 
 
The Prince Edward litigation continued running parallel through the state and 
federal courts. Questions remained unanswered. Did the county and state violate the state 
or federal constitution by refusing to operate public schools? If so, did the federal 
judiciary have the authority to compel the board of supervisors to levy taxes for the 
operation of a public school system? If so, could the court set a dollar figure? Ultimately, 
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals absolved the board of supervisors, but the U.S. 
Supreme Court set aside that decision. The High Court found that the school closings 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment and directed the district court to order the county to 
reopen the public schools. The ambiguity of that order and the passivity of the district 
court judge allowed the county board of supervisors to comply with the court under the 
most minimal standards. The courts forced the schools to reopen but in such a manner 
that restored a dual school system. 
 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that the state constitution did not 
require public schools in Prince Edward County. On December 2, 1963, the court, by a 6-
to-1 majority, determined that localities had the option to operate public schools and that 
the state had no obligation to step in to fill an educational void. In short, schools could 
close across Virginia without violating the state constitution. Chief Justice John W. 
Eggleston dissented. Eggleston agreed that the responsibility to operate public schools 
fell on the localities, but the state constitution required the General Assembly to maintain 
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an efficient public education system “throughout the State.” “How can there be an 
efficient system of public free schools without such schools?” asked Justice Eggleston. 
“How can there be an efficient system of public free schools ‘throughout the State’ so 
long as there are no such schools in Prince Edward County?” This interpretation required 
the state to take responsibility in Prince Edward County. However, Eggleston’s appraisal 
fell on deaf ears, as did his caution that the court’s failure to protect individual rights 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution would invite a response from the federal courts: “I 
am sure that that invitation will be promptly accepted. We shall see!” The NAACP had 
already sent that invitation. On January 6, 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of 
certiorari and set a hearing for March 30.
25
  
The NAACP and Department of Justice presented arguments on behalf of the 
locked-out children. Robert Carter, general counsel of the NAACP, asked the Supreme 
Court to uphold the district court’s ruling that enjoined the defendants from refusing to 
operate public schools and using public funds to operate a segregation academy. Carter 
argued that the state violated the Fourteenth Amendment by operating schools elsewhere 
but not in Prince Edward County. U.S. Solicitor General Archibald Cox expounded upon 
Carter’s remarks that public education was a state function and made the moral argument 
against the school closings. “Education is too fundamental, too important, and I 
emphasize that it transcends county lines,” reasoned the solicitor general. “If children 
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lose three years of education, their lives will be affected by that, wherever they go or 
whatever they do. And if this experiment in ignorance is continued in Prince Edward 
County, it will affect the whole state and not just conditions in that county.” Cox closed 
by urging the court to direct the district court to issue an order to reopen the public 
schools. The discussion between the justices and solicitor general was congenial, a 
promising sign for black Prince Edwardians.
26
  
The justices eviscerated the defense. Segar Gravatt trumpeted the artifice that 
Prince Edward County facilitated freedom of choice, a difficult needle to thread 
considering the absence of public schools – another notion he vociferously defended. 
“The purpose of what has been done here,” boasted Gravatt, “was to exercise an option 
and to afford all of the people of Prince Edward County an enlargement of their liberty of 
choice as to where they would go to school.” In fact, the tuition grant program was color-
blind in design, having “no racial connotation whatsoever.” Justices Potter Stewart, Hugo 
Black, Byron White, Arthur Goldberg, and Earl Warren repeatedly interjected, badgering 
Gravatt for clarification on those mendacious assertions: “Are you saying in substance 
that the purpose and object of this plan…was to keep from having any schools where 
white and blacks go together?….It seems to me that your plan has completely deprived 
people of the privilege of going to an integrated public school….The action was not to 
terminate public education, but the action was to terminate the giving of funds to schools 
that were operated to educate both Negroes and whites together. That’s the action that 
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was taken, isn’t it?” Former mayor and now Commonwealth’s Attorney Billy Watkins 
watched helplessly from the defense table knowing that “we were getting screwed.” The 
screwing culminated in the concussive dialectic of Chief Justice Earl Warren. “May I ask 
you this?” baited the chief justice. “These little children – these little colored children 
who have had no education or no opportunity for education in the last several years that 
they had freedom. Do they have freedom?” Gravatt answered affirmatively, “Yes, I think 
they have.” With the trap set, Warren dispensed Gravatt with sarcasm, “I mean freedom 
to go through life without education.” From the gallery, one Free School student 
celebrated, “They’ve got them cornered now.” The court’s questioning signaled its 
leaning. In the internal deliberations, the justices quickly formed a consensus favoring the 
locked-out children.
27
 
 On May 25, 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court found the Prince Edward County 
school closings unconstitutional. The High Court, by a 7-2 vote, agreed with the district 
court that public schools operating throughout the state but not in Prince Edward County 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, thus reversing the circuit court and negating the 
ruling of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. In fact, the justices concluded that state 
and local officials colluded to evade Brown by facilitating the establishment of a publicly 
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funded private school system. The Court did not issue a sweeping decision on tuition 
grants, but it upheld the district court’s injunction. Further, the court held that the 
defendants’ abuses resulted in undue delay to the implementation of Brown. The Court 
felt obliged to grant “quick and effective” relief. “There has been entirely too much 
deliberation and not enough speed in enforcing the constitutional rights which we held in 
Brown v. Board of Education,” wrote Hugo Black for the majority. “The time for 
‘deliberate speed’ has run out, and that phrase can no longer justify denying these Prince 
Edward County school children their constitutional rights to an education equal to that 
afforded by the public schools in other parts of Virginia.” Many questioned whether the 
court had the authority to compel a local legislative body to levy taxes and fund public 
schools, but the Court had “no doubt” that it held such power. The Supreme Court 
directed the district court to enter a decree to reopen the schools.
28
 
 Virginia segregationists reacted to Griffin like the end of days, or at least the end 
of constitutional government. The Richmond News Leader published an editorial with a 
less than reassuring title, “Let There Be Chaos.” The editor conveyed broad concern that 
the decision portended “a dictatorship imposed by judicial oligarchy.” The Supreme 
Court, many feared, set the precedent to arbitrarily order taxation “for any purpose.” This 
power could even be extended to direct the federal legislature. “We cannot help being 
disturbed by the attitude of the Supreme Court,” editorialized the Roanoke Times, “which 
interprets its powers of compulsion as virtually limitless.” The ruling resuscitated the 
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moribund Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, which passed a 
resolution urging state legislatures to nullify Griffin. Interposition had long since been 
discredited, just as the Defenders had lost its influence over state government. A 
Defender in national government, Watkins Abbitt, introduced legislation in the House of 
Representatives to prohibit the federal judiciary from compelling a legislative body to 
levy taxes.
29
 Editorials, resolutions, and token bills meant little at that point. The 
immediate future of public education came down to a federal district court judge and six 
supervisors.  
 The board of supervisors moved cautiously. “This decision has far-reaching 
consequences,” stated Chairman Vaughan, “and as such requires the careful consideration 
of the people of this county and the board of supervisors.” The school board had 
presented the supervisors with two budgets: one to educate all the county’s school-age 
children and another designed for only 1,600 children – all the black students and a 
handful of whites. Nevertheless, the supervisors advertised a budget with $375,000 
earmarked for tuition grants but no operational funds for the public schools. On June 5, 
the supervisors held a public hearing on the budget. Eight speakers endorsed the 
advertised budget, while thirty-two others urged the board to open the public schools. 
Fred Reid, a black resident, shamed the supervisors by wondering aloud how they could 
“rest at night knowing you have deprived Negroes of a public education.” J.W. Whitted, a 
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white resident, cautioned the board against the societal consequences of further 
resistance: “Within a few years the expense of the social problems will far surpass the 
cost of operating the public schools.” Tyler Miller, a professor at Hampden-Sydney 
College, closed by stating that the situation had gone on long enough. “You have proven 
that you have the courage to stand up for what you believe,” Miller told the board, but he 
argued that further resistance did not reflect the will of the majority. Despite the public 
school supporters’ numerical advantage at the hearing, the board accepted the counsel of 
attorneys Segar Gravatt and Billy Watkins to take no action until the federal district court 
issued an order.
30
  
 On June 17, 1964, the U.S. District Court convened a hearing on appropriations 
for the public schools. Judge Lewis opened by asking the attorneys for suggestions on an 
order. Samuel Tucker recommended that the school budget be set minimally at 1958-59 
levels. Segar Gravatt, on the other hand, shrewdly measured Judge Lewis’s zeal to 
effectuate the Supreme Court’s directive. Lewis had demonstrated his discomfort for 
exercising judicial power to force a law-making body to tax its citizens. Gravatt, 
therefore, ratcheted up that uneasiness by asking Judge Lewis to fix a dollar figure. “The 
Court is not going to be put in a position under any conditions of telling the board of 
supervisors how much money that they have to appropriate for schools and how much be 
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spent,” said Lewis. “That is their function.” Tucker urged the court to specify an amount, 
because he questioned the county leaders’ sincerity. Lewis asked Tucker to trust the 
county leaders to perform their duty. Tucker was not nearly as naive: “I do not think we 
can credit them with the presumption that they are going to act in good faith.” In fact, 
moments earlier, Gravatt had asked Lewis to set a penalty in the event that the board of 
supervisors could not comply with the court’s order. Judge Lewis refused to make a 
prejudgment. Instead, he ordered the board of supervisors to “appropriate such funds as 
are reasonably necessary for the opening and maintaining of the public schools…on a 
non-discriminatory basis” and to do so by June 25. The county could either comply with 
the court order or face an unspecified penalty to continue its recalcitrance. The Richmond 
Times-Dispatch encouraged the county to open the schools and reasoned that “no 
conceivable benefit can be achieved by further resistance.”
31
 
 Six days after the hearing, the county board of supervisors met to vote on the 
budget. Hugh Jenkins, the representative of Leigh District, made an eleventh hour plea 
for continued defiance. He read a ten-page statement into the record that defended the 
four-year fund cut-off with disingenuous revisionism. Jenkins claimed that the purpose of 
the case was “to see how much freedom and liberty I had left” as an elected 
representative “to cast my vote for or against” any matter before the board. Apparently, 
the constitutional test of his authority justified the (un)intended byproduct of more than 
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one thousand children losing important years of their education. He sympathized with the 
locked-out children, or at least feigned sympathy, but deflected any culpability, blaming 
the school closings on “a lack of cooperation on the part of their parents and whomever 
was at fault.” Even in that small meeting place, apparently, he could not find any party, 
neither to his immediate left nor to his immediate right, who could share the fault. Yet, in 
this same disjointed statement, he asserted that he could not “find in the Fourteenth 
Amendment where it is said that public schools must be operated” nor a pressing need to 
fund the public schools until Judge Lewis specified a penalty for further delay. Jenkins, 
now on the verge of tears, urged his colleagues to oppose a school budget with the most 
convoluted reasoning, likening defunding the public schools to soldiers dying with valor 
on the battlefield. Jenkins recalled that during World War II he had seen his compatriots 
“blown to bits” in defense of their country and way of life. “I could not sleep with my 
conscience tonight,” Jenkins asserted, “if I thought that I had let these boys down.” At the 
crescendo of his demagoguery, Jenkins urged the board to delay a vote until after another 
public hearing, but the motion was voted down five-to-one.
32
  
 The county board of supervisors, rather, complied with the federal court order 
under the narrowest possible terms. The board voted to fund the operation of public 
schools for the first time since 1958. By a four-to-two vote, with Hugh Jenkins and 
Charles Gates dissenting, the board levied taxes to raise $189,000 for the public schools. 
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The figure represented a mere fraction of the school board’s low-end request of $339,300 
in local funds to educate sixteen hundred children. Billy Watkins defended the board’s 
action, claiming that the board arrived at that figure “in a fair manner.” The supervisors 
allotted $116 per pupil, certainly short of the $125 figure from the 1958-59 school year, 
but on par with the outlays in the neighboring counties. He admitted that the county could 
not operate public schools on equal terms with the Free Schools. “We just don’t have that 
kind of money,” Watkins explained. The county had sufficient funds, however, to 
allocate nearly double that figure in local tuition grants. In a separate resolution that 
carried unanimously, the board approved $375,000 in tuition grants for private school 
students. The public-private funding disparity provided little incentive for white students 
to return to the public schools, thus re-establishing a government-sponsored dual school 
system. Judge Lewis had invited minimal compliance by setting the bar for expectations 
so low that the supervisors could have tripped over it. In fact, at the June 17 hearing, he 
did not require the county to accept the school board’s budget request. “The county board 
does not have to meet the full budget,” stated Lewis. “The board of supervisors can 
reduce the overall budget, can they not? They are not bound to accept their budget?” 
Judge Lewis’s sole concern was for the schools to reopen, but that was achieved by the 
county meeting the lowest possible standard of compliance.
33
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 Black Prince Edwardians challenged the school budget. Reverend Griffin 
considered the allocation “hopelessly inadequate.” The local authorities were not 
“confronting the problem realistically.” The educational lag required public schools to be 
“not anything less” in quality than the Free Schools. The local NAACP Youth Council 
circulated a petition urging the board of supervisors to provide more funds. They hoped 
that “Operation Doorknob,” a door-to-door solicitation campaign, would gather fifteen 
hundred to two thousand signatures. The NAACP also announced its intentions to ask the 
 
 
Figure 12.5 Frank Reeves, Henry Marsh, and Samuel Tucker. (Photo: Richmond Times-Dispatch). 
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federal district court for an order to increase the school budget. The Richmond Times-
Dispatch discouraged the NAACP from taking any further court action. “There has been 
a decade of such litigation, and this would seem to be enough,” editorialized the 
newspaper. Nevertheless, the NAACP filed a motion in federal court for an order to 
increase the public school budget to the school board’s full request. The NAACP sought 
a school budget that would educate “all of the children of school age” in the county. 
Otherwise, school desegregation could never occur.
34
 
 On July 9, 1964, the U.S. District Court heard the NAACP’s motion to force the 
county to increase public school funding. Judge Lewis, noticeably exasperated, tired of 
any action that he perceived as interference with reopening the schools. He did not want 
to hear anything about insufficient funds. “I am not going to be the superintendent of 
schools of Prince Edward County,” explained Judge Lewis. “I am neither competent nor 
do I have the time, and if I did, it is not part of my function.” Samuel Tucker argued that 
insufficient funding would perpetuate segregated education. “When His Honor leaves to a 
recalcitrant board…the definition of what is reasonable,” advised Tucker, “they come up 
with any figure they consider reasonable without rhyme or reason, and the inevitable 
result is going to be that, as a practical proposition, there will be no school opened for 
white pupils in the county, except the Foundation School.” Judge Lewis refused to 
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“prejudge” the county budget, preferring to insulate himself from common sense 
projections of the budget’s consequences with naïve hopes of the supervisors’ good faith. 
The court denied the NAACP’s motion.
35
 
 The Concerned Citizens for Public Education took the matter directly to the 
school board. The organization had formed in the early spring as an outgrowth of 
informal bi-racial meetings. In anticipation of an affirmative Supreme Court decision, the 
Concerned Citizens made preparations to ensure that the county operated quality public 
schools. Twenty-five black women were delegated to study the situation and prepare 
recommendations for the school board. On June 19, the chairperson, Josephine 
Thompson, sent a two-page letter to the school board. “We feel it mandatory,” wrote 
Thompson, “that we have an exceptional system of education for the children of Prince 
Edward County, in view of the fact that they have been denied the advantage of free 
public education provided by the County for five years.” The letter urged the school 
board to request more funds and to implement a number of proposed reforms. On July 22, 
forty-two Concerned Citizens, seventeen of whom were white, met with the T.J. 
McIlwaine, the superintendent of schools, to discuss their requests. Weeks earlier, 
McIlwaine had told the press that the local allocation for public schools was inadequate 
“unless we can find some more money somewhere else.” At this meeting, he reversed 
himself and fell in lockstep with county leaders by defending the funding levels and per 
capita spending, while also dismissing the need for more funds from either the state or 
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county. However, he had insufficient funds to satisfy the Citizens’ most urgent requests: 
hire a nurse and more than one guidance counselor and special education teacher for the 
whole school system; provide a free lunch program, a health facility, and late buses; and 
open other school buildings to alleviate overcrowding. McIlwaine did not satisfy any of 
the Concerned Citizens’ primary requests but he only assured the group that the best 
possible education would be provided with the available money.
36
 
 The Concerned Citizens took its case to the county board of supervisors. On 
August 4, Warren Scott presented a petition with 1,004 names, which read:   
 
Because the schools of Prince Edward County were closed for four years, the 
children of Prince Edward County must have excellent educational opportunities 
offered to them. We believe that 189,000 dollars of local funds appropriated by 
the Board of Supervisors on June the 23, is an insufficient amount to finance the 
type of school system needed. Therefore, we, adult citizens of Prince Edward 
County, do petition the Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County to allocate 
additional funds to be used for the purposes of education. 
 
Billy Watkins, speaking for the supervisors, assured Scott that state contributions would 
put the total public school expenditures around $500,000. Scott replied that the local levy 
was still too low due to “the tremendous amount of damage done by the schools being 
closed for four years.” Watkins retorted with a dismissive rhetorical: “Don’t you think 
that it would be desirable to give the county a chance to operate the schools instead of 
making a prejudgment, and then if things don’t turn out satisfactorily come to the school 
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board or the board of supervisors?” Scott answered, “No, because from all indications we 
have now, it will not be sufficient.” Nevertheless, Watkins declared that he would not 
recommend that the supervisors provide any further disbursements without a formal 
request from the school board.
37
 Local officials closed the door to additional state or 
county funding. 
The Prince Edward Free School Association made significant contributions to 
bridge the financial gap. In late July and August the board of trustees met with T.J. 
McIlwaine to discuss the transition to public education. The trustees agreed to transfer all 
its property, purchased and donated, to the school board. The bequest included 
audiovisual materials, books, surplus food, and cafeteria equipment – no small value. 
This donation benefited the public schools for years to come. In addition, the trustees 
offered to finance the school board’s most pressing needs with its residual funds. 
McIlwaine’s wish list mirrored the requests of the Concerned Citizens. The trustees 
granted $23,200 to hire remedial reading and special education teachers, a school nurse, 
and an audiovisual instructor, and to subsidize the free lunch program. McIlwaine hailed 
the grant for making “possible programs which we could not have provided from the 
regular school budget.”
38
 Unlike the in-kind donations, the grant only aided the schools 
for one year. The trustees’ benevolence was finite. The Association would soon dissolve 
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and the treasury would be penniless. In the future, the county had to take greater 
responsibility for the public schools. 
On September 8, 1964, public education returned to Prince Edward County. In 
some ways, the public schools resembled the Free Schools. They used the same four 
school buildings, had an integrated faculty, and enrolled a handful of white students. In 
the most fundamental way, the schools were worlds apart. The Free Schools were 
governed and funded by people sympathetic to desegregated schools, while the school 
board and board of supervisors were unabashed white supremacists. The federal courts 
had forced the public schools to reopen, but they handed the reigns over to officials with 
a unique record of indifference to black children. These local leaders’ sympathies 
remained with Prince Edward Academy. They were more concerned with the solvency of 
the private school system than providing enough funding for quality public schools. The 
issue of public funds for Virginia’s private schools would be settled by Kennedy’s 
judges. 
 
III 
 
 The constitutionality of Virginia’s freedom of choice program remained 
undetermined. In Griffin, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the district court’s injunction on 
tuition grants as long as the public schools stayed closed but passed on issuing a decisive 
ruling on the state laws. “If the court wanted to say they were illegal,” asserted Governor 
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Harrison, “it had a wonderful opportunity to do so.” The Prince Edward County board of 
supervisors found opportunity in the High Court’s omission. The supervisors funded the 
public schools to negate the cause for the federal injunction. Funding public education for 
black children, even at woefully inadequate levels, would conceivably release tuition 
grants to patrons of the Prince Edward School Foundation. After Griffin, the NAACP 
ramped up its legal strategy from attacking tuition payments for segregation academies to 
an all-out assault on Virginia’s freedom of choice program.
39
 President Kennedy’s Fourth 
Circuit judges permanently enjoined the disbursement of public funds to county residents 
attending the Foundation schools and, in time, invalidated Virginia’s tuition grant laws 
altogether. 
The local white leaders took steps to procure retroactive tuition grants. On June 
30, the board of supervisors adopted a resolution for payment of the 1963-64 school 
year’s tuition grants – up to $375,000, conditioned on the state making its contribution. 
Academy parents had completed applications during a recent mass meeting. “We don’t 
know that we will be eligible,” explained Dr. James H. Helms, president of the PTA, “but 
if the injunction is lifted, we want to be ready.” Due to the injunction, the parents had 
missed both filing deadlines, November 1963 and March 1964. Billy Watkins and Mayor 
Herbert Stokes appealed to the State Board of Education to waive the deadlines and pay 
the retroactive grants. The state board gave the county a hearing on July 1, but members 
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requested corroborating evidence that the injunction had indeed been lifted. Bob Button, 
the state attorney general, advised the board that “the public schools no longer remain 
closed and are now open as much as the public schools of the other counties of the State 
of Virginia are open for the 1964-65 session and that therefore the injunction by its terms 
is no longer applicable to the State Board of Education and the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction.” Button’s opinion was construed without consulting the court. Nevertheless, 
the state board waived the deadlines and agreed to accept applications from Prince 
Edward residents through July 10. Academy parents had won an apparent victory, but 
Mayor Stokes expressed cautious optimism: “It looks like it won’t be settled until checks 
have actually been received here.”
40
 
 The NAACP contested the state board’s resolution. Henry Marsh, who had 
attended the hearing, considered the board’s action a “clear violation” of the injunction. 
“If the board wants to act in apparent defiance,” Marsh told the conferees, “we think the 
board should have petitioned the court to see if it would permit the payment of grants.” 
The next day, Samuel Tucker travelled to Alexandria to present Judge Lewis with a 
motion to enjoin the payment of the retroactive grants. Lewis denied the request but said 
that he would hear the motion in court on July 9. That was too late. The county board of 
supervisors was scheduled to issue payments at its meeting the following day. As a result, 
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Tucker sought relief from the circuit court. He visited Albert Bryan at his office, also in 
Alexandria. Bryan, however, declined to intervene because he had recused himself from 
the case. Tucker then hopped a flight to Charlotte, North Carolina, to cajole Spencer Bell, 
who was convinced that the payment of tuition grants would result in “irreparable harm” 
to the plaintiffs. Judge Bell issued an injunction on the disbursement of tuition grants 
until Judge Lewis heard the motion and all resulting appeals had been adjudicated. A 
U.S. marshal served the documents on the chairman of the board of supervisors, county 
treasurer, county clerk, officers at the local banks, and Billy Watkins before the county 
could distribute the money.
41
 The NAACP turned the tables, as the clock was now 
running out on the county.  
 Academy parents’ hopes for receiving retroactive grants were diminishing by the 
minute. Under state law, all business for the previous fiscal year had to be completed by 
July 10. Therefore, the State Board of Education could not issue retroactive grants 
beyond that date. Judge Bell’s injunction could be lifted after Judge Lewis ruled on the 
NAACP’s motion at the July 9 hearing, but that required events to unfold quickly. In a 
desperate move, Billy Watkins asked the governor to place the county’s tuition money in 
escrow, but Harrison did not have the authority. “I am disappointed in the turn of events,” 
sympathized Harrison, “and particularly in Judge Bell’s action.” There was little the 
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governor could do, but he gave his assurance to “do everything in my power to see that 
the General Assembly approves payments of grants for the 1963-1964 session.” In 
federal court on July 9, during the same hearing that Judge Lewis refused to increase the 
public school budget, the door closed on retroactive grants. Samuel Tucker argued that 
“to allow the retroactive payment for the period when schools were actually closed is, 
really, to nullify the effect of the court’s order which enjoined those payments for those 
years of school.” With time about to expire anyway, the county did not offer a defense. 
Judge Lewis made the injunction on retroactive tuition grants permanent.
42
 
 The future of tuition grants remained in flux. Judge Lewis refused to entertain any 
injunctive action on 1964-65 tuition grants over concern that the issue would interfere 
with reopening the public schools. The NAACP considered the disbursement of such 
scholarships, in combination with inadequate funding for public education, a disrupting 
agent in operating quality, non-discriminatory public schools. On July 17, therefore, the 
NAACP filed an appeal with the Fourth Circuit Court to block tuition grants for all 
Prince Edward County residents. Eleven days later, Samuel Tucker asked the court to 
accelerate the appeal and hear the case in a special session: 
 
Unless prompt action will be taken by this Court, thirteen years of litigation in 
which the plaintiffs have sought desegregation of public schools and five years of 
closed public schools will have been but a prelude to the establishment of two 
separate systems of schools maintained at public expense, the favored of which 
will be for white children only and the other one of which will be an inadequately 
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financed system attended only by Negroes and by such few, if any, white children 
who and whose parents may withstand the dissuading community pressure and 
publicly financed inducements to conform to the pattern of racially segregated 
public education to which the County Board of Supervisors continues to be 
committed. 
 
News of the motion reached the defense attorneys by a chance encounter in downtown 
Richmond when Frederick Gray, attorney for the State Board of Education, happened 
upon Morris Dean, the clerk of the Fourth Circuit Court. In a follow-up phone 
conversation, Dean, speaking for Judge Haynsworth, asked Gray if state and local 
authorities would agree to withhold tuition payments until the final determination of the 
case. On Monday, August 3, Gray conferred with state Attorney General Bob Button and 
telephoned Billy Watkins. The following day, Watkins reported that the board of 
supervisors found such a stipulation unworkable. Gray soon discovered that Dean had 
misunderstood Haynsworth, who only wanted an assurance that grants would not be paid 
ahead of schedule. Before Gray could update Watkins, the county had already taken 
action.
43
 
 County leaders formulated a plan to protect tuition grants from a possible federal 
injunction. “The courts still have us over a barrel,” remarked Barrye Wall. “If the courts 
take tuition grants away from these parents, there will be hell to pay.” On Tuesday 
evening, more than a dozen prominent local segregationists, including four county 
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supervisors (Gates, Jenkins, Pickett, and Steck) met at Taylor Manufacturing to plot 
strategy. They discussed distributing the tuition grants immediately. “Well, the way I 
feel,” explained Hugh Jenkins, “this injunction could come down and if we are going to 
pay these tuition grants, we are going to have to start work on them tonight.” John Steck 
agreed that “speed was of the essence.” Samuel Tucker’s flight to Charlotte weeks earlier 
proved that the NAACP would act quickly to secure an injunction against the payment of 
tuition grants. The supervisors called the board chairman, William Vaughan, to convince 
him to hold an emergency meeting at his home that night. Billy Watkins assured the 
board that the payments were legal because the federal injunction only applied to 
retroactive grants. The supervisors called attorney Segar Gravatt for a second opinion, but 
he advised them not to proceed. Nevertheless, the board disregarded its counsel’s advice. 
“We had always lost our tuition grants,” justified Hugh Jenkins, “and I felt that this was 
an opportunity for the people in the county to get back some of the money that they had 
paid out in taxes.” The board moved forward to immediately effectuate its scheme.
44
 
 The “midnight raid on the treasury” had begun. The supervisors called the county 
clerk into work to prepare the checks. Vernon Womack arrived around midnight to find 
the “largest staff I have ever had,” more than two dozen volunteers. They worked into the 
morning preparing over twelve hundred checks, using a list of names supplied, not by the 
county, but by the Prince Edward School Foundation. Meanwhile, Academy parents were 
awoken by phone calls and messengers with directions to assemble downtown to 
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complete their applications. The police, local officials, and foundation employees, in a 
show of collusion, organized the crowd. “That’s the first time,” said one volunteer, “I’ve 
seen 500 people on Farmville streets at 3:00 am.” Robert Taylor recalled so much 
excitement that “you would have thought an atomic bomb went off.” The board of 
supervisors made this action official early Wednesday morning. They amended an 
ordinance to increase local tuition grants from $100 to $310 and $290 respectively for 
each secondary and elementary school student and approved the immediate payment of 
half the allotment. The Academy parents poured into the bank, forming a line down the 
sidewalk and around the block. An observer noted the crowds’ “complete jubilation.” 
They sang “Dixie” and reveled in the speed and efficiency of the conspiracy. The 
segregationists had caught the NAACP off guard. Samuel Tucker did not even learn of 
the unfolding incident until late in the morning. “You’ve got to get up early in the 
morning to get around some folks,” demurred Tucker, “but I can’t stay up all night – 
every night!” In the end, $181,005 had been distributed and cashed.
45
 The NAACP had 
been outfoxed, but this action would not go unchallenged. Nor tuition grants in toto. The 
wheels were already in motion. 
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 The NAACP had challenged Surry County, Virginia’s freedom of choice scheme. 
The State Pupil Placement Board had assigned seven black students to the white public 
school for the 1963-64 session. In response, local leaders organized a private school for 
white students, for which nearly all of the district’s white students registered. Due to 
insufficient enrollment, the school board closed the white public school and released 
teachers from their contracts so they could accept employment at the Surry County 
 
 
Figure 12.6 Midnight Raid on the Treasury. (Photo: Southern School News). 
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School Foundation. Unlike Prince Edward County, public education continued 
uninterrupted for African Americans. A dual school system had been preserved, whereas 
blacks attended the public schools while whites went to a private school funded by public 
tuition grants. The NAACP filed suit in federal court to force the school board to operate 
non-discriminatory public schools and restrain officials from issuing tuition grants to any 
Surry County resident. The NAACP attacked the application of the state’s freedom of 
choice program, not the constitutionality of tuition grants as a whole – at least not yet.
46
 
 Judge John Butzner invalidated Surry County’s school program. In Griffin, the 
U.S. Supreme Court had upheld the injunction on tuition grants in a community that 
closed all its public schools, but it provided no guidance for a situation in which a 
community imposed a partial shutdown. Nevertheless, Butzner found that the distinction 
between Prince Edward and Surry counties “is not of controlling significance” in 
deciding the constitutional question. “Both situations are variations upon the same 
theme,” determined Butzner. “State and County funds are used to perpetuate racial 
segregation in the schools located in Surry County. These funds subsidize the 
Foundation’s segregated school as a substitute for the County’s public school.” On June 
18, 1964, Judge Butzner issued an injunction on the payment of tuition grants to students 
attending schools in Surry County that discriminated based on race and enjoined the 
school board from refusing to operate the white public school “or any other school under 
its jurisdiction and control while any other public school in Virginia is operated.” 
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Pettaway v. County School Board had potentially far-reaching implications. “It is my 
considered judgment,” stated Governor Harrison, “that the decision is potentially the 
most disruptive of public education and racial relations of any rendered in the past 
decade.” Every community that established segregation academies was now vulnerable to 
attack.
47
  
 Pettaway presented the NAACP with an opening to challenge Virginia’s tuition 
grant laws. Butzner had responded much more vigorously than Judge Lewis had in Prince 
Edward County. Lewis never ordered all the county’s public school buildings opened, 
and he suggested that once public education resumed that he would lift the injunction on 
tuition grants. Butzner, on the other hand, withheld tuition grants even when all the 
school buildings resumed operation. He would not permit tuition grants to be used as a 
device to circumvent school desegregation. Butzner prohibited Surry County from using 
public money to operate public schools for blacks and private schools for whites as Lewis 
had done in Prince Edward County. The discrepancies in the two district court cases 
required a resolution from a higher court. The NAACP, emboldened by Pettaway, filed 
suit in federal district court to abolish Virginia’s tuition grant statutes. In this matter, as 
chief judge of the Fourth Circuit, Simon Sobeloff was required to designate a three-judge 
federal court to interpret the state constitution. He selected Butzner for the panel, but not 
Lewis, a not-so-subtle indication of his sympathies. The court placed Griffin v. State 
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Board of Education on the docket for December 1964. In the meantime, the defendants 
appealed Pettaway to the Fourth Circuit Court.
48
   
 The U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the Prince Edward and 
Surry county cases to consider the similar issues. The court scheduled an en banc hearing 
for November. Albert Bryan, again, had reservations about sitting for the case, but he 
joined the court nevertheless and ardently supported Judge Sobeloff’s opinion. “I worked 
desperately to find a flaw in your handiwork but I was repulsed upon every attack,” 
Bryan wrote Sobeloff. “You have carried the day, and I commend your skill and 
generalship.” On December 2, the circuit court issued a unanimous ruling, finding that 
public funding for the counties’ private schools made them public facilities and, thereby, 
the foundations could not discriminate based on race. The court feigned at desegregating 
the private schools as the “most appropriate remedy,” but instead, directed the district 
court judges to enter orders enjoining the processing and payment of tuition grants for 
those enrolled at the private academies in Prince Edward and Surry counties “as long as 
those schools remain segregated.”
49
 The Prince Edward School Foundation had to 
completely rework its business model to receive tuition grants.  
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 Elizabeth Beck of Green Bay (Prince Edward County), claiming to represent “all 
the people,” pleaded with Governor Harrison to facilitate the release of tuition grants to 
Academy parents. She found the court’s decision the “most unfair and the most 
discriminatory action” in her memory, leaving the white children with no freedom of 
choice. The court, on the other hand, had dismissed such terms as euphemisms designed 
“to enforce involuntary segregation of the races in public facilities.” Clearly, Beck spoke 
in coded language. Months earlier at a supervisors meeting, she joined a chorus of 
speakers asserting that this was “not a fight against the Negro but a fight for individual 
liberties.” In her letter to Harrison, Beck made it clear that the fight was not for vaguely 
defined liberties as much as against African Americans. “The Negro race has contributed 
so little to the culture and building of this great nation,” declared Beck. “In fact the 
Negroes have been a burden to the South for a hundred years.” She believed that the 
government was siding with blacks over whites, concluding rhetorically: “How can 
people respect a Government which would literally destroy the race which has made it 
great in order to build up another race.” Governor Harrison had already recommended, 
and the General Assembly approved, an eight-bill package to remove any taint of racial 
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discrimination from its freedom of choice program – although, like Beck, his public 
actions were designed to cover racially discriminatory intent.
50
 
 The Griffin opinion punctuated Simon Sobeloff’s six-year term as chief judge. 
The Richmond News Leader censured Sobeloff for his “compulsive need to deliver one 
last integrationist oration.” The editorial characterized the circuit court judges as 
“zealots” for expanding the Fourteenth Amendment in the name of racial integration. 
“Whatever serves compulsory race-mixing is right! And in this field whatever serves 
individual freedom is wrong!” The Richmond Times-Dispatch opined that the court 
“stretched the original intent” of the Brown decision, which beckoned the call for 
legislation to curb the influence of the federal judiciary. Sobeloff shared the news 
clippings with Spencer Bell, who replied in jest, “Like Cal[vin] Coolidge I never read the 
opposition.” Sobeloff and Bell had solidified the liberal wing of the circuit court. “Since 
you joined the court three years ago,” Sobeloff extoled Bell, “we have worked together, 
and not without a measure of success. Even in defeat I have found that there is a vast 
difference between being alone and having a valiant companion at one’s side.” In fact, 
Sobeloff and Bell stood side-by-side in their rulings. They were in accord on 100 percent 
of the school cases in which they sat together (see Table 12.2).  
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1961 Dodson v. School Board of the City of Charlottesville         
1962 Greene v. School Board of the City of Roanoke       
 Marsh v. County School Board of Roanoke County       
 Dillard v. School Board of the City of Charlottesville       
 Jackson v. School Board of the City of Lynchburg       
 Wheeler v. Durham City Board of Education       
 Jeffers v. Whitley       
 Brunson v. Board of Trustees       
1963 Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond       
 Jackson v. School Board of the City of Lynchburg       
 Bell v. School Board of Powhatan County       
 Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County       
 Brooks v. County School Board of Arlington County       
1964 Brown v. School District No. 20       
 Brown v. County School Board of Frederick County       
 Wheeler v. Durham City Board of Education       
 Gilliam v. School Board  of the City of Hopewell       
 Pettaway v. County School Board of Surry County       
 Buckner v. County School Board of Greene County       
 Blakeney v. Fairfax County Board of Education       
 Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County       
1965 Gilliam v. School Board of the City of Hopewell       
 Nesbit v. Statesville City Board of Education       
 Bowditch v. Buncombe County Board of Education       
 Brown v. County School Board of Frederick County       
 Wheeler v. Durham City Board of Education       
 Felder v. Harnett County Board of Education       
 Brewer v. School Board of the City of Norfolk       
 Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond       
1966 Wanner v. County School Board of Arlington County       
 Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County       
 Wheeler v. Durham City of Board of Education       
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Although united, the liberal wing lost strength by handing over the chief judge 
responsibilities, and thus the power to assign panels, to Clement Haynsworth, who along 
with Herbert Boreman formed an equally formidable conservative wing. Sobeloff looked 
forward to the “fun [he and Bell] shall continue to have together” on the bench but hoped 
“occasionally to lure one or more of the others out of that  moderation in pursuit of 
justice which we have been told is a virtue.”
51
 With Morris Soper dead, that left Albert 
Bryan.  
 In many cases, Albert Bryan was the swing vote on the Fourth Circuit Court. 
Instinctively, Bryan’s initial thoughts tended to be conservative, but he was not a rigid 
ideologue. He kept an open mind and encouraged his colleagues to persuade him with 
reasoned arguments. In Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital (1963), for 
example, the liberal and conservative wings actively wooed Bryan. His first inclination 
was to join the conservatives, but Sobeloff made such a convincing argument that, as 
Bryan reported, “it has shaken my original view considerably.” Bryan instead joined with 
the liberal wing in a historic decision that, for the first time, applied the Fourteenth 
Amendment to strike down racial discrimination at a private facility. The hospital, 
located in Greensboro, North Carolina, had received federal funds under the Hill-Burton 
Act, which the court determined made health services a state action, and thus the facility 
was prohibited from practicing racial discrimination. In Simkins, Judge Bryan provided 
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the deciding vote.
52
 On matters of equality, Bryan became more identified with the liberal 
wing. That proved instrumental in striking down Virginia’s tuition grant statutes. 
 Tuition grants provided a safety valve against desegregation. Under the Stanley 
Plan, white leaders had planted the seeds for segregation academies in Charlottesville, 
Norfolk, and Warren County. Manured by tuition grants, those relics of massive 
resistance flowered year after year. Since 1959, residents of Warren County, for one, had 
received over $1.3 million in public funds to attend John S. Mosby Academy, which 
supported an average enrollment of over one thousand students per year – and the 
numbers steadily climbed. The interest in segregation academies increased in relation to 
the federal courts prohibiting racial discrimination in student transfers. The pupil 
placement board’s assignment of black students to the public schools in Powhatan, Surry, 
and King and Queen counties resulted in second wave segregation academies. In the 
aftermath of massive resistance, Huguenot Academy opened with nominal attendance in 
its first four years (ranging from 25 to 104 students). After John Butzner ordered 
Powhatan County public schools desegregated, enrollment at Huguenot spiked to over 
                                                          
52
 Albert V. Bryan to Simon E. Sobeloff, “No. 8908 – Simkins, et al. v. The Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital, etc.,” Box 64, SESP; Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 232 F.2d 959 (4
th
 Cir. 1963); 
“Constitutional Law: Discrimination by Private Hospitals Participating in Hill-Burton Program Held to Be 
Violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,” Duke Law Journal, 1964, No. 4 (Autumn 1964): 908-914. 
Simon Sobeloff was not always successful in his courtship of Albert Bryan. In May 1964, Sobeloff tried to 
convince Bryan not to dissent in Gilliam v. School Board of the City of Hopewell, but Bryan’s dissenting 
opinion was submitted nonetheless. “I am indeed sorry you disapprove of my dissent,” Bryan wrote 
Sobeloff. “I highly value your judgment and always I dislike to disagree with you, and this for many 
reasons. However, though crushed by your devastating stricture upon my view as one not ‘to be tolerated, 
even in dissent,’ I leave it as written.” See Simon E. Sobeloff to Albert V. Bryan, “No. 9258 - Renee 
Patrice Gilliam, et al. v. School Board of the City of Hopewell, Virginia, et al.,” May 7, 1964, Albert V. 
Bryan to Simon E. Sobeloff, “No. 9258 - Renee Patrice Gilliam, et al. v. School Board of the City of 
Hopewell, Virginia, et al.,” May 11, 1964, both in Box 152, SESP. 
 
422 
500. In the 1963-64 school year, Huguenot students received $133,477.23 in tuition 
grants. In that same year, York Academy opened its doors to stem the tide of 
desegregation in King and Queen County. The enrollment increased, and thus the number 
of tuition grants, from 143 to 242 the following year. Amelia and Brunswick counties, 
likewise, opened segregated private schools in September 1964.
53
 The NAACP 
challenged the disbursement of tuition grants to patrons of these segregation academies. 
 Albert Bryan struck a severe blow to segregation academies. Bryan led the three-
judge court (with district court judges John Butzner and Walter Hoffman) in determining 
the constitutionality of Virginia’s tuition grant laws. The NAACP asked the court to 
invalidate the laws and restrain the State Board of Education and local officials from 
disbursing tuition grant payments to students attending segregation academies. The 
NAACP named as defendants the State Board of Education and seven counties (Amelia, 
Brunswick, King and Queen, Powhatan, Prince Edward, Surry, and Warren) and two 
cities (Charlottesville and Norfolk) that contributed tuition grants to segregation 
academies. On March 9, 1965, Albert Bryan, writing for the court in Griffin v. State 
Board of Education, found that the tuition grant laws were “not unconstitutional on their 
face,” because they did not overtly discriminate based on race. Not all private schools had 
been formed to avoid integration. However, the court recognized that the program could 
become “misdirected.” Once the state contributed a preponderance of a private school’s 
funding, then operating schools became a state action. The court found “incontestably” 
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that tuition grants were the main support for the private schools associated with this case. 
“This contribution is of such magnitude that they plainly are State supported institutions,” 
read the opinion. “Thus the State is nurturing segregated schools.” The court enjoined the 
defendants from disbursing tuition grants to these schools so long as they practiced racial 
segregation. “As a matter of practical politics,” determined Samuel Tucker, “this kills the 
tuition grant program.”
54
 Griffin did not kill tuition grants, but it did severely restrict 
public support for segregation academies. The future of tuition grants in Prince Edward 
County was in jeopardy, as was its past.  
  The U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had remanded contempt proceedings on 
the midnight raid to the district court. Judge Lewis absolved the board of supervisors of 
contempt charges. He found no evidence that the supervisors acted illegally, because, at 
the time, there was no injunction on tuition grants for the 1964-65 school year. The 
supervisors simply distributed the tuition payments “in order to beat the gun,” to preempt 
a possible injunction. Since the action did not violate his injunction on retroactive 
payments, the court dismissed the contempt charges. Again, Judge Lewis expressed his 
exasperation with the case. “The people of Prince Edward,” he lectured, “have more to do 
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than litigate.” Nevertheless, the NAACP appealed the ruling to the Fourth Circuit Court, 
which set a hearing for February 7, 1966. Albert Bryan, again, questioned the propriety of 
his sitting for the case. Clement Haynsworth, now chief judge, found “absolutely no 
reason why [Bryan] should not sit in this case,” adding, “Judge Sobeloff, too.”
55
 The 
participation of Sobeloff and Bryan changed the outcome in Griffin v. County School 
Board of Prince Edward County (1966). Albert Bryan not only sat but took command of 
the case. 
 Albert Bryan delivered a crushing defeat to Prince Edward Academy patrons. 
Bryan, Sobeloff, and Bell determined that the board of supervisors should be held in 
contempt. Bryan had tried to build a consensus on the court, not by finding a true middle 
ground, but by cajoling the conservatives to join the liberals. Haynsworth and Boreman 
considered the supervisors’ conduct “unconscionable,” but they agreed with Judge Lewis 
that there was no violation of the court because, at the time, there was no restraining 
order or injunction against the payment of tuition grants. “I would hate to think,” Bryan 
countered in a memorandum to Haynsworth, “that this or any other Federal court may be 
willfully thwarted or completely blocked by a party before it, as the Board of Supervisors 
has attempted to do, with complete immunity.” Nevertheless, Haynsworth and Boreman 
remained unmoved. Bryan submitted a majority opinion that gave no quarter. He found, 
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“beyond cavil,” the board of supervisors in contempt of court for the midnight raid. “The 
Board undertook to put the money then available for tuition grants…beyond its control as 
well as that of the court,” wrote Bryan. “Obviously, the aim was to thwart the impact of 
any adverse decree which might ultimately be forthcoming on the appeal.” The court 
ordered that all disbursements made during the midnight raid be repaid to the county 
treasury. In fact, the court made each supervisor “personally and in their own right” 
responsible for the restoration of one-sixth of the money. Charles Gates, a county 
supervisor, told a reporter that “they’re going to have to board me for a while if they 
think that they’re going to get $30,000 out of me.”
56
 The court was not done. 
 The circuit court also considered compensating the plaintiffs for counsel fees. The 
NAACP had requested that the district court order the defendants to pay the plaintiffs 
$21,600 for counsel fees dating back to 1960. However, Judge Lewis only awarded 
$7,500, because the NAACP had not heeded his advice years earlier to resolve some 
unanswered questions in the state courts, thus contributing to the case’s unnecessary 
delay. Judge Sobeloff raised the topic of full compensation with his colleagues. He 
argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s Griffin decision, which set aside state court rulings, 
“made perfectly clear that the course pursued by the plaintiffs was the correct one.” 
Sobeloff considered paying the attorney fees a moral issue:  
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Prince Edward County, to hinder, delay and nullify the plaintiffs’ rights, enacted 
one of the most notorious chapters in American history by closing its public 
schools entirely. If this case involved no more than a difference of opinion over 
what is reasonable compensation, I would not consider it worthwhile to register 
my disagreement. But the issue is deeper and more far-reaching. The lost years 
cannot be retrieved. The plaintiffs had to shoulder a heavy burden in an effort to 
obtain public education for their children in the future. Those – plaintiffs and 
attorneys – who bore the burden are entitled to full reparation. The defendants are 
not entitled, in conscience, to a bargain rate. 
 
 
Judge Bell joined Sobeloff for “decency’s sake,” adding that a financial penalty may 
deter further resistance to Brown: “A slight touch on that most sensitive of all nerves will 
telegraph the message that the identical issue does not have to be litigated ad nauseam in 
every district in every state.” Sobeloff and Bell persuaded Bryan to amend the opinion to 
direct Judge Lewis to ascertain counsel fees without penalty for the NAACP’s failure to 
litigate a federal question in the state courts. Ultimately, the district court taxed the 
defendants for $20,595.05 in counsel fees.
57
 
The Richmond News Leader, or as Spencer Bell called it, “that vulgar afternoon 
paper,” published a scathing assessment of the court. “Judges Albert V. Bryan and Simon 
Sobeloff, as two of the chief umpires in this game, have blundered with one bad call after 
another.” The newspaper argued the call on the field, conceding that the board of 
                                                          
57
 Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 363 F.2d 206 (4
th
 Cir. 1966); Henry L. 
Marsh III, “Amended Motion for an Award of Counsel Fees,” April 19, 1965, William F. Watkins, Jr., to 
Samuel W. Tucker, August 8, 1968, both in Box 126, Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County, Civil Action No. 1333, USDCEDV-R; Oren R. Lewis, “Order on Findings,” May 17, 1965, Allen 
v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Civil Action No. 1333, Box 75, SESP; Simon E. 
Sobeloff to Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. et al., “No. 10,191, Cocheyse J. Griffin, et al. v. County School 
Board of Prince Edward Co.,” April 18, 1966, J. Spencer Bell to Clement F. Haynsworth, et al.,  “No. 
10,191, Cocheyse J. Griffin, et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward Co.,” April 19, 1966, Albert 
V. Bryan to Simon E. Sobeloff, “No. 10,191, Cocheyse J. Griffin, et al. v. County School Board of Prince 
Edward County, Virginia, et al.,” all in Box 166, SESP; Albert V. Bryan, Order, July 29, 1966, Box 839, 
Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, No. 10,191, US4CCA.  
 
427 
supervisors acted inappropriately but not in violation of the law or a court order. “They 
took slick advantage of a momentary hiatus in the stream of court orders. “In effect,” 
allegorized the editor, “they stole home while the pitcher was looking the other way. 
Time hadn’t been called. The ball was still in play.” The editor concluded that the court’s 
call was “absurd,” which “is what we have to expect from the Fourth Circuit judges in 
suits having racial overtones.” Nevertheless, the editorial page was not the official scorer 
of the American justice system. The Fourth Circuit Court had stayed its order until 
reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court. On November 21, 1966, the High Court denied the 
defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari, thus allowing the circuit court decision to 
stand. Subsequently, the court restored its original order requiring the board of 
supervisors to return the disbursements to the county treasury within ninety days.
58
 
 The county board of supervisors struggled to recover the money. The board 
directed its agents to request that all grant recipients return the funds to the treasury. 
Some citizens promptly volunteered their share, but the community’s general destitution 
suggested that this campaign would be a long slog. The county attorneys, therefore, 
petitioned the court to extend the deadline an additional ninety days. Albert Bryan 
thought the board was “quite sincere” in its efforts and, if his colleagues agreed, he was 
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willing to grant the request. “I am not sure I share your opinion that the Board is sincere 
in its efforts,” responded a skeptical Spencer Bell, “but I would give them the benefit of 
the doubt.” The extension provided time to organize a broader appeal. The Prince Edward 
Emergency Committee, an organization formed to meet this challenge, solicited funds 
from outside the community. “We’ve got friends all over the country who’ve helped us in 
the past,” assured co-chair Robert Taylor. The county segregationists had a history of 
taking principled stands by tugging others’ purse strings. This effort was no different.  
“We have fought your fight and stand steady as we are, no quarter given,” read a 
newspaper appeal. “Don’t let us be crushed financially when our cause is so near a 
conclusion.” The campaign and repayments restored a significant sum to the treasury, but 
they were still well short. On behalf of the board, Billy Watkins, the legal counsel that 
assured the legality of the midnight raid, filed suit against 240 people who had failed to 
make full repayment. Finally in June 1967, after one more extension, the board restored 
the full amount to the treasury. Albert Bryan had weakened the county segregationists. 
His handling of the case impressed a recent appointee to the court. “Of all the members 
of the Court,” Harrison Winter told Albert Bryan, “you are the most skillful and creative 
executioner. I have never performed a decapitation with such finesse.”
59
 Nevertheless, the 
county attorneys still clucked for tuition grants.  
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Segar Gravatt wasted little time petitioning the district court to lift the injunction 
on tuition grants to Prince Edward County. In January 1965, Judge Lewis had extended 
the injunction. However, Gravatt argued that the county was subject to the more recent 
ruling in Griffin v. State Board of Education, which invalidated the use of tuition grants 
to support a preponderance of a private school’s budget. Certainly, the Prince Edward 
School Foundation could manipulate its budget to ensure that the value of private 
donations outweighed tuition grant revenue. Since Griffin, dozens of new private 
academies had opened in Virginia and received $10,000s in tuition grants. On December 
4, 1967, Judge Oren Lewis denied the county’s motion based on Griffin (1964) and 
Griffin (1965). Those cases “clearly indicate” that the Academy was ineligible for tuition 
grants “so long as those schools refuse to accept pupils on account of their race or color.” 
Griffin v. State Board of Education remained sufficient to block tuition grants to Prince 
Edward County, but the hearing exposed the ease with which segregationists exploited its 
deficiencies in other localities.
60
  
 Albert Bryan reevaluated Virginia’s tuition grant laws in light of new court 
decisions. In 1967, a three-judge court led by John Minor Wisdom applied the “Griffin 
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test” – the assessment of whether public funds contributed a preponderance of a private 
school’s support – to determine the constitutionality of Louisiana’s tuition grant law. 
Like Griffin (1965), the court found in Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance 
Commission that Louisiana’s segregation academies were state supported. Poindexter, 
 
 
Figure 12.7 Open Letter from Prince Edward County. 
(Image: Petersburg Progress-Index). 
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however, went beyond Griffin by declaring that a state contribution “in any amount” 
made the operation of a private school a state function. “Unless this system is destroyed,” 
concluded the court, “it will shatter to bits the public school system of Louisiana and kill 
the hope that now exists for equal educational opportunities for all our citizens, white and 
black.” Therefore, the court invalidated the Louisiana law and enjoined all tuition 
payments under its provisions. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Poindexter in early 
1968. Months later, a similar case tested the constitutionality of South Carolina’s tuition 
grant law. In Brown v. South Carolina State Board of Education, a three-judge court led 
by Albert Bryan found the state law unconstitutional and enjoined officers from enforcing 
it. Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Brown on December 9, 1968.
61
 
Considering the similarities between the Louisiana, South Carolina, and Virginia laws, a 
court challenge foretold the demise of the Old Dominion’s tuition grant statutes. 
 The NAACP petitioned the federal district court to re-examine Griffin v. State 
Board of Education. Poindexter affirmed the NAACP’s assertion that any amount of 
public funds that supported private schools was invalid. The public dollars made the 
private schools an extension of the public school system and thus prohibited them from 
practicing racial discrimination. The Commonwealth of Virginia supported this 
discriminatory system by issuing over $3 million annually in tuition grants to fourteen 
thousand students, many of whom attended one of the dozens of segregation academies. 
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In fact, the State Board of Education had even issued tuition grants to students attending 
the segregation academies in the communities named as defendants in this case. Even the 
Prince Edward School Foundation benefited from tuition grants. Although county 
residents were restrained from receiving grants, non-residents received public 
scholarships to attend the academy. The NAACP asked the court to invalidate the state’s 
tuition grants laws and, as in Griffin (1966), issue an order that all tuition grant 
disbursements since 1965 be restored to the public treasury. “Come hell or high water,” 
an NAACP attorney told a reporter, “we’re going to fight this one through to the end.” 
Poindexter put the end in sight.
62
 
 On February 11, 1969, Bryan, Butzner, and Hoffman struck down Virginia’s 
tuition grant laws. In doing so, they negated key provisions in their previous ruling in 
Griffin v. State Board of Education. Albert Bryan applied the Poindexter criterion to 
conclude that “any assist whatever by the State towards provision of a racially segregated 
education, exceeds the pale of tolerance demarked by the Constitution,” thus 
necessitating that the “Griffin test” be set aside. Next, the court maintained its earlier 
position that not all grants were used to foster segregation, but it now recognized the near 
impossible task of policing potential abuses of the law. “A law may, of course, survive 
despite its unacceptable consequences, if the valid portions may be independently 
enforced,” wrote Bryan. “Here, as we see, there can be no such separation and the entire 
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law must go.” The court did not, however, force the defendants to restore tuition 
disbursements since 1965. Sensibly, the court, not wishing to disrupt the students’ 
education, protected tuition payments for the remainder of the 1968-69 school year, but 
fixed June 30, 1969, as the death of freedom of choice. In the life of that program, the 
state had contributed $20 million in tuition grants to subsidize segregated education.
63
 
Kennedy’s judges eradicated this last vestige of Virginia’s massive resistance. 
 Kennedy’s judges played a significant, yet only a partial role in desegregating 
Virginia’s public schools. The plaintiffs shouldered the heavy burden. The federal courts 
issued six major school desegregation rulings with a case citation that began with 
“Griffin.” The Griffin family and all the co-plaintiffs, like their predecessors in Davis and 
Allen, possessed the resolve to fight these interminable court battles for educational 
equality. The NAACP attorneys provided yeoman service, against the tides of white 
supremacy and state recalcitrance, in their relentless pursuit of equal justice. Oliver Hill, 
Spottswood Robinson, Samuel Tucker, and Henry Marsh kept relentless pressure on 
communities across the state to conform to the Constitution. Without the plaintiffs and 
the NAACP, there would have been no litigation, no progress. The federal courts only 
acted upon complaints raised before them. Kennedy’s judges issued rulings that respected 
black Prince Edwardians cries for justice. 
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* * * * * 
 
 President Kennedy’s appointees to the Fourth Circuit were not an obstacle but a 
conduit to school desegregation in Virginia. These judges do not reflect the negative 
interpretation of the administration’s appointment record. Evaluating federal judges is 
pregnant with qualitative variables. Lower court judges are constrained by precedent and 
often have to moderate their interpretation of the law to arrive at a consensus with their 
colleagues on the bench. Therefore, a judge’s record is not always clear cut. What is 
clear? Bryan, Bell, and Butzner were not Elliott, West, and Cox. The latter obstructed the 
implementation of Brown, while the Fourth Circuit judges protected African Americans’ 
rights to a free public education and invalidated the most odious remnants of Virginia’s 
massive resistance. Kennedy’s Fourth Circuit judges extended the life of the Kennedy 
administration beyond its one thousand days and left an indelible impact on Prince 
Edward County. 
Albert Bryan wrote monumental decrees striking down aspects of Virginia’s 
massive resistance, but he was not a progressive. He was not Skelly Wright, John Minor 
Wisdom, or Simon Sobeloff. Bryan did not provide leadership in areas left void by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Rather, he was a strict adherent to precedent. As a federal district 
court judge, Bryan had upheld “separate but equal” education in Prince Edward County 
until the Warren Court reversed him – and then he followed the Briggs dictum. After the 
public schools closed, Bryan ordered the school board to admit African Americans to the 
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public schools, but he found no precedent to order the schools reopened, thus mooting his 
desegregation order. As a circuit court judge, Bryan voted to restrain Powhatan County 
from closing its public schools, but that decision had followed Hall v. St. Helena Parish 
School Board (1961). Later, Griffin (1964) cleared the path for Bryan to join the circuit 
court in restraining officials from disbursing tuition grants to residents of Surry and 
Prince Edward counties. Griffin v. State Board of Education demonstrated Bryan’s 
caution in the absence of overwhelming precedent but also his readiness to modify the 
course when the standard changed. Albert Bryan’s progressive judgments were not fueled 
by fervent social activism, but by a cerebral observance of the law.  
Spencer Bell stood less concerned by precedent than by social consciousness. He 
proved to be a reliable ally to Prince Edward County’s locked-out children. Judge Bell 
wrote a blistering dissent to the conservative wing’s remand of Griffin, extended the 
injunction on retroactive tuition grants, joined with his colleagues to block tuition 
payments to students attending the Academy, and allied with Albert Bryan and Simon 
Sobeloff to find the county board of supervisors in contempt for the midnight raid on the 
treasury. Judge Bell was not only a dependable vote on Prince Edward County, but also a 
liberal voice in a historically conservative circuit. That voice was forever silenced on 
March 19, 1967, after Spencer Bell succumbed to a stroke just days shy of his sixty-first 
birthday. Bell’s sudden death struck a “shattering blow” to Simon Sobeloff, a friend, 
mentor, and liberal ally on the court. “We fought many a battle together,” eulogized 
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Sobeloff. “Sometimes we were up, sometimes down; but always we were together.”
64
 
Spencer Bell and Simon Sobeloff had worked valiantly together to hasten the pace of 
school desegregation. President Lyndon Johnson filled the vacancy left by Bell’s death 
with John Butzner. 
John Butzner restrained segregationists from obstructing and delaying school 
desegregation. Oren Lewis’s caution and misplaced trust in the county board of 
supervisors had contributed to an interminable school crisis in Prince Edward County. 
Judge Butzner, mindful of Lewis’s indecision, permitted defendants in Powhatan and 
Surry counties no such latitude. Butzner restrained both counties from closing any public 
school building within its jurisdiction. Those decrees alarmed segregationists, but not as 
much as his attack on tuition grants. The higher courts had provided little guidance on 
tuition grants but that did not inhibit Butzner from issuing a precedent-setting injunction 
on the payment of public scholarships to any student residing in Surry County. Pettaway 
led directly to the permanent injunction on tuition grant payments to students attending 
the Prince Edward School Foundation and set in motion the ultimate demise of Virginia’s 
tuition grant statutes – the lifeblood of segregation academies. At critical moments, John 
Butzner issued decisive orders that contributed to the preservation and reformation of 
Virginia’s public education system.  
The conduct of Albert Bryan, Spencer Bell, and John Butzner in the Prince 
Edward litigation demonstrates the folly of characterizing all Kennedy appointees as 
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racists. These men exhibited no lurid courtroom behavior, nor condemned the Brown 
decision, nor obstructed justice. Nevertheless, Elliott, West, and Cox remain the face of 
Kennedy judges, a misleading construction that needs revisiting.
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CHAPTER XIII 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The Kennedy administration’s response to Prince Edward County demonstrates 
the need to reexamine Kennedy’s civil rights record. The administration’s work in the 
county counters the prevailing interpretation that Kennedy reacted to civil rights matters, 
placated southern congressmen, and appointed racist federal judges. The administration 
took proactive measures to arrest the educational erosion in Prince Edward County within 
its first one hundred days and continually sought a solution. No other branch of 
government at any level had exhibited such an interest in the locked-out children. In fact, 
the administration took extraordinary measures to restore universal education by 
facilitating the organization of the Prince Edward Free School Association. The 
administration’s concern for black Prince Edwardians exposed its domestic agenda to 
assault from southern congressmen, especially the Virginia congressional delegation. 
Harry Byrd and Howard Smith already had the influence to bottle up much of Kennedy’s 
liberal program without being antagonized by federal action in Prince Edward County. 
Finally, Kennedy’s judicial appointments to the Fourth Circuit invalidated Virginia’s 
massive resistance to school desegregation. Still, the Kennedy administration had a 
further impact on Prince Edward County and Virginia, which will be explored in post-doc 
chapters.
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“Mirabile Dictum” will provide further analysis of the Prince Edward Free School 
Association. The chapter picks up after “To See What Can Be Done” and chronicles the 
remarkable effort to open the Free Schools by September 16, 1963 – just one month after 
Governor Harrison formally announced the creation of the Association. The preparation 
of the school property, the formulation of a curriculum, and hiring teachers was the result 
of extraordinary interagency cooperation – the Office of Education and the departments 
of Justice, Labor, and Agriculture. Bill vanden Heuvel coordinated that work, while also 
spearheading the drive to raise $1 million in financial contributions and gifts-in-kind. The 
Free Schools stopped the educational erosion in the county, but they were more than 
schools. The Free Schools addressed the poverty problem by providing free hot lunches, 
warm clothes, and medical and dental care; and facilitated the first open, significant bi-
racial dialogue in the community. The Free Schools served as a model of an integrated 
faculty working with a desegregated student body while also addressing the broader 
needs of impoverished children.  
President Kennedy’s judicial appointments expanded democracy in the Old 
Dominion. A post-doc chapter, “A New Dominion,” will explore how Albert Bryan and 
John Butzner contributed to Virginia’s expanding electorate. The Byrd Organization had 
attempted to block the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which banned the poll tax, by passing 
a repressive certificate of residence law. In Forssenius (1964), Bryan and Butzner struck 
down the law and a provision in the state constitution that was designed to disenfranchise 
African Americans. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment and Forssenius stimulated 
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unprecedented black voter registration. In Prince Edward County, the pace of registration 
quickened as the October 3, 1964, deadline approached. The registrar likened his office’s 
activity in late September to “a woods afire,” adding, “I have all I can handle for the past 
three weeks.” S.L. Graham had registered as many voters in September as he had the 
three previous months combined. The State Board of Elections estimated that the number 
of registered black Prince Edwardians increased from 725 to 1,112 between April and 
October. There were significant increases in black registered voters across the state, most 
notably a fifty percent increase in Norfolk that raised its total to 15,801. Overall, there 
were an estimated 175,000-200,000 black Virginians registered to vote in the November 
1964 elections. That election produced the largest voter turnout in state history.
1
 It was 
not the small, predictable electorate that the Byrd Organization relied upon to maintain its 
handle over state politics. 
 Albert Bryan improved representative democracy. The Byrd Organization had 
endured due in large measure to malapportioned legislative districts that favored rural 
areas. After the 1960 decennial census, the General Assembly redrew district lines with 
little consideration for the growth of urban centers. Subsequently, a lawsuit was filed by 
northern Virginians. In Mann v. Davis (1962), Albert Bryan wrote the majority opinion 
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that invalidated Virginia’s redistricting plan, which was later affirmed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. The federal court rulings mandated that legislative districts be reasonably 
balanced based on population. This signaled the death knell for Byrd Organization 
dominance of the General Assembly.
2
 The “one man, one vote” principle also affected 
local government. The magisterial districts in Prince Edward County were similarly 
malapportioned in favor of the rural districts. In time, the district lines were redrawn in 
the county and, with the expansion of the black political power, African Americans were, 
in time, elected to the county board of supervisors.  
 “A New Dominion” will also chronicle John Butzner’s ruling to protect black 
Prince Edwardians’ First Amendment rights. After the “midnight raid on the treasury,” 
Reverend Griffin had threatened to renew street demonstrations and the economic 
boycott. In response, the white segregationist leaders invited black leaders to a bi-racial 
conference – the first such meeting in the county. At the meeting, Griffin had confirmed 
reports of the impending direct action campaign that would, again, involve juveniles on 
the picket lines. Billy Watkins, who participated in the meeting, conveyed this 
development to Judge William Hay of the Prince Edward County Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court. Hay predicted that juvenile picketers would engage in lawless behavior. 
As evidence, he cited the thirty-three arrests from the previous summer’s street 
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demonstrations. Therefore, Judge Hay ordered that Francis Griffin and Goodwin Douglas 
“cease and desist from any further effort on your part to aid, encourage, or solicit in any 
manner, any juvenile in the County of Prince Edward to engage in any form of 
‘demonstrations,’ in violation of any laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, or any 
ordinances of the Town of Farmville, or any other activities that may tend to encourage 
such juveniles to become delinquent.” In Griffin v. Hay (1965), Butzner found Hay’s 
order unconstitutional.
3
 The court restored the power of direct-action to black Prince 
Edwardians. 
Another post-doc chapter will explore the impact of liberal legislation on race 
relations and poverty in Prince Edward County. “The Law Must Lead” will study the 
influence of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on commerce and equal employment 
opportunity. The law prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations. The 
businesses, in general, conformed to that provision. Similarly, businesses and the local 
government started hiring African Americans to professional positions, such as clerks and 
police officers – a revolutionary action by the standards of Southside Virginia. The 
chapter will also study the War on Poverty programs, like job training and remedial 
education, but it will also consider the bi-racial cooperation that the law prescribed. 
Third, the chapter will analyze the Johnson administration’s education laws that infused 
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federal dollars into the county. Accepting federal dollars required the county to abide by 
federal standards, which meant no racial discrimination. Finally, the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 protected minority voters. The expansion of black political power resulted in the 
election of African Americans to local office. It also contributed to the election of the 
first African American governor of Virginia, Douglas Wilder, and the first African 
American president. In fact, Barack Obama carried Prince Edward County in 2008. The 
Kennedy-Johnson program did not change hearts and minds overnight, but in time the 
legislation contributed to improved race relations and a political shift in the community. 
The Kennedy administration quickened the pace of racial progress in Prince 
Edward County. Court decrees and federal legislation increased black political power and 
protected constitutional rights. Those actions, along with the rise of black militancy, 
generated greater demands for equality. In April 1969, black students walked out of class 
demanding better investment in the public schools and black representation on the school 
board. Shortly thereafter, the School Trustee Electoral Board appointed the first African 
Americans to the school board. Also, the federal injunction on tuition grants for county 
residents (and later the invalidation of public scholarships to segregation academies 
altogether), the rising fees of Prince Edward Academy, and the federal investment in the 
public schools persuaded some white families to enroll their children in the public 
schools. Over the next several decades, the white enrollment increased from a negligible 
number in the mid-1960s to a racially balanced student body decades later. Prince 
Edward County is still not a bastion of racial harmony. Some elements of the community 
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long for another time, a time before the Kennedys intervened in the county’s affairs. 
Some traditions die hard. “Those fucking Kennedys fucked up this county,” bluntly stated 
the son of a school closing-era county board of supervisor to the author. Still more 
celebrate the racial progress that the county has made over the last five decades. That 
progress resulted from the black community pushing for equality and the federal 
government answering their call. 
“A Matter of National Concern” exposes the insufficient study of local civil rights 
struggles. The scholarship on the school desegregation cases in Powhatan and Surry 
counties and St. Helena Parish, for example, remains thin to non-existent. Those school 
stories, and many others, need to be examined and added to the administration’s civil 
rights record. In doing so, scholars will uncover the work of federal officials who worked 
behind-the-scenes, like Burke Marshall, St. John Barrett, and Bill vanden Heuvel; or 
under examined jurists, like Albert Bryan, Spencer Bell, and John Butzner. Further, 
scholars may discover local civil rights leaders, like the Reverend L. Francis Griffin, and 
reconstruct black communities to develop a more complete understanding of the black 
freedom struggle. Perhaps scholars will even discover white moderates, like Gordon 
Moss, who took unpopular stands against friends, neighbors, and southern traditions. This 
is the new frontier in Kennedy scholarship. 
“A Matter of National Concern” is not the final word. It is not the last study of the 
Prince Edward County school closings; it is but another layer added to the foundation laid 
by They Closed Their Schools. In the future, scholars will synthesize and expand upon the 
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Prince Edward County scholarship to write the definitive work. Similarly, “A Matter of 
National Concern” does not replace Kennedy scholarship (or dismiss the negative 
interpretations), but it instead challenges scholars to study more instances of presidential 
intervention in the 1960s. Once collected, these histories promise to provide posterity 
with a comprehensive assessment of the Kennedy administration’s response to the great 
domestic issue of its generation. 
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